absolutely prohibits the introduction of any such cattle into the state, with the single exception mentioned.

§ 1062. The states have no power to regulate interstate commerce.

It seems hardly necessary to argue at length, that, unless the statute can be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, it is a usurpation of the power vested exclusively in congress. It is a plain regulation of interstate commerce, a regulation extending to prohibition. Whatever may be the power of a state over commerce that is completely internal, it can no more prohibit or regulate that which is interstate than it can that which is with foreign nations. Power over one is given by the constitution of the United States to congress in the same words in which it is given over the other, and in both cases it is necessarily exclusive. That the transportation of property from one state to another is a branch of interstate commerce is undeniable, and no attempt has been made in this case to deny it.

1063. A law excluding from the state during two-thirds of the year any cattle coming from another state or country is a regulation of commerce and void.

The Missouri statute is a plain interference with such transportation, an attempted exercise over it of the highest possible power,- that of destruction. It meets at the borders of the state a large and common subject of commerce, and prohibits its crossing the state line during two-thirds of each year, with a proviso, however, that such cattle may come across the line loaded upon a railroad car or steamboat, and pass through the state without being unloaded. But even the right of steamboat owners and railroad companies to transport such property through the state is loaded by the law with onerous liabilities, because of their agency in the transportation. The object and effect of the statute are, therefore, to obstruct interstate commerce, and to discriminate between the property of citizens of one state and that of citizens of other states. This court has heretofore said that interstate transportation of passengers is beyond the reach of a state legislature. And if, as we have held, state taxation of persons passing from one state to another, or a state tax upon interstate transportation of passengers, is prohibited by the constitution because a burden upon it, a fortiori, if possible, is a state tax upon the carriage of merchandise from state to state. Transportation is essential to commerce, or rather it is commerce itself; and every obstacle to it, or burden laid upon it by legislative authority, is regulation. Case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall., 232 ( 1255-62, infra); Ward v. Maryland, 12 id., 418 (§§ 825-823, supra); Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U. S., 275 ($ 1379-83, infra); Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, 92 id., 259 ($ 1336-42, infra); Chy Lung v. Freeman, id., 275 (§§ 1343-44, infra). The two latter of these cases refer to obstructions against the admission of persons into a state, but the principles asserted are equally applicable to all subjects of commerce.

1064. The states have police power. What is police power. It cannot be exercised on a subject confided exclusively to congress.

We are thus brought to the question whether the Missouri statute is a lawful exercise of the police power of the state. We admit that the deposit in congress of the power to regulate foreign commerce, and commerce among the states, was not a surrender of that which may properly be denominated police power. What that power is, it is difficult to define with sharp precision. It is generally said to extend to making regulations promotive of domestic order, morals, health and safety. As was said in Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington

R. Co., 27 Vt., 149, "it extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the state. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non læ las, which, being of universal application, it must, of course, be within the range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure others." It was further said that, by the general police power of a state, "persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state; of the perfect right of the legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowledged general principles ever can be, made, so far as natural persons are concerned." It may also be admitted that the police power of a state justifies the adoption of precautionary measures against social evils. Under it a state may legislate to prevent the spread of crime or pauperism, or disturbance of the peace. It may exclude from its limits convicts, paupers, idiots and lunatics, and persons likely to become a public charge, as well as persons afflicted by contagious or infectious diseases; a right founded, as intimated in The Passenger Cases, 7 How., 283 (§3 1284-1335, infra), by Mr. Justice Grier, in the sacred law of self-defense. Vide 3 Sawyer, 253. The same principle, it may also be conceded, would justify the exclusion of property dangerous to the property of citizens of the state; for example, animals having contagious or infectious diseases. All these exertions of power are in immediate connection with the protection of persons and property against noxious acts of other persons, or such a use of property as is injurious to the property of others. They are self-defensive.

