of counsel was shown by way of further inducement: Held, that the holder was, through his answer, entitled to have the bonds and mortgages restored to him without the necessity to file a cross bill. Ib.

12. Trustees of an invalid trust, who reasonably defended it but who were cognizant of all the transactions out of which its invalidity arose, decreed to bear their own costs. Ib. 13. The right of a banking association to purchase state stocks attaches only when the object is to affect a deposit or pledge of the same for circulating notes, or, if for any other purpose, it should be the investment of capital or surplus funds for the sake of interest. It should not be done on credit and by a deposit of their securities and for speculation with a view to profit. Ib.

14. Nor can such an association purchase upon credit (not for an investment) depreciated paper of the banks of other states at a discount, with an intention to re-sell the same at an expected profit or to be laid out in cotton at the south to be shipped to Europe. Ib. 15. Nor can such an association, especially while it is in pecuniary difficulties, buy up, with its own bills of exchange, shares of its own capital for the purpose of being sold again and, in the meantime, of being used as a means of raising money. Ib. 16. The revised statutes, on the subject of preventing the insolvency of monied corporations and to secure the rights of creditors and stockholders, apply to associations under the general banking act of 1838. Ib.

17. Where an injunction is issued to restrain a foreign banking company from proceeding to foreclose a mortgage given as security for their certificates and there is a serious question as to the transaction not being within the spirit of the restraining act against unauthorized banking and the circulation of certain notes or evidence of debt issued by banks, (1 R. S. 712) the court will not dissolve the injunction on the coming in of the answer. (The court, however, in this case allowed a cross-bill to be filed by the company to sell the property embraced by the mortgage, inasmuch as the same might, otherwise, have been sacrificed.) Ib.

18. A foreign institution, on an application in New York to loan $100,000 at seven per cent. on bond and mortgage of property there, agreed to give their certificates to that amount bearing interest at five per cent. and a large portion of them payable in twenty years: such a transaction, it would seem, is usurious. Stoney v. The American Life Insurance and Trust Company, 332.

19. Although there may be a partnership in the use and working of land, there cannot be one in the buying and selling of real estate, so as to carry with it the rights, powers, duties and responsibilities of partners under the law merchant. Patterson v. Brewster, 352. 20. Where an association is formed for the purchase, sale and improvement of real estate and its trustees (pursuant to its articles) effect sales and buy in their own names individually and so give their own bonds and mortgages, a seller cannot follow the associates where the trustees become insolvent. It might be otherwise, however, where the sale was made on the credit of the capital of the association and on that of the parties where their shares have not been paid in. Ib.

21. The fact of the death of some shareholder in an association does not create a difficulty sufficient to justify a suit in equity in order to make all contribute to pay a debt. Ib.

And see, RELIGIOUS CORPORATION, 1; INJUNCTION, 3.

ATTORNEY. See SOLICITOR and CLIENT.

B

BANK NOTES.

1. Interest allowed on bank notes from the day of demand out of the surplus effects of
a bank in a receiver's hands; such bank having been wound up through this court,
but not on the ground of insolvency. Bank Commissioners v. La Fayette Bank, 287.

And see, LosT NOTES, 1.

C

COMMISSIONS.

1. Commissions, in the two-fold capacity of executor and trustee, not allowed. Holley v.
284.

S. G.,

CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION.

1. A solicitor who is made a defendant, and who desires to protect himself from answer-
ing on the ground of confidential communication, must distinctly show that his know-
ledge and information came solely from his client. He is not exempt, merely because
he obtained it while engaged in business for his client. And should he afterwards become
the executor of his client and he is made a defendant to reach the property which had
been held by such client, the privilege would cease and he must answer in connection
with it. Crosby v. Berger, 254.

CORPORATION. See, ASSOCIATION.

COSTS.

CORPORATION.

1. Where a seller had not delivered an abstract of his title, and had not cleared off a judg-
ment, he was not allowed his costs on a bill for specific performance, although he suc-
ceeded in the suit. Scott v. Thorp, 1.

2. Both parties being considered in the wrong, on a bill for specific performance, each one had
to bear his own costs, except the costs of exception to the master's report of a good title,
which the vendee had to bear. Ib.

3. An accumulation of costs, arising from a solicitor's spreading litigation by a second
suit, while the first is pending, and might, by an amendment or otherwise, be made
sufficient, will be disallowed; and, if paid, must be refunded. The client's consenting to
the proceedings, by signature and oath to the pleading involved, does not debar him
from questioning its propriety. De Rose v. Fay, 40.

