nection therewith, and the introduction of which tends only to obstruct and obscure the elucidation of truth. Thus it is charged in the complainant's bill, that the law authorizing the improvement of the Homochitto river is void, because it violates the constitution of Mississippi, by omitting to provide a compensation for the injury which might be done to individuals by carrying that law into effect; the constitution of the state having declared that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation being made therefor. In answer to this charge it is sufficient to state that this court never has, and does not, assume the right to pronounce authoritatively upon the wisdom or justice of the legislation of the states, when operating upon their own citizens, and upon subjects of property clearly within their own territory and appropriate cognizance, except so far as the constitution of the United States expressly, or by inevitable implication, may have made it the duty of this court to control the action of the state governments. Nor has it been deemed the province of this court to abrogate or overrule the interpretation put upon their own respective statutes by the courts of the several states, whether such interpretation had reference to the ordinary rights of person or property, or to the nature and extent of the legislative powers vested by the constitutions of the several states, and their coincidence with acts of legislation performed under the delegation of those powers. These are functions wisely and necessarily left by this court untouched in the state tribunals, the assumption of which by the federal judiciary, as it would embrace every matter upon which the governments of the states could operate, would, in effect, amount to the annihilation of those governments. The doctrine of this court as here stated has been clearly affirmed.

In the case of Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet., 280 ($ 1840-48, infra), this court has declared that it "has no authority, on a writ of error from a state court, to declare a state law void on account of its collision with a state constitution, it not being a case embraced in the judiciary act, which alone gives power to issue a writ of error to the state court." This court say "that they will therefore refrain from expressing any opinion on the points made by counsel in relation to the constitution of New York." See, also, the ruling of this court upon the construction of state laws, in the cases of Polk v. Wendal, in 9 Cranch, 87, and of the West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How., 507 (§§ 2188-90, infra). The conformity, therefore, to the state constitution, of the statute appointing the commissioners of the Homochitto river, and prescribing their powers and duties, was a question appropriately belonging to the state court, and its decision of that question is not properly subject to re-examination here.

§ 208. The first ten amendments of the constitution of the United States are restrictions upon the federal government and not upon the states.

The statute of Mississippi is next assailed, on the charge that it violates the fifth article of the amendments of the constitution of the United States, of which the clause in the constitution of Mississippi, relied on by the plaintiff in error, is a literal transcript. In this charge is instanced another effort to confuse and obstruct the only legitimate inquiry arising on the record before us, viz., that which relates to the authority of the high court of errors and appeals of Mississippi, for their decree pronounced in this cause. To every person acquainted with the history of the federal government, it is familiarly known that the ten amendments first engrafted upon the constitution had their origin in the apprehension that in the investment of powers made by that instrument in the federal government, the safety of the states and their citizens had not been

sufficiently guarded. That from this apprehension arose the chief opposition shown to the adoption of the constitution. That, in order to remove the cause of this apprehension, and to effect that security which it was feared the original instrument had failed to accomplish, twelve articles of amendment were proposed at the first session of the first congress, and the ten first articles in the existing series of amendments were adopted and ratified by congress and by the states, two of the twelve proposed amendments having been rejected. The amendments thus adopted were designed to be modifications of the powers vested in the federal government, and their language is susceptible of no other rational, literal or verbal acceptation. In this acceptation this court has repeatedly and uniformly expounded those amendments in cases having reference to retroactive statutes, to the right of eminent domain, to the execution of plans for internal improvement; in opposition to which, the clause in the fifth article of the amendments of the constitution has been urged. In all such cases, this court has ruled that the clause in question was applicable to the federal government alone, and not to the states, except so far as it was designed for their security against federal power. Indeed, so full, so emphatic and conclusive, is the doctrine of this court, as promulgated by the late Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, in 7 Pet., 247, that it would seem to require nothing less than an effort to unsettle the most deliberate and best-considered conclusions of the court, to attempt to shake or disturb that doctrine. An extract from the reasoning of the chief justice, so full, so unanswerable on this point, may not be unfruitful of benefit as a guide to the future. After stating that the case was brought before the court in virtue of the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act, the chief justice proceeds: "The plaintiff in error contends that it comes within that clause of the fifth amendment to the constitution which inhibits the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. He insists that this amendment, being in favor of the liberty of the citizen, ought to be so construed as to restrain the legislative power of a state, as well as that of the United States. If this proposition be untrue, the court can take no jurisdiction of the cause.

The question thus presented we think of great importance, but not of much difficulty. The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves; for their own government, and not for the government of the individual states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated. The people of the United States framed such a government for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their situation, and best adapted to promote their interests. The powers they conferred on this government were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and we think necessarily, applicable to the government created by the instrument. They are limitations of power granted by the instrument itself; not of distinct governments, framed by different persons, and for different purposes. If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as restraining the power of the general government, not as applicable to the states. In their several constitutions they have imposed such restrictions on their respective governments as their own wisdom suggested; such as they deemed most proper for themselves. It is a subject on which they judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no farther than they are supposed to have a common interest."

