Senator MALONE. Now since the President made a speech in Milwaukee or Minnesota, I think it was in 1953, he has never again said that you had to defend Belgium to get uranium from the Belgian Congo.

When I handed him a bound copy of Senate report 1627 of the 83d Congress, I said "Mr. President, in making these speeches, I am sure you have been advised on these materials, but you can get them right here under your nose where you can defend the Western Hemisphere." You know that if Russia ever attacks us they are coming over the Pole, they are not coming through Europe or Asia, and the Administration contends we have to defend the Belgian Congo to get uranium. I said, if we treated the taxpayers as well as the foreigners uranium would be running out of our ears in 2 years, as it was.

While still in the private engineering business I made a report, published in 1944. It took 8 years. It covers the Western States, Hawaii, Alaska, and the Philippines, and I covered uranium in Utah and Colorado. There is more information on that in my report than anybody had at the time they split the atom.

It is crazy. You do not have to buy uranium from Canada although that would not be as bad because you could get it during a war. You do not have to get it from the Belgian Congo. You do not have to get it any place other than the United States. The Government is cutting down right now on the purchases of uranium from men who spent their lifesavings in the mining of uranium and you are shutting them down, closing them down, depressing their production and buying it abroad on your policy, I suppose, that you are making friends in foreign lands but what of our friends in America?

Now we have right here this morning the man who is about to be chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee of this legislative body, and I think he knows what he is talking about.

So, Mr. Chairman, in order to save the time of the committee, if I may complete my comment in the record, I will thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being very frank, as you were before, and acknowledging our differences of opinion and the differences in our convictions. I have the highst regard for you.

I do not think you are right in this thing. I hope this committee sees fit to kill this act that you are up here on, and I hope if the committee does not do it, they do it on the Senate floor.

I want you to know that. I think you know it already. And I think if you go back to the policy of merely adjusting the differences in cost of production here and in the chief competing nations and allowing any nation equal access to our markets, but no advantage, let American investors and workingmen compete for the American market on an equal basis with foreigners. Then the American workingman and investor will be back in business. Then you would not have someone in Washington selecting an industry to trade for some foreign policy when some fellow out there, 2 miles or 2,000 miles away, has spent his life's savings and those of his friends in an industry where he is suddenly broke and does not even know what happened because we have a foreign policy that we have to buy with it.

So that is what I believe. I believe we have all the law we need if we just let this act expire on June 30.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your patience.
Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

(At the conclusion of his interrogation of Secretary Dulles and Secretary Weeks, Senator Malone presented the following summation:)

Secretary Dulles, in response to my inquiries, conceded that:

1. In the 1934 Trade Agreements Act, Congress, for the first time in the Nation's history, gave the Chief Executive power to trade or sacrifice any industry in the United States in furtherance of his, the Executive's, foreign policy.

2. Prior to 1934, tariffs were set by direct congressional action, as provided by the Constitution, article 1, section 8; not by the President or his subordinates in the executive branch.

3. Since the 1934 Trade Agreements Act, tariffs have been set, changed, reduced, and adjusted by the President, his subordinates, or the latter in consultation with foreign nations, a practice and procedure nowhere authorized in the Constitution.

4. Under the 1934 act and subsequent extension statutes, the President can make any type of trade convention or agreement he wishes, within the time and percentage limits of the legislation, and with any country or group of countries he wishes, regardless of the effect on our domestic industry.

5. Such agreements can apply to every product imported into United States and from any country whose government is recognized by the United States. 6. Uuder the unconditional most-favored-nation policy of the State Department, such agreements do apply to all such countries and to all products designated in each and every agreement, and apply also to products from countries with which we have no agreement.

7. The President is the sole judge and arbiter of concessions offered to foreign countries.

8. The President is the sole judge and arbiter of what, if any, concessions are sought of other countries in return for concessions made by this country to foreign nations.

9. The President is the sole judge and final arbiter of the effects such concessions granted to foreign countries have on American industry, wage earners, and investors; what, if any, relief is given to American industries being destroyed as a result of concessions to foreign countries, and whether or not relief shall be granted or denied to afflicted industries.

