OUR NATIONAL DEFENCES.

EVERY Englishman, with possibly the exception of the Manchester arch-demagogue, has become imbued, by recent continental events, with the conviction that the defenceless state of Great Britain offers a premium for invasion. The idea has gradually grown stronger since the beginning of the present year, and the recent publication of the report of the commissioners has fully opened our eyes to the danger to which we have so supinely exposed ourselves. Twelve millions are the sum asked of us for ensuring peace, and though it is very heavy, it is the consequence of having a neighbour whose house is constantly filled with combustibles, and we have to pay for increased risk. That the nation are quite prepared to supply the amount we are willing to believe, but the question has first to be settled whether we shall be any the safer when the money has been converted into stone walls at the recommendation of

the commissioners.

One thing is tolerably certain: in the event of hostilities with France, London will be the great point de mire; the imperialist navy would not be sent to ravage our coasts and then retire, for such a step would produce retaliation, and our ex-ally would suffer more than ourselves, owing to his greater extent of seaboard. If the French ever attempt a landing, it will be for the purpose of marching straight on the capital of the world, for the occupation of London, apart from the pleasant prospect of plunder, would be a perfect set-off for Waterloo, and other small items written against our account in the ledger of every Frenchman's mind. The first thing to investigate is, naturally, the chance of successfully resisting any landing.

The first great thing which enables Englishmen to sleep comfortably in their beds when the wind blows from Cherbourg, is the possession of a Channel fleet. Sir Charles Napier and Mr. Bentinck, allied for once, have expressed their sturdy opinion that we can depend on our fleet, and uttered the hearty old clap-traps about wooden walls, British oak, and other causes of congratulation which had their value before steam was invented. Unfortunately, we cannot forget that the admiral did not carry his precepts into practice when he had the opportunity at Cronstadt, and though Mr. Bentinck is a well-meaning man, we can hardly accept him as an authority. We are reluctantly compelled to endorse the opinions of the commissioners, that our fleet is not to be entirely relied on for the defence of our coasts, even if we were willing and able to maintain it at the same scale as we had at the beginning of the century. "Since the application of steam to the propulsion of vessels, we can no longer rely upon being able to prevent the landing of a hostile force in this country." With the tremendous appliances on board our fighting vessels, a contest would be most destructive, and it is very possible that many of our iron-built vessels would soon be sunk. Even supposing that we destroyed the enemy's fleet as well, we should have nothing to fall back upon, for it must never be forgotten that, though our fleet will be always numerically superior to the French, the moment may occur when, owing to the enormous extent of territory we have to

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defend, the enemy may possess a temporary advantage. of sight all possible combinations of the European navies, and we know that the outlay in building a fleet of vessels to begird the entire British coast is simply impossible. We must, therefore, regard-our navy as, at the best, but a first line of defence, which must be supported by others, if we wish to render the result of a possible invasion a certainty of defeat to the French.

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The next principal feature that causes us grave doubts in the report of the commission is, that while they allow that London would be the object of the invader, they offer no suggestions as to the defence of that city, as being beyond the scope of their inquiry. Common sense seems to suggest that the point vitally menaced should be first defended, and we could not afford what is called a counter hit," in the language of the ring-that is to say, give our London for the chance of smashing the enemy by a blow in the face. The commissioners remind us most unpleasantly, but truly, that in the line of coast from the Humber to Penzance, which is about seven hundred and fifty miles in length, there is an aggregate of nearly three hundred miles on which a landing could be effected, and which it would be impossible to fortify, or, if fortified, to defend so as to prevent the landing of a determined enemy. With the exception, however, of fortifying Woolwich and Chatham, the commissioners propose to expend the twelve millions on the coast, to prevent the enemy bombarding our dockyards, and thus destroying our resources for the equipment of a fresh fleet. If the enemy delayed his march for the purpose of reducing those fortifications, all would be well, but if he were to turn them and march on London, we can hardly see of what advantage they would prove, for the occupation of the capital would, in all probability, cause a speedy suspension of hostilities. In addition, these extensive works would require large garrisons, who could be invested by a corps of observation, and at the moment when we required every man to check the invader's march, we should find a large factor in our defensive system held in check. The great point is, not so much to render it impossible for the French to get out of England again if they once landed, but to place our country in such a state that it would not be worth their while to attempt it, with the probability that they would be foiled in their darling wish of occupying London.

