ferent classes of taxes and defines the duties of officers charged with their collection. It may define the jurisdiction of justices in revenue cases and prescribe the practice. An act "to regulate the use of water for irrigation, and providing for settling the priority of rights thereto, and for payment of the expenses thereof, and for payment of all costs and expenses incident to said regulations and use," is only equivalent to the briefer title which might have been adopted: An act to regulate the use of water for irrigation. This was held to be the controlling purpose of the law; that the rest of the title refers to nothing which is not germane to the subject thus expressed. Incidental to a proper regulation of the use of water diverted from natural streams in (Colorado) is a determination of the priorities of water rights.2 the treasurer of the district and not paid for want of funds, which fact shall be indorsed upon the order by the treasurer.' As there are two kinds of school districts in Iowa, 'district township' and 'independent district,' the latter carved out of the former, it is contended that the title to the act in question embraces two subjects: one relating to matters in which independent school districts alone are concerned, and the other to matters in which the township district and independent districts are concerned; that whether school orders, which may be issued for many purposes, by districts of either kind, should bear interest or not, is wholly foreign to the borrowing of money to build school-houses in independent districts. Iowa Code, 1873, ch. 9, tit 12. "We are not referred to any adjudication by the supreme court of Iowa which supports the point here made. On the contrary the principles announced in State v. County Judge, 2 Iowa, 281, show that the act before us is not liable to the objection that its title embraces more than one subject. 1 State v. Whitworth, 8 Lea, 594; § 96. A subject expressed in the title includes all subsidiary details, which are means for carrying into effect the object or purpose of the act disclosed in that subject.' An act to incorporate a railroad or other like company may, besides granting its corporate powers, confer on townships or municipalities through which its road passes, or which otherwise derive a public advantage from the enterprise and improvement of such company, power to subscribe to the capital stock of, or make donations to, the company; and it may provide for elections to decide as to such subscriptions or donations; for taxation to pay such subscriptions or donations, if voted; and for the issue of bonds to represent the same. It may also provide for the personal liability of stockholders for labor. A charter to create an institution for the education of young men presents a subject which embraces everything which is designed to facilitate that object; everything intended and adapted to promote the well-being of the institution or its students. An act to establish a house of refuge for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders may include an appropriation, not only of money, but land with directions for its sale. An act incorporating a bank may provide that all parties liable on any bill negotiated at the bank may be sued in one action." An act for the benefit of a turnpike company may authorize it to borrow money and to execute mortgages to secure its payment; to sell the road, right of way, etc., applying the 1 Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Highsmith, 15 id. 20; Fireman's Benefit Assoc. 44 Iowa, 330; State v. Tucker, 46 Ind. v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511; People v. 355; State v. Baum, 33 La. Ann. 981; Loewenthal, 93 Ill. 191; City of VirAllen v. Tison, 50 Ga. 374; Brown v. den v. Allan, 107 id. 505; Slack v. State, 73 Ga. 38; McArthur v. Nel- Jacob, 8 W. Va. 640; Hope v. Gainsson, 81 Ky. 67; State v. McConnell, 3 ville, 72 Ga. 246; Unity v. Burrage, Lea, 332; Smith v. Bohler, 72 Ga. 103 U. S. 447; San Antonio v. Me546; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Oregon, haffy, 96 U. S. 312; Binz v. Weber, etc. R. R. Co. 24 Fed. Rep. 407; Floyd 81 Ill. 288; People v. Brislin, 80 Ill. V. Perrin, 30 S. C. 1; Fahey v. State, 423. 27 Tex. App. 146. 2 Mahomet V. Quackenbush, 117 U. S. 508; Town of Abington v. Cabeen, 106 Ill. 200; S. C. 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 581; Connor v. Green Pond, etc. R. R. Co. 23 S. C. 427; Board of Super. v. People, 25 Ill 181; Bellville R. R. Co. v. Gregory, 3 Shipley v. Terre Haute, 74 Ind. 297. 4 O'Leary v. County of Cook, 28 IIL 534. 5 McCaslin v. State, 44 Ind. 155; Klein v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 194. 6 Davis v. Bank of Fulton, 31 Ga. 69. 3 2 proceeds to the payment of its debts; may authorize a judicial sale at the instance of creditors giving the purchaser the rights and powers of the company. An act to establish state depositaries and prescribe their duties and liabilities will cover provisions requiring a bond, and regulating the enforcement of it in case of default. A statute of limitations may be inserted in a tax law for the purpose of aiding and assisting in the collection of taxes. As a means of enforcing a law for regulating and licensing the sale of intoxicating liquors, it may provide that a house where such liquors are sold, if kept in a disorderly manner, may be deemed a common nuisance; that so keeping it shall cause a forfeiture of the license, and subject the proprietor to a fine. For a like purpose the act may provide that the applicant for a license shall give a bond to the state conditioned, among other things, that he will pay all fines and costs that may be assessed against him for violating the provisions of the act. As a means of enforcing the payment of a special tax on dealers in liquors, it is germane to provide that upon failure to pay such tax the dealer may be indicted and punished for a misdemeanor." An act entitled "to prevent deception in the sale of dairy products, and to preserve the public health," goes beyond its title in making the manufacture of imitation butter a crime. A provision for submitting an act or any question on which its operation depends to a popular vote is germane to the subject or object of such act, and is a means to facilitate its execution. 