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The United States Potters Association

Atlantic Fishermen's Union (AFL-CIO)

American Lace Manufacturers Association, Inc.

International Photo Engravers' Union of North America (AFL-CIO)
California Walnut Growers Association

California Almond Growers Exchange

Pin, Clip and Fastener Association

Amalgamated Lace Operatives of America (Ind.)
National Association Greenhouse Vegetable Growers
United States Wood Screw Service Bureau

United States Machine Screw Service Bureau

United States Cap Screw Service Bureau

Service Tools Institute

Oregon Filbert Commission

American Knit Handwear Association, Inc.

Pacific Coast Fish Producers Institute

Cannery Workers Union of the Pacific (AFL-CIO)
Cannery Workers & Fishermen's Union (AFL-CIO)
Wyoming Wool Growers Association

Carpet Institute, Inc.

Harley-Davidson Motor Co.

The Dow Chemical Co.

John B. Stetson Co.

Onondaga Pottery Co.

National Creameries Association

The Wall Paper Institute, Inc.

Reynolds Metals Co., Inc.

Hardwood Plywood Institute

American Glassware Association

Wm. Ainsworth & Sons, Inc.

Scientific Apparatus Makers' Association

Tile Council of America

Air Products, Inc.

Industrial Fasteners Institute

American Tunaboat Association

International Leather Goods, Plastics & Novelty Workers Union (AFL-CIO) International Brotherhood of Operative Potters (AFL-CIO)

The Diamond Gardner Co.

Pacific Match Co.

Cupples Co.

Massachusetts Fisheries Association, Inc.

Seafood Producers Association of New Bedford

Mushroom Growers Cooperative Association

National Authority for the Ladies Handbag Industry

American Cyanamid Co.

United Hatters, Cap & Millinery Workers International Union (AFL-CIO)

Pass and Seymour, Inc.

Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc.

Idaho Wool Growers Association

California Fig Institute

American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Co.

Monsanto Chemical Co.

Young Aniline Works, Inc.

Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.

Pharma Chemical Corp.

Pfister Chemical Works, Inc.

Texas Sheep and Goat Raisers Association

Hooker Electrochemical Co.

American Fine China Guild

Umbrella Frame Manufacturing Industry

National Match Workers' Council

Rhode Island Textile Association

Allied Chemical & Dye Corp.

Carus Chemical Co.

Five Star Fish & Cold Storage

Fuller Brush Co.

E. S. Mayer & Son

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Ferro Corp.

Fostoria Glass Co.

Fourco Glass Co.

French Saxon China Co.

The Hall China Co.

The Harris Clay Co.

Harshaw Chemical Co.

Hartford Steel Ball Co., Inc.

The Homer Laughlin China Co.

Illinois Coal Operators Association

Imperial Glass Corp.

Independent Domestic Fluorspar Producers Association

The Edwin M. Knowles China Co.

Mayer China Co.

Mesinger Manufacturing Co., Inc.

National Lead Co.

New Castle Refractories Co.

Northern West Virginia Coal Association
Pemco Corp.

Pennsylvania Pulverizing Co.

Persons-Majestic Manufacturing Co.
The Potters Supply Co.

The Risdon Manufacturing Co.

Rockwell Manufacturing Co.

The Salem China Co.

H. C. Spinks Clay Co.
Star-Kist Foods, Inc.
The Sterling China Co.
Swindell-Dressler Corp.
Taylor, Smith & Taylor Co.
The Torrington Co.
United Clay Mines Corp.
Universal Potteries, Inc.
Van Camp Sea Food Co.
Vitachrome, Inc.

The Wellsville China Co.

Westfield Manufacturing Co.

Westgate-California Corp.

The S. C. Williams Co.

Detrex Chemical Industries, Inc.

United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America.

Penzac Oil Co.

Phelps Dodge Corp.

Sayles Biltmore Bleacheries, Inc.

Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.

Brewer Manufacturing Co.

Columbian Rope Co.

Delta Electric Co.

The Eagle-Picher Co.

Harnischfeger Corp.

Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

McCauley Metal Products, Inc.
Ohio Rubber Co.

Wyckoff Steel Co.

Mr. STRACKBEIN. It is the purpose of this statement to analyze those features of H. R. 12591 that we regard as unacceptable and indeed against the best interests of the many industries that would be affected adversely by the bill's passage.

We believe that H. R. 12591 disregards some of the most justifiable complaints lodged against the administration of the trade agreements program by those who have been injured by import competition.

Experience with the escape clause, in particular, has been distressing to industries that have in good faith looked to the machinery and procedures provided by Congress for relief from serious injury caused by increasing imports.

I do not believe that the House of Representatives is as indifferent to the welfare of the many industries, miners, farmers, growers and workers that have complained about imports, as the vote of that body on H. R. 12591 would indicate.

This is not to say, Mr. Chairman, that the House voted blindly; nor is it the purpose here to blame the inordinate and I may say rampant lobbying that went with the bill's progress.

The principal trouble lay in the rules of the House and the particular rule under which this bill was considered.

This was a so-called modified closed rule which severely limited any rounded consideration of the rather complicated issue.

The limitation prescribed by the rule was unfortunate precisely because the difference that divided the proponents and opponents of the bill was a matter of degree. One disagreement, for example, was over the length of time for which the extension should be made: 2 years or 5 years.

Another and perhaps more important disagreement was over the question of congressional versus executive control over Tariff Commission recommendations.