There is another serious consideration in the fact that the fortifications the commissioners recommend, and whose value is not fully proved, would require at least three years in completing. During that period, the nation would be suffering from its present uneasy state, while the very fact of our fortifications being left so long incomplete, might lead to the very event we are all so anxious to avoid. If Louis Napoleon really meditate those designs against England with which he is charged, he would scarcely be so chivalrous as to allow us full time to place ourselves in a posture of defence. There was a period, we allow, "when the French Guard never fired first," but soldiers have grown more practical now-a-days, and take advantage of every chance afforded them of injuring the enemy.

The first important item, then, appears to us to be the defensive fortification of London, and a proper system of covering the roads which lead from the coast to the capital. Our hedges and ditches would compel an July-VOL. CXIX. NO. CCCCLXXV.

enemy to follow the beaten track, and along that he might be harassed at every available point by available point by our volunteers, defended by easily thrown-up earthwork entrenchments. By this mode his various corps converging on the capital might be so weakened, that, when they assembled before the entrenched camp, which would be the advanced defensive work of London, their numbers might be rendered no longer formidable.

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There is the same objection to fortifying London sufficiently as there is to preventing a landing the size of the city would render it simply impossible, for we could not obtain sufficient armed men to defend the lengthened works. The scheme suggested by a contemporary, of building detached forts around London at the commanding points, appears feasible enough, but the question is, whether it would not be more advisable to trust to the defences of entrenched camps, which have ever offered a most serious obstacle to a foe. In the modern system of defences, every large fortification has such a camp before it, for the troops concentrated there, by continual engagements, prevent the enemy opening his parallels. Such a system would be almost invaluable for London; for, as the enemy would be unable to invest the capital, armed forces could flock up from every part of the country during the protracted struggle, and we should have such a body of riflemen at our command that the foe would eventually be compelled to retreat through fear of being enveloped, and not a man would live to tell the tale of the invasion in France.

It is evident that the nation will never return to its normal state of tranquillity until it be assured of being in a proper posture of defence, and the easiest way of doing that is by protecting London from a coup de main. When the earthworks we suggest have been formed, there would be time for building the detached forts, of which we certainly entertain a very high opinion, especially that suggested for the defence of Woolwich, which should be set about at once. These camps could be employed, too, for the training of our volunteers, who, protected from the necessity of meeting trained troops in the field, would render most valuable aid. But we are strongly of opinion that it would be a very dangerous step to risk everything on a general action, for, were our scanty regular army destroyed, it would take a long time to re-form a corps of sufficient strength to drive the invader back into the sea.

Much stress has been laid on the value of volunteers, and we have more than once seen references made to the heroic actions fought by the Prussian volunteers against the French troops in 1812 and 1813. But it must not be left out of sight that the troops Vandamme led into the field were the merest conscript lads, almost untrained to arms, and were opposed by the flower of the country. If the French landed here, however, they would bring their picked troops, who feel confident of victory against any enemy, owing to their late achievements in Lombardy, and the most important thing for ourselves would be to avoid any doubtful contest, the result of which would heighten the ardour and impetuosity of the French, On the other hand, were they harassed on their march by swarms of sharpshooters, on whom they would find it impossible to retaliate, they would, as is their nature, soon become desponding, and when they found themselves in front of an entrenched camp, which could only be carried by a heavy expenditure of men, and with the certainty of

having fresh forces to contend with at every step, they would soon discover the mistake they had committed, and victory would be thus assured beforehand to our arms.

It is impossible for England to maintain for any lengthened period a large regular army. The habits of the nation protest against such a state of things, and the clamour would soon grow so great that no government would be strong enough to withstand it. The rifle volunteers respond admirably to the temper of the people: there is no compulsion about the system, and a certain degree of healthy latitude, which renders the service essentially popular. On the other hand, we must guard against attaching any exaggerated value to the volunteers; and they cannot undergo that strict training and discipline which render our line regiments a solid wall in action. Fighting must be ever more or less a trade, and the want of a regular army can never be fully supplied by volunteers, though they may be actuated by the most patriotic feelings, as we are proud to see is the case among us. Our object must be to derive the largest amount of practical advantage from the volunteers, and as they must supply the place of regular troops, their services must be so employed that they may be exposed to no unnecessary risks. For this purpose we consider entrenched camps admirably adapted: the men could be relieved without any difficulty, and in this way fresh troops be constantly opposed to the French. We should have at least two hundred thousand available men in the best possible positions, and with the detached forts incessantly pouring their fire on the enemy, the contest could not last a week. Then would be the moment for the volunteers: in compact bodies they would follow up the retreating foe, decimating his ranks, and scattering the troops by their vigorous charges, which the certitude of victory would render irresistible. From all parts of the country fresh bodies would come up to surround the invader, and he would have the alternative between unconditional surrender or destruction.