10. The President can ignore or waive the safeguards to American industry which Congress has attempted to provide in recent acts extending the 1934 Trade Agreements Act.

11. Although Congress requires the United States Tariff Commission, an agency of Congress, to prepare peril-point findings to determine, in effect, at what point increased imports resulting from reduced tariffs will cause or threaten serious injury to domestic industry, the President can ignore these findings.

12. Although Congress has set up procedures by which industries that are being destroyed by import competition as a result of reduced tariffs may produce the facts to the Tariff Commission and appeal for an adjustment of the tariff, and although the Tariff Commission may recommend such an adjustment in the interest of the afflicted American industry, the President can and frequently does ignore the recommendations of the Tariff Commission.

13. The so-called escape clause of recent extension acts offers no assurance of escape to any industry from destructively low tariffs even when the Tariff Commission unanimously recommends to the President that relief be granted, because the Trade Agreements Act permits the full power of final decision to rest with the President.

14. With the power of the President under the 1934 Trade Agreements Act to ignore any peril-point determination of the Tariff Commission and to reject any recommendation made by the Tariff Commission under the escape clause, the President can sacrifice any industry he may choose to sacrifice if he believes such sacrifice of a domestic industry will further his foreign policy. (He may also sacrifice any American industry forced to compete against the products of foreign industry regardless of whether or not such sacrifice has any bearing on his foreign policy, but that specific question was not asked of Mr. Dulles.)

15. Tariff Commission findings and recommendations go to the President, as previously indicated, and the Tariff Commission has no authority to adjust any tariff on its own responsibility, regardless of any findings of injury to or destruction of a domestic industry, as it did have under the 1930 Tariff Act when it was subject only to a reversal by Congress.

16. Tariff and trade agreement negotiations with foreign countries are conducted by the State Department, the State Department alone representing the executive branch in actual negotiations.

17. Neither Congress nor congressional committees are advised prior to or during these negotiations what sacrifices or concessions of American markets or interests the State Department plans to offer to foreign countries.

18. Such negotiations are generally carried on with the delegates of 36 foreign nations at periodic, usually annual or more frequent, sessions of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), held at Geneva, Switzerland, the negotiations being multilateral.

19. Congress is never consulted during these negotiations to reduce American tariffs.

20. Congress receives no knowledge of what concessions have been made by our State Department delegates to GATT, or of terms offered or accepted, until negotiations have been completed and the tariff reductions and terms have been finalized and published.

21. GATT sessions are conducted in secrecy. Congressmen who have been in Geneva during sessions of GATT have not been permitted to sit in on any of the actual tariff negotiations. No American industry, organization, or private citizen may appear there.

22. Foreign countries which may offer concessions to the United States or otherwise agree to reduce restriction on American goods in return for free or easy access to the American market, may ignore these concessions or continuetheir restrictions against American products on the pretense that they are threatened with a shortage in their dollar balances or are experiencing a decline in their monetary reserves.

23. Competing countries can manipulate the value of their own money in terms of the dollar so as to perpetuate a shortage in dollar balances and thus make any peril point set by the United States Tariff Commission prior to the foreign manipulation obsolete and valueless.

24. The words "reciprocal trade" nowhere appear in the Trade Agreements Act.

25. Prior to the 1934 Trade Agreements Act tariffs on each competitive product were determined and adjusted to equalize the differences in wages and costs of producing products in the United States and wages and costs of producing like or similar products in the chief competing nation abroad, which principle has been scuttled by the Trade Agreements Act.

In conceding these facts, Secretary Dulles confirmed my position and the position I have proclaimed throughout my 12 years of service in the United States Senate, and my position prior to that time while I was in private life, that the Trade Agreements Act is a complete nullification of both the letter and the spirit of the United States Constitution. Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution, specifically vests in Congress the exclusive power to lay and collect duties and regulate our foreign commerce.

