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In Daubman v. Smith ? the act was entitled “to transfer the charge and keeping of the jails and the custody of the prisoners in the counties of Essex and Hudson from the sheriff to the board of chosen freeholders, and for the employment of prisoners, and to regulate the term of service therein.” Magie, J., said, in delivering the opinion of the court: “I am compelled to the conclusion that the legislation in question is in obvious opposition to the constitutional provision in one or the other of its phases. For, if the object of this act may be taken to be the regulation of the jails and the custody of the prisoners in the two counties named in the first eight sections, then the ninth section, in providing for the extension of the scheme to other counties, introduces another and different object, and the act embraces more than one object.?
“If, on the other hand, the object of this act may be taken to be the regulation of the jails and then of the prisoners in all the counties of the state, then that object is not expressed in the title. If such was the object of the act, the fact that with respect to some counties it was mandatory, and with respect to others optional, might not be objectionable. The matters
part of the legislature to disregard special and peculiar legislation in rethe constitutional requirement, yet spect to which the roads have no necwe cannot be governed by these con- essary connection. A combination siderations, if the act is of a class of that description would at once be which is actually prohibited.
pronounced unconstitutional by gen“The act, it will be seen, is not one eral consent, but would not differ at which establishes a general system all, in principle, from the present act, for the expenditure of non-resident in which the combination of objects highway taxes, or for the construc- is equally apparent, and equally untion of state roads. It singles out necessary for the proper purpose of two state roads and provides for the legislation. The only difference there expenditure of certain non-resident could be in the two cases would be highway taxes upon each. It then that, in a case of a combination of inproceeds to provide for the location terests among powerful corporations and construction of a third state road to secure favorable legislation on their and the expenditure of certain other behalf, a purpose to evade the contaxes upon that
stitutional requirement would gen"The three objects are as separate erally be very apparent, while in this and distinct as the three great lines case we do not imagine it to have of railroad crossing the state, and the existed at all; but the question of same arguments which might be ad- violation of the constitution is not a vanced in support of this act would question of intent." support also an act which would 147 N. J. L. 200. single out those three railroads for ? In re Sackett, etc. Sts. 74 N. Y. 95.
comprehended in the act would seem to be germane to such an object. But the title does not express such an object.” The act had more scope than the title, and the excess was so much as applied to a county not named in the title.
$ 99. A curative act may apply to any number of instruments or proceedings. One act legalized the proceedings in three separate towns, though taken distinct from each other, to issue bonds in aid of a railroad. By miscarriage of some promoters of them they failed to comply with the law under which they were set on foot, so as not to be efficacious. It was held that the bill contained but one subject. The court said it was a local bill, to have effect upon that separate portion of the state. The object of it was to legalize and validate certain doings in that territory, which, although carried on distinct from each other, had a common aim and purpose. So an act to confirm, reduce and levy certain assessments in the city of B. was held to embrace but one subject.?
$ 100. One act may relate to all or a portion of the courts of a state in defining their jurisdiction or regulating their practice. In the Matter of Wakker, an act in relation to justices and police courts of New York was held not to be obnoxious to constitutional objection on account of two courts being the subject of legislation. The court say: "It was the object of this law to establish justices' courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction within this city, and to abolish such minor jurisdictions as stood in the way of the courts to be created. The wellknown jurisdiction of justices of the peace for the country is divided by this statute between the new justices created by it, upon one set of whom is conferred the civil and upon the other the criminal jurisdiction of the country magistrates. The office of justice, its tenure and jurisdiction, and the compensation of its incumbents are provided for, and clerks are ordered and compensated by this law.” It provided also that its provisions should be applicable to the justices and clerk of the marine court. That court was substantially a justice's court, it being distinguishable only by having additional jurisdiction in certain marine cases not cognizable by justices. On this point the court say: "It would be giving an undue importance to this
1 Rogers v. Stephens, 86 N. Y. 623. 33 Barb. 162. 2 In re Van Antwerp, 1 T. & C. 423.
one feature in respect to jurisdiction to hold that this alone deprived it of the character of a justice's court, while it possessed all the main characteristics of that tribunal. It is still a court of inferior and limited jurisdiction, conducted, in all respects material to this argument, as a justice's court. If this be correct, then, in the strictost construction of the article of the constitution under consideration, a statute in relation to justices' courts, confined to the organization and regulation of these courts, may properly embrace in its provisions the marine court."