4. Trust deed set aside on the complaint of a receiver, as the court considered the trustees
so placed that they could not well do otherwise than defend it; and yet, as the fact was
that they were not strangers to the transactions out of which it arose, and accepted the
trust knowingly, they were decreed to bear their own costs, and the receiver was al-
lowed his costs out of the fund. Leavitt v. Yates, 134.

5. Where one of several complainants urges on a suit after he has taken the benefit of the
bankrupt act and costs accrue, these are not recoverable out of after acquired property.
Leavitt v. Baldwin, 289.

6. Where several exceptions are taken for impertinence when one only should have covered the matter, the court will, as to costs, look at it as one exception merely. Renwick v. Mack, 380.

7. Where a complainant files a judgment-creditor's bill and a retaxation of costs takes place in the court below whereby the judgment becomes less than $100, he will not be allowed to dismiss his bill without payment of costs here. Newell v. Burbank, 536.

8. Executors, in pursuing a debt, made a person a party who they had fair right to suppose held a claim. The latter denied holding such a claim and yet met every allegation of the bill, thereby making a long answer. On an application, by the complainants, to dismiss the bill without costs: The Court restricted such defendant's costs to a disclaimer and to the ordinary costs of solicitor and counsel fees of opposing the motion. Smith v. Wyckoff, 543.

9. Although a complainant filing a bill of interpleader ordinarily gets his costs, yet where he leaves unprotected (by not making him a party) one who should have been primarily protected, e. g. his accommodation endorser, and compels the filing of another bill, he will not be allowed his costs. Palmer v. Elliott, 643.

And see, LosT NOTES, 1.

COVENANT.

1. A covenant to extend a lease which does not fix the amount of rent cannot be enforced in equity. Robinson v. Kettletas, 67.

2. A covenant to renew a lease at a certain rent, without stating what covenants the new lease should contain, does not carry any of the old covenants with it. Therefore, although an old lease contained a provision that the tenant should pay taxes and assessments, yet, as the lessor merely covenanted to make a new lease at a given rent and said nothing about covenants: Held, that he must give such new lease, exclusive of a covenant, on the part of the tenant, to pay taxes and assessments. Willis v. Astor, 594.

CROTON WATER.

See, RIVER, RIPARIAN OWNER, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

D

DAMAGES.

1. Items of damage allowed on a bond given under the 31st rule, on granting an injunction to restrain the sale of mortgaged premises. Edwards v. Bodine, 292.

2. Appraisers appointed to assess damages to the riparian owner arising from the diversion of the water of the river, should allow to a tenant of a mill (under such owner) the damages he will sustain. Water Commissioners v. Van Cortlandt, 545.

3. Mode, recommended by the court, of assessing damages in favor of owners of unequal shares in different pieces of land and others on account of the diversion of water of a river. Ib.

4. Where the main body of water in a river has been controlled by a dam and turned and used by a mill for forty years and the dam and mill were maintained without objection, a perpetual right in such use of the water is thereby gained; unless a qualified right as to time is insisted on and proved by the party who attempts to narrow it. Even twenty years of such enjoyment would presume a grant. Ib.

5. The principles applicable to the use of river water, as stated by the court in Wright v.
Howard, 1 Sim. & S. 190, recognized as in force here. Ib.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

1. On the 5th of April, 1802, Charles H. executed bonds to Henry and Newberry H., for
$375, and $150 payable, on the death of their mother Martha, to them or if either died
without issue, to the survivor or his heirs. Charles H. died and among his papers was
found the note of Henry H., for $310, dated 2d October 1818, and his draft of the same
date on Charles H., in favor of Newberry H., for $200, inclosed in a memorandum
written by Charles, dated 3d January, 1829, showing $548 due, "and to be taken by
agreement from the bonds." Newberry H. died insolvent, indebted to Charles; but, by
his death, the bonds became the sole property of Henry H. In 1818 Henry H. left this
state for Baltimore, did business and failed there in 1829; took the benefit of an insolvent
act in the Baltimore County Court; but did not insert these bonds amongst his assets.
Martha was not then dead, but died soon afterwards. Shortly after taking the benefit of
such act, Henry H. came again to this state and sued the administrator with the will
annexed of Charles H. on the bonds, who, believing that Henry H. would plead the
statute of limitations to any set-off founded on the note and draft and not knowing that
the former had gone into insolvency in Baltimore, allowed judgment to go by default.
But having now got knowledge of such insolvency proceedings, he filed a bill to restrain
Henry and to have the judgments satisfied and cancelled. The court decreed it to be a
fair conclusion that Henry, when he took the benefit of the act, considered the bonds paid
and extinguished by his indebtedness on the note and draft (which, with interest, amount-
ed to more than the bond;) that the statute of limitations, owing to his absence, would
not have availed him; that it was equitable to remember how an administrator had
to act from the information of others in obtaining facts for defence; and that the com-
plainant, administrator, was within the exception of the statute against relief from judg-
ments. Decree as prayed for, with costs. Hewlett v. Hewlett, 7.

