tion, to the agreement between Virginia and West Virginia under which the latter state was formed. Such consent need not be given in the form of an express and formal statement of every proposition of the agreement and of the consent of congress thereto. Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall., 39.

§ 275. Implied powers of the states to enforce rights. Where the constitution prohibits states from impairing a right, it, by implication, gives the states power to pass laws to support and enforce it. (Per TANEY, C. J.) Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Pet., 627. § 276. Suits by United States in state courts.- The United States are a body corporate, having a capacity to contract, to take and hold property, and in this respect stand upon the same footing with other corporate bodies; and if they will prosecute their suits in a state court and avail themselves of state laws for this purpose, it is not perceived that any good reason can be given why such state process as they use for the purpose of enforcing their right should not be subject to the state law. Stearns v. United States, 2 Paine, 312. See COURTS. $277. Declaration of independence - Effect on sovereignty of states. By the declaration of independence the united colonies did not become free in a collective capacity merely, but each colony became a sovereign and independent state; that is, each had a right to govern itself by its own authority and its own laws, without any control from any other power on earth. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dal., 224.

$278. State and federal governments not foreign to each other.- The governments of the several states and of the United States are not to be considered as foreign to each other. The laws of the United States operate on and bind the same people as the government and laws of the several states. The laws of the various states may be considered as foreign to each other, but the laws of the United States and of each state are a part of the same system. Stearns v. United States, 2 Paine, 310.

§ 279. The duty of allegiance to the United States is co-extensive with the constitutional jurisdiction of its government, and is to that extent independent of, and paramount to, any duty of allegiance to a particular state. The duty of allegiance to the United States is paramount so long as the United States is able to maintain peace, and to extend to its citizens the protection to which allegiance to it entitles them. United States v. Greiner,* 24 Law Rep., 99. § 280. Relations of the states to each other. For all national purposes embraced by the federal constitution, the states and the citizens thereof are one, united under the same sovereign authority, and governed by the same laws. In all other respects the states are necessarily foreign and independent of each other. Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet., 590; Bank of United States v. Daniel, 12 Pet., 54. See STATES.

§ 281. It was not the design of the framers of the constitution, nor is it the policy of the government and of the people of the United States, that any state shall be permitted to place restrictions between the states of the Union. Baltimore v. P. & C. Railroad Co.,* 13 Pittsb. L. J., 576.

$282. Though acts of a state government which are temporary in their nature, and simply affect individuals, are binding upon the residents of territory under its actual, though wrongful, control, still a grant of land by such state, if without its actual borders, is inoperative and invalid, though it may have been under the control and government of the state at the time of the grant; and for that state to admit, in a compact with another state, that the lands so granted are not within its boundaries, is not to impair the obligation of a contract. Fleeger v. Pool, 1 McL., 190.

§ 283. Except as restrained and limited by the constitution of the United States, each state is a separate and independent sovereignty. No state, therefore, can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property not within its territory. The several states are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. So it is laid down by jurists as an elementary principle that the laws of one state have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as it is allowed by comity, and no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decision. Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto, 722. In order to maintain a ferry across a river between two states, the concurrent action of the two states is not necessary. Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black, 629.

§ 284. Every state is perfectly competent, and has the exclusive right, to prescribe the remedies in its own judicial tribunals, to limit the time as well as the mode of redress, and to deny jurisdiction over cases which its own policy and its own institutions either prohibit or discountenance. Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Pet., 614.

§ 285. In administering justice, to enforce contracts and judgments, the states of this Union act independently of each other, and the courts of each are governed by their own municipal laws and regulations in the administration of justice, unless they are controlled by the constitution of the United States, or by laws enacted under its authority. Bank of Alabama v. Dalton, 9 How., 527.

§ 286. extradition. The clause of the constitution of the United States which provides that a person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime," applies to and embraces every act forbidden and made punishable by a law of the state, whether a crime at common law, or in the state to which the fugitive has fled, or not. The word "demand" implies that the right to have such fugitives surrendered up is an absolute right, and it follows that there must be a correlative obligation to deliver, without any reference to the character of the crime charged, or to the policy or laws of the state to which the fugitive has fled. Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How., 98. See CRIMES.

§ 287. That clause of the constitution which requires the various states to surrender up fugitives from justice from other states implies that the mode in which it is to be executed shall be prescribed by congress; and as in our government the executive is always to be subjected to the judicial department, the governor of the state on whom demand is made can act only when the demand is duly founded on judicial proceedings, and when called upon to render his aid, he should be satisfied that the fugitive has been duly and judicially charged with the crime for which his return is requested. Ibid.

