CHAPTER III.

THE LEGAL MEANING OF LIBELLOUS WORDS.

BEYOND what has been said it may be added that the
meaning attachable to libellous words is their ordinary
popular signification as understood by those who read
them or to whom they are addressed. This is a well-
recognised principle. There can be no fanciful mean-
ings, no strained interpretations, and in determining
this the jury exercises its most important function.
Thus, where initial letters were only used (2 Atk.
469), or asterisks were employed to point out a man, it
was held no defence that he was not properly described
if those who read the paper knew who was meant
(Bourke v. Warren, 2 C. & P. 37). No libel will lie
unless the ordinary reader understands the words in
a defamatory sense (Mulligan v. Cole, L. R. 10 Q. B.
549). Sometimes words may be defamatory in a
secondary sense; but where words are not slanderous
in their primary sense, but are so in their secondary
sense, there
must be evidence of facts making
It is not

them so (Ruel v. Tatnell, 43 L. T. 507).
what the libeller means in his own mind, but what
meaning the words convey, that has to be considered
(Read v. Ambridge, 6 C. & P. 308); whether the words
taken as a whole are actionable is the true test (Shipley
v. Todhunter, 7 C. & S. 680). Express malice is only
inquired into when the occasion is justified (Hooper v.
Truscott, 2 Scott, 672). Of course, a repetition of a
defamatory statement is actionable (Watkin v. Hall,

KIND OF WORDS THAT ARE ACTIONABLE.

27

L. R. 3 Q. B. 396), and it is no justification that the rumour existed (ibid.). Where the intermediate utterer of a slander is privileged owing to the relations existing or for other canse, the original utterer is liable (Derry v. Handley, 16 L. T. 263); not unless the original statement was defamatory (Parkins v. Scott, 1 H. & C. 153). Words conveying mere suspicion are not actionable (Simmonds v. Mitchell, 6 App. Cases, 156); nor words imputing crime unless it is a crime liable to punishment (Holt v. Scholefield, 6 T. R. 691), and all X slanderous words must be understood by the Court in the sense the rest of the world ordinarily understands them (Woolnoth v. Meadows, 5 East,, 463). If the words impute a crime they are actionable, though they may not describe it in technical but in popular terms (Colman v. Godwin, 3 Doug. 90); they are not actionable if they charge a mere breach of trust (Thompson v. Bernard, 1 Camp. 48), or of contract (Christie v. Cowell, Peake 4); where charging a transportable act they are of course libellous (Curtis v. Curtis, 4 M. & S. 337); or where calling a man a returned convict, even not imputing further sentence (Fowler v. Dowdney, 2 M. & Rob. 119). Words are actionable according f to the sense they are understood by those to whom they are addressed (Hankinson v. Bilby, 16 M. & W. 442; Daines v. Hartley, 3 Ex. 200). Saying a man is guilty after verdict of acquittal is actionable (Peake v. Oldham, Cowp. 275; Ford v. Primrose, 5 D. & R. 287); or charging theft or robbery (Penfold v. Westcote, 3 B. & P. N. R. 338 ; Beavor v. Hides, 2 Wils. 30; Hankisson v. Bilby, 2 C. & S. 440; Slowman v. Dutton, 10 Bing. 402); where the charge is clear and specific (Tomlinson v. Brittlebank, 4 B. & Ad. 630).

All depends upon whether mere abusive words are used or a felony is charged (Sibley v. Tomlins, 4 Tyr. 90).

The malice, circumstances, and occasion of speaking are all matters for the jury (Padmore v. Laurence, 3 P. & D. 209; Kelly v. Partington, 2 N. & M. 460). In Duke of Brunswick v. Harmar (12 Q. B. 185) Campbell, C.J., held that a witness could not be asked. what he understood by a word, that this was for the jury to determine.

The principle guiding the law was clearly laid down in the Irish Court of Appeal in the case of Clanricarde and Joyce, where it was held that the true test of the libel was the meaning attached to it by those to whom it was addressed. In that case the Court of Appeal (Dec. 21st, 1888) unanimously set aside the verdict for plaintiff in the Exchequer Court. The Master of the Rolls in his judgment said that the principle of the law was that "the words should be not only defamatory but must be understood as such by those to whom they were published. It had been stated by an eminent judge that "the slander and damage must consist in the apprehension of the hearers. This was a short but weighty statement of the law. As to the publication there was the clearest proof of it. In his opinion the plaintiff had failed to prove that the letter to the Times had come to the knowledge of any person to whose mind it would have presented a defamatory sense, different from its ordinary innocent meaning" (Law Times, Dec. 1888).

