ferent classes of taxes and defines the duties of officers charged with their collection. It may define the jurisdiction of justices in revenue cases and prescribe the practice. An act “to regulate the use of water for irrigation, and providing for settling the priority of rights thereto, and for payment of the expenses thereof, and for payment of all costs and expenses incident to said regulations and use,” is only equivalent to the briefer title which might have been adopted: An act to regulate the use of water for irrigation. This was held to be the controlling purpose of the law; that the rest of the title refers to nothing which is not germane to the subject thus expressed. Incidental to a proper regulation of the use of water diverted from natural streams in (Colorado) is a determination of the priorities of water rights.?

the treasurer of the district and not subject. ... The doctrines of paid for want of funds, which fact that case have been approved by the shall be indorsed upon the order by same court in subsequent decisions, the treasurer.' As there are two and they are decisive against the kinds of school districts in Iowa, point here raised. Morford v. Unger, 'district township’and'independent 8 Iowa, 83; Davis v. Woolhough, 9 district,' — the latter carved out of id. 104; People v. Brislin, 70 11. 423; the former,- it is contended that the McAurich v. R. R. Co. 20 Iowa, 312; title to the act in question embraces Farmers’ Ins. Co. v. Highsmith, 44 two subjects: one relating to mat- Iowa, 334. The general subject to ters in which independent school which this special act relates is the districts alone are concerned, and the system of common schools. That other to matters in which the town- system is maintained through the ship district and independent districts instrumentality of district schools of are concerned; that whether school different kinds. Provisions in reorders, which may be issued for spect to these instrumentalities – many purposes, by districts of either those referring to the erection and kind, should bear interest or not, is completion of school-houses in indewholly foreign to the borrowing of pendent school districts with money money to build school-houses in in- raised upon negotiable bonds, and dependent districts. Iowa Code, others, to the rate of interest which 1873, ch. 9, tit. 12.

all school orders shall bear -- relate “We are not referred to any adju- to the same general object and are dication by the supreme court of only steps towards its accomplishIowa which supports the point here ment.” made. On the contrary the princi- 1 State v. Whitworth, 8 Lea, 594; ples announced in State v. County Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 329. See Judge, 2 Iowa, 281, show that the act State v. Wardens, 23 La. Ann. 720. before us is not liable to the objection 2 Golden Canal Co. v. Bright, 8 Colo. that its title embraces more than one 144

$ 96. A subject expressed in the title includes all subsidiary details, which are means for carrying into effect the object or purpose of the act disclosed in that subject. An act to incorporate a railroad or other like company may, besides granting its corporate powers, confer on townships or municipalities through which its road passes, or which otherwise derive a public advantage from the enterprise and improvement of such company, power to subscribe to the capital stock of, or make donations to the company; and it may provide for elections to decide as to such subscriptions or donations; for taxation to pay such subscriptions or donations, if voted; and for the issue of bonds to represent the same. It may also provide for the personal liability of stockholders for labor. A charter to create an institution for the education of young men presents à subject which embraces everything which is designed to facilitate that object; everything intended and adapted to promote the well-being of the institution or its students. An act to establish a house of refuge for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders may include an appropriation, not only of money, but land with directions for its sale. An act incorporating a bank may provide that all parties liable on any bill negotiated at the bank may be sued in one action. An act for the benefit of a turnpike company may authorize it to borrow money and to execute mortgages to secure its payment; to sell the road, right of way, etc., applying the

1 Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Highsmith, 15 id. 20; Fireman's Benefit Assoc. 44 Iowa, 330; State v. Tucker, 46 Ind. v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511; People v. 355 ; State v. Baum, 33 La. Ann. 981; Loewenthal, 93 Ill. 191 ; City of VirAllen v. Tison, 50 Ga. 374; Brown v. den v. Allan, 107 id. 505; Slack v. State, 73 Ga. 38; McArthur v. Nel- Jacob, 8 W. Va. 640; Hope v. Gainsson, 81 Ky. 67; State v. McConnell, 3 ville, 72 Ga. 246; Unity v. Burrage, Lea, 332; Smith v. Bohler, 72 Ga. 103 U. S. 447; San Antonio v. Me546; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Oregon, haffy, 96 U. S. 312; Binz v. Weber, etc. R. R. Co. 24 Fed. Rep. 407; Floyd 81 Ill. 288; People v. Brislin, 80 Ill. v. Perrin, 30 S. C. 1; Fahey v. Stete, 423. 27 Tex. App. 146.

