8. POLICE POWER-REGULATION BY STATES OF INTER-
STATE COMMERCE.-Every state has the right under its re-
served police power to prohibit the importation and sale of all ar-
ticles inherently unworthy of commerce and unfit for the use of
its people, and, in the absence of congressional action to the con-
trary, the determination by a state legislature that an article of
doubtful commercial quality is not a legitimate article of commerce,
is conclusive. (Austin v. State, 703.)
POLICE POWER MANUFACTURE AND SALE OF
CIGARETTES.-A state statute prohibiting the sale of cigarettes
manufactured within the state, is valid as an internal police regu-
lation. (Austin v. State, 703.)
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.
See Criminal Law, 3-7, 10.
PRESCRIPTION.
See Waters and Watercourses, 2.
PRESUMPTION - SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE. - The
presumption arising from the spoliation or suppression of evidence
that it would, if produced, be unfavorable to the party destroying
or suppressing it, is not limited to the case of documentary evi-
dence is the exclusive possession and control of the party. (Fonda
v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 341.)
See Burden of Proof; Corporations, 29, 34; Courts; Evidence, 4;
Homicide, 9; Judgment, 6; Rape, 4; Statutes, 21; Vendor and
Purchaser, 2; Witnesses, 6.
PRIVATE WAYS.
See Cotenancy, 5.
PROCEDURE.
See Statutes, 2.
PROCESS.
See Jurisdiction, 2.
1. RAILROAD COMPANIES-DUTY TO TRESPASSERS.-A
person stealing a ride on a railroad train is a trespasser and gains
no rights; but it is the duty of the railroad company and its em-
ployés not to injure him willfully or intentionally. (Illinois Central
R. R. Co. v. King, 93.)
RAILROAD COMPANIES-DUTY TO TRESPASSERS-
LIABILITY FOR ACT OF BRAKEMAN.—A railroad company is
liable for the willful act of its brakeman within the scope of his
authority in putting a trespasser off its train. (Illinois Central R. R.
Co. v. King, 93.)
3. RAILROAD COMPANIES-DUTY TO TRESPASSERS-EVI-
DENCE OF WILLFULNESS.-Evidence that a brakeman pulled a
person who was stealing a ride on a railroad train from under the
train while it was in motion, and manifested his feeling and will-
ingness to inflict needless injury by cursing him and throwing a
stone at him, is evidence that the act of the brakeman was willful.
(Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. King, 93.)
4. RAILROAD COMPANIES - LIABILITY FOR WILLFUL
INJURY TO TRESPASSER.-The negligence of a trespasser in tak-
ing a position under the cars to steal a ride upon a train is not an
issue in an action to recover for injury received while he was be-
ing dragged from such position by the willful act of a brakeman
while the train was in motion. (Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. King,
93.)
5. RAILROAD COMPANIES-ENTRY ON LAND-RIGHT TO
IMPROVEMENTS.-If a railroad company lawfully enters upon
land under conveyance from a tenant for life, and makes improve-
ments necessary to its business, it has a right, upon abandoning
the premises at the expiration of the life estate, to remove such
improvements, and, if it continues in possession thereafter, the value
of such improvements should not be considered in assessing the
damages to which the remainderman is entitled. The amount which
the latter is entitled to recover is the market value of the property
at the time the life estate terminated, with interest, the value of
such improvements placed on the property at the expense of the
company and necessary to its business not being considered in ascer-
taining such market value. (Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 17.)
6. RAILROAD COMPANIES - ENTRY ON LAND — EJECT-
MENT.-If a railroad company enters upon land and constructs its
road either with the consent of the owner or without lawful author-
Ity, and the landowner acquiesces in the appropriation of the prop-
erty to a great public use until it has become a necessary component
part of the property acquired by the railroad to perform its public
duties, the landowner must be held to have waived his right to
retake the property in ejectment, and must be remitted to such other
remedies for the wrong done him as will not interfere with the
rights of the public to have the railroad maintained and operated.
(Charleston etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 17.)
7. RAILROAD COMPANIES-ENTRY ON LAND BY CON-
SENT-ESTOPPEL AGAINST LANDOWNER.-If a railroad com-
pany enters upon land with the consent of the owner, or under
license from him, and the property thus taken possession of becomes
such a component part of its railroad that to surrender its possession
would interfere seriously with the interests of the company or of
the public, the landowner, though entitled to compensation for his
property, is estopped from asserting against the company the legal
title to the property by an action of ejectment. (Charleston etc. Ry.
Co. v. Hughes, 17.)
8. RAILROAD COMPANIES-LEGISLATIVE POWERS OVER
-REASONABLE REGULATION.-The property of a railroad com-
pany is dedicated to a public use, and the legislature has the power
to regulate that use in a reasonable manner, unless the charter of
the railroad company expressly protects it from such regulation.
