always be consistent with truth, and the recognition of which would be inconsistent with public policy.

6. Will a Court of Chancery enforce a charitable bequest for foreign objects?1

upon the conversion of nine-tenths of the society to Christianity, be permitted to hear the word of life in that place where infidelity and error had once been taught. And upon the same principle, the newly created Equity Jurisdiction in a neighboring State might find itself constrained to order some of the parishes within its limits, to employ religious teachers who should inculcate the doctrine of whitchcraft as it was taught in the same churches, at the time of their first organization." The authority of this case is very much weakened by the remarks of the Chancellor, in Gable vs. Miller, which was subsequently decided. In 1 Dev. E. R., 453, Judge Hall intimates that the majority of the corporation must govern in the use and disposition of property held by it absolutely; and declares his opinion that it is not for the Court to decide whether the parties or church have strayed from the true faith, or introduced errors into the church government; and that it might be more than difficult to qualify any earthly tribunal to decide it. And in Keyser et al vs. Stansifer et al, 6 Ohio R., 363, the Court held, that where a religious society purchase land, the majority of the society have a right to control its use and occupation; and of which they cannot be deprived by subsequent lapse into any supposed error of doctrine. In delivering this opinion, Judge Lane used the following language: "It does not follow that they lose their property by ceasing to entertain certain opinions. The declaration of faith under which they were organised, contains no attempt to bind them to abide in the same belief. It is shown, in proof, that each Baptist church is in itself a whole, separate and independent, at liberty to form its own creed, and looking to others for counsel and social intercourse only. The opinions of such a body cannot but change. To fix their fleeting wherries; to anchor them immoveably in the stream of time; is beyond human power; for the mind at least is free; ranging by its inherent strength through the boundless fields of knowledge, moulding its belief' according to the apprehension of the truth, and incapable of fixedness until the great day when all truth shall be made known. And if it were possible, it were wrong; to limit activity of mind, is to set boundaries to human knowledge."

1 The following points connected with charities and corporations for religious purposes, have been adjudicated.

1. In Harper et al vs. Crawford et al, 13 Ohio R., 129, it was held, that trustees of a religious society, who hold an estate at law, cannot maintain a suit in Chancery to establish such title, against defendants

It will, unless they violate the public policy, or laws of its own jurisdiction. Where the trustees are amenable to its process, a Court of Chancery will secure the fund, and direct its

who claim a better title to the same property, as the lawful trustees of the same society. They must manifest their title by suit at law.

2. A Court of Equity cannot take cognizance of acts of forfeiture; nor remove members, nor pronounce a dissolution of the corporation for a breach of the franchises, conferred by the charter, yet where a corporation has been made the depository of trusts, civil or eleemosynary, and property has been invested in its hands as a trustee, a Court of Chancery may exercise jurisdiction over such corporate trusts, in the same manner, and with like power, as over other trust estates; 1 B. Munroe R., 217; vide also, 4 Wheat. Rep., 518; 6 Conn., 532.

3. Where the trustees of a charity, have through real mistake, and without any corrupt motive, misapplied the funds under their care, their conduct will be considered in a lenient disposition, if not in a favorable light. The circumstance of the trustees being a corporate body, should rather increase the disposition towards a lenient construction of their proceedings, and, although in contemplation of law, the identity of the body is preserved through ages, yet misdeeds alleged to have been. committed long gone by, are only to be visited upon those of the present generation, where there exists no doubt of the misfeasance. But where this is clear, it is of no consequence that the individuals now sustaining the corporate character, enjoying the immunities, and exercising the functions of the corporation, are wholly different from those who did the wrong, or who permitted the neglect, and are only connected with them through the medium of a common municipal character. This is the condition inseparably annexed to their corporate existence, and by which the individuality of the body politic with all its incidents, is perfectly maintained; 3rd Mylne & Reen, 647; 3rd Russ., 397.

4. In England, the King, by virtue of his prerogative, and the Chancellor, by virtue of his power, delegated to him by the crown, was the visitor and superintendant of all eleemosynary corporations, where no other person had the right; and since the 43rd Eliz., as that statute has been construed, the power is greatly enlarged. It extends to cases, 1st. Where a general purpose of charity is manifested, without designating its object or mode of administration; 2nd. To cases in which there is a definite object, or a peculiar mode of applying it, and either has failed; 3rd. Where the fund is more than adequate. In all such cases, the Chancellor, (by the application of the civil law doctrine of cy pres,) will not only support the charitable intention, but will apply it to some kindred object of charity. (Moore's heirs vs. Moore's devisees, 4 Dana, 359.) In this country, the legislature or government of the State, has

administration. But if the charity is to be established abroad, and executed by persons living there, the Court will simply order the money to be paid over to those entitled, and leave the future control of the charity to the local tribunals.

the right to enforce all charities of a public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is intrusted with it. The jurisdiction vested by the Statute of Elizabeth, over charitable uses, is said to be personally in the Chancellor, and does not belong to his ordinary, or extraordinary jurisdiction in Chancery; Kent Com., vol. 4, page 509; 1 B. Munroe's Rep., 220.