§ 288. Reserved powers of the states. It seems that the federal government, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its field of action, and its laws, when passed in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land. On the other hand, the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. The exclusive powers possessed by the states cannot be exercised by the federal government; and that the United States and the states, in these respects, though exercising jurisdiction within the same territorial limits, are separate and independent sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other within their respective spheres, just as fully as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye. Sweatt v. Boston, etc., R'y Co., 3 Cliff., 352; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How., 506; Latham v. United States,* 1 Ct. Cl., 163; United States v. Bailey, 1 McL., 236; United States v. Cisna, 1 McL., 257; United States v. Brigantine William,* 2 Hall L. J., 277; State of Rhode Island v. State of Massachusetts, 12 Pet., 657. See STATES. § 289. The right of the United States to exercise control over a public quay in Louisiana can only exist by virtue of the constitution, though the quay was dedicated before the cession of the land to the United States. And as all powers which appertain to sovereignty, and which have not been delegated to the United States, remain in the several states, the right to regulate such quay is in the state alone. New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet., 737.

§ 290. In construing the constitution as to grants of power to the United States, and the restrictions upon the states, the supreme court of the United States has ever held, that an exception in any particular case presupposes that those matters which are not excepted are embraced within the grant or prohibition; and has laid it down as a general rule, that where no exception is made in terms, none will be made by mere implication. State of Rhode Island v. State of Massachusetts, 12 Pet., 722.

§ 291. Prerogative powers belonging by the common law to the sovereign as parens patriæ, belong, in the United States, to the separate states, and cannot, by virtue of any state law, be exercised by the federal courts. (Per TANEY, C. J.) Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How., 393.

§ 292. The states still retain the attributes of sovereignty except so far as they have surrendered them to the federal government; and they have never surrendered the right to determine the qualifications for office and the conditions upon which citizens may pursue their various callings within their jurisdiction. Cummings v. State of Missouri, 4 Wall., 277 (SS 608-618).

§ 293. Conflict of state and federal laws.— Where the nature of a provision of the constitution and the objects to be attained by it require that it should be controlled by one will, the states cannot legislate on the subject. And any state law interfering with the exercise of this right by congress is unconstitutional and void. Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Pet., 624. See XIII, 7.

$294. Whether the constitution of a state or an act of its legislature conflicts with the constitution or laws of the United States is a federal question, the ultimate and final decision of which, by the constitution and laws of congress, is vested in the supreme court of the United States, whose decision is binding on all other courts, both federal and state. United States v. Jefferson County, 5 Dill., 317.

§ 295. The law of congress upon a subject within its jurisdiction is the supreme law of the land; but in order that a state law which was enacted by virtue of its reserved power should be void as being in conflict with it, the repugnance or conflict must be so direct and positive that the two acts cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together, and also that the act of

congress should be clearly within its authority. Sinnot v. Commissioners of Pilotage of Mobile, 22 How., 243; Austin v. The Aldermen, 7 Wall., 694.

§ 296. No power can exist in a state the exercise of which might tend to defeat the purposes for which the federal government was established. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall., 35 ($S 1269-73).

§ 297. Where congress has failed to act in reference to a matter over which it has control, the states may act if not directly inhibited; but when congress acts, its act is exclusive. United States v. Quinn,* 8 Blatch., 48.

§ 298. A state cannot exercise its police power in regard to a subject-matter which has been confided exclusively to the discretion of congress. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 2 Otto, 259 (§§ 1336-42). See § 266.

§ 299. When an unqualified power is given to the general government, the exercise of which by the state governments would be inconsistent with the express grant, the whole of the power is granted, and consequently vests exclusively in the general government. Golden v. Prince,* 3 Wash., 313.

§ 300. State may legislate when congress does not.- Where congress has not legislated upon a subject-matter within its jurisdiction, it seems that state legislation upon the same subject-matter is not unconstitutional. The Canal-boat Ann Ryan,* 7 Ben., 23. Contra, Golden v. Prince,* 3 Wash., 313.

§ 301. Where congress legislates concerning a subject-matter within its constitutional powers, such legislation supersedes all state legislation on the same subject, and, by necessary implication, prohibits it. When congress has exercised such power, state legislatures have no right to interfere, and, as it were, by way of complement to the legislation of congress, to prescribe additional regulations, and what they may deem auxiliary provisions for the same purpose. Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Pet., 617; The Celestine, 1 Biss., 6. § 392. Judicial powers. The constitution does not prohibit the legislature of a state from exercising judicial powers. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet., 380 (§§ 1630–35).

§ 303. Territory to be included in a city.→ What portions of a state shall be within the limits of a city and be governed by its authorities and its laws is a proper subject of legislation. Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 14 Otto, 78 (§§ 695–700).