A third difference lay in the treatment of products that are necessary to the national security.

A fourth lay in the peril point proceedings.

By forcing these somewhat varied provisions into a single substitute bill it was not possible to go to the merits of each particular point. Therefore the vote was not a clear expresssion on the time period, i. e., 2 years versus 5 years, nor on the question of restoring to Congress its authority over the regulation of foreign commerce or the several other provisions on which there was a difference.

None of these points could be voted on separately, even though each one was of sufficient importance to justify a separate vote.

It is therefore hoped that more detailed consideration may be given to these points by this committee and by the Senate.

This statement will confine itself to what are undoubtedly the two leading points. One is the number of years of the renewal. The other is the question of congressional authority over Tariff Commission findings as opposed to complete domination by the Executive. I shall address myself to these two points from here on.

Mr. Chairman, our concern over the 5-year extension is very clear and, I would hope, very compelling. A 5-year extension of the trade agreements program would to all intents and purposes exclude the many industries, mining interests, fisheries, farmers and workers

who take the brunt of foreign competition from making a reentry into the legislative channels for the full 5-year period.

It would for all practical purposes be the same as closing the doors of Congress during that period so far as general tariff and trade legislation is concerned.

It is difficult indeed to reconcile such a proposal with the very principles of our Government. Two new Congresses will have been elected and will have run their course during this period, without having the opportunity to express themselves on an issue that is very important to those who sent them here.

În these unsettled days 5 years is a long time-particularly in the field of international relations and in view of the great economic and competitive developments abroad, as a result of which one domestic industry after another that was previously unharmed by imports finds foreign products progressively capturing more and more of the domestic market.

Congress should not absent itself, so to speak, for so long a period. Constitutionally it really has no right to do so. It should be possible whenever the need for legislation arises to find the legislative channels open, and not locked by the key of a moratorium.

The reason advanced for the moratorium of 5 years is found in the desire to introduce stability into our foreign economic policy.

Other countries, it is said, find it disconcerting to be confronted with the possibility of tariff changes in this country when such countries greatly increase their exports to these shores. They will not bother to expand their markets here for fear that if they are successful we will raise our tariff or impose a quota.

Parenthetically it might be said, Mr. Chairman, that actually the escape clause cases that have been processed have not impeded imports.

Imports have gone right ahead and in fact in a number of instances have increased before, during and after escape-clause actions.

On the other hand, it seems to matter little or nothing that the lack of safeguards, the want of a remedy, confronts our own industries with uncertainties at least as grave as those faced by other countries when they ship goods into this country.

The House bill would have the effect of throwing nearly the whole burden of uncertainty over the future upon our own industries while seeking to assure other countries of stability.

Five years of uncertainty will greatly cripple some of our industries as indeed uncertainty in recent years has already done.

We hoped that the House would recognize this fact but were handed a nettle for our pains.

The maximum extension in our judgment should be for 2 years. One year would be preferable in view of the present uncertainty in the very elements that undoubtedly weighed heavily in the judgment of the House, namely, the European Common Market and the Russian economic challenge.

I might interpolate here to say that the uncertainty of the European political situation is such that no one knows whether the European Market will actually develop or not, and the same with the Russian situation.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that being bound up in the general agreement on tariffs and trade in the manner that we would be for 5 more years under the bill, is one of the least appropriate methods of either confronting Russia economically or the European Common Market tariffwise.

We should keep ourselves as a nation in a more flexible position and avoid these handcuffs.

For example, should we undertake to engage Russia in a campaign of economic warfare we would above all need maneuverability, such as is not provided under GATT nor for that matter by private international trade itself.

We would find it necessary to engage in State trading to an unknown extent. The trade agreements system would be of little or no help; in fact, it might be a liability.

As for the European Common Market, once more the GATT system would work to our disadvantage in tying our hands in a manner quite suitable to the member countries of the European bloc. They could outvote us 6 to 1 and later possibly 16 or 17 to 1, even though their population would be about equal to our own.

The other point of extreme importance in this legislation is the one of control over our foreign trade.

The Constitution is very clear on this point. No one questions this. The trouble has arisen under the delegation of power that has been made from time to time by Congress to the executive branch under the trade agreements program.

Under this delegation the actual power of Congress has been alienated and overwoven by a network of international commitments that in point of fact greatly constricts the freedom of Congress to legislate, and directly threatens its standing as an independent and self-determining body.

It has become obvious under the present escape-clause procedures that Congress has lost its influence: In fact, through an unfortunate wording of the escape clause gave it away.

As matters stand today the voice of Congress in the escape clause extends not one inch beyond the outer portals of the Tariff Commission. Once a recommendation leaves the Tairff Commission on its way to the White House the authority of Congress is instantly and completely dissolved.

The President presumes not to be bound by the criteria laid down by Congress in the escape clause and makes his own disposition of the Tariff Commission's recommendation as he sees fit, unrestrained by any legislative mandate. The guidance contained in the delegated power, to repeat, does not extend beyond the Tariff Commission. The result is that the President operates under delegated power without any restraint beyond the need of writing identical letters to the Finance Committee of the Senate and the Committee of Ways and Means of the House, and Mr. Chairman, apparently those letters are very easily written.

It is this absolute power of the President to dispose of Tariff Commission recommendations as he pleases that gives rise to most of the complaints that are made against the administration of the Trade Agreements Act.

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