It appears to us, then, that this great question of the national defence is easily soluble, if we will only approach it with a practical spirit. The misfortune is that such matters are always entrusted to professional men, who can never take exceptional circumstances into consideration, but adhere to the old strategic rules, as if progress were not as necessary in them as in the other branches of the service. We are ready enough to accept Enfield rifles and Armstrong guns, but, strangely enough, we close our eyes to all improvements suggested in our system of fortification. Civilians have, however, recently turned their attention to this important subject, and Mr. Fergusson's method of fortification, derided before the Crimean war, was, with certain modifications suggested by the inventive genius of a Todleben, so successful at Sebastopol that stone walls fell into general discredit. If in such matters the question of expense were only taken into account, we feel assured that our system of defence could be carried out very quickly, and a heavy discount be obtained on the outlay recommended by the commissioners.

With the exception of beginning at the wrong end, there is, however, no great objection to the defensive system proposed by the commissioners, and they very fairly draw a comparison between the expense of increasing the army or our fortifications.

A large permanent increase to the regular army, taking into account pay, clothing, provisions, barracks, pensions, and all other expenses, would involve an annual charge to the country which may be calculated at from 60,000%. to 70,000l. per one thousand men. This sum would be irrespective of the expenses of raising the men, which we take at 117. a man, and of the necessary increase to barrack accommodation, which on the present scale would amount to at least 1007. a man; making a first charge of 111,000l. per one thousand men, and an annual charge of 60,000l. to 70,000l. We do not express an opinion as to the permanent increase to the army which would be necessary under the circumstances supposed. It would, however, cost upon this calculation about eight millions at the outset, and nearly four millions annually afterwards, to double the number of regular troops now at home-viz. about sixty-six thousand men, exclusive of the Indian depôts; and this would not be an extraordinary increase if the aid of fortifications were to be rejected. The same eight millions expended in fortifications would be far more effectual for the defence of the dockyards than any such increase of the regular army, would incidentally provide barrack accommodation for some thousands of men, and would entail no future annual charge, beyond a small sum for maintenance, and the expense of embodying the substitutes for regular troops, whether volunteers, fencibles, or militia, for three weeks' training; which could not much exceed one-twentieth of the cost of an equal regular force.

We fancy that the commissioners are so wedded to their profession that they purposely ignored the value of the volunteer movement, for they merely allude to them, as if by accident, as serviceable in defending the fortifications they propose to build. There is also considerable value in the suggestions they offer, as explanatory of their plan for fortifying the dockyards and arsenals.

If London were placed in such a state of defence as to render an attack on it improbable by any enemy established on shore, even in such force as to be able to hold in check any army that could be brought against him, an invader's attention would then be turned to the dockyards and arsenals, as by the destruction of these he might hope to annihilate the naval power of the country, and deprive it of further means of resistance. If, on the other hand, London cannot be rendered capable of resistance after the defeat of the army in the field, the dockyards and arsenals, if fortified, become places of refuge from which the defence of the country can be protracted or means of resistance organised; and unless these are capable of resistance, our naval means fall with the capital, and the whole power of the nation is practically in abeyance. Indeed, the fortification of the dockyards and arsenals by land would aid materially in the defence of London itself; for whilst by means of the system proposed the vital points of the empire would be protected against either capture or bombardment, the fortifications by land would set the manoeuvring army free to operate against the enemy.

Finally, the commissioners reserve for a subsequent report the question of an internal arsenal. Their recommendations are unanimous, and they submit them to her Majesty with a firm conviction that their adoption will place the power of this country for self-defence on a par with its other elements of greatness and strength, will give security to industry and commerce, afford a guarantee to the maintenance of peace, and add a new glory to her Majesty's reign. Still, while conceding to a considerable extent the validity of these statements, we feel assured that the nation would have felt more comfortable had the commissioners suggested any practical scheme by which the defence of the capital could be rendered a certainty. It is a recognised fact, that a reckless enemy would