The compelling of intersecting lines to put in a connecting switch
is a reasonable regulation. (Jacobson v. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co.,
358.)
9. RAILROAD COMPANIES-LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER.
The legislature has the power to compel a common carrier to do
business in the ordinary and usual way, and therefore may compel
such interchange of cars as incidental to the business for which
the company was chartered. (Jacobson v. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co.,
858.)
10. RAILROAD COMPANIES - INCIDENTAL POWERS.-AS
incidental to the operation of its road, a railroad company has the
power to interchange cars with other connecting companies. (Jacob-
son v. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co., 358.)
11. STREET RAILWAYS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-
WANTON CONDUCT OF MOTORMAN.—A plaintiff may recover
of a street railway company, notwithstanding that he might have
negligently placed himself in a place of danger, if the conduct of
the motorman in running him down was wanton and willful, or if,
after discovering the plaintiff in a place of danger in time to have
prevented the injury by the exercise of reasonable care, he failed
to do so. (Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 341.)
12. STREET RAILWAYS - EVIDENCE-GENERAL INCOM-
PETENCY OF MOTORMAN.-Evidence of the general incompe-
tency of a motorman, based on the observations of witnesses who
had seen him operate his car on prior occasions, is inadmissible to
establish negligence at the time of the accident. (Fonda v. St. Paul
City Ry. Co., 341.)
13. STREET RAILWAYS-MASTER AND SERVANT-EVI-
DENCE-RULES OF COMPANY.-The private rules of a master
regulating the conduct of his servants in the management of his
own business, intended only for the guidance of his servants, al-
though designed for the protection of others, are not admissible in
evidence to establish negligence on the part of the master.
v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 341.)
14. RAILROADS-COUPLING OF CARS-ASSUMPTION OF
RISKS-LIABILITY FOR INJURY.—If one railroad receives a car
from another railroad, with a drawbar different in make and
height from that which it uses itself, and an experienced man is
ordered to couple the cars together by a link and pin, but he is
crushed between the sills of the cars while attempting to make the
connection, because one drawbar slides over the other, the railroad
company is not answerable for the injury, because the difference
in height was an obvious risk assumed by the plaintiff. (Ellsbury
v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 248.)
RAILROADS-STREET-CARS-RISK ASSUMED BY PAS-
SENGER-EXPELLING DRUNKEN MAN.-A passenger upon a
street-car assumes the risk, when he takes passage, of the conse
quences of a lawful and reasonable act of the conductor in expelling
a drunken man from the car. (Spade v. Lynn etc. R. R. Co., 298.)
16. RAILROADS-STREET-CARS-OBLIGATION TO NERV-
OUS PASSENGERS.-The obligation of a street railway company
toward a passenger cannot be increased simply by his notifying the
notifying the conductor that he has unstable nerves. (Spade v.
Lynn etc. R. R. Co., 298.)
17. RAILROADS-STREET-CARS-DAMAGES FOR FRIGHT
CAUSED BY EJECTING DRUNKEN PASSENGER.-If the con-
ductor of a street-car, in ejecting a drunken man therefrom, jostles
against another drunken man, who falls upon a lady passenger,
and the injury from the fall is slight, though she suffers physical
injury from fright caused by the fall and the rest of the occurrences,
she can recover, if at all, only for the fright caused by the inad-
vertent battery, and not for that attributable to the general disturb-
ance. (Spade v. Lynn etc. R. R. Co., 298.)
18. RAILROADS STREET-CARS — UNAVOIDABLE
DENT TO PASSENGER IN EJECTING DRUNKEN
RIGHT OF ACTION.-If due care is used in expelling a drunken
man from a street-car, an unavoidable battery committed on a pas-
senger's person, during the process, by the conductor's jostling an-
other drunken man, who falls upon the passenger, seems not to be
actionable. (Spade v. Lynn etc. R. R. Co., 298.)
19. RAILROAD COMPANIES-NEGLIGENCE PER SE-FAIL-
URE TO USE SELF-COUPLING DEVICES.-Failure of a railroad
company to equip its freight-cars with modern self-coupling devices
is negligence, per se. (Troxler v. Southern Ry. Co., 580.)
20. RAILROAD COMPANIES-DUTY TO USE SAFE APPLI-
ANCES IN GENERAL USE.-The employés of a railroad company
and the traveling public alike have a right to be protected against
any dangers which can be avoided by the adoption of safety appli-
ances which have been tested by experience and which have come
into general use. (Troxler v. Southern Ry. Co., 580.)
21. RAILROAD COMPANIES - SAFE APPLIANCES — DE-
FENSE OF POVERTY.—If an appliance is such that the railroads
should have it, the poverty of the company is no sufficient excuse
for not having it. (Troxler v. Southern Ry. Co., 580.)