If libellous words point to and refer to no person in particular it becomes a question of evidence if and how far the plaintiff was pointed at, and it is for the jury to decide if he were really meant at all (Merryweather v. Turner, 19 L. J. C. P. 10; O'Donnell v. Walter, see infra). Where, for instance, a class is referred to and libelled, it must be left to jury to determine if an individual as such is separately referred to and dis

THE TRUE MEANING OF WORDS.

29

tinguished (Le Fauu v. Malromson, 1 H. L. C. 637). It must always appear conclusively to the Court that the words in the declaration are clearly capable of bearing the defamatory meaning assigned to them, and if so it is for jury to say how far they affect the person seeking redress (Solomon v. Lawson, 8 Q. B. 826; Hemings v. Gasson and Homer v. Taunton, 5 H. & N. 663). Where words are susceptible of a harmless meaning it is incumbent on plaintiff to shew their harmful sense (Broome v. Gosden, 1 C. P. 728; Williams v. Gardiner, 1 M. & W. 246). An insensible, strained and repugnant meaning attributed to words may be rejected as surplusage, and all words and meanings not manifestly libellous (Harvey v. French, 1 Cr. & M. 11; Roberts v. Cambden, 9 East, 92). Where the meaning is double or equivocal its application to plaintiff must be shewn (Williams v. Stott, 1 C. & M. 675; Smith v. Carey, 3 Camp. 461; Vellers v. Till, 4 B. & C. 655; Wakeley v. Healey, 7 C. B. 605; Baboneau v. Farrell, 15 C. B. 360; Greville v. Chapman, 5 Q. B. 731, in all of which cases the juries were the sole judges of the meaning of the words). In Hoare v. Silverlock (12 Q. B. 624) it was held that where the meaning is at all doubtful or obscure the words are not actionable. As regards the context of an article or in slander the whole conversation, it has been held that the jury must consider the whole matter and not disjointed, disconnected parts without the qualifying or restrictive portions of the article or conversation which either followed or preceded, and which might not improbably alter the whole signification of the excerpted passages (Shipley v. Todhunter, 7 C. & P. 680). In Kelly v. Partington (5 B. & Ad. 651) Patterson, J., held that words were not actionable unless in their nature defamatory, and it did not follow that because a servant was dismissed by his master that such was

the resultant damage of the communication made. "To make the speaking of words wrongful they must be in their nature defamatory." Addison speaking on the matter in his admirable book on Torts, says (p. 823), "The ordinary popular sense of the writing, language, or words is to be taken to be the meaning the printer, publisher or speaker had, but a foundation may be laid for shewing another and a different meaning. Something may have previously passed which gives a peculiar character or meaning to some expression, and some word which popularly or ordinarily is used in one sense may from something that has gone before have a meaning different from its usual one. When, therefore, it is wished to get rid of the ordinary meaning the witness must be asked if there is anything to prevent these words conveying the meaning they ordinarily would convey, and if evidence is given and a foundation laid for it then the further question' may be put, What do the jury understand by it? It was ruled in Dames v. Hartley (3 Ex. 205) that it must first be shewn that a word has acquired a certain peculiar accepted meaning, and then a witness may be asked if he understood it in that sense as applied to plaintiff. Thus the word "lame duck" would be libellous if applied to a member of the Stock Exchange, as it has acquired a certain defamatory meaning (Barnett v. Allen, 3 H. & N. 381). In Cook v. Hughes (Ry. & M. 115) the defendant was held entitled to have the whole article read, and in Pearce v. Ornsby (1 M. & Rob. 456) the judge ruled that the whole conversation should be repeated so that the jury might draw their own conclusions as to how far the plaintiff was understood to be libelled or slandered. In R. v. Watson (2 T. R. 206) Buller, C.J., left it to the jury to read the libel and see what they as common-sense men understood by