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not cover a retrospective provision. An act to prescribe the manner of creating corporations cannot constitutionally embrace provisions amending existing charters. A title import

ing exclusively a public statute will not cover provisions of a private nature not mentioned in the title.' An act purporting by its title to legalize and make valid certain county bonds may not authorize the issue of new bonds for like reasons to other persons. Provisions directing the manner of executing a judgment may not be embraced in an act professing by its title to regulate fees on judicial sales. Under a title providing for work in the improvement of certain named streets in a city, no provisions can be enacted for work on others not named." A title confined to leasehold estates will not cover provisions relating to freeholds.' So an act whose title refers only to revenue for state and county purposes cannot provide for municipal revenues. It has been made a question whether an act entitled to regulate the jurisdiction of a class of inferior courts and providing for an appeal could properly regulate the jurisdiction and practice of the appellate court in the cases so appealed. It appears to the writer to be an extraneous subject.9

way, 61 Mich. 285; Church v. De-
troit, 64 id. 571; Nester v. Busch, id.
657; Losch v. St. Charles, 65 id. 555;
Supervisors v. Auditor-Gen'l, 68 id.
659; Ellis v. Hutchinson, 70 id. 154;
Eaton v. Walker, 76 id. 579; Fidelity
Ins. Co. v. Shenandoah V. R. R. Co. 9
S. E. R. 759; Thomas v. Wabash,
etc. R. R. Co. 40 Fed. Rep. 126;
Touzalin v. Omaha, 25 Neb. 817;
McCabe v. Kenny, 52 Hun, 514; Lane
v. State, 49 N. J. L. 673; Hatfield v.
Commonwealth, 120 Pa. St. 395;
Wulftange v. McCollom, 83 Ky. 361.
1 Thomas v. Collins, 58 Mich. 64.
2 Ayeridge v. Town Com'rs, 60 Ga.
405; City Council v. Port Royal, etc.
74 Ga. 658.

People v. Supervisors, 43 N. Y. 10. But see Neuendorff v. Duryea, 69 N. Y. 557.

5 Gaskin v. Anderson, 55 Barb. 259. 6 In re Sackett, etc. Streets, 74 N. Y. 95.

7 Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192.

8 Ross v. Davis, 97 Ind. 79; Bugher v. Prescott, 23 Fed. Rep. 20; Knoxville v. Lewis, 12 Lea, 180.

9 Jones v. Thompson, 12 Bush, 394; Faqua v. Mullen, 13 Bush, 467; Kuhns v. Krammis, 20 Ind. 490, overruled in Robinson v. Skipworth, 23 Ind. 311. The title of the act in question in this case was: "The election and qualification of justices of the peace and defining their jurisdiction, powers and duties in civil cases. The act contained a provision in regard to cases appealed from justices' courts to the circuit and common pleas courts, that "such cases shall stand for trial in the court of com

4 Board of Commissioners v. Baker, mon pleas or circuit courts whenever 80 Ind. 374.

such transcript has been filed ten

An act which by its title is directed against the adulteration of milk, and professing to regulate the sale of milk, does not extend to the provision against producing unwholesome milk by any other process than adulteration. So, where the title of an act referred only to bills and promissory notes, no other contracts could be affected or made the subject of legislation in the body of the act. A title of legislation relating to the

days before the first day of the term thereof, and be there tried under the same rules and regulations prescribed for trials before justices; and amendments of the pleadings may be made on such terms as to costs and continuances as the court may order." In Kahns v. Krammis the court said: "Appeals from justices of the peace entirely remove the causes appealed from the justices. They are not tried upon error but de novo, and are never returned to the justices. The final judgment regulating the rights of the parties is rendered in the appellate court. Such being the case, all legislation touching the manner of rendering judgment in such cases should be in acts regulating proceedings in the appellate courts; and provisions in the justice's act assuming to prescribe the practice in the trial and judgment of such causes in the appellate courts is in no manner connected with the act regulating the practice in justice's court." 'But," the court inquires in the overruling opinion in Robinson v. Skipworth, "is there not a natural and proper connection between this matter and the subject of the act? It is plain that to constitute this connection the matter need not form any part of the subject. For it is well said by Mr. Justice Perkins in delivering the opinion of this court in the case of The Bank of the State of Indiana v. The City of New Albany, 11 Ind. 139, that as to sec. 19, art. 4 (of the constitution), referred to, that "every act

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shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title." The title incorporating the bank is "An act incorporating the bank without branches." We have already seen that the extent and manner of taxing the capital stock of the bank, when created, is a matter properly connected with the subject of chartering the institution, and it is only the subject, and not the matter properly connected therewith, that must be expressed in the title. The chain connecting the matter of section 70 (supra) with the subject of the act is unbroken. We follow the case in all its stages, from the commencement of the action to the final judgment of the justice; then follows the appeal; then the proceedings in the appellate court, step by step, to final judgment, including costs in the action." Here the cases on which the jurisdiction is exercised are treated as "matter properly connected therewith," even after they have passed beyond that jurisdiction. It is not the purpose of the act to provide for cases they are connected with the subject of the act — the justice's jurisdiction-while they are subjects of that jurisdiction - no longer. They are incidents; and when they have passed out of the sphere of the principal, they are no longer connected with it in theory or practice.

'Shivers v. Newton, 45 N. J. L.

469.