As Mr. Dulles has conceded, the executive branch now determines the tariff on each product, the reductions made, and with what countries and all countries; that Congress is not even advised of what tariff reductions have been determined on, or what American industries, investments, or jobs are to be sacrificed until the reductions have been made effective at the conclusion of secret negotiations at Geneva, Switzerland; that there is no "reciprocity" whatsoever required by the act itself, and that under the act, each administration has the unreserved power to destroy any competitive industry or to remake the industrial map of America.

It is therefore acknowledged, in effect, that the Trade Agreements Act vests power over tariffs, foreign commerce, and the domestic economy as affected by disastrous foreign competition, in the hands of one man, the President, removing this power from Congress, in which the power was exclusively placed by the United States Constitution.

These are life and death powers over the economy of the United States which the Congress has illegally delegated to the President since 1934, and which three successive Presidents have now exercised.

The proposed extension act would extend these powers to a President or Presidents as yet unknown, and for a term of years so far in the future that no person knows or can predict the status of our economy or the friends or enemies we may acquire before the tariff reducing authority proposed in this bill has expired.

Mr. Dulles, who negotiates these agreements through his subordinates in the State Department, does not know that. Whoever may be appointed as Mr. Dulles' successor within the next 5 years, and who, as Secretary of State, will

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carry on the negotiations authorized on this bill should the act be extended, does not know that.

To continue this act is to place industry, labor, investors, and the national security on the brink of disaster.

To continue this act is to nullify again the intent and purpose of the Constitution to separate the powers of Government in the regulation of the domestic economy from the making of foreign policy. Under the Constitution, Congress, the elected representatives of the people, was to possess all legislative powers, including those over tariffs, commerce, and the domestic economy; the President was to conduct our foreign policy with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Under the Trade Agreements Act, Congress has divested itself of its legislative power over tariffs, commerce, and the domestic economy as it is affected by tariffs and commerce. By use of the trade agreements procedure, an executive invention to do away with commercial treaties, the President has isolated himself from any requirement that he seek or receive the advice and consent of the Senate. Prior to the 1934 Trade Agreements Act, tariffs were adjusted by Congress on the principle that they would make up the difference between costs of production in this country and costs of production in the chief competing foreign country. Such a tariff gave American enterprise and foreign enterprise equal access to the American market.

As wage costs and other production costs in foreign countries rose tariff differentials were reduced, so that when and if foreign wages and other costs of doing business were the equivalent of American costs, the tariff would disappear and we would have free trade.

Under a principle fixed by Congress that guaranteed American enterprise equal access to the American market, American investors felt free to risk their capital in American enterprise.

The principle of equal access was abandoned when the Trade Agreements Act was enacted. Tariffs are now adjusted by bureaucrats in the executive branch in the interest, not of American markets, enterprise, or economy, but in the interest of obscure and undefined and fluctuating foreign policies.

For that reason the investment of capital in the United States is now precarious.

For that reason also, there has been in recent years an unprecedented flight of American capital, now exceeding $33 billion, to foreign countries which do offer this capital some protection in the form of protective tariffs or tax incentives. Mr. Weeks concedes virtually every point conceded by Mr. Dulles. Among those on which he was particularly specific are:

1. That the President, under the Trade Agreements Act, can make any trade agreement he wants within the time and percentage specifications of the bill. 2. That he can do so without consulting Congress.

3. That the Secretary of State will continue to direct and conduct all trade agreement negotiations despite the creation of the so-called Trade Policy Committee of Cabinet members of which Mr. Weeks is Chairman.

4. That the President is not required to accept Tariff Commission recommendations in escape-clause cases, and "can go beyond the peril point as he sees fit."

5. That under the GATT agreement any nation can waive provisions with regard to trade barriers or restrictions if it considers itself threatened by a shortage of dollar balances.

6. That the objective of tariff laws prior to the 1934 Trade Agreements Act was to equalize the differences in domestic production costs with those of the chief competing nation on each product, and thus take the profit out of sweatshop wages at the water's edge.