§ 304. Exclusive power of the states in local matters.-The several original states, from the time they declared themselves independent, became entitled, at least so far as regards their municipal regulations, to all the rights and powers of sovereign states, and such powers were not derived from concessions made by the British king. The treaty of peace contains a recognition of their independence, not a grant of it. So a law of such a state, passed after the declaration of independence, declaring all persons residing therein to be citizens and owing allegiance thereto, is binding upon all residents. M'Ilvaine v. Coxe, 4 Cr., 212; City of New York . Milne, 11 Pet., 102 ( 1274-83).

§ 305. Shores and beds of navigable waters. The right of eminent domain over the shores and the soils under the navigable waters for all municipal purposes belongs exclusively to the states within their respective territorial jurisdictions, and they, and they only, have the constitutional power to exercise it. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How., 230; Griffing v. Gibb, McAl., 224.

$396. The shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were not granted by the constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the states respectively, and new states have the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction over this subject as the original states. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How., 230.

§ 307. The right of the United States to the public lands, and the power of congress to make all needful rules and regulations for the sale and disposition thereof, confers no power on congre-s to grant the soil under the navigable waters of a state below high water mark. Ibid. $308. The right of states to grant licenses to maintain ferries across the navigable waters of the United States is one of the reserved powers of the states, not delegated to the general government. Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black, 635.

309. Power of states to regulate contracts and civil status.- Except as restrained and limited by the constitution of the United States, the several states exercise and possess the authority of independent states. As such independent states, every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every state has the power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may contract, the forms and solemnities with which their contracts shall be executed, the rights and obligations arising out of them, and the mode in which their validity shall be determined and their obligations enforced. They may regulate, also, the manner and conditions upon which property situated within such territory, both real and personal, may be acquired, enjoyed and transferred. Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto, 722; Strader v. Graham, 10 How., 82.

§ 310. Marriage in the United States is not a federal question, but is governed by each state for itself. Celebration of Marriages by Consuls,* 7 Op. Att'y Gen'l, 23.

§ 311. State may lay out road through public lands.-The legislature of a state may authorize and lay out a rail or turnpike road through the lands of the United States within its territorial limits. The proprietorship of lands in a state by the general government cannot enlarge its sovereignty or restrict that of the state. This sovereignty extends to the state limits over the territory of the state, subject only to the proprietary right of the lands owned by the federal government, and the right to protect and dispose of such lands as it shall deem proper. The state has the right to provide for and promote intercourse between its citizens by the establishment of roads of all kinds, in the discretion of the legislature. The right of eminent domain appertains to a state, and may be exercised free from the restraints of the federal constitution. United States v. Railroad Bridge Co., 6 McL., 531.

§ 312. Power of state to authorize aid to railroads.- The construction of a railroad, although owned by a private corporation, is a matter of public concern, and its uses are so far public, that the legislature of a state, unless restrained by the express provisions of the state constitution, may authorize a county to make a donation of its warrants or bonds to aid in such an enterprise, and to levy taxes for the payment of such bonds or warrants. Olcott v. The Supervisors,* 16 Wall., 678; Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall., 666; Town of Queensbury v. Culver, 19 Wall., 83; St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16 Wall., 644. Contra (CLIFFORD, J., dissenting), Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall., 655. See BONDS, B.

§ 313. State bankrupt laws.-The exercise of the power to pass bankrupt laws, by the state governments, is incompatible with the grant of power to congress to pass uniform laws on the same subject. If congress does not exercise the power, no, right to pass such laws results to the state governments. The failure by congress to pass such a law amounts to a declaration that none should exist. Golden v. Prince,* 3 Wash., 313. See infra, X, 3. 314. Regulating occupations.- An ordinance requiring for the issue of a license to establish, maintain or carry on a laundry within the limits mentioned, the recommendation of twelve citizens and tax-payers in the block in which the laundry is to be established, maintained or carried on, is unauthorized by the power, given to the body passing it, to prohibit and suppress, or exclude from certain limits, or to regulate, all occupations, houses, places, pastimes, amusements, exhibitions and practices, which are against good morals, contrary to public order and decency, or dangerous to the public safety." And it may be doubted whether such an ordinance could be authorized by any legislative body under our form of government. The Laundry Ordinance Case,* 7 Saw., 526.

§ 315. Rights of Chinese - Police regulations.- Chinese, resident here before the passage of the recent act of congress restricting Chinese immigration, have, under the Burlingame treaty, the right to remain and follow any of the lawful, ordinary trades and pursuits of life, without let or hindrance from the state, or any of its subordinate municipal bodies, except such as may arise from the enforcement of equal and impartial laws. Ibid. See S$ 266, 298.