But whatever may be the nature and reach of the police power of a state, it cannot be exercised over a subject confided exclusively to congress by the federal constitution. It cannot invade the domain of the national government. It was said in Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, supra, to "be clear, from the nature of our complex form of government, that whenever the statute of a state invades the domain of legislation which belongs exclusively to the congress of the United States, it is void, no matter under what class of powers it may fall, or how closely allied it may be to powers conceded to belong to the states." Substantially the same thing was said by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1 (§ 1183-1201, infra). Neither the unlimited powers of a state to tax, nor any of its large police powers, can be exercised to such an extent as to work a practical assumption of the powers properly conferred upon congress by the constitution. Many acts of a state may, indeed, affect commerce, without amounting to a regulation of it, in the constitutional sense of the term. And it is sometimes difficult to define the distinction between that which merely affects or influences and that which regulates or furnishes a rule for conduct. There is no such difficulty in the present case. While we unhesitatingly admit that a state may pass sanitary laws, and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health or property within its borders; while it may prevent persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, etc., from entering the state; while, for the purpose of self-protection, it may establish quarantine and reasonable inspection laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or'through the state, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection. It may not, under the cover of exerting its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either foreign or interstate commerce. Upon this subject the cases in 92 U. S., to which we have referred, are very instructive. In Henderson v. The Mayor, etc., the stat

ute of New York was defended as a police regulation to protect the state against the influx of foreign paupers; but it was held to be unconstitutional, because its practical result was to impose a burden upon all passengers from foreign countries. And it was laid down that, "in whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect." The reach of the statute was far beyond its professed object, and far into the realm which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of congress. So in the case of Chy Lung v. Freeman, where the pretense was the exclusion. of lewd women; but as the statute was more far-reaching and affected other immigrants, not of any class which the state could lawfully exclude, we held it unconstitutional. Neither of these cases denied the right of a state to protect herself against paupers, convicted criminals, or lewd women, by necessary and proper laws, in the absence of legislation by congress, but it was ruled that the right could only arise from vital necessity and that it could not be carried beyond the scope of that necessity. These cases, it is true, speak only of laws affecting the entrance of persons into a state; but the constitutional doctrines they maintain are equally applicable to interstate transportation of property. They deny validity to any state legislation professing to be an exercise of police power for protection against evils from abroad, which is beyond the necessity for its exercise wherever it interferes with the rights and powers of the federal government.

§ 1065. A law prohibiting the importation of cattle is not a quarantine or inspection law, nor otherwise within the police powers of the state. Such a law is repugnant to the constitution of the United States.

Tried by this rule, the statute of Missouri is a plain intrusion upon the exclusive domain of congress. It is not a quarantine law. It is not an inspection law. It says to all natural persons and to all transportation companies, "You shall not bring into the state any Texas cattle or any Mexican cattle or Indian cattle, between March 1 and December 1 in any year, no matter whether they are free from disease or not, no matter whether they may do an injury to the inhabitants of the state or not; and if you do bring them in, even for the purpose of carrying them through the state without unloading them, you shall be subject to extraordinary liabilities." Such a statute, we do not doubt, it is beyond the power of a state to enact. To hold otherwise would be to ignore one of the leading objects which the constitution of the United States was designed to secure. In coming to such a conclusion, we have not overlooked the decisions of very respectable courts in Illinois, where statutes similar to the one we have before us have been sustained. Yeazel v. Alexander, 58 Ill., 254. Regarding the statutes as mere police regulations, intended to protect domestic cattle against infectious disease, those courts have refused to inquire whether the prohibition did not extend beyond the danger to be apprehended, and whether, therefore, the statutes were not something more than exertions of police power. That inquiry, they have said, was for the legislature and not for the courts. With this we cannot concur. The police power of a state cannot obstruct foreign commerce or interstate commerce beyond the necessity for its exercise; and under color of it, objects not within its scope cannot be secured at the expense of the protection afforded by the federal constitution. And as its range sometimes comes very near to the field committed by the constitution to congress, it is the duty of the courts to guard vigilantly against any needless intrusion.