Mr. Weeks and Mr. Dulles clearly indicate by their testimony that they think the Chief Executive, not only the present Chief Executive but the Executives, whoever he or they may be in the next 5 years, can adjust tariffs and regulate our foreign commerce and the national economy better than can the 435 Representatives and 96 Senators elected by the people, and in whom the Constitution reposes that responsibility and power.

Mr. Weeks and Mr. Dulles thus take a position precisely opposite to that of Abraham Lincoln, who, as a Member of Congress, asked on the House floor: "Can he," referring to the President, "know the wants of the people as well as 300 other men, coming from all the various localities of the Nation? If so, where is the propriety of having a Congress."

In an effort, obviously, to cite some Republican precedent for legislation such as the administration seeks for the next 5 years, Secretary Weeks, as have other administration spokesmen, claimed that William McKinley "urged the establishment of reciprocal trade legislation."

There is no similarity between provisions of the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 and the 1934 Trade Agreements Act, nor between tariff legislation enacted during the McKinley administration and approved by him as President.

The McKinley Act sought to assure protection and, where it was not assured, impose retaliatory duties.

The 1934 Trade Agreements Act seeks only to remove protection and to lower duties irrespective of the barriers other nations impose upon our commerce and products.

In the McKinley Tariff Act no legislative powers under the Constitution were delegated to the President. The act was therefore constitutional and so held by the Supreme Court.

The 1934 Trade Agreements Act did delegate legislative authority to the President, and in doing so disregarded the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. The Supreme Courts of this era have refused to consider the question of its constitutionality or unconstitutionality when cases have been brought before it for the purpose of seeking a determination. It has neither upheld the constitutionality of the act nor held it unconstitutional.

Under the McKinley Tariff, Congress retained full power over regulation and rates, and specified the contingencies under which rates determined and specified by Congress would or would not apply to a limited number of commodities.

Under the 1934 Trade Agreements Act, Congress transfers regulation and rate determination to the President. No contingencies or conditions are expressed under which he is required to raise rates, lower rates, bind rates, or do anything he may wish to do with respect to the commerce of country or any product, provided he does not lower rates beyond a certain percentage within a certain period of time.

The McKinley Tariff required the President to impose penalty duties on countries that did not grant equitable concessions to us in return for our concessions to them on certain products.

The 1934 Trade Agreements Act gives the President a blank check which he can fill in at his discretion and tender to any nation in the world, or to all nations under the unconditional most-favored-nation policy.

The McKinley Tariff Act required reciprocity from other nations if they sought any concessions from us.

The 1934 Trade Agreements Act requires no reciprocity or reciprocal treatment from any nation in return for the concessions we extend.

William McKinley was the outstanding champion of his time of tariffs to protect the Nation's economy, industry, labor, and agriculture, and he was too wise a statesman to write a reciprocity provision that did not make reciprocity by the other country mandatory if we extended it any favors, the favors being specified and limited. Under his act we gave little and gained much. Under the Trade Agreements Act we give much and our losses outweigh our gains.

The McKinley tariff reciprocity provision had a specific objective-to break down barriers raised by certain Latin American and European countries to American goods, and to place penalizing duties on important products of those countries if they did not break them down. Spain then governed Cuba and Puerto Rico and drastically restricted their markets to American products. Here is the text of the reciprocity provision of the McKinley bill. "That with a view to secure reciprocal trade with countries producing the following articles, and for this purpose, on and after the 1st day of January 1892, whenever and so often as the President shall be satisfied that the government of any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, cured and uncured, or any of such articles, imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States, which, in view of the free introduction, such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides into the United States he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the power and it shall be the duty to suspend, by proclamation to that effect, the provisions of this Act relating to the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, the production of such country, for such time as he shall deem just, and in such case and during such suspension duties shall be levied, collected, and paid upon sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, the product of or exported from such designated country as follows, namely."

Then follows a list of specific duties, on tea, 10 cents a pound; on coffee, 3 cents a pound; on hides and skins, 1 and 11⁄2 cents a pound; on molasses, 4 cents a gallon; and on sugars variable rates up to 2 cents a pound, depending on type and quality. And in 1892 a cent a pound was a more effective rate than 5 cents would be today.