3 Sh pley v. Terre Haute, 74 Ind. 2 Mahomet v. Quackenbush, 117 297. U. S. 508; Town of Abington v. Ca- 4 O'Leary v. County of Cook, 28 Ill. been, 106 II. 200; S. C. 12 Am. & 534. Eng. R. R. Cas. 581; Connor v. Green 5 McCaslin v. State, 44 Ind. 155; Pond, etc. R. R. Co. 23 S. C. 427; Klein v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 194. Board of Super. v. People, 25 Ill. 6 Davis v. Bank of Fulton, 31 Ga. 69. 181; Bellville R. R. Co. v. Gregory,

3

proceeds to the payment of its debts; may authorize a judicial sale at the instance of creditors giving the purchaser the rights and powers of the company. An act to establish state depositaries and prescribe their duties and liabilities will cover provisions requiring a bond, and regulating the enforcement of it in case of default.? 'A statute of limitations may be inserted in a tax law for the purpose of aiding and assisting in the collection of taxes. As a means of enforcing a law for regulating and licensing the sale of intoxicating liquors, it may provide that a house where such liquors are sold, if kept in a disorderly manner, may be deemed a common nuisance; that so keeping it shall cause a forfeiture of the license, and subject the proprietor to a fine. For a like purpose the act may provide that the applicant for a license shall give a bond to the state conditioned, among other things, that he will pay all fines and costs that may be assessed against him for violating the provisions of the act. As a means of enforcing the payment of a special tax on dealers in liquors, it is germane to provide that upon failure to pay such tax the dealer may be indicted and punished for a misdemeanor. An act entitled "to prevent deception in the sale of dairy products, and to preserve the public health,” goes beyond its title in making the manufacture of imitation butter a crime. A provision for submitting an act or any question on which its operation depends to a popular vote is germane to the subject or object of such act, and is a means to facilitate its execution.

$ 97. The subject or object stated generally in the title includes the abolition of things inconsistent - Cases of substitution. It is germane to the subject of an act to repeal previous acts relating to it. Such repeal is ancillary to the pur

1 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Ballard, 2 Wayne Circuit Judge, 58 Mich. 381; Met. (Ky.) 165.

S. C. 55 Am. R. 693. See People v. Seay v. Bank of Rome, 66 Ga. 609. Arensberg, 105 N. Y. 123. See Wardle v. Townsend, 75 Mich. 6 City of Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 385.

505; Caldwell v. Barrett, 73 Ga. 604; 3 Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311. Simpson v. Bailey, 3 Oregon, 515;

* Fletcher v. State, 54 Ind. 462; Unity v. Burrage, 103 U. S. 447. O'Kane v. State, 69 Ind. 183.

y Yellow River Imp. Co. v. Arnold, 5 Kane v. State, 78 Ind. 103. 46 Wis. 215; State v. County Com’rs,

• Brown v. State, 73 Ga. 38; Howell 13 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 203; Gabbert v. State, 71 Ga. 224.

v. Jeffersonville R. R. Co. 11 Ind. 365 ; i Northwestern Manuf'g Co. V. Burke v. Monroe County, 77 Ill. 610;

.

pose of the new legislation. When one legislative scheme or system is intended to supersede another, the subject of the act which makes the change naturally includes the removal of the existing legislative institution intended to be abolished or reorganized, in whole or in part, and the establishment of the new in its place. One act may divide the state into judicial circuits for judicial purposes, provide for election of judges, fix the time for holding courts; also abolish an existing court,

nd transfer its unfinished business to the new court.So one act properly includes all provisions for effecting the change of a steam railroad running in a tunnel in the street of a city to a surface railway, including the subject of compensation to the owner of the railroad and raising the means to pay it. It may happen, when partial substitutions occur, that a residuum of the previous state of things will remain, in a disrupted condition, requiring some fresh legislation not germane to the disrupting act. In such case the whole situation will not be re-arranged by one act. The unity of the original condition being destroyed, the validity of the new legislation will depend on its own subject being single.

