contract with the defendant. This is conceded by appellant in its opening argument, and denied in its reply. The first impression was undoubtedly the correct one. The contract was with the sender of the message, and whether recovery might be had for breach thereof, because made for plaintiff's benefit, we need not determine. This action is based on the negligence of the defendant in the performance of a duty in its public capacity as a common carrier of messages. In all such actions, sounding in tort, the injured party is not limited to damages which might reasonably have been within the contemplation of the parties, but recovery may be had "for all the injurious results which flow therefrom, by ordinary, natural sequence, without the interposition of any other negligent act or overpowering force": Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa, 757, 57 Am. St. Rep. 294; Code, sec. 2163; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Du Bois, 128 Ill. 248, 15 Am. St. Rep. 109; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Allen, 66 Miss. 549; Ellis v. American Tel. Co., 13 Allen, 226; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fenton, 52 Ind. 1; Smith v. Western Union Tel. Co., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am. St. Rep. 126; Milliken v. Western Union Tel. Co., 110 N. Y. 403; Young v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N. C. 370, 22 Am. St. Rep. 883; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Adams, 75 Tex. 531, 16 Am. St. Rep. 920. There was evidence tending to show that immediate delivery was requested, and that the agent at Winfield knew that McPeek was expecting a message, that it would relate to the capture of McPherson, and that prompt delivery was required. If so, while he may not have known of the reward being offered he may well be credited with understanding that McPeek was putting forth his efforts to accomplish a purpose from which he anticipated some benefit to accrue to himself. The law authorizes the offering of such rewards, and it is not too strict a rule to hold the defendant responsible for such losses as may reasonably be anticipated to follow its negligence, whether informed definitely what these may be or not. It was charged with knowledge that such a reward might be made, and it might reasonably reckon on such a contingency, in omitting its duty with reference to such a message. Nor was the plaintiff advised that the reward had actually been offered on October 22d, though he understood it would be, and was acting to secure this and others proposed by local officers. That the omission of the defendant caused greater loss than he then supposed does not affect its liability, or his right of recovery. Certainly,

AM. ST. REP., VOL LXX.-14

303

the loss of the reward was the direct result of the failure to arrest and deliver McPherson to the proper authorities, for this was the very condition of its payment.

4. The burden was on the plaintiff to prove that in all reasonable probability the loss resulted from the negligence of the defendant: Hendershott v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100 Iowa, 529, 68 Am. St. Rep. 313. Had the plaintiff proceeded by team to Morning Sun, with the assistance of the two constables and another, there seems no good reason to doubt that he would have arrested McPherson, who had been disarmed by his wife. This is not absolutely certain, for many contingencies may be supposed which could have intervened. While these might well be considered, they do not warrant us in saying that these men would not have accomplished that which has often been done before, and which is ordinarily done by officers in like situation. Whether they would in all probability have succeeded was for the jury to determine.

5. It is suggested that, as the train did not go until 6:06 in the morning, even if the message had been delivered the plaintiff could not have reached Morning Sun in time to make the arrest. But the plaintiff had made every arrangement to go by team. This message was understood 364 by the plaintiff to require immediate attention owing to his agreement with Mrs. McPherson.

6. It may be that the defendant can fix office hours which are reasonable, and that those from 8 A. M. to 6 o'clock P. M. are not unreasonable. This we do not decide. But see Western Union Tel. Co. v. Harding, 103 Ind. 505; Given v. Western Union Tel. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 119. The company received this message, if Mrs. McPherson is to be believed, with the understanding that it was to be delivered at about 9 o'clock. The agent at Winfield received it, and the company, having undertaken to deliver it, was bound to do so with reasonable diligence: Thompson on Electricity, sec. 300. He was acting within the scope of his agency, although not within the hours fixed for the active discharge of his duties. This could not relieve the company from discharging the obligation incurred by receiving the message to be delivered out of office hours.

7. The defendant asserts that no negligence in failing to deliver the message has been shown. If the testimony of Ridgeway be accepted as true, it might be that, in loudly rapping on the door repeatedly, and receiving no response, he exercised reasona

ble diligence. This is in dispute. The daughter of the plaintiff testified that she was at his home from 9 o'clock P.M., and did not retire until a half-hour later, and that she heard no noise at the door. Mr. and Mrs. McPeek also testified that they heard no such noise, and that they would have been likely to have heard it, had there been any. Whether Ridgeway made any effort to arouse the family is put in question by this evidence. If he was advised of the importance of the message, as claimed by the plaintiff, he was bound to exercise diligence accordingly, and whether he so did was for the determination of the jury.

