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grams have, and there isn't any simple single formula that you coul apply.

Senator Long. I have tried to come up with one on occasion, do not have the experts available to me that you have, but it ha several times seemed to me that perhaps we could work out sorn formula that would exclude a tariff on imports up to about 1 or percent of the domestic production of a commodity above this pei cent of the market a tariff would go into effect, rising to a slight! higher level at 5 percent and to a much higher level at 8 or 9 percen I have never seen that sort of thing proposed by the administratioi

I would hope, though, that some day we could find some way < spreading this burden rather than allowing some people to be face with the danger of going out of business because of foreign imporl while others are being well protected.

Secretary Dulles. Of course, that is the way really I think tt peril-point clause is supposed to operate.

Senator Long. Of course, as you know, even with the peril poii provision there are many individual injuries which are not correct e<

Last tune we held hearings on this matter I voted, I believe pretty closely to the administration's position.

I received about 3,000 letters from the textile industry in Louisian This time I have not received any because these men are out of bus ness. Louisiana has expanded enough in other industries, some c which are related to trade, for us to make this up and perhaps mor than make it up, but it does seem to me that some industries < have the right to urge that we spread the burden of foreign compel tion.

I understand that our commitments with these foreign nations i many instances go directly against any quota limitations, or do w have the right to impose quotas pretty freely?

Secretary Dulles. The general provision that we have is again; quotas with certain exceptions.

Senator Long. That is the General Agreement on Tariffs an Trade.

Secretary Dulles. But the theory is that you do not propose quota: yes.

Senator Long. And therefore, you try to avoid quotas insofar a possible.

Secretary Dulles. That is correct.

Senator Long. Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, you favor thi multilateral arrangement and trie favored-nation clause in preferenc to a bilateral arrangement. I sometimes wonder whether it is to ou advantage to strip ourselves of power in international affairs tha could perhaps be used to our advantage on occasion. Do I take i that you feel it is advantageous for us to enter these arrangement without getting any concessions from the foreign country? Othc countries are able to benefit from our according them favored-natioi treatment even though in some instances those countries act in way that are very much against the interests of this country.

Do you feel that it is better for us under this Trade Act not to havi any power to bring pressure to bear upon them if they nationalizi American investments, or if they go very much contrary to our forcigi policy?

Secretary Dulles. I believe as a practical matter it is extremely difficult to administer a tariff policy which is other than on a mosthvwed-nation basis.

You get into just inextricable quarrels and claims that you are favoring one as against another.

I think it is not possible really to operate on that basis.

It Just is too complicated and involves too many hostilities, animosities, comparisons. I just do not think it is practical.

Senator Long. Sugar, of course, has been a complete exception to thai. We like to sell rice to Cuba, and Cuba sells the greatest portion of her sugar crop to us. She is very happy with that arrangement. She always wants to sell us more sugar, and we always want to sell inr more rice. If she decides to cut us off from rice, we can always tike this into consideration when the Sugar Act expires.

-Secretary Dulles. There are a few cases, a few commodities perhaps where this works, and sugar is about the only one where we bay* found it practical to work on that basis.

Senator Long. I know that you have urged that this should be a major segment of our foreign policy.

1 know that you testified to this effect some years ago, and, if that * the case, why do we administer our foreign trade in such a way that it deprive ourselves of the leverage of using it to further our foreign

In other words, it seems to me as though there would be a great number of cases where, if a country cared to nationalize our investments or to depart completely from the arrangements and the good fiutli agreements we had made with it over a period of years, there •ould certainly be a lot of things that we could do with our trade poiir T if we had the power to do them. I have never understood why •c did not at least vest that power somewhere where it could be used.

Secretary Dulles. Of course, we are not without other weapons to ijse. you know.

We are not wholly without pressures to bring to bear without »»raog them in this particular field.

Senator Long. Mr. Secretary, when our people went over to the conference on the law of the sea, a conference I thought very important to us, quite a number of nations declined to give much consideration to defense problems and voted contrary to our position. They simply vtnted to catch more fish or to have more territorial waters to claim for fishing purposes.

Secretary Dulles. That is right.

Senator Long. Now in that case in many instances the market for ibar fish was right here in the United States. It would seem to |ne that the United States could have been more successful in achieving «* pals if we had pointed out to those people that if they could not •Mastand the defense problem that we could not be very sympathetic to their trade problems as far as the market for their fish was con•*n»«d. They might then have cooperated with us.

•is it was, some of the very people who depend most on us for the for their fish proceeded to fight the position of the United in order to catch a few more fish. I guess the same thing apply in manv other respects, and I hope we do not see ourstripped of tne power that we could use. Other countries us accept their position demanding commercial concessions we strip ourselves of power to act in a similar way toward them.

Secretary Dulles. I would say. Senator, that we have plenty power in the world.

The question is whether you try to use this power in a coerci and threatening way or not, which raises some serious questions.

I believe that as the world is today, and given the relationsh which we for our own sake need to establish with other countri that it is not a good idea for us to go around just brandishing c power and saying, "If you do not do what we want in this respe we are going to put you out of business."

Now I know what the answer to that will be. They will say, "W all right, we will tie up with the other fellow."

Senator Long. Perhaps so, but, of course, there are many facets the question. The point I have in mind is the question of how you go.

Secretary Dulles. Yes.

Senator Long. I recall a situation where, on some votes, even J Syngman Rhee's South Korean government voted against us. Chil Kai-shek's government voted against us on vital things. It seems to me it was as much to their advantage to vote with us as against

I just wonder whether it is all to our advantage to put oursol into a position where people who depend upon us for their defe can with impunity disregard our wishes in matters relating to < mutual security.