Judgment reversed, and the record remanded with instructions to reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Grundy county, and to direct that court to award a new trial.

§ 1066. Power of congress exclusive. The power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states is vested exclusively in congress. Passenger Cases, 7 How., 283 (SS 1284-1335); Hall v. De Cuir, 5 Otto, 485 (S$ 1140-63).

§ 1067. Whenever the subjects over which a power to regulate commerce is asserted are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they are within the exclusive legislative power of congress. Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall., 232 (S$ 1255-62).

§ 1068. The United States, under the constitution, is a sovereignty as to the objects surrendered and specified, limited only by the qualifications and restrictions expressed in the constitution. The power of the United States, as far as commerce is concerned, is sovereign, qualified by the limitations expressed in the constitution. United States v. The Brigantine William,* 2 Hall L. J., 272.

§ 1069. The paramount authority of an act of congress, relative to commerce between the states, is not wholly conferred by the constitution itself, but is the logical result of the power over the subject-matter conferred upon that body by the states. They surrendered this power to the general government; and to the extent of a fair exercise of it by congress the act must be supreme. Sinnot v. Commissioners of Pilotage of Mobile, 22 How., 243.

$1070. It seems that the power of congress to regulate commerce among the states is limited by other provisions of the constitution, by the nature of the power and the sovereignty of the states. United States v. Cisna, 1 McL., 261.

§ 1071. Regulations by congress are exclusive. When congress exercises the power to regulate commerce, either with foreign nations or among the states, all conflicting state laws must give way. Hinson v. Lott,* 8 Wall., 148.

§ 1072. Commerce between two or more states.- Under the constitution congress has power to regulate commerce "among the states,” and this latter phrase limits the power of congress in the regulation of commerce to two or more states. Consequently a state has power to regulate a commerce exclusively within its own limits, but beyond such limits the regulation belongs to congress. Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is essentially a commercial power, and it is necessarily limited to the exercise of that power by congress. Every voyage of a vessel between two or more states is subject to admiralty jurisdiction, and not to any state regulation. (Per MCLEAN, J.) The Steamboat Magnolia, 20 How., 304; Halderman v. Beckwith, 4 McL., 293.

§ 1073. Railroads incorporated in different states and engaged in the business of transporting passengers and freight from one state to another, or through more than one state, are instruments of commerce, and the power of congress to regulate commerce embraces them. Sweatt v. Boston, etc., R'y Co., 3 Cliff., 347.

§ 1074. Failure of congress to legislate.- The inaction of congress on the subject of interstate commerce, when considered with reference to its legislation with respect to foreign commerce, is equivalent to a declaration that interstate commerce shall be free and untrammeled. Welton v. State of Missouri, 1 Otto, 275 ($ 1379-83).

§ 1075. It seems that the constitutional provision that congress shall have power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes," is not per se, and without any exercise of that power by congress, an absolute inhibition of all state legislation which may interfere with or affect the foreign and interstate commerce of the United States. It is settled by the supreme court that a state may have an undoubted right to pass many laws which have incidentally not only a remote, but an immediate and very considerable, influence upon commerce among the states. Of this class are police regulations, health laws, inspection laws, quarantine laws, etc., as well as those affecting internal commerce, such as laws relating to roads, ferries, etc. And even if the power given congress was thus exclusive, it would seem that the states would retain power to legislate upon these subjects, and that such legislation, if a legitimate exercise of such power, would be beyond the control of the federal courts. (Per HALL, J.) Silliman v. Hudson River Bridge Co., 4 Blatch., 402; Sherlock v. Alling, 3 Otto, 100.

§ 1076. Preference to ports of one state.-A state law regulating charges by warehousemen is not objectionable as giving preference to the ports of one state over those of another. Munn v. Illinois, 4 Otto, 113 ( 1349-67).

§ 1077. The prohibition of legislation by congress giving one port preference over another port was intended only to prevent legislation directly giving such preference, not laws giving

incidental advantages to one port not enjoyed by another. State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How., 421 (§§ 1203-12).

