that the account given by Daniel of the name, history, and fate of the last king of Babylon, is inconsistent with the history as given by every ancient historian, Berosus, Herodotus, &c. According to them, the king (who is called by Berosus Nabonidus, by Herodotus Labynetus) took the field against Cyrus, was "defeated, and shut himself up in Borsippa, where he was taken after the capture of Babylon." Daniel calls the king Baltassar, and describes him as remaining in Babylon, where he was killed on the night on which it was taken. This was indeed a proud triumph for the Rationalists, and so it continued till ten years ago, when some of those inscribed clay cylinders which many of our readers have seen in the British Museum, being deciphered (some by Sir H. Rawlinson, in England; some almost at the same moment by Oppert, in Lower Chaldea) proved by evidence strictly contemporary that Baltassar was the son of Nabonidus, was associated in the kingdom by him, and was killed in the taking of Babylon. It is exceedingly remarkable that since this discovery the only change in the tactics of the rationalist writers is, that they say nothing about this particular objection, which twelve years ago was one of their strong points. Now it seems hardly necessary to observe that this discovery not merely overthrows the argument against the real date of the Book of Daniel derived from his mention of Baltassar, but gives an overpowering argument in support of it. For how stands the case. None of the histories accessible to an Alexandrian Jew in the second century B.C. made any mention of Baltassar. They all gave a name and a history quite different to the last king of Babylon. Now if the Book of Daniel had really been forged, as the rationalists pretend, by an Alexandrian Jew, in the second century B.C., it is certain that he would have made his account of the fall of Babylon agree with the existing histories—that is, he would have said nothing of Baltassar, but have mentioned only Nabonidus. Nay, if he had wished to invent a different history, he would have had no knowledge of the very name of Baltassar, and must have invented some other. Our most recent discoveries prove that Daniel's history was correct exactly on the point about which he himself could not possibly be ignorant, and about which the imaginary forger four centuries later could not possibly have been informed. It is certain that this, if it stood alone, would have been considered a conclusive proof of the genuine character of Daniel's book, if that book had not been religious, miraculous, and prophetical. We do not remember that Dr. Pusey mentions the circum ور stance that in the all-but kingly honours paid to Daniel by Baltshassar he was made "the third man in the kingdom. Why not be second? Obviously because Baltshassar himself was only the second, being, as it now appears, associated with his father in the kingdom. That he was so, is now known as an historical fact, but it was a fact utterly unknown almost from his own time until within the last ten years, and Daniel's narrative is the more remarkable, because he does not state it, but only implies it as something known to all his readers. The two last lectures are on "the points of doctrine and practice mentioned in the Book of Daniel, which are alleged to indicate a date later than that of the prophet, showing that they are identical or in harmony with the other Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, and that no doctrine or practice mentioned in the Book of Daniel was borrowed [as objectors have alleged] from Parsism." This chapter contains a mass of most interesting matter on the indications of the divinity of the Messias, and of the resurrection of the body, and of judgment to come, in the Old Testament. But our space forbids us to enter upon these subjects. We heartily hope that a second edition of this valuable work will speedily be required, and that it will not appear without an index. We have left ourselves only room to mention the two other works at the head of this article. That of Mr. Boyle is highly honourable to him, especially as a layman and a barrister. It is written in an excellent spirit, with much learning and talent. It was published before the appearance of Dr. Pusey's volume, and we believe was more valuable as an account of the Prophet Daniel, and as an answer to the objections against him, than any other work then accessible. Dean Goode's work is of a different character. He seems, indeed, to have felt that some apology was needed for the nonsense which he has written in one of his chapters, and pleads the terms of the founder's will. Valeat quantum. But our article hitherto has been occupied with the agreeable task of expressing sympathy and admiration for non-Catholic writers; and we gladly persuade ourselves that we are under no obligation of entering on a less pleasant duty, and criticizing this part of Dean Goode's book as it deserves. 206 ART. VIII.—THE MEXICAN EMPIRE AND THE Le Mexique Ancien et Moderne. Par MICHEL CHEVALIER, Membre de l'Institut. Paris: Hachette. La Politique Française en Amérique. Par M. HENRI MOREAU. Paris: L'Expédition du Mexique. Par Le Prince HENRI DE VALORI. L'Empire Mexicain et Son Avenir. Paris: Dentu. Paris : Speeches and Addresses on British American Union. By the Hon. T. D'ARCY MCGEE, Minister of Agriculture in the Canadian Government. London: Chapman & Hall. Parliamentary Debates on the subject of Confederation. Printed by order of the Legislature. Quebec: Hunter, Rose, & Co. Papers relating to the Conferences between H. M. Government and the Executive Council of Canada. By Command. London: Spottiswoode. PUB UBLIC opinion, amazed at the sudden and complete collapse of the American war, is already beginning to wonder how it could ever have believed in the success of the South. But public opinion is in its nature Protean, and has, besides, in this country, the advantage of the anonymous. How many in a million remember to-day what the Times said yesterday? But the words of statesmen of the first class become texts; and never, perhaps, was there any great series of public events in which the