They can continue to get everything they want from us but t •do not have to cooperate or help support our position.

Secretary Dulles. Those situations are distressing, but I beli« Senator, that we are better off to have association and free nations v feel that they cooperate or not according as they see it to their terests rather than try to develop satellites that we crack the w over.

Now you may get some immediate advantages through crack the whip but in the long run I think you accumulate more disadvs ages and I just do not think that is the American way of doing it.

Senator Long. You may describe it as cracking the whip. I Secretary, but I have oftentimes seen the indications that the Gol Rule does not work as well as some of us would like to have it \v< Now and then some people tend to advocate a different rule, "Do u others as they do unto you." When other nations discrimin against us and treat us unfairly, it does seem to me that it miglil to our advantage to have the authority, even if we never used to act in a similar fashion with regard to them.

I think sometimes they might treat us with greater considera if we had that particular power.

Secretary Dulles. I think we are not lacking in power. It is our policy to use our power in those ways except in extreme case

Senator Long. I just question the advisability of passing a lav that you cannot use the power even if you think you should, would not only not have the power but the other fellow would ki that you did not have it.

That is the question that occurs to me.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The Chairman. Senator Malone.

Senator Malone. Mr. Secretary, this act has been exten 10 times, I think you testified.

Would you mind including in the record at this point the dates and the length of the extensions, that is, the length of time for which it was first passed as an emergency and then the dates of its extension together with the time of the extension.

Secretary Dulles. Can I supply that, Senator? I do not have it actually in my hand.

Senator Malone. Yes, I understand.

(The information referred to follows:)

TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT, ENACTMENT AND EXTENSIONS

1. The original act authorized the President to enter into foreign trade agreements for a period of 3 years from June 12, 1934, the date of enactment of the act (48 Stat, 943).

2. The President's authority to enter into foreign trade agreements was extended by Public Resolution No. 10, 75th Congressional, for 3 years from June 12, 1937 (50 Stat. 24).

3. The President's authority to enter into foreign trade agreements was extended bv Public Resolution No. 61, 76th Congress, for 3 years from June 12, 1940 (54 Stat. 107).

4. The President's authority to enter into foreign trade agreements was extended bv Public Law 66, 78th Congress, for 2 years from June 12, 1943 (57 Stat. 125)/

5. The President's authority to enter into' foreign trade agreements was extended bv Public Law 130, 79th Congress, for 3 years from June 12. 1945 (59 Stat. 410).

6. The President's authority to enter into foreign trade agreements was extended bv Public Law 792, 80th Congress, from June 12, 1948, until the close of June 30/1949 (62 Stat. 1053).

7. The President's authority to enter into foreign trade agreements was extended bv Public Law 307, 81st Congress, (which repealed Public Law 792, 80th Cong.) for 3 years from June 12, 1948 (63 Stat. 697).

8. The President's authority to enter into foreign trade agreements was extended bv Public Law 50, 82d Congress, for 2 vears from June 12, 1951 (65 Stat. 72).

9. The President's authority to enter into foreign trade agreements was extended by Public Law 215, 83d Congress, for 1 year from June 12, 1953 (67 Stat. 472).

10. The President's authority to enter into foreign trade agreements was extended bv Public Law 464, 83d Congress, for 1 year from June 12, 1954 (68 Stat. 360)."

11. The President's authority to enter into foreign trade agreements was extended bv Public Law 86, 84th Congress, (69 Stat. 162) until the close of June 30, 1958.

Senator Malone. Such extensions have, however, been from 1 to 3 years, have they not?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator Malone. One year, I think, on three occasions.

Secretary Dulles. I think so.

Senator Malone. Never more than three, and always an emergency.

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator Malone. You have asked for 5 years?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator Malone. And a 25 percent further reduction in duties or tariffs.

Secretary Dulles. Yes.

Senator Malone. And you do believe, I think from your testimony, that this act should be permanent?

Secretary Dulles. I believe that the concept that underlies the act is good as far as we can see. Now you can imagine a change of world conditions where it would not be valid anymore. I would hesi

Secretary Dulles. I would say, Senator, that we have plenty of power in the world.

The question is whether you try to use this power in a coercive and threatening way or not, which raises some serious questions.

I believe that as the world is today, and given the relationships which we for our own sake need to establish with other countries, that it is not a good idea for us to go around just brandishing our power and saying, "If you do not do what we want in this respect, we are going to put you out of business."

Now I know what the answer to that will be^ Mvvill say, "Well, all right, we will tie up with the other follow. ■

Senator Long. Perhaps so, but, of course, the question. The point I have in n^nd is you go.

Secretary Dulles. Yes.

Senator Long. I recall a situati Syngman Rhee's South Korean gov Kai-shek's government voted again! to me it was as much to their advan

I just wonder whether it is all ti into a position where people can with impunity disregard mutual security.

They can continue to get e' do not have to cooperate or h

Secretary Dulles. Those sit' Senator, that we are better off to feel that they cooperate or not terests rather than try to develop* over.

Now you may get some immedU the whip but in the long run I think 1 ages and I just do not think that is tin

Senator Long. You may describe! Seeretanr, but I have oftentimes seen 11 Rule does not work as well as some of Now and then some people tend to adv others as they do unto you." Whe: against us and treat us unfairly, it doei to our advantage to have the author to act in a similar fashion with regard t

I think sometimes they might treat if we had that particular power.

Secretary Dulles. I think we are ni our policy to use our power in those w

Senator Long. I just question the that you cannot use the power even would not only not have the power bu that you did not have it.

That is the question that occurs to

Thank you very much, Mr. Secreta

The Chairman. Senator Malone.

Senator Malone. Mr. Secretary, 10 times, I think you testified.

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