or if you have any questions that I should properly answer now, I would be glad to.

Mr. BENDER. You might give us some idea as to what is happening on the floor and whether it is possible for us to meet this afternoon. Mr. BROWNSON. I can see no reason why we could not reconvene at 2 o'clock this afternoon and keep in close touch with the House.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Legislative appropriations bill, several bills on the District of Columbia, some of them controversial.

General SMITH. Mr. Chairman, Secretary Robertson is taking off between 2:30 and 3 for Korea on a mission of the gravest importance, and if you could excuse me this afternoon and allow Mr. Lourie to proceed, then I will be at your disposal at any subsequent time. Mr. BROWNSON. That will be splendid.

We will recess at this time until 2:30 o'clock this afternoon. Mr. Lourie will be the first witness, and we will get in contact with you, Secretary Smith, probably tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 12: 15 p. m., the committee was recessed until 2:30 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(Thereupon, at 2:55 p. m. of the same day, the proceedings were resumed.)

Mr. BROWNSON. The committee will come to order, please. The first witness this afternoon will be Hon. Donold B. Lourie, Under Secretary of State for Administration. Mr. Lourie has with him some charts which he wishes to use in presenting this testimony. I would suggest that we withhold questioning of Mr. Lourie until the presentation is through so that the committee members may see the charts. Mr. Lourie, do you desire to read your prepared testimony? STATEMENT OF HON. DONOLD B. LOURIE, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ADMINISTRATION; ACCOMPANIED BY EDWIN M. MARTIN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY FOR MUTUAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; HOWLAND SARGEANT, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION; EDWARD T. WAILES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION; SCOTT MCLEOD, ADMINISTRATOR FOR SECURITY AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS; AND JOSEPH B. PHILLIPS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Mr. LOURIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Rather than read the report, as you say I would like to use these charts and we put them up at the other end of the room so that I hope everyone can see them. I would like to discuss in detail the comprehensive report which came to you this morning. That report came through Mr. Hughes and General Smith.

Mr. BROWNSON. I will ask unanimous consent that the statement by Hon. Donold B. Lourie be included in the record at this point. (Statement of Donold B. Lourie is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. DONOLD B. LOURIE, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ADMINISTRATION

This is the first time I have been called before your committee and I am pleased to have the opportunity to explain as best I can what effects the President's Reorganization Plans 7 and 8 will have on the State Department.

Mr. Hughes and General Smith have given you a comprehensive picture of the proposals outlined in Reorganization Plans 7 and 8 and I would like to give you a more detailed discussion of those proposals. The President has pointed out in his message on the reorganization that there are two major deficiencies in the organization of the executive branch for conducting foreign affairs:

(1) There has been no clear assignment of central responsibility for foreign policy below the President;

(2) A number of programs which implement our foreign policy have been scattered within the executive branch rather than appropriately grouped together for the most efficient and economical administration.

The President made it clear in his message transmitting the reorganization plans to the Congress that our organization for the conduct of foreign affairs has been built upon a patchwork of statutes. This must be carefully studied as a basis for new legislation, but this will take time. The President added that by early next year we should be prepared, with appropriate consultation with the Congress, to recommend such legislation, but, in the meantime, we should go ahead to improve the present arrangements within the framework of existing legislation. That is what these measures are designed to do. This is a move in the direction of making it possible for the Secretary of State to spend more of his time and that of his principal assistants on the development and control of foreign policy and our relations with foreign governments.

I believe that these proposals offer the opportunity for the Secretary of State and the State Department to concentrate attention on the advice and assistance which the President desires in the formulation and control of foreign policy and in addition provide a focal point for coordination of foreign affairs activities throughout the Government.

May I add that I came to the Department of State without preconceived ideas on how the Department of State could best be organized. One of the things that impressed me was the fact that I, like most people in this country, never realized the extent of the administrative burdens that fall on the Secretary of State under the present arrangement where he is ultimately held responsible for personnel, for budget, for regulations and other administrative aspects of operating programs, such as the information program. At the present time these operating responsibilities tend to keep him and his principal assistants from concentrating on the primary role of the State Department in the formulation and control of foreign policy itself. Under the proposals before the committee, there are more than a dozen operating programs for which the Secretary now has this kind of responsibility, which would be placed in other agencies where they can be effectively consolidated into truly hard-hitting instruments to support our national objectives.

Under these proposals, the Secretary of State would be relieved of operating responsibility for the following programs:

(1) The program authorized by the Kersten amendment of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 for aiding persons who have escaped from Communist areas.

(2) The foreign information programs of the International Information Administration, including those large-scale and important programs in Germany and Austria.

(3) The special United States program for the relief and resettlement of refugees coming into Israel.

(4) The technical cooperation program carried out by the Technical Cooperation Administration.

(5) The Institute of Inter-American Affairs.

(6) Administration of the local currency fund generated by the food-reliefassistance program for the Yugoslav people, authorized by the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950.