calculations and predictions of the most eminent politicians of this country, and, indeed, of all Europe, have been so utterly belied by the event. Mr. Gladstone's famous expression about the nation which Jefferson Davis had made, will long militate against his character for that foresight which is supposed to be the first faculty of a minister. But Mr. Disraeli's more elaborate horoscope of the results of the war has proved equally fallacious. Mr. Disraeli more than once, after declaring that the war would be a longer war than any one in Europe yet imagined, intimated that it would end in the formation of not merely two, but more than two, Sovereign Confederacies - dimly indicating that the Western States, and perhaps the Pacific, would in their turn secede, and form two rival Republics, with a complicated diplomacy, large standing armies, and the same tendency to war as the Greek cities of the time before Alexander, or the Italian cities of the age of the Guelphs and Ghibellines. This prediction is one which its author would, perhaps, be glad to obliterate from Hansard. But the consideration of such calculations on the part of great politicians is valuable, as indicating that they as little understand the American character, and the real tendencies of American events, as they ordinarily do Asiatic character and events. Their calculations would have been good calculations had they been applied to a war between two European nations, or perhaps even two great segments of the same European race. But there are certain differences between Europe and America which even advanced thinkers here do not adequately estimate. The higher average intelligence of the mass of the American population counts for much in all public transactions. It enlists a far greater energy if they become convinced that a cause is winning, and will win. But their peculiar dialect is rich in words that, on the other hand, indicate an easy acquiescence in failure, recognized as inevitable; they avow that it is necessary to " cave in," and that a cause or a man is "played out," with a degree of deference to the logic of facts which is peculiar to their polity. One of the French Princes is said to have stopped a Yankee sergeant, who was running away as fast as his legs could carry him, after one of the battles on the Chickahominy, and reproached him with his cowardly conduct. The sergeant stopped coolly to debate the point with the "stranger." His argument was that he had been fighting all day, had fired a hundred rounds of cartridge, that the battle, nevertheless, was not won, and he guessed his General did not know how to win it-so, he calculated, he should run. This explanation was given with the greatest coolness, while the disputants were actually under fire; and, as soon as it was over, the Yankee took to his heels again. There is every evidence hitherto that throughout the South, as fast as the population recognized the fact that the cause of the Confederacy was "played out," they accepted the fact, and acted accordingly. Even in the very heat and fury of the war it was remarkable that a general, with a character such as was attributed to General Butler, should be able to hold, as it were, in the palm of his hand, such a city as New Orleans, always remarkable for its riotous and blood-thirsty population. Russian generals in Warsaw, Austrian generals in Milan, have, generally speaking, had a different time of it; and this indicates a second leading difference between an American and a European population. The American-perhaps because he has so much to do with the making and unmaking of it, perhaps because it is pretty much a religion as well as a code to him-has a greater respect for the law than the ordinary European. Not merely did Northern generals peaceably occupy great Southern cities and States-they easily succeeded in extemporising the different institutions of Republican Government; and the people could not resist the temptation of working them. Slavery has been abolished in nearly as many Southern States by the action of their State Legislatures as by the Presidential proclamation; and no one has seriously doubted that its abolition in such States was a valid act of popular Sovereignty. The very idea of popular Sovereignty does, in fact, inform and intensify the character of the whole people, and equally animates them to victory, or renders them resigned to disaster. But, beyond this, they appear to differ from European nations most essentially in their rapid mastery of facts and their ready respect for law. If Mr. Disraeli had drawn his picture of the results of the war, with a view, not so much to the United States in particular as North America in general, the tendency of events would certainly appear to move towards a kind of fulfilment of his prediction. The restored United States fronts the world, animated by an intensified pride of nationality, and an extraordinary, but justified, confidence in its unprecedented resources; with the powers of the Executive Government immensely enhanced, and the functions of the several States considerably lowered in the political hierarchy, a Government rather more out of proportion with the other Governments of America than Russia is with the other Governments of Europe. Indeed, such a comparison as this with Russia can only be suggested, but does not bear an instant's argument. Two European States have combined and defeated Russia; but what combination of mere American Powers could cope with the United States? The French sovereign and statesmen, who have pledged the honour of France to the establishment of the Mexican Empire, and the British Cabinet, which has just agreed to guarantee the loan which is to provide the defences and communications of a Canadian Confederation, would hardly wish to take the responsibility of answering. There will, indeed, be a strange balance of powers henceforward on the American continent; and no stint of soldiers, no limit to the complications of diplomacy. But the soldiers will be in a considerable degree European; and at this moment France and England seem to have deliberately committed themselves to traverse the leading |