2 Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199.

transportation of freight will not permit any provision relative to passenger transportation. Nor is a title providing for the acknowledgment of deeds and other conveyances of land broad enough to include provisions defining the consequences of a failure to record such instruments. Under the phrase "to lay additional tracks," in the title of an act supplementary to the charter of a railway company, a new route cannot be substituted for that established under the original charter.3 An act confined by the title to "the preservation of the Muskegon river improvement" may include authority to collect tolls and expend the money for that object, but a provision for raising means to pay and authorizing payment for the original construction of the work is beyond the object expressed in the title. An act "to secure complete records in the courts" does not warrant a provision for obtaining recovery from a delinquent officer who had been already paid for completing the record. An act "to provide revenue by taxation of corporations, associations and limited partnerships" is too restricted to embrace individual taxation. Provisions for attaching unorganized territory to a judicial district cannot be enacted under a title to regulate the terms of court in it.7

§ 103. Effect of acts containing more than one subject.— If an act contain more than one subject, and more than one subject is expressed in the title, the whole act is void.

In State v. Lancaster Co., Maxwell, J., said: "The rule is well settled that where the title to an act actually indicates, and the act itself actually includes, two distinct objects, where the constitution declares it shall embrace but one, the whole act must be treated as void, from the manifest impossibility of choosing between the two and holding the act valid as to one

1 Evans v. Memphis, etc. R. R. Co. 56 Ala. 246.

2 Carr v. Thomas, 18 Fla. 736.
3 West Phila. R. R. Co. v. Union
R. R. Co. 9 Phila. 495.

4 Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269.
3 Lowndes County v. Hunter, 49

Ala. 507.

8 State v. McCann, 4 Lea, 1; Skinner v. Wilhelm, 63 Mich. 568; Johnston v. Spicer, 107 N. Y. 185; Re Commissioners, 49 N. J. L. 488; Ragio v. State, 86 Tenn. 272; State v. Lancaster Co. 17 Neb. 87; Moore v. Police Jury, 32 La. Ann. 1013; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151; Pennington v. Wool

• Commonwealth v. Martin, 107 Pa. folk, 79 Ky. 13. St. 185. 917 Neb. 87.

7 Ex parte Wood, 34 Kan. 645.

and void as to the other. But this rule will apply only in those cases where it is impossible from an inspection of the act itself to determine which act, or rather which part of the act, is void and which is valid. Where this can be done the rule does not apply, unless it shall appear that the invalid portion was designed as inducement to pass the valid, so that the whole taken together will warrant the belief that the legislature would have passed the valid part alone." So if the body of an act embrace more than one subject, and only one be mentioned in the title, the whole act will be void, unless the subject mentioned in the title is so independently treated in the act as to be capable of separation from the other subject. This result must be the conclusion though the act be passed under a constitution like that of California, containing the condition added to the inhibitory clause in question.

In People v. Parks,2 McKee, J., thus characterizes the act in question, entitled an act "to promote drainage:" "It will thus be seen that the body and scope of the act included a combination of subjects; the construction of reservoirs for the storage of debris from mines; the protection of mines, towns or cities from inundation, by the erection of embankments or dykes; the drainage of certain districts of the state by the rectification of river channels, and the levy of special taxes to carry on a system of public works, are all inseparably conjoined in the body of the act. The extraordinary powers conferred upon the district board of directors are to be exercised for the benefit of all the subjects conjointly; and the money to be raised by the exercise of these powers is to be expended for all without distinction as to any particular ones, thus rendering it impossible to disjoin the subjects embraced in the act which are not expressed in its title so as to adjudge the one void and the other valid as might be done under section 24 of article 4 of the constitution." 3

Where the provisions of a statute which are not connected with its subject are separable, they will be declared void and the residue sustained. In states where this constitutional restriction applies only to local and private acts, the joinder of

1 Cooley's Const. Lim. 147.

258 Cal. 624, 638.

3 See State v. Exnicios, 33 La. Ann.

253; State v. Crowley, 33 La. Ann.

782.

4 State v. Dalon, 35 La. Ann. 1141;

provisions of a public or general nature with those of a local or private nature will not invalidate the former though the latter may be void for duplicity of subjects in the act or for not being germane to the title.1

Cooley's C. L. 181; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 566, 568; Succession of Irwin, 33 La. Ann. 63; State v. Exnicios, 33 La, Ann. 253; Unity v. Burrage, 103 U. S. 447; State v. Young, 47 Ind. 150; Shoemaker v. Smith, 37 Ind. 122; Richards v. Richards, 76 N. Y. 188; Ex parte Wood, 34 Kan. 645; Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192; Commonwealth v. Martin, 107 Pa. St. 185; Stuart v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 524; State v. Lancaster Co. 17 Neb. 87; Smith v. Mayor, 34 How. Pr. 508; Allegheny Co. Home's Case, 77 Pa. St. 77; Adams v. Webster, 26 La. Ann. 142; State v. Baum, 33 La. Ann. 981; Williamson v. Keokuk, 44 Iowa, 88; State v. Hurds, 19 Neb. 316; Whited v. Lewis, 25 La. Ann. 568; People v. Hall, 8 Colo. 485; Fuqua v. Mullen, 13 Bush, 467; Municipality

No. 3 v. Michoud, 6 La. Ann. 605; Ex parte Moore, 62 Ala. 471; Mississippi & R. River B. Co. v. Prince, 10 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 391; Ex parte Thomason, 16 Neb. 238; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151; State v. Wardens, 23 La. Ann. 720; State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227; Gibson v. Belcher, 1 Bush, 145; Stockle v. Silsbee, 41 Mich. 616; People v. Fleming, 7 Colo. 230; Bugher v. Prescott, 23 Fed. Rep. 20; Rader v. Township of Union, 39 N. J. L 509; Daubman v. Smith, 47 N. J. L 200; Grubbs v. State, 24 Ind. 295; Rushing v. Sebree, 12 Bush, 198; Central & G. R. R. Co. v. People, 5 Colo. 39.

1 People v. Supervisors, 43 N. Y. 10; Richards v. Richards, 76 N. Y. 186, 189; People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; Williams v. People, 24 N. Y. 405.

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