to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade or business, if any, with respect to such instruments, and the facts of the particular case."

*

We are of the opinion that a study of the instrument itself before us for consideration shows that a reasonable time within which it should be presented is one year after date, at which time the interest stops running. It provides that it shall carry 2% interest, if left six months, and that interest shall cease one year from date, so that if the payee is to enjoy the interest provision, he must let the certificate run not less than six months and not more than one year. The limitation of the interest period operates as a direct inducement to the holder of the certificate to present the certificate at the end of a year, as he is penalized if he does not present it at that time. The certificate was presented within the year, on December 5, 1917, or 13 days less than the year for which it was to run as an interest-bearing security. We do not think that it was the intention of the parties that the certificate of deposit was to be immediately presented for payment, and the rule which seems applicable is thus stated by Daniel on Negotiable Instruments (6th Ed.), § 610, quoting Byles on Bills:

"Sometimes the note is expressly made payable with interest, which clearly indicates the intention of the parties to be that though the holder may demand payment immediately, yet he is not bound to do so."

See Kirkwood v. National Bank, 40 Neb. 484 (58 N. W. 1016, 24 L. R. A. 444, 42 Am. St. Rep. 683); Pierce v. National Bank, 215 Mass. 18 (101 N. E. 1060, 46 L. R. A. [N. S.] 693); Murray v. National Bank, 234 Fed. 481 (148 C. C. A. 247). These cases are sufficient to show that the courts have generally recognized a different rule applicable to these certificates of deposit which provide for an interest rate from those that do not and thus are payable on de

mand. It will be noticed, on an examination of the case of Tripp v. Curtenius, supra, upon which counsel for the plaintiff rely in their argument as to what was a reasonable time for presentation of the certificate, that there was no interest provided in the certificate there under discussion.

Did the State Savings Bank take this certificate in good faith and for value? It is urged that the Ann Arbor bank showed a disregard of plaintiff's right and it is accused of bad faith, but we are not impressed that there is much force to this argument. The Ann Arbor bank knew nothing about the plaintiff, who was not a party to the certificate and lived a considerable distance away. It dealt with Ida E. Wadhams as a stranger who had a certificate of deposit to sell. It believed that the certificate was genuine, which was true, and that the woman who indorsed it was the real indorsee and had a right to indorse it, which was true, and it had nothing to gain by taking the certificate, for it paid the full value for it. Some claim is made that the Ann Arbor bank knew from the statements made by Ida Wadhams at the time she negotiated the certificate, that she received it by gift. While a reading of the testimony upon this point does not satisfactorily show that she gave the officer of the bank information which would lead him to believe that it was a gift, and the statement relied upon might well be construed to mean that she simply received the certificate from her brother, not necessarily meaning that she received it as a gift, nevertheless, even if it should be construed to mean a gift, we are of the opinion that it would not make the bank any less a bona fide holder in due course. One who acquires a certificate by a valid complete gift, with proper delivery, has a perfect title to it.

There is also a contention made that the Ann Arbor bank did not pay full value for the certificate, because

it gave Miss Wadhams its own certificate of deposit for $700, instead of cash. This $700 certificate, however, was purchased by the Ypsilanti bank, and that bank thereupon became a bona fide holder for value and the Ann Arbor bank became absolutely liable to it upon the certificate, and it is not material that the Ann Arbor bank did not actually pay out money on the $700 certificate until after it knew of the dishonor of the $950 certificate of the Hastings bank, for it was clearly bound to pay it. Upon this record it appears that the Ann Arbor bank became legally bound to the Ypsilanti bank on the $700 certificate before it knew of any claim by plaintiff on the $950 certificate issued by the Hastings bank, and in our opinion it was therefore a purchaser of the certificate for its full face value. We are of the opinion that the learned circuit judge should have held that the certificate of deposit was a negotiable instrument and that the State Savings Bank of Ann Arbor was a holder thereof in due course. It follows, therefore, that the decree should have provided that the Hastings City Bank pay to the State Savings Bank the amount due thereon at the time it was presented to the Hastings bank for payment.

The decree will therefore be reversed and one here entered in accordance with this opinion, with costs in favor of the appealing intervening defendant against the plaintiff and appellee.

OSTRANDER, C. J., and BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, BROOKE, FELLOWS, and STONE, JJ., concurred.

OMMEN v. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RAILWAY CO.

1. NEGLIGENCE - INFANTS NEGLIGENCE.

-IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE

CONTRIBUTORY

In an action under the survival act for personal injuries resulting in the death of a minor 18 years of age, who was a passenger in an automobile struck by defendant's train, the negligence, if any, of the driver of the car, is not to be imputed to decedent.

2. SAME-INFANTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

Where decedent had arrived at the age of discretion, considering his position in the car, his age, and the situation in which he found himself, whether he exercised that care and prudence which a reasonably prudent person should, under the circumstances, held, a question for the jury.

3. RAILROADS-CROSSING ACCIDENT-NEGLIGENCE-SPEED OF TRAIN -QUESTION FOR JURY.

In an action for the death of plaintiff's decedent, caused by a collision at a highway crossing between an automobile and defendant's train, where the crossing was within the village limits, was virtually in a railroad yard, there was a freight train engaged in switching, there were four sets of tracks, the depot was only 1,300 feet away, and it was upon one of the main traveled streets of the village, the speed of the train, upon the question of defendant's negligence, held, a question for the jury, although there was no village ordinance regulating the speed of trains.

4. APPEAL AND ERROR-STIPULATIONS.

In view of stipulation by counsel for defendant that an inadvertent reference by the court in his charge to a statute, under which plaintiff had claimed no rights, would not be taken advantage of, on appeal, the question will not be considered by this court.

5. NEW TRIAL-WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.

Verdict for plaintiff held, not so contrary to the great weight of the evidence as to warrant setting it aside.

Error to Kalamazoo; Weimer, J. Submitted OctoSee notes in 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 597; L. R. A. 1915A, 761.

ber 18, 1918. (Docket No. 87.) Decided December 27, 1918.

Case by Jill Ommen, administrator of the estate of Ludwig Ommen, deceased, against the Grand Trunk Western Railway Company for the negligent killing of plaintiff's decedent. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Harrison Geer (William K. Williams, of counsel), for appellant.

Mason & Sharpe, for appellee.

KUHN, J. The families of John Ommen and of his neighbor, George Suntken, who lived on their farms near Colfax, in Illinois, left their homes on the morning of September 8, 1917, in two automobiles, an Overland and a Ford, for the purpose of motoring to Sunfield, Michigan, to pay a visit to the family of Jill Ommen, a brother of John Ommen. The course of their travels led them through the village of Schoolcraft, in Kalamazoo county, in this State, which village they approached from the south along Grand or Main street, so called, shortly before 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, September 9th. Grand street in Schoolcraft, which is a village of 800 inhabitants, is crossed by the tracks of the defendant railway company within the corporate limits, but at the very southerly portion thereof. Two main tracks run in a southwesterly and northeasterly direction, the southerly track carrying eastbound traffic and the next northerly track, westbound. These main tracks are crossed by a single main track of what was formerly a division of the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway, now the New York Central Lines, and the intersection is at the southeasterly limit of the village, the crossing being at right angles. Situated in the northeast