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The court said: "One purpose of the constitutional provision referred to was to prevent secret or fraudulent legislation, or people from being misled by the title. And that reasonable notice of the object of the bill should be given by the title;" and in referring to the foregoing title, in connection with the subject-matter, used this language: "It is true that strictly the maintenance of this work, or the power to keep and maintain the same in good repair at the expense of the town," is not identically the same as "constructing the dock," spoken of in the title. No one, however, could imagine that the dock was to be abandoned by the town the moment its original construction was completed. Subsequent repair is necessary in the nature of the case; and authority to construct the dock would therefore, in a general sense, seem to imply and include the power to keep it constructed by means of necessary repairs." The provision for charging dockage was connected with the construction as a means of raising the money to pay the cost.
§ 93. The subject or object stated generally in the title includes incidents and subsidiary details. It appears already from what has been said in the preceding sections and the cases which have been cited, that the constitutional provision in question permits an announcement of the subject in general terms in the title of an act; that to facilitate legislation which is intended to be germane to that subject, a very liberal construction is adopted, both of the constitutional requirement and of legislation affected by it, to sustain all laws not within the mischief intended to be remedied. It only remains to illustrate some general principles which the course of decision has established for determining the singleness of legislative subjects; whether the provisions under them are congruous and pertinent; and the consequences of a total or partial departure from the constitutional injunction.
Where the title of a legislative act expressed a general subject or purpose which is single, all matters which are naturally and reasonably connected with it, and all measures which will or may facilitate the accomplishment of the purpose so stated, are properly included in the act, and are germane to its title.1 1 In re Mayer, 50 N. Y. 504; State Commissioners, 47 N. Y. 501; Smith v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 345; People v. v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush, 108;
The degree of relationship of each provision is not material, if it legitimately tends to the end disclosed in the title.' Whatever the scope of the subject, it comprehends not only its constituent parts, but its general incidents, and those which pertain to either of its parts, and everything contributary to the purpose the title expresses or necessarily implies. This principle is recognized in several of the constitutions, which confine an act to a single subject, "and the matters properly connected therewith."
Any definite sub
§ 94. Same-Acts of incorporation. ject is generally capable of almost infinite arbitrary division; many particular or subordinate subjects may be included in one general subject, and each of these particular or subordinate subjects may be selected for the subject of the bill, and may itself be divisible and may embrace other particular or subordinate subjects. Acts to create corporations contain
Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 83; Shipley v. Terre Haute, 74 Ind. 297; Black v. Cohen, 52 Ga. 621; Golden Canal Co. v. Bright, 8 Colo. 144; Wishmier v. State, 97 Ind. 160; McCaslin v. State, 44 Ind. 151; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; State v. Atherton, 13 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 203; S. C. 19 Nev. 332; People v. Brislin, 80 Ill. 423; Howland Coal & Iron Works v. Brown, 13 Bush, 681; Mosier v. Hilton, 15 Barb. 657; City of St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578; State v. Whitworth, 8 Lea, 594; Phillips v. Covington, etc. Bridge Co. 2 Met. (Ky.) 219; Brown v. State, 73 Ga. 38; Township of Union v. Rader, 39 N. J. L. 509; Montgomery M. B. & L. Asso. v. Robinson, 69 Ala. 413; Goldsmith v. Georgia R. R. 62 Ga. 485; Town of Abington v. Cabeen, 106 Ill. 200; Mayor, etc. v. Reitz, 50 Md. 575; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Oregon, etc. R. R. Co. 24 Fed. Rep. 407; State v. McConnell, 3 Lea, 332; Allen v. Tison, 50 Ga. 374; Adams v. Webster, 26 La. Ann. 142; Campbell v. Board of Pharmacy, 45 N. J. L. 241; McArthur v. Nelson, 81 Ky. 67; Halleman v. Halle
man, 65 Ga. 476; Daubman v. Smith, 47 N. J. L. 200; Yellow River Imp't Co. v. Arnold, 46 Wis. 214; Unity v. Burrage, 103 U. S. 447; Ackley School Dist. v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135; Gillitt v. McCarthy, 34 Minn. 318; Central Plk. R. Co. v. Hannaman, 22 Ind. 484; Smith v. Bohler, 72 Ga. 546; Kirkpatrick v. New Brunswick, 40 N. J. Eq. 46; Crawfordsville, etc. T. Co. v. Fletcher, 104 Ind. 97; People v. Goddard, 8 Colo. 432; Mahomet v. Quackenbush, 117 U. S. 508; Seay v. Bank of Rome, 66 Ga. 609; State v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 346; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ballard, 2 Met. (Ky.) 165; In re De Vaucene, 31 How. Pr. 337; Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311; Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Highsmith, 44 Iowa, 330; Town of Fishkill v. Fishkill, 22 Barb. 634; Atkinson v. Duffy, 16 Minn. 49; In re Dept. Public Parks, 86 N. Y. 437; English v. State, 7 Tex. App. 171; Klein v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 194; Ross v. Davis, 97 Ind. 79.