Some other matters are discussed, but they are not of suffi cient importance to call for special attention. We discover nc error in the record, and the judgment must be affirmed.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES-DELAY IN DELIVERY OF MESSAGE-LIABILITY TO SENDEE.-No relation of contract exists between the receiver of a dispatch and the telegraph company, and the proper remedy of the former for damages is an action in tort: Webbe v. Western Union Tel. Co., 169 Ill. 610, 61 Am. St. Rep. 207; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Dubois, 128 Ill. 248, 15 Am. St. Rep. 109. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES-DELAY IN DELIVERY-DAMAGES.-It is as much the duty of a telegraph company to use diligence in delivering messages without unreasonable delay as in transmitting them, and it is generally liable in special damages for such delay or for the nondelivery of a message: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Moore, 12 Ind. App. 136, 54 Am. St. Rep. 515, and note. A telegraph company is liable for such damage as is the direct and natural result of its failure to deliver a message: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Broesche, 72 Tex. 654, 13 Am. St. Rep. 843. The general rule is, that the damages must be such as may fairly be supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties when they made the contract; that is, must be such as might naturally be expected to follow its violation: See the extended note to Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cooper, 10 Am. St. Rep. 778. The loss of a mere opportunity or possibility to make some money does not render a telegraph company liable in damages for the nondelivery of a telegram: Clay v. Western Union Tel. Co., 81 Ga. 285, 12 Am. St. Rep. 316.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES-NOTICE OF IMPORTANCE OF MESSAGE.-To authorize a recovery of special damages for delay in the delivery of a message, the telegraph company must have had notice, either from the face of the message or otherwise, at the time of receiving it, of the circumstances out of which special damages might arise: Gulf etc. Ry. Co. v. Loonie, 82 Tex. 323, 27 Am. St. Rep. 891, and note. Contra, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla. 637, 1 Am. St. Rep. 222, and note.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES - DELIVERY OF MESSAGE BURDEN OF PROOF.-A prima facie case is made out against a telegraph company when it is shown that the message which the company undertook to send was not delivered, and that damage has resulted, and the burden of proof is then thrown upon the company to show the exercise of ordinary care, and that its failure to transmit and deliver the message was not caused by its fault or negligence, or that of its employés: Fowler v. Western Union Tel. Co., 80 Me. 381, 6 Am. St. Rep. 211.

FEDER V. IOWA STATE TRAVELING MEN'S ASSOCIATION.

INSURANCE

[107 IOWA, 538.]

ACCIDENT-WHAT IS.-While it may be true that an accident is an event which takes place without one's foresight or expectation, and is undesigned, it is not true that every unforeseen, undesigned, and unexpected event is an accident. A result which, though not designed, foreseen, or expected, is yet the natural and dircct effect of acts voluntarily done, or of conditions voluntarily assumed, cannot be said to be accidental.

INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-DEATH BY-RUPTURE OF ARTERY.-Where the death of an insured was due to the rupture of an artery it will not be considered as the result of accident where. in the circumstances attending the rupture, there is no evidence that anything was done or occurred which the insured had not foreseen or planned, except the rupture and its consequences.

Berryhill & Henry and George E. Hubbell, for the appel

lants.

Cummins, Hewitt & Wright, for the appellee.

538 ROBINSON, C. J. The certificate in suit was issued to one Louis L. Feder, and entitled him to all the benefits accruing from membership in the defendant by virtue of its constitution and by-laws. When the certificate was issued, an article of the constitution of the defendant provided that "whenever the death of a member of this association in good standing shall occur from any accidental cause (except while such member shall be under the influence of intoxicating liquors or narcotics)," and proofs thereof should be made, the 539 proceeds of an assessment of two dollars on each member of the association, not exceeding the sum of five thousand dollars, should be paid to the beneficiary named in the certificate, or to his heirs or legal representatives, provided, however, that if, at the time of such death, the amount of money in the treasury of the association not otherwise appropriated should exceed the sum of five thousand five hundred dollars, payment of five thousand dollars was to be made from the money in the treasury. On the eighteenth day of April, 1894, Feder died. At that time he was a member of the association in good standing, and this action is brought on the certificate, to recover the sum of five thousand dollars. The validity of the certificate is admitted, the death of Feder is not disputed, and notice and proofs of his death are shown. We are required to determine whether there was sufficient evidence tending to show that Feder's death re

sulted "from an accidental cause" to require the submission of

the case to the jury.

The evidence tended to establish the following: The decedent, at the time of his death, was about twenty-six years of age, and had been in Denver, where his death occurred, about nine months. He was suffering from consumption, and wer t to Denver and resided there, on account of his health. He was benefited by the change of climate and medical treatment he received, and his health had been considerably improved, and was constantly improving, at the time of his death. During the day of his death he had been as well as usual, and in the evening was with two of his brothers in their office. Preparatory to leaving it, the decedent went to a window to close the shutters. A chair stood in front of the window, and he stood on his toes, and reached over the chair toward the shutters, and, as he did so, blood began to flow from his mouth. He was placed on a lounge, and died within a few minutes. The cause of his death was hemorrhage from a ruptured artery, and the evidence would have authorized the conclusion that the rupture 540 of the artery was not due to the disease from which he was suffering. There is no evidence that he fell, slipped, lost his balance, failed to catch the shutter when he reached for it, or that it moved at his touch more or less readily than he had expected it would move; in other words, there is no evidence whatever that anything was done or occurred which he had not foreseen and planned, excepting the rupture of the artery, and the consequences which resulted from it.

Did his death result "from an accidental cause"? Various definitions of the word "accident" are quoted by the appellants, and among them are the following: It is an "unexpected event, which happens as by chance, or which does not take place according to the usual course of things": North American etc. Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. St. 43, 8 Am. Rep. 212. "The equitable definition of the term 'accident' includes, not only inevitable casualties, and such as are caused by the act of God, but also those which arise from unforeseen occurrences, misfortunes, losses, and acts or omissions of other persons, without fault, negligence, or misconduct on the part of the person injured": Bostwick v. Stiles, 35 Conn. 198. "An event which takes place without one's foresight or expectation"; and it may include an injury received in a common-law affray, without the fault of the person injured: Supreme Council etc. v. Garrigus, 104 Ind.