Again, adverting to the causes which led to the proposal and adoption of the amendments of the constitution, the same judge remarks (id., p. 250)—and these remarks embrace the whole series of articles adopted" In almost every convention in which the constitution was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government; not against those of the local governments. In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears thus extensively entertained, amendments were proposed by the required majority in congress, and adopted by the states. These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments. This court cannot so apply them." Vide, also, the cases of Fox v. State of Ohio, 5 How., 410 (§§ 496-500, infra), and of West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How., 507 (§§ 2188-90, infra). From the aforegoing view, it follows that neither the constitution and laws of Mississippi, as interpreted by the high court of that state, nor the provision of the fifth article of the amendments of the federal constitution, as construed by this court, can have any just applicability to the legitimate inquiry now before us.

§ 209. The act of congress for the admission of Mississippi as a state, and providing for free navigation of the Mississippi river, does not impair the sovereignty of that state. (a)

The remaining objection to the decree of the high court of errors and appeals that which is most directly pertinent to the present controversy — is that founded upon the allegation that the law of Mississippi of March 5, 1850, creating the board of commissioners of the Homochitto, for the purpose of improving the navigation of that river, and of any outlet from the same through Old river and Buffalo bayou to the Mississippi, and for excavating a canal into the Buffalo from the Homochitto, or from Old river to the Buffalo, is a violation of the act of congress of the 1st of March, 1817, authorizing the people of the Mississippi territory to form a constitution, which act declares "that the Mississippi river, and the navigable rivers and waters leading into the same, shall be common highways, and forever free as well to the inhabitants of the state of Mississippi as to other citizens of the United States." In considering this act of congress of March 1, 1817, it is unnecessary to institute any examination or criticism as to its legitimate meaning, or operation, or binding authority, farther than to affirm that it could have no effect to restrict the new state in any of its necessary attributes as an independent sovereign government, nor to inhibit or diminish its perfect equality with the other members of the confederacy with which it was to be associated. These conclusions follow from the very nature and objects of the confederacy, from the language of the constitution adopted by the states, and from the rule of interpretation pronounced by this court in the case of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How., 223. The act of congress of March 1, 1817, in prescribing the free navigation of the Mississippi and the navigable waters flowing into this river, could not have been designed to inhibit the power inseparable from every sovereign or efficient government, to devise and to execute measures for the improvement of the state, although such measures might induce or render necessary changes in the channels or courses of rivers within the interior of the state, or might be productive of a change in the value of private property. Such consequences are not unfrequently and indeed unavoidably incident to public and general measures highly promotive of and absolutely necessary to the public good. And here it may be asked, whether the law

(a) S. P., Woodman v. Kilbourn Manuf. Co.,* 6 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.), 238.

complained of, and the measures said to be in contemplation for its execution, are in reality in conflict with the act of congress of March 1, 1817, with respect either to the letter or the spirit of the act? On this point may be cited the case of Veazie v. Moor, in 14 How., 568 (§ 1202, infra).

By the allegations of the bill it appears that this trace or channel, which is distinguished by the appellation of Old river, is not in fact, and never was, a separate navigable river. It was once the bed or channel of the Mississippi, but, by natural causes, the latter many years since changed its bed or course, thereby rendering derelict the former bed or channel, which would be wholly without water, except what occasionally is forced into it from freshets in the Mississippi, and that which is received from the current of the Homochitto. With no propriety of language, then, can it be pretended that the contemplated communication between the Homochitto and the Buffalo bayou would be the violation of a law which declares that the waters of the Mississippi, and the navigable rivers and waters leading into the same, shall be common highways, and forever free as well to the inhabitants of the state as to other citizens of the United States. Old river was once the bed or a portion of the Mississippi, but never a separate navigable river flowing into the Mississippi. Any improvement, therefore, in the facilities of reaching the Mississippi by another river cannot be an obstruction in what never was, in any correct sense of the phrase, a navigable river leading or flowing into the Mississippi.