97. The subject or object stated generally in the title includes the abolition of things inconsistent - Cases of substitution. It is germane to the subject of an act to repeal previous acts relating to it. Such repeal is ancillary to the pur 1 Louisville, etc. Co. v. Ballard, 2 Wayne Circuit Judge, 58 Mich. 381; Met. (Ky.) 165. S. C. 55 Am. R. 693. See People v. Arensberg, 105 N. Y. 123. 2 Seay v. Bank of Rome, 66 Ga. 609. See Wardle v. Townsend, 75 Mich. 385. 3 Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311. O'Kane v. State, 69 Ind. 183. 5 Kane v. State, 78 Ind. 103. 8 City of Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 505; Caldwell v. Barrett, 73 Ga. 604; Simpson v. Bailey, 3 Oregon, 515; Unity v. Burrage, 103 U. S. 447. "Yellow River Imp. Co. v. Arnold, 46 Wis. 215; State v. County Com'rs, 13 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 203; Gabbert v. Jeffersonville R. R. Co. 11 Ind. 365; ¡Northwestern Manuf'g Co. v. Burke v. Monroe County, 77 Ill. 610; v. State, 71 Ga. 224. pose of the new legislation. When one legislative scheme or system is intended to supersede another, the subject of the act which makes the change naturally includes the removal of the existing legislative institution intended to be abolished or reorganized, in whole or in part, and the establishment of the new in its place.1 One act may divide the state into judicial circuits for judicial purposes, provide for election of judges, fix the time for holding courts; also abolish an existing court, nd transfer its unfinished business to the new court. So one act properly includes all provisions for effecting the change of a steam railroad running in a tunnel in the street of a city to a surface railway, including the subject of compensation to the owner of the railroad and raising the means to pay it. It may happen, when partial substitutions occur, that a residuum of the previous state of things will remain, in a disrupted condition, requiring some fresh legislation not germane to the disrupting act. In such case the whole situation will not be re-arranged by one act. The unity of the original condition being destroyed, the validity of the new legislation will depend on its own subject being single. $98. Acts which relate to a plurality of similar subjects.Such subjects may be grouped and treated as a class for general legislation embracing all or a part. There is evident in the later constitutions a strong preference for such legislation, and against special, where general acts are appropriate and practicable. Generalizations to answer all cognate wants require preparation and reflection. A particular need first attracts the attention of the legislator, and when he proceeds to frame a measure with reference to it, how comprehensive he will make it depends on his leisure, his courage, his capacity and his public spirit. There is a marked difference between an act treating of individual subjects as such, and embracing more than one, and an act which aims at a single purpose 3 involving a plurality of subjects, and concerning all of them, or several of them. The former is generally multifarious;' the latter valid as dealing with a unity. One general law may provide how all municipal corporations may be organized, how all private corporations may be formed; but one act to create two corporations is void for duplicity. One act may define all the crimes, or all belonging to one class; but one act which creates two separate offenses deals with two subjects. The multiplicity of persons or things which will be affected by the legislation is immaterial if the subject be single. An act authorizing two counties to issue bonds to erect a court-house in each was held to embrace but one subject that of building court-houses. Such an act might properly embrace all counties. That it is not so general, and only applies to two, does not affect this question. It may have been as extensive as the occasion in the state required. But where the legislation concerns separate things without unity in any consideration or purpose it is within the constitutional inhibition. Thus a law provided for the expenditure of certain highway taxes on two distinct state roads, and for the location and construction of a third state road, and for the expenditure of certain other taxes upon that; it was held to embrace more than one subject. The three roads were held to be "three distinct objects of legislation,” which might with entire propriety have been provided for by separate acts; and, indeed, ought to have been, in view of the care which is taken by the constitution to compel each distinct object of legislation to be considered separately." 1In re Paul, 94 N. Y. 497; State v. from expressing by their votes their Harrison, 11 La. Ann. 722. opinion upon each separately, but 2 King v. Banks, 61 Ga. 20; Ex they are so united as to unite a comparte Connor, 51 id. 571. State v. Brassfield, 81 Mo. 162. bination of interest among the friends of each in order to secure the success of all, when, perhaps, neither could Allen v. Tison, 50 Ga. 374; Wey- be passed separately. The evils of and v. Stover, 35 Kan. 545. "People v. Denahy, 20 Mich. 349. Cooley, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "These objects have certainly no necessary connection, and being grouped together in one bill, legislators are not only precluded that species of omnibus legislation which the constitution designed to prohibit are all invited by acts thus framed; and although we have no reason to suppose that those evils actually existed in the present case, or that there was any purpose on the |