5. The proper Courts in this country will interfere to prevent an abuse of the trusts, confided to British corporations, holding land here to charitable uses, and will aid in enforcing the due execution of the trusts, but neither those Courts, nor the local legislatures, where the lands lie, can adjudge a forfeiture of the franchises of the corporation, or of its property; 8th Wheat, 464.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

IMPLIED TRUSTS.

1. WHAT IS A RESULTING TRUST.

2. WHEN AN IMPLIED TRUST IS RAISED ON AN EXPRESS TRUST.

3. IMPLIED TRUSTS ON A CONVEYANCE, IN WHICH NO URE OR CON

SIDERATION IS EXPRESSED.

4. IMPLIED TRUST ON THE PURCHASE OF REAL ESTATE BY ONE MAN

WITH THE MONEY OF ANOTHER.

5. EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF A RESULTING TRUST.

6. EXECUTOR DOES NOT TAKE THE RESIDUUM OF THE PERSONAL ES

TATE IN AMERICA.

7. DOCTRINE OF THE EQUITABLE CONVERSION OF PROPERTY.

3. WHAT ARE LIENS AND HOW REGARDED IN EQUITY.

9. LIENS IMPLIED ON THE SALE OF REAL ESTATE.

10. EQUITABLE LIEN FOR REPAIRS AND IMPROVEMENTS OF PROPERTY

BELONGING TO ANOTHER PERSON.

11. IMPLIED TRUSTS ARISING FROM POSSESSION OF THE TRUST SUB

JECT.

12. TRUSTS FORCED UPON THE CONSCIENCE OF A PARTY IN INVITUM,

BY OPERATION OF LAW.

13. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRUSTEES.

14. JURISDICTION OF EQUITY OVER FOREIGN TRUSTS.

1. What is a resulting Trust?

The law will sometimes raise or imply a trust, for the pur

pose of effectuating the intention of the parties, or of preventing fraud, where it is not created in express terms. But it must be consistent with a fair and reasonable construction of the acts of the parties. These trusts are mere legal implications, not embraced within the provisions of the Statute of Frauds,1 liable to be rebutted by parol testimony, and only binding upon purchasers who have actual notice of them.3

2. When does the law raise an implied trust on an instrument creating an express trust ?4

The Statute of Frauds does not include trusts which arise by the mere operation of law. These may be proved by parol evidence; 2nd Black., 198; 3rd Hay, 57; 1 McChord's Ch. 119; 4th Desau, 486; 1 J. J. Marshall, 403. And the exception in the Statute of Frauds, is deemed merely affirmative of the general law, and not as creating a saving of resulting trusts, which would have otherwise been cut off, unless in writing. 1 Sumner's Rep., 187. "As that statute," says Mr. Lewin in his Treatise on Trusts and Trustees, "was directed against frauds and perjuries, it is obvious that resulting trusts were not within the mischiefs to be remedied. The aim of the legislature was, not to disturb such trusts, as were raised by maxims of Equity, and so could not open a door to fraud or perjury, but by requiring the creation of trusts by parties, to be manifested in writing, to prevent that fraud and perjury, to which the admission of parol testimony had hitherto given occasion. And the enactment itself is only applicable to this view of the subject: for the legislature could scarcely direct that "all declarations or creations of trusts should be manifested and proved," unless the trusts were in their nature capable of manifestation and proof; but as resulting trusts are the effect of a rule of law, to prove them would be to instruct the Court in its own principles, to certify to the judge how Equity itself operates."

2 The American cases are cited in Kent's Commentaries, vol. 4, page 305. Vide also 2nd Wash., C. C. R., and 2nd Story's C. C. R., 1.

3 4 Watts & Serg. Rep., 102; 3rd J. J. Marsh., 558. Another important principle is, that if a trustee by implication is to be affected by an Equity, that Equity must be pursued within a reasonable time. 4 J. C. R., 310.

4 Where all the valid purposes for which an express trust is created by will in real property cease, or have been accomplished, the estate of the trustee in such property ceases; and every other estate or interest in it vests in the heirs at law of the testator, or in his devisees, who have the benefit and interest therein, as a legal estate. 9th Paiges, R., 110, 523.