An act was held valid in Kentucky which regulated the jurisdiction of several courts, the inferior courts of the state. It was an act to regulate the civil jurisdiction of justices of the peace, police judges and quarterly courts, and the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts on appeals from their judgments, and to authorize the quarterly courts to appoint clerks. The act was treated as one to regulate the jurisdiction of several of the courts of the state. The subject was deemed single.
$ 101. The title and subject of amendatory and supplementary acts. The constitutional requirement under discussion as applied to acts of this character when they contain matter which might appropriately have been incorporated in the original act under its title is satisfied generally if the amendatory or supplemental act identifies the original act by its title, and declares the purpose to amend or supplement it. Under such a title, alterations by excision, addition or substitution may be made. 1 Allen v. Hall, 14 Bush, 85.
46 Wis. 214, 224; Hoffman v. Par2 State Line, etc. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, sons, 27 Minn. 236; Jones v. Colum77 Pa. St. 429; Craig v. First Presb. bus, 25 Ga 610; City of St. Louis v. Church, 88 id. 42; Millvale Borough Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578; State v. Newark, v. Evergreen R’y Co. 131 id. 1; Sec- 34 N. J. L 236; Robinson v. Lane, 19 ond German Am. B. Asso. v. New- Ga 337; Perry v. Gross, 25 Neb. 826; man, 50 Md. 62; Swartwout v. Rail- Williamson v. Keokuk, 44 Iowa, 88; road Co. 24 Mich. 389; Gibson v. National Bank v. Com’rs, 14 Fed. State, 16 Fla. 291; Morford v. Unger, Rep. 239; Saunders v. Provisional 8 Iowa, 82; People v. Willsea, 60 Municipality, 24 Fla. 226; AlberN. Y. 507; Brandon v. State, 16 Ind. son v. Mayor, 82 Ga. 30. See Hy197; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400; man v. State, 87 Tenn. 109; Hyde Yellow River Imp't Co. v. Arnold, Park v. Chicago, 124 IIL 156. But
3 Robinson v. Lane, supra.
It is not enough to refer to the original act merely by the number of the chapter of published laws which includes it.
see State v. Smith, 35 Minn. 257. In the title of the law of 1878, “An act that case it appears that outside of to provide for the assessment and the general law for the assessment collection of taxes,” the only legisla: and collection of taxes an independ- tion adopted had been a change of ent or cumulative act in pari materia the prior law in respect to the time was in force requiring notice of the of meeting of the state board of expiration of redemption after a tax equalization or of the manner of pubsale. A subsequent statute, entitled lishing the delinquent list. Now, generally as an act to amend the gen- suppose a later act, declared in its eral law, contained a provision ex- title to be amendatory of that act, to pressly repealing this separate stat- consist of two sections; the first ute, which was probably equivalent amending the prior act by prescrib to providing that redemption should ing a different time for the meeting expire absolutely by lapse of the re- of the state board or a different mandemption period without notice to ner of publishing the delinquent list the party who had the right of re- The second section, we will suppose, demption. This was matter germane simply declares the repeal of section to the original bill which 2 of a law of 1873 (Sp. Laws, 1873, amended, and under the rule stated ch. 111), authorizing railroad corpoin the text the title was sufficient. rations to adopt the scheme of substiThe court, however, held otherwise, tuted taxation in that act provided; and Dickinson, J., delivering the or let the supposed second section de opinion of the court, said: “An clare the repeal of the law of 1877 amendatory law is for the amend- (chapter 105), which required an anment not of what might have been nual return by railroad corporations enacted under the title of the original of land sold from their untaxable statute, but of what was enacted; land grant, so that the same might not of what the original law might be properly subjected to taxation; or have been, but of what it was. Hence again, let the supposed