But, for argument, let it it be conceded that this derelict channel of the Mississippi, called Old river, is in truth a navigable river leading or flowing into the Mississippi; it would by no means follow that a diversion into the Buffalo bayou of waters, in whole or in part, which pass from Homochitto into Old river, would be a violation of the act of congress of March 1, 1817, in its letter or its spirit; or of any condition which congress had power to impose on the admission of the new state. It cannot be imputed to congress that they ever designed to forbid, or to withhold from the state of Mississippi, the power of improving the interior of that state, by means either of roads or canals, or by regulating the rivers within its territorial limits, although a plan of improvement to be adopted might embrace or affect the course or the flow of rivers situated within the interior of the state. Could such an intention be ascribed to congress, the right to enforce it may be confidently denied. Clearly, congress could exact of the new state the surrender of no attribute inherent in her character as a sovereign independent state, or indispensable to her equality with her sister states, necessarily implied and guarantied by the very nature of the federal compact. Obviously, and it may be said primarily, among the incidents of that equality, is the right to make improvements in the rivers, water courses, and highways, situated within the state. Thus situated, as appears on the face of the bill, are the derelict bed of the Mississippi, called Old river, the Homochitto river, the Buffalo bayou, and the line of the canal by which it is proposed that the two last shall be united for the more easy and certain access to the Mississippi.

The act of the legislature of Mississippi, therefore, is strictly within the legitimate and even essential powers of the state, is in violation of neither the constitution nor laws of the United States, and presents no conjuncture or aspect by which this court would be warranted to supervise or control the decree of the high court of errors and appeals of Mississippi. We are therefore of the opinion that the decree of that court be affirmed.

§ 210. Powers of congress generally. All the powers conferred on congress, both the express and non-enumerated, must be regarded as related to each other, and all means for a common end. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall., 457. For the principles discussed in the Legal Tender Cases, see MONEY.

$211. The general government is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the constitution, were generally considered to belong to every government as such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions. (Per BRADLEY, J.) Ibid.

§ 212. The cession of power to the general government means no more than that they may assume the exercise of it whenever they think it advisable. Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat., 304. § 213. It is not indispensable to the existence of any power claimed for the federal government that it can be found specified in the words of the constitution, or clearly and directly traceable to some one of the specified powers. Its existence may be deduced fairly from more than one of the substantial powers expressly defined, or from them all combined. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall., 457.

§ 214. A grant of power in the constitution is to be construed according to the fair and reasonable import of its terms, and its construction is not necessarily to be controlled by a reference to what existed when the constitution was adopted. So, under an indictment for sending prohibited matter through the mails, the question whether congress had properly exercised its power of exclusion does not depend upon the state of things existing at the time of the adoption of the constitution as to the exclusion of matter from the mails. In re Jackson, 14 Blatch., 251.

$215. Where the end is legitimate and within the scope of the constitution, all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional, as "laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution" powers expressly granted. Hepburn v. Griswold, 6 Wall., 603.

§ 216. In considering the constitutionality of an act of congress, it seems that it is entirely immaterial what clause of the constitution congress had in mind at the time of the passing of the law, for if it can be sustained under any clause of the constitution, it is valid and binding. Columbus Ins. Co. v. Curtenius, 6 McL., 214.

§ 217. The act of June 22, 1874, amending the bankrupt act, and making it necessary for at least one-fourth of the creditors in number, and one-third in value, to join in the petition to have their debtor adjudged a bankrupt, and providing that this provision shall apply to all cases of compulsory or involuntary bankruptcy commenced since December 1, 1873, does not apply to cases where an adjudication of bankruptcy has been had before the date of the act; since this would be beyond the power of congress, and no act will be so construed as to transgress the power of congress, unless the intention is expressed in the plainest and most unambiguous language. In re Comstock, 3 Saw., 128; The Sloop Elizabeth, 1 Paine, 15.

§ 218. The laws of the United States are the supreme law of the land, and cannot be changed, altered, modified or repealed by state enactments. Nor can any right or privilege given or secured by them be abrogated, displaced or suspended by such state enactments. A maritime lien is as much a right as a mortgage or a bottomry bond, and it seems that a state law which should declare that a maritime lien should have no effect in the state, or which should postpone it to a lien given by the state law, would have no binding force or effect. Harris v. The Steamboat Henrietta, Newb., 288; Ashbrook v. Steamer Golden Gate, id., 307. $219. Power to enact necessary laws.-The authority expressly given to congress to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the specified powers vested in congress and all other powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof, includes the right to employ freely every means, not prohibited, necessary for the preservation of the government and the fulfilment of its acknowledged powers. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall., 457.

$220. The necessity spoken of in the gift of authority to congress to enact laws" "necessary and proper" for the execution of all powers created by the constitution, is not to be understood as an absolute one. On the contrary, a sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it in the manner most beneficial to the people. Ibid.

221. The degree of necessity for any congressional enactment, or the relative degree of its appropriateness, is within the discretion of congress, and not to be determined by the judiciary. Ibid.

§222. Under the power to make all laws necessary, etc., congress has no authority to enact laws in furtherance even of a legitimate end merely because they are useful. There must be some adaptedness or appropriateness of the laws to carry into execution the powers created by