In re Mayer, 50 N. Y. 504. 2 In re Upson, 89 N. Y. 67.
3 People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553, 562.
general subjects capable of much division; they are not confined to the mere creation of a corporate entity. Such an act defines the powers of the corporate body and regulates their exercise. An act to incorporate a city may contain provisions relating to the various subjects upon which municipal legislation may be required for the preservation of the peace, the promotion of its growth and prosperity, and for the raising of revenue for its government.' It may confer the necessary legislative, taxing, judicial and police powers - the grant of them is one subject. The whole thing, the creation of the municipality, is that subject; the parts of it are separate subjects, but parts of one general subject. So an act to consolidate a city and provide for its government embraces but one subject. It may properly embrace the details for uniting different municipalities, providing for the payment of their debts, the government of the city, and all the minutia to which the general administration of its affairs would lead. The revision of an act which
has incorporated a municipality announces but one subject. It may treat of the essential parts of the whole as well as may the original creative enactment. An act to revise and consolidate the several acts in relation to the charter of a city embraces but one subject. The charter consists of the creative act and all acts in force relating to the corporation. The word consolidate signifies that all the acts are to be brought into and re-enacted in one act. The subject is broad enough to embrace the details of the city government." "An act to revise the laws providing for the incorporation of railroad companies, and to regulate the running and management, and to fix the duties and liabilities of all railroad and other corporations owning and operating any railroad in this state," covers but one object. It is to bring together the legislation concerning the creation and management of railroads." An act
1 Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278; City of Jacksonville v. Basnett, 20 Fla. 525; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 560.
2 Harris v. People, 59 N. Y. 599; Attorney-General v. Amos, 60 Mich. 372; People v. Pond, 67 id. 98; People v. Hurst, 41 id. 328.
4 Louisiana v. Pilsbury, supra; City of Covington v. Voskotter, 80 Ky. 219; State v. Haskell Co. 40 Kan. 65. 5 Harris v. People, 59 N. Y. 602.
6 People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 560, 561.
7 Toledo, etc. R. R. Co. v. Dunlap,
to prescribe the manner of organizing corporations, public or private, is prospective, and provides the mode of creating new corporations. In such an act provisions to modify the charter of an existing corporation is a new subject, not germane to the title. An act so entitled will operate to govern the incorporation of all subsequent companies; it is not multifarious on that account, but an act which in terms incorporates several companies is so.2
§ 95. The subject expressed in the title includes not only all matters which are constituent parts of it, but all matter directly incidental to it. An act "concerning drainage" includes for this reason assessments upon lands benefited to pay the expense. An act providing for the sale of school lands may define the rights acquired by a purchaser. So a grant of lands in aid of a public improvement may contain a provision exempting the land from taxation for a limited time. An act to regulate a specified business may prescribe penalties for violations of the act. An act "to authorize the Utica WaterWorks Company to increase its capital stock and to contract with the common council of a city named for a supply of water in that city for the extinguishment of fires" was held to embrace but one subject, namely, the giving of authority to two corporate bodies therein named to enter into a contract for the purpose therein specified. The power to increase the capital of the company was given simply to enable it to raise such
47 Mich. 456; Continental Improvement Co. v. Phelps, id. 299.
1 Ayeridge v. Town Commissioners, 60 Ga. 405; City Council v. Port Royal, 74 Ga. 658. See State v. Clinton, 27 La. Ann. 40.