$ 98. Acts which relate to a plurality of similar subjects.Such subjects may be grouped and treated as a class for general legislation embracing all or a part. There is evident in the later constitutions a strong preference for such legislation, and against special, where general acts are appropriate and practicable. Generalizations to answer all cognate wants require preparation and reflection. A particular need first attracts the attention of the legislator, and when he proceeds to frame a measure with reference to it, how comprehensive he will make it depends on his leisure, his courage, his capacity and his public spirit. There is a marked difference between an act treating of individual subjects as such, and embracing more than one, and an act which aims at a single purpose Martin v. Hewitt, 44 Ala. 418; Tol- Bush, 108; State v. McConnell, 3 ford v. Church, 66 Mich. 431; State v. Lea, 332; Mullen v. State, 34 Ind. 540; Aulman, 76 Iowa, 624; Muldoon v. Phillips v. Mayor, etc. 1 Hilt. 483 ; Levi, 25 Neb. 457. See Ridge Avenue Supervisors v. Heenan, 2 Minn. (281), R’y Co. v. Philadelphia, 124 Pa. St. 333. 219.

? State v. Tucker, 46 Ind. 355. 1 Luehrman v. Taxing Dist. 2 Lea, 3 People v. Lawrence, 41 N. Y. 137. 425; Smith v. Commonwealih, 8 *Cutlip v. Sheriff, 3 W. Va. 588.

involving a plurality of subjects, and concerning all of them, or several of them. The former is generally multifarious ;? the latter valid as dealing with a unity. One general law may provide how all municipal corporations may be organized, how all private corporations may be formed; but one act to create two corporations is void for duplicity. One act may define all the crimes, or all belonging to one class ; ' but one act which creates two separate offenses deals with two subjects. The multiplicity of persons or things which will be affected by the legislation is immaterial if the subject be single. An act authorizing two counties to issue bonds to erect a court-house in each was held to embrace but one subject — that of building court-houses. Such an act might properly embrace all counties. That it is not so general, and only applies to two, does not affect this question. It may have been as extensive as the occasion in the state required. But where the legislation concerns separate things without unity in any consideration or purpose it is within the constitutional inhibition. Thus a law provided for the expenditure of certain highway taxes on two distinct state roads, and for the location and construction of a third state road, and for the expenditure of certain other taxes upon that; it was held to embrace more than one subject. The three roads were held to be “three distinct objects of legislation,” which might with entire propriety have been provided for by separate acts; and, indeed, ought to have been, in view of the care which is taken by the constitution to compel each distinct object of legislation to be considered separately.

1 In re Paul, 94 N. Y. 497; State v. from expressing by their votes their Harrison, 11 La. Ann. 722.

opinion upon each separately, but 2 King v. Banks, 61 Ga. 20; Ex they are so united as to unite a comparte Connor, 51 id. 571.

bination of interest among the friends 3 State v. Brassfield, 81 Mo. 162. of each in order to secure the success 4 In re Paul, supra.

of all, when, perhaps, neither could 3 Allen v. Tison, 50 Ga. 374; Wey- be passed separately. The evils of and v. Stover, 35 Kan. 545.

that species of omnibus legislation 6 People v. Denahy, 20 Mich. 349. which the constitution designed to Cooley, J., delivering the opinion of prohibit are all invited by acts thus the court, said: “ These objects have framed; and although we have no certainly no necessary connection, and reason to suppose that those evils actbeing grouped together in one bill, ually existed in the present case, or legislators are not only precluded that there was any purpose on the