(7) The payment of ocean freight for private relief shipments under the terms of the Mutual Security Act.

(8) The program for guaranteeing convertibility of currency acquired by United States exporters of information media materials under the terms of the Mutual Security Act.

(9) Operating phases of United States participation in five special multilateral programs in the general mutual-security field:

(a) United Nations Technical Assistance (UNTA)-the multilateral technical assistance program carried out by the United Nations and its specialized agencies to enlist technical skills from many nations to help the governments and peoples of underdeveloped areas to develop their economic resources;

(b) The program of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), which assists underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and

Latin America in the development of long-range maternity and child-welfare activities;

(c) Relief and rehabilitation for the Korean people, provided through the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA);

(d) Aid to Arab refugees from Palestine provided through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA);

(e) The program carried out by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) to assist in the movement of migrants from Europe to overseas areas desiring to receive immigration.

In the past it has not always been clear that the President looked to the Secretary of State as the Cabinet officer primarily responsible for foreign affairs in the Executive Department. During the war and at other times in the past, agencies were created which dealt primarily in foreign affairs but which were not responsible to the Secretary of State in any way, not even policy coordination. As a result, we often found various agencies of the Government operating overseas expressing different views and different policies and working at cross-purposes. These two reorganization plans make it crystal clear that the Secretary of State is the Cabinet officer within the executive branch who is primarily responsible for foreign relations, subject to the guidance and direction only of the President himself.

I believe that the reorganization proposals which you are considering will result in a single and straightforward organization of agencies and functions relating to foreign affiairs and I am satisfied that these proposals clarify the role of the Secretary of State and will make it possible for him to function with much greater effectiveness in Washington and aboard.

The issue of keeping control over foreign policy

One of the chief problems faced by those responsible for drafting Reorganization Plans 7 and 8 was separating foreign economic aid and foreign information programs from the Department of State and yet retaining overall control of foreign policy for the Secretary of State. This difficulty has, I believe, been resolved in these proposals. Ultimately, the only way that the primary responsibility of the Secretary for foreign policy within the executive branch can be assured is by the reliance of the President himself on the Secretary of State and by the President's use of the Secretary of State as his principal channel of authority on foreign policy. The President has clearly stated his intention of doing exactly this in his message to the Congress and in his letter to the heads of the executive departments and to the Director for Mutual Security.

There are also some other very important safeguards in these proposals. For example, the Preseident has given the Secretary clear authority to provide guidance on our foreign policies to all other agencies of the Federal Government. The President has directed that other officials of the executive branch will work with and through the Secretary of State on matters of foreign policy. The plans also specifically provide Presidential assurance that the Foreign Operations Administration and the United States Information Agency will be headed by men who support and enjoy the full confidence of the Secretary of State. This is essentially a plan for team work. It will avoid many of the frictions and frustrations which so often jeopardize the harmonious collaboration of agencies working in closely related fields.

The Secretary's leadership will also be made effective by the authority given him to review the plans and policies relative to the programs and legislative proposals of the two principal operating agencies in the foreign affairs field. To assure his ability to carry out this responsibility the requirement is laid down by the President that the heads of the foreign operations administration and the United States information agency shall at all times keep the Secretary informed in such a way that he can be certain that the programs of the agencies and the implementation of their programs further the attainment of our foreign policy objectives.

Making the organization abroad more effective

The President, in his message to the Congress, made it clear that only part of the job can be done by giving the Department of State the clear authority to provide guidance on our foreign policies to all agencies of the Federal Government. He went on to say: "It is equally important that each chief of diplomatic mission in each foreign country provide effective coordination of, and foreign policy direction with respect to, all United States Government activities in the country." The chief of a diplomatic mission plays a vital role in applying this clearcut assignment of responsibility for foreign policy to the

conduct of our foreign relations overseas. A chief of mission receives all of his instructions from the President and the Secretary of State and is responsible for exercising general direction and leadership of the entire United States effort in the country to which he is accredited. He assures unified development and execution of United States programs. In addition to coordinating activities of United States representatives carrying out programs in his country, he sees that the interpretation and application of instructions received by United States representatives are in accord with established United States policy. The chief of mission is actively concerned with the programs developed by the foreign operations administration for his country and with the programs developed by the United States information agency for that country. It is his responsibility to see that representatives of these and other United States agencies in his country are adequately informed as to current and prospective United States policies. Where the chief of mission considers it necessary in the interests of the United States he may recommend the withdrawal of any United States personnel assigned to his country.

Effect of reorganization on the size of the Department of State

When these proposals become effective, the State Department will have only about one-half the number of positions that exist today.

I have tried to study the evolution of the Department of State in the postwar years to see what the causes were of the rapid increase in the size of the Department. Immediately after the end of the war, for example, there were only 12,910 positions in the State Department, both at home and abroad-including United States nationals and local employees in this total. Now this was the time when the Department was in the process of reestablishing normal diplomatic and consular activities in almost one-half the countries of the world, when the United Nations had just been born, and when such activities as issuing passports and visas or the demands made upon the Department for maintaining the security of its establishments overseas were all at abnormally low levels.