5 Prescott v. Beebe, 17 Kan. 320. It was held in Swayze v. Britton, 17 Kan. 625, that an act "concerning notaries public" was not broad enough to include a provision authorizing notaries public protesting commer
2 King v. Banks, 61 Ga. 20; Ex parte cial paper to give notice thereof to Conner, 51 id. 571.
3 Central Plk. R. Co. v. Hannaman, 22 Ind. 484; Mayor, etc. v. Reitz, 50 Md. 574; City of St. Louis v. Green, 7 Mo. App. 468; Golden Canal Co. v. Bright, 8 Colo. 144; State v. Whitworth, 8 Lea, 504; McGrath v. State, 46 Md. 633; Brown v. State, 73 Ga. 38; Carson v. State, 69 Ala. 235; English v. State, 7 Tex. App. 171.
Wishmier v. State, 97 Ind. 160.
parties secondarily liable. This conclusion cannot be reconciled with the rule of construction generally adopted.
6 Board of Supervisors v. AuditorGeneral, 65 Mich. 408.
7 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Raymond, 70 Mich. 485; Weil v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450; Sykes v. People, 127 Ill. 117; State v. Stunkle, 41 Kan. 456.
sums of money as might be necessary for a performance of its contract; it was a mere incident to the main object. An act to establish a court necessarily includes provisions for the appointment or election of a judge and other officers, how and by whom jurors should be chosen and summoned. An act to make further provision for the government of a city or county is one to provide ways and means for its support, a revenue act, not one which can contain any provision to reorganize or change the government or its organic law. Under a title to enable a public corporation to raise money by tax, provisions may be included not only prescribing the procedure to assess and collect the tax, but the objects may be designated for which the money is to be raised. An act entitled a supplement to "An act concerning taxes" is not open to the objection that it embraces more than one subject expressed in its title because it deals with several details of the matter of taxes." A statute embracing only one general subject, indi- . cated by its title, is constitutional, no matter how fully it may enter into the details of that subject. An act for the more rigid collection of the revenue properly provides for the dif
1 Utica Water-works Co. v. Utica, 31 Hun, 426; O'Meara v. Commissioners, 3 T. & C. 236.
Co. v. Bright, 8 Colo. 144; People v.
In Ackley School District v. Hall,
2 Commonwealth v. Green, 58 Pa. 113 U. S. 135, was considered an St. 233.
3 Gaskin v. Meek, 42 N. Y. 186; People v. O'Brien, 38 id. 193. This last case decides that there cannot be included in a revenue bill entitled to give authority to raise money by tax for the use of a city corporation, and regulating its disbursement, a provision amending the charter in relation to the official term of councilmen and the time of their election. See Huber v. People, 49 N. Y. 132.
4 Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mayor, etc. 8 N. Y. 252; Sharp v. Mayor, etc. 31 Barb. 572-575; Smith v. Mayor, etc. 34 How. Pr. 508.
5 Kirkpatrick v. New Brunswick, 40 N. J. Eq. 46; Brown v. State, 73 Ga. 38. 6 Crawfordsville, etc. T. Co. v. Fletcher, 104 Ind. 97; Golden Canal
"Act to authorize independent school districts to borrow money and issue bonds therefor for the purpose of erecting and completing schoolhouses, legalizing bonds heretofore issued, and making school orders draw six per cent. interest in certain cases," which was held not in violation of the provisions of the state constitution (Iowa), that "every act shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title."
The act is thus summarized in the opinion of the court:
"The act contains six sections, the fourth providing that 'all school orders shall draw six per cent. interest after having been presented to