22. RAILROAD COMPANIES - FAILURE TO USE SELF-
COUPLING DEVICES-NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYE.-Where a
railroad company fails to equip its freight-cars with modern self-
coupling devices, and an employé is injured in coupling cars by
hand, the company is liable, whether such employé was negligent
in the manner of making the coupling, or not. (Troxler v. Southern
Ry. Co., 580.)
RAILROAD COMPANIES-INJURY TO PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY-COMPENSATION.-If the convenience of a railroad com-
pany requires a change in its terminal yard, so that what has been
done in one part thereof with one kind of appliances without in-
jury to private property, when done in another part with another
kind, inflicts serious injury upon the buildings on adjoining land, it
becomes the duty of the company to acquire the right to thus vir-
tually use the neighboring property either by purchase or through
the power of eminent domain. (Garvey v. Long Island R. R. Co.,
550.)
24. RAILROAD COMPANIES-INJURY TO PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY-NUISANCE.-A statute simply authorizing a railroad com-
pany to construct and operate a steam surface railroad does not
confer power, either express or implied, to construct and use. with-
out making compensation, a turntable in its terminal yard in the
immediate vicinity of dwelling-houses on private property, so as to
seriously, continuously, and permanently injure such premises and
impair their enjoyment. Such construction and use of a turntable
is a nuisance which may be enjoined. (Garvey v. Long Island
R. R. Co., 550.)
25. RAILROAD COMPANIES-INJURIES TO SERVANTS-AS-
SUMPTION OF RISKS.-A section hand who continues to use a
hand-car, the brake on which he knows to be dangerously defec-
tive, assumes the risk arising from such defect and cannot recover
for injuries resulting therefrom. (Gann v. Railroad, 687.)
26. RAILROAD COMPANIES-INJURIES TO SERVANTS—
FELLOW-SERVANTS.-While a section foreman and his subordi-
nates generally occupy the position of vice-principal and servants
as to each other, yet such foreman may become the fellow-servant
of his subordinates during the performance of work properly that
of a fellow-servant, as by handling the brake on a hand-car used
by the section gang. While engaged in such work the principal is
not liable for injuries resulting to a member of the section gang
from the foreman's negligence. (Gann v. Railroad, 687.)
COMPANIES-INJURIES TO SERVANTS-
SAFE APPLIANCES-NEGLIGENCE OF SECTION FOREMAN.
In the matter of providing safe appliances for the use of his sub-
ordinates, a section foreman bears to such subordinates the rela-
tion of a vice-principal, and for his negligence in this regard the
company is liable. (Gann v. Railroad, 687.)
See Eminent Domain, 2, 3; Irterstate Commerce, 1.
1. RAPE-FRAUD IN PERSONATING HUSBAND.-In order
to constitute the crime of rape by fraud in personating the hus-
band the defendant must resort to some device or stratagem, some
artifice or trick, intending to deceive the prosecutrix and make her
believe that he is her husband, and the effect of such stratagem
must also be to deceive and impose on her and make her believe
that he is her husband at the time the act is committed, and by
this means gain her consent to the copulation. (Payne v. State, 757.)
2. RAPE FRAUD IN PERSONATING HUSBAND-INDICT-
MENT.-An indictment which charges a rape by fraud in person-
ating the husband must allege that the injured female is a married
woman, and not the wife of the defendant; and while it is not
necessary to allege the name of the husband, it is the better prac-
tice to do so. (Payne v. State, 757.)
3. RAPE-BY FORCE-PERSONATING HUSBAND.-If a man
begins the act of copulation with a married woman while she is
asleep, and upon awakening she makes no resistance, believing him
to be her husband, the crime may be rape by force, but not by
fraud. (Payne v. State, 757.)
4. RAPE ATTEMPT TO COMMIT.-A BOY UNDER FOUR-
TEEN YEARS OF AGE is conclusively presumed to be incapable
of committing the crime of rape, whatever may be the real fact.
Evidence to rebut the presumption is inadmissible. He cannot,
therefore, be held guilty of an attempt to commit the offense. (Fos-
ter v. Commonwealth, 846.)
RECEIVERS-FOREIGN-SUITS BY.-The right of a re-
ceiver to bring suits in a foreign jurisdiction to enforce a liabil-
ity arising under the law of the state of his appointment cannot
be conferred upon him absolutely by his order of appointment, but
can arise only through an exercise of comity between states, and
such exercise will be denied where it would be in contravention of
the rights of citizens and opposed to equity. (Wyman v. Eaton, 193.)
RECOGNIZANCE.
See Libel, 2.
RELEASE-IGNORANCE OF CLAIM.-A party cannot re-
lease a claim of which he had no knowledge, and of the existence
of which he had always been fraudulently kept in ignorance.
(Cooper v. Hayward, 330.)
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