2. Where an assignment for creditors is had, and the assignees let furniture (embraced by
it) on a rental to one of the assignors, until a favorable time for sale, the assignment
will be void as to this, for want of a change of possession. Dewey v. Adams, 21.

3. Although a deed or assignment is set aside by a decree obtained in a judgment creditor's
suit, still it should be limited to the rights of such judgment creditor and, therefore, an-
other judgment creditor does not, necessarily, get a benefit thereby. Davis v. Per-
rine, 62.

4. Where a judgment debtor filed a bill, on his own behalf only, against his debtors and
their assignees, complaining principally of the latter in allowing the debtors to be their
agents and receive large compensation and did not amend, so as to go against the as-
signment itself until long afterwards, when the property had been distributed, and brought
his cause to a hearing on bill and answer when he might, by expedition and replication,
have made a sufficient case: his bill was dismissed, but without costs. Redmond v.
Wemple, 221.

5. If an assignee to pay debts allows the debtor to act as his agent and receive large com-
pensation therefor, he will have to account for the amount to creditors, on a bill filed in
behalf of all of them. Ib.

6. A defendant in a bill filed by a judgment-creditor cannot be compelled to discover pro-
perty to a later date than the filing of the bill. If a discovery to a later date is requi-
red, a supplemental bill should be filed. Gregory v. Valentine, 282.

7. Where a complainant claims to make the remainder in fee of an estate, vested in infants,

P

liable for a debt accruing for professional services performed in relation to the rights of the father and mother in such estate, it is necessary, for his success, that he should affirmatively show the debt in question was contracted for the preservation of the inheritance of the children or for its permanent improvement. And where this is not shown on the hearing, the court will not indulge him with a reference to a master to inquire how far his services contributed to preserve and benefit the inheritance, so that a portion, at least, of the debt might be charged thereon. Warner v. Hoffman, 381.

8. In a creditors suit, although there may have been a decree, the neglect or omission of one will not preclude his right to be afterwards let in, provided the other creditors are placed in no worse position or put to additional expense. Ib.

9. Where different judgment creditors file their bills on the same day, he who first gets his pleading on file has priority of payment. Safford v. Douglas, 537. 10. A judgment creditor, who proves his debt in bankruptcy in order to oppose the bankrupt's discharge and not with a view to a dividend and succeeds in his opposition, cannot afterwards pursue the bankrupt and his property through a creditor's bill. All the property becomes vested, on the first application of the bankrupt, in the provisional assignee and the proof of debt is an election to come in and the judgment is thereby surrendered-and dividends only ean be received. Haxtun v. Corse, 585.

11. It would seem, that a quarter's salary due to a defendant on a certain day can be secured under a judgment creditor's bill filed on that day, notwithstanding the defendant, a few days before, had filed his petition in bankruptcy. But, however this may be, he, himself, cannot take the point by a plea-it is the province of his assignee. Smith v. ——— 653. 12. Where, on a dissolution of copartnership, one partner assigns all his rights in its stock and properties to the other and the latter covenants to apply such stock and properties to the debts of the firm, its creditors may follow it for that purpose, notwithstanding the receiving partner makes divers transfers of it in fraud of the creditors and even though both parties are applicants under the bankrupt law. The effects become a trust fund for the creditors under the covenant. Wildes v. Chapman, 669.

And see, STALE Demand, 1.

DEED.

1. Certificate of acknowledgment, signed by a master in chancery, upon a deed dated 29th May, 1790, executed by a married woman of her estate showed, on a private examination, that she acknowledged she executed the same without any fear, threat, or compulsion of her husband." The statute of 1788 declared, that no estate of a feme covert should pass without a previous acknowledgment by her on a private examination, &c., that she executed such deed freely, without any fear or compulsion of her husband. Held, in the absence of proof of fear, threat, or compulsion, that there was a substantial compliance with the statute and that the certificate was to be presumed sufficient. Meriam v. Harsen, 70. 2. Although a bill in partition states that certain property belongs to husband and wife, and the decree follows the bill, yet, as an accounting was connected with the suit which justified the making of both of them parties, it was not to be considered that these statements created an estoppel as to the real rights of these parties, and that the husband alone might, notwithstanding, be seized of a fee. Ib.

3. A wife may, without the intervention of a court, convey away her estate to a stranger or to her husband by circuity; but chancery will scrutinize the act closely, to see that she has not been circumvented, coerced, defrauded or unduly influenced. Ib.