second section the sufficiency of the title of an act be like that now in question — simply merely declared to be amendatory of the repeal of the act of 1877, respecta prior law, to justify the legislation ing the giving of notice of the expirawhich may be enacted under it, de- tion of the period for redemption; pends not alone upon the fact that or let us suppose that the so-called the title of the original statute was so amendatory act had consisted only of comprehensive that the legislation such repeal of the law of 1877. In might have been properly enacted in such cases the mind is at once imsuch prior law, but it depends also pressed with the incongruity between upon the nature and extent of the the subject of the act as expressed in prior enactment to amend which is its title and the enactment under it the declared purpose or subject of the Yet the principle relied upon by the latter act. This seems self-evident; respondent would sustain such legisbut to test the correctness of the rule lation, because it might have been invoked, let us apply it to supposable adopted under the title of the orig
We will assume that under inal law. The fault in the asserted People v. Hills, 35 N. Y. 449.
The true and actual subject or object must be expressed in the title and not by way of reference to something else to show it."
An act entitled to amend the charter of a named municipal corporation may contain a provision changing the territorial boundary of the municipality. Under such a title provisions
? have sometimes been enacted curing defects in and validating municipal proceedings taken of course subsequent to the enactment of the original charter. Such provisions are germane to the object of the incorporation, but not to the function or act of creating a corporation, prescribing and distributing its powers, and regulating their exercise. Such curative provis
, ions are retrospective, and are not of the nature of a charter, while the original act is constitutive and wholly prospective.
$ 102. Provisions in an act not within the subject expressed in the title.— The title of an act defines its scope; it can contain no valid provision beyond the range of the subject there stated. A title importing a prospective statute will
rule is that it does not regard the American Banking Association v. nature and extent of the original en- Newman, supra. actment which it is the declared pur- 2 Whiting v. Mt. Pleasant, 11 Iowa, pose of the later act to amend, but 482; Morford v., Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; only the title of it; it rests upon the Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush, 37; Humassumption that the enactment was bolt County v. County Com’rs, 6 as comprehensive as under its title it Nev. 30. might have been. We think it can- 3 See post, S 483. not be relied upon to aid in the de- 4 Williamson v. Keokuk, 44 Iowa, termination of such cases, and, if 88; In re Kiernan, 6 T. & C. 320; recognized as a rule without qualifi- State v. Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236, cation, that it would open a way to and Humbolt Co. v. County Com'rs, the accomplishment of the very evils 6 Nev. 30, are liable to criticism for which the constitutional provision embracing provisions which are not was intended to prevent.” Re-affirmed strictly cognate with the purpose of in State ex rel. Nash v. Madson, 45 the act as stated in the title. See N. W. Rep. 856.
Dolese v. Pierce, 124 Ill. 140. 1 Id. ; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553; 5 State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227; People Tingue v. Port Chester, 101 N. Y. v. Common Council, 13 Abb. Pr. (N.S.) 294, 303; People v. Fleming, 7 Colo. 121; Lowndes County v. Hunter, 49 231 ; Pennington v. Woolfolk, 79 Ky. Ala. 507; State v. Wardens, 23 La. Ann. 13. It was decided in State v. Gar- 720; Brieswick v. Mayor, etc. 51 Ga. rett, 29 La. Ann. 637, that parts of a 639; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 115; In re statute could be repealed by refer- Tappen, 36 How. Pr. 390 ; Ex parte ence to the numbers of the sections Thomason, 16 Neb. 238; Mewherter repealed. But see Second German v. Price, 11 Ind. 199; People v. Gad