$1078. Police power of the states. In conferring upon congress the regulation of commerce, it was never intended to cut the states off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life and safety of its citizens, though the regulation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country. Legislation in a great variety of ways may affect commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it, within the meaning of the constitution. General legislation prescribing the liabilities or duties of citizens of a state, without distinction as to pursuit or calling, is not open to any valid objection because it may affect persons engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. Sherlock v. Alling, 3 Otto, 103; Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 6 Wall., 31 (§§ 1535–38); The Steamboat New York, 18 How., 226. See § 266, 298, 315, 318, 1033.

§ 1079. The statute of the state of New York authorizing the summary removal of persons, other than Indians, settling or residing upon lands occupied by any nation or tribe of Indians within the state, is a police regulation of the state, calculated to protect the Indians and preserve the peace, and is constitutional. The power of a state to make such regulations to preserve the peace of the community is absolute, and has never been surrendered. State of New York v. Dibble, 21 How., 370.

§ 1080. Commerce with Indians.— Under the constitution and the treaty between the United States and the Cherokee Indians, the right to regulate the entire intercourse between the United States and that nation of Indians is vested in the government of the United States, and a law of Georgia assuming control over such Indian country is invalid. Worcester v. State of Georgia, 6 Pet., 561.

§ 1081. Under that clause of the constitution giving congress the power to regulate commerce among the Indian tribes, the sale of liquor may be forbidden by it, not only in the Indian country but in localities adjacent thereto. United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whisky, 3 Otto, 193; United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall., 407.

§ 1082. The decision of the executive and other political departments of the government, that a particular class of Indians constitute a tribe, will be followed by the courts in deciding whether such Indians are within the control of the laws of congress for certain purposes, under the constitutional authority to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall., 407.

§ 1083. Regulating navigation and trade.-- Under the clause of the constitution empowering congress to regulate commerce, it seems that congress may legislate over navigation as well as trade over intercourse as well as traffic. It has also power to prescribe what shall constitute American vessels, and the national character of the seamen who shall navigate them, and it may likewise prescribe rules and regulations for the intercourse and navigation of such vessels between the different states. But this constitutional grant of power does not confer upon congress the authority to extend its legislation throughout the entire sphere of legislation of the several states. This power of congress is not operative upon persons and things upon land within the boundaries of state jurisdiction, and the right and duties of persons in relation to property are rightfully prescribed and controlled by the laws of the state within whose territorial limits it is found. The powers reserved to the several states extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern property and the rights of property of individuals as well as to the internal order, improvement and prosperity of the state. King v. American Transportation Company, 1 Flip., 6.

§ 1084. Power to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate navigation, and this power is exclusive in congress. The Barque Chusan, 2 Story, 455; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1 ( 1183-1201); The Brig Wilson, 1 Marsh., 430.

§ 1085. The power over navigation and intercourse is part of the power to regulate commerce, and is possessed by congress as fully as it possesses the power to regulate commerce, but not to a greater extent. There is no separate and distinct grant to reguiate navigation and intercourse. Wherever the right to regulate commerce does not extend, the right to regulate navigation and intercourse does not go. The latter goes with the former and follows it. The right to regulate commerce extends to foreign commerce, commerce with the Indian tribes, and commerce between the states. It does not include the purely internal commerce of a state. Commerce, to be subject to such regulations, must be among, that is, intermingled with, the several states. If confined to one state alone, congress has no control over it. So a commercial regulation as to the licensing of steamboats conveying passengers does not apply to a ferry boat confined to the waters of one state. United States v. The Steamboat James Morrison, Newb., 243; United States v. The Steam Ferry Boat Wm. Pope, id., 257.

§ 1086. Vesting jurisdiction in the courts in certain cases.— A law of congress giving jurisdiction to courts of the United States in certain cases is not a regulation of commerce. Though the act may give the courts jurisdiction to a certain extent over commerce and navi