induced to consummate the transaction in question through fraudulent representations made by or on behalf of defendant. Plaintiffs acted seasonably in repudiating the contract, tendering the property they had received and demanding a return of their own. The fact that defendant has lost the farm through the action of the original owner is of no importance. Tender to him was made ten days prior to the resale of the farm by the owner and he could readily have protected himself had he so desired.

The decree is affirmed.

OSTRANDER, C. J., and BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, FELLOWS, STONE, and KUHN, JJ., concurred.

FARR v. CHILDS.

1. MORTGAGES-DEED AS MORTGAGE-EQUITY.

Although a deed amounts in equity only to a mortgage, a deed is required to revest the title in the grantor.

2. SAME CONSIDERATION.

Where the grantee in a deed given for security merely conveyed to a third party at the grantor's request, on the payment of the debt, there was a valuable consideration.

3. EQUITY-JURISDICTION-QUIETING TITLE-TITLE TO LAND. A court of equity had jurisdiction to enter a decree quieting defendants' title on their cross-bill asking for affirmative relief, where the averments of plaintiff's bill setting up a claim of title in and possession of certain property and praying for an injunction preventing defendants from interfering with said possession were sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction of the parties and subjectmatter, although a court of equity is not ordinarily the proper tribunal for the trial of title to real estate.

See note in 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 209.

4. SAME-JURISDICTION.

The court of equity having once acquired jurisdiction, should retain same for the purpose of finally determining the rights of the parties and awarding complete relief.

5. SAME MORTGAGES-DEED AS MORTGAGE PAYMENT OF DEBTESTOPPEL

Where the grantee in a deed given for security merely, at the oral request of the grantor, conveyed the premises direct to a prior mortgagee on the payment by the latter of the grantor's debt, the latter would be estopped from asserting any claim to the land, since he received a valuable consideration in the payment of his debt, and such transaction is not void under the statute of frauds.

6. APPEAL AND Error—QUESTION FOR REVIEW.

The question as to whether the husband alone could surrender a contract running to himself and wife, not having been raised in the court below, will not be considered by this court.

7. EQUITY-ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT INTEREST-CLEAN HANDS. Where plaintiff, after a land contract had been paid by the grantee in a deed of the premises which was on record, and after a mortgage against same had been discharged of record, and after said grantee had taken possession of the premises, procured an assignment of the contract to himself, obtained surreptitious possession of the place, which he maintained by force, and thereafter invoked the aid of a court of equity to protect him therein, held, that plaintiff had violated the cardinal rule of equity and did not come into equity with clean hands.

Appeal from St. Clair; Tappan, J. Submitted October 17, 1918. (Docket No. 83.) Decided Decem

ber 27, 1918.

Bill by John A. Farr against Charles A. Childs and another to restrain interference with the possession of a farm. Defendants filed a cross-bill to set aside plaintiff's deed and to quiet title. From a decree for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

C. L. Benedict and J. F. Wilson, for plaintiff.

John B. McIlwain and Clair R. Black, for defendants.

The bill in this case was filed by the plaintiff for the purpose of securing a preliminary and permanent injunction against defendant, preventing him from interfering with plaintiff's possession of a certain farm. Plaintiff's title was alleged to rest on a deed covering the premises made on March 8, 1918, by Cleston Minnie and Eleanor, his wife. A preliminary injunction was issued by the court, followed by a motion for its dissolution made on behalf of defendant. This motion was never decided. The defendant filed an answer and cross-bill. By said cross-bill defendant set up title and possession to the farm in question and prayed that the injunction issued against him might be vacated; that the deed under which plaintiff claimed title be declared to be void and that plaintiff be required to vacate said farm and deliver possession thereof to defendant. Upon the hearing a peculiar state of facts developed. Prior to September 7, 1916, Cleston Minnie and Eleanor, his wife, were the owners of the farm in question. On that date they gave a mortgage to one Louis Lobes for the sum of $800. About six months later and on February 27, 1917, they bought lumber from one James Dunn to the value of $75. Dunn, desiring security, a warranty deed of said premises was executed by Cleston Minnie and wife to Dunn on the last named date and a contract was executed by Dunn to Minnie and wife covering the same property. By the terms of the contract Dunn agreed to convey the property to Minnie and wife upon payment of $75 at the rate of $10 per month. Minnie never paid anything on account of the land contract but secured further lumber from Dunn amounting in value to about $50, which, it seems, was to be added to the sum due from him to Dunn under

the contract. Minnie thereafter paid nothing to Dunn, either principal or interest, on account of the land contract, nor to the original mortgagee, Lobes, on account of the $800 mortgage, nor did he pay the taxes assessed upon said farm. Lobes died July 20, 1917, leaving a last will and testament, by the terms of which the residue of his estate went to Nancy L. Childs, wife of defendant. This residue included the $800 mortgage on the Minnie farm. Defendant Charles A. Childs was the executor of the will of Louis Lobes. Desiring to close said estate he interviewed Minnie with reference to the payment of the $800 mortgage. The record shows beyond peradventure that Minnie told Childs that he was unable to pay anything upon the $800 mortgage; that he had conveyed the place to Dunn as security for lumber purchased from him, whom he was likewise unable to pay, and advised Childs that if he would pay Dunn the amount due from him to Dunn that a conveyance might be made from Dunn directly to Childs. Pursuant to this agreement Minnie instructed Dunn to convey the farm directly to Childs upon payment to him, Dunn, of the amount due to him from Minnie, whereupon Childs paid to Dunn the sum of $120 and received a warranty deed of the farm in question bearing date January 23, 1918, and recorded upon the same day. As soon as the deed was executed defendant visited the farm in question, which was unoccupied, closed and locked the door of the house, closed the door of the barn, and wired the front gate. On the next day, January 24, 1918, the defendant, as executor of the estate of Lobes, discharged the $800 mortgage of record.

It further appears that Minnie had purchased from plaintiff upon a contract certain furniture amounting to about $45. Some time in February or early in March plaintiff made an examination of the records

touching the title to said farm and discovered that the $800 mortgage had been discharged. Thereupon he entered into negotiations with Minnie's wife, the result of which was that on March 8, 1918, about six weeks after Dunn had conveyed to Childs, Minnie and wife deeded said property to plaintiff and assigned to him the land contract which they had received from Dunn heretofore described. Defendant testified that prior to the receipt of said deed and assignment by the plaintiff, he, Farr, had asked permission from Childs to place some horses in the barn upon said place. This permission Childs refused, but, nevertheless, having negotiated the trade with Minnie and a week before it was consummated, plaintiff caused to be delivered at the barn upon said place a load of hay and on about the 29th of March he made an arrangement with one Bronson to take possession of the place. The house was opened by use of a skeleton key and Bronson moved in. On the 18th of April defendant having learned of Bronson's entry he, with one or two others, attempted to eject Bronson from the premises by force. Plaintiff's son came to Bronson's assistance and the fracas ended in an armed neutrality, both defendant and Bronson occupying the house the night of the 18th. On the 19th of April the preliminary injunction in this case was served upon defendant and he left the premises in the possession of Bronson. While some of the facts as above stated are contradicted by the plaintiff or by witnesses in his behalf, the learned circuit judge who heard the case believed them to be sustained by the proofs. He filed an opinion which, after stating the facts, concludes as follows:

"1. It is my conclusion as a matter of law and fact that defendant Childs' petition for affirmative relief sets up a cause for relief in a court of chancery.

"2. That as between themselves, Childs and Minnie had a legal right to conclude the oral arrangement