§ 316. The Burlingame treaty is not violated by the act of the legislature of California providing that no body shall be exhumed, and no exhumed body carried through the streets or highways, except upon a permit from the health officer at the cost of $10, this sum being charged to defray the expense of inspection and supervision. The treaty does not prevent the application of the act to the removal of Chinese bodies for transportation to China. In re Wong Yung Quy,* 6 Saw., 442.

$317. The right to reside in this country, guarantied by the Burlingame treaty, implies the right to work for a living. The act of the legislature of Oregon of October 16, 1872, providing that "it shall be unlawful to employ any Chinese laborers on any street, or part of a street, of any city or incorporated town of this state, or on any public works or public improvements of any character, except as a punishment for crime," is void as in conflict with the provisions of the treaty, the fifth article of which recognizes "the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects respectively from one country to the other, for the purpose of curiosity, trade, or as permanent residents,” and the sixth article of which declares that "Chinese subjects visiting and residing in the United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may be then enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation." Baker v. City of Portland,* 5 Saw., 566.

$318. The police power of the state extends to all matters relating to the internal improvement of the state, and the administration of its laws, which have not been surrendered to the general government, and embraces regulations affecting the health, good order, morals, peace and safety of society. This power may be exercised by precautionary measures against the increase of crime or pauperism, or the spread of infectious diseases from persons coming

from other countries. The state may entirely exclude convicts, lepers and persons inflicted with incurable disease; may refuse admission to paupers, idiots, lunatics and others who, from physical causes, may likely become a charge upon the public, until security is afforded that they will not become such a charge. But the extent of the power of the state to exclude a foreigner from its territory is limited by the right of self-defense. Whatever, outside of the legitimate exercise of this right, affects the intercourse of foreigners with our people, their immigration to this country and residence therein, is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal government. The act of the state of California requiring the commissioner of immigration to satisfy himself whether or not any passenger who shall arrive in the state in vessels from any foreign port or place (who is not a citizen of the United States), belongs to any of certain specified classes, including "lewd or debauched women," and declaring that no person who shall belong to any of these classes, or who possesses any of the specified infirmities or vices, shall be permitted to land, unless the master, owner or consignee of the vessel shall give bond to the people of the state that such person will not become a charge upon the public, no difference being made between the woman whose lewdness consists in private unlawful indulgence and the woman who publicly prostitutes her person for hire, or the woman debauched by intemperance in food and drink, or debauched by the loss of her chastity, is not only unconstitutional, but, when applied to citizens of China, is in conflict with the treaty between the United States and China, adopted July 28, 1868. In re Ah Fong,* 3 Saw., 144. See § 266, 298, 315.

§ 319. Power to suppress insurrection.- A state may use its power to put down an armed insurrection too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The power is necessary to the existence of every government, essential to the preservation of order and free institutions, and is as necessary to the states of the Union as to any other government. It rests with the state to determine what force the exigency demands, and if, in its opinion, a declaration of martial law is essential for the suppression of the insurrection, a law declaring martial law is constitutional and valid. (WOODBURY, J., dissenting.) Luther v. Borden, 7 How., 45.

§ 320. Compact between states.- Where private rights are injured by a compact between states, entered into with assent of congress, the injured parties must look to their respective states for redress. To allow persons to object to the treaty because their rights were not suitably protected would be to abrogate the treaty-making power altogether. Fleeger v. Pool, 1 McL., 191. See § 130.

2. Congressional Elections.

[See ELECTIONS.]

SUMMARY-Constitutional provision, § 321.- Acts of congress valid, § 322.- May act in conjunction with states, § 323.— Power to provide for appointment of supervisors and deputy marshals, §§ 322, 324.- Power of marshals to arrest, § 325.

§ 321. The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators. Const., art. I, sec. 4. See § 354.

§ 322. The acts of congress punishing officers of election for violation of their duty at elections for representatives in congress, and authorizing the appointment of supervisors by the circuit courts, and of special deputy marshals by the marshal, are constitutional. Ex parte Siebold, $ 326-343; Ex parte Clarke, SS 344-348. See § 360.

§ 323. It is not necessary that congress should assume entire control of elections of representatives, but in the exercise of its power to make regulations it may act in conjunction with the states, and any regulations it may make will supersede those of the states. Ibid.

§ 324. Congress has power to provide for the appointment of deputy marshals. In re Engle, $ 349-353. See § 360.

325. And it was held that deputy marshals were justified in arresting two men, one of whom was intoxicated and noisy, and the other one, a colored man, was distributing to colored voters, many of whom could not read, tickets containing the names of democratic candidates, but purporting to be republican tickets - having republican devices thereon, such as pictures of Presidents Lincoln and Grant. Ibid. See § 1601.

[NOTES.-See §§ 354-364.]

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