It was at this time in the early part of the fiscal year 1946, that nearly 13,000 more positions were added to the Department-in effect, doubling the size of the Department in the period of just a few short weeks. How was this done? It was done by transfers to the Department in the period immediately after V-J day of responsibility for programs which had been carried on during the war by independent agencies-the Office of War Information, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the Office of Strategic Services, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner.

These swollen wartime functions were drastically and rapidly reduced in size. The fact remains that 2 years later, by fiscal 1948, the consolidation of some of the wartime functions that had to be carried on in peacetime as continuing functions of the Department of State (such as intelligence), together with the continued rise in the volume of normal peacetime activities, resulted in a 50-percent increase in the number of employees working on regular State Department functions. From 1948 to 1953, however, the staff on regular diplomatic and consular activities had been reduced from 17,989 positions to 12,851a reduction of over 20 percent.

In the fiscal year 1950, there came another enormous addition to the size of the Department-resulting from the transfer of responsibility from the military services to the State Department for programs in Germany and Austria. This resulted in the addition of nearly 19,000 positions. In effect, we had once again doubled the size of the Department.

By the current fiscal year, the total number of employees of the Department at home and abroad-still including not only United States nationals but local employees as well-had reached 42,000. Of these, approximately 13,000 were engaged on the regular functions of the Department, 9,500 on German and Austrian affairs, 3,500 on the Technical Cooperation Administration programs, 12,000 on foreign information and exchange programs and another 4,000 who were rendering administrative services to programs carried on by other agencies, such as the Department of Defense and the Mutual Security Agency.

As I said in my opening remarks about the size of the Department, the immediate result of the reorganization proposals is to cut the size of the Department approximately in half. However, if we look ahead and take into account the anticipated reduction in appropriations for the Department in fiscal year 1954 we find that the number of positions allocated to the normal State Department functions will in fact be smaller than the number in the fiscal year 1946, before

the addition to the State Department of any of the continuing peacetime functions arising from the war. We estimate that there will be approximately 11,700 positions for the regular State Department functions in the coming fiscal year as compared with 12,910 in the fiscal year 1946. In fact, my study of the history of the postwar evolution of the Department of State shows clearly that the Department resources devoted to the traditional responsibilities and basic policy functions will have actually declined during this period.

I find that very few people understand the fact that out of the present 42,000 employees of the Department of State, 32,000 are overseas. Under these reorganization proposals, the Department of State expects to have approximately 16,000 people overseas-including United States nationals and all local employees.

The educational exchange programs remain in the Department of State

I should point out that the Department of State retains, under these reorganization proposals, the educational-exchange programs now administered by the International Information Administration. These programs differ from those of the mass media like radio broadcasting or motion pictures of the present International Information Administration. They involve direct face-to-face communication and contact between the people and institutions of the United States and those of other countries.

In fact, official educational exchange programs began before the present combined information and educational exchange program was started. They originated before the Second World War and have been administered continuously by the Department of State. I should also say that they have not created the same kind of complex operating and policy problems as those faced by other media. Perhaps in part for this reason, their administration within the framework of the Department has been effective.

The responsibilities of the Department of State for the exchange program are to a great extent supervisory, rather than operational in nature. Certain administrative functions with regard to about three-quarters of the program are delegated to private organizations and other Federal agencies in this country and to binational commissions and committees abroad.

Accurate statements of official United States positions for use abroad

I should also point out that the Department of State is instructed by the President to control the content of a program designed to assure accurate statements of official United States positions on important issues and current developments. Such official statements, specifically identified by an exclusive descriptive label, will normally be disseminated on a worldwide basis by the new United States Information Agency. This is a new concept. Its objective is clear. It is to present accurately, without exaggeration and without the slightest tinge of propaganda the official position of the United States on major current problems and issues. It is the President's desire that such an official program come to be known by the leaders and governments of other nations as a completely dependable statement of the official position of the United States on important problems and issues. The President hopes that by use of the official program technique, such leaders of other countries will in fact come to rely on what is stated in such a program as a correct statement and an official statement of the United States position.

Conclusion

I do believe that these first steps outlined in the reorganization proposals which are before you will result in much clearer asignments of responsibility and far more effective teamwork on the part of the President's executive departments and principal advisers and assistants. From the point of view of the Secretary of State, these proposals move in the right direction. They constitute a blueprint of the first esesential steps toward meeting the needs of our Government in the conduct of foreign affairs. If adopted, they will have these main results: (1) provide for the assignment of primary responsibility for all foreignpolicy matters to the Secretary of State; (2) group together a number of homogeneous programs which help to implement our foreign policy; (3) make possible more efficient administration of the respective programs; and (4) permit the Secretary of State and his principal assistants to devote a major proportion of their time and resources to concentration on basic foreign policy functions.

For these reasons I respectfully urge that this committee approve reorganization plans 7 and 8 as submitted by the President.