§ 132. Acts expressly amendatory. In the amendment or revision of a statute two things are required: First, the title of the act amended or revised should be referred to; and secondly, the act as revised, or section as amended, should be set forth and published at full length. In the amendment of a section the title of the act in force containing it should be referred to. It is unavailing to refer to the original title of the act containing the section after it has been amended and formulated in a later act. The title of the later law should be referred to, for the section as part of the original act, by the amendment, has ceased to exist except as to past transactions; it is superseded by the section as amended. An amendment of a section after it has been thus displaced is void. It is not necessary in an amendatory statute to set forth the old act or section, but only to re-enact complete the amended section. It is intended that the law in force after the amendment shall be formulated and stated as it reads entire, and not in shreds. The supreme court of Louisiana say: "It was in 1 Feibleman v. State ex rel. 98 Ind. 521; Tuskaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9; Rogers v. State, 6 Ind. 31; Armstrong v. Berreman, 13 id. 422; Sovereign v. State, 7 Neb. 409, 413; Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. Ann. 297; Kohn v. Carrollton, 10 La. Ann. 719; Jones v. Commissioner, 21 Mich. 236; State v. Algood, 87 Tenn. 163. See Comstock v. Judge, etc. 39 Mich. 195; Earle v. Board of Education, 55 Cal. 489, 492, 493. 2 Burnett v. Turner, 87 Tenn. 124. 3 Id.; Draper v. Falley, 33 Ind. 465; Town of Martinsville v. Frieze, id. 507; Blakemore v. Dolan, 50 id. 194; Ford v. Booker, 53 id. 395; Cowley v. Rushville, 60 id. 327; Niblack v. Goodman, 67 id. 174; Clare v. State, 68 id. 17; Brocaw v. Board, etc. 73 id. 543; Lawson v. De Bolt, 78 id. 563; McIntyre v. Marine, 93 id. 193; Robertson v. State, 12 Tex. App. 541. See Jones v. Commissioner, 21 Mich. 236; Pond v. Maddox, 38 Cal. 572; State v. Brewster, 39 Ohio St. 653. In Basnett v. Jacksonville, 19 Fla. 664, an 5 act purported to amend a section which had been amended, and enacted that it should "read as follows;" held to operate to repeal all of the section amended which is not embraced in the amendment. A clerical mistake in the title of the amendatory act referring to the date when the amended act was approved will not vitiate the amendatory statute. Saunders v. Provisional Municipality, 24 Fla. 226. See Wall v. Garrison, 11 Colo. 515. 4 Greencastle, etc. Co. v. State ex rel. 28 Ind. 382; Draper v. Falley, 33 id. 465; Blakemore v. Dolan, 50 id. 194; Rogers v. State, 6 id. 31; People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182; Arnoult v. New Orleans, 11 La. Ann. 54; Jones v. Commissioner, 21 Mich. 236; City of Portland v. Stock, 2 Oregon, 69; Colwell v. Chamberlin, 43 N. J. L. 387; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573, 602; Mayor v. Trigg, 46 Mo. 288; State v. Powder Mfg. Co. 50 N. J. L 75. 5 Arnoult v. New Orleans, supra. tended that each amendment, and each revisal, should speak for itself; should stand independent and apart from the act revised or the section amended. It was therefore provided that, in such cases, if the object was to revise an act, it should be re-enacted throughout; and if the object was to amend an act, then the section amended should be re-enacted and published." If the section is subdivided into clauses or paragraphs, and an amendment is made affecting one only of the clauses or paragraphs, the entire section must nevertheless be included in the amendatory statute; it must be reconstructed entire as · it is intended in the future to operate. A recital of the sec 3 tion amended as it stood prior to the amendment will not vitiate the amendatory statute; such recital will be treated as surplusage. If incorrectly recited it will not affect the validity of the amendatory act. It is not required that the amendatory act state that certain words of a specific section are stricken out and others inserted, and then set out in full the section as amended; it is sufficient if the section as amended be set out in full. The legislature may, by amendment, substitute any provision they please for any other provision, whether cognate or not, if the new section is not foreign to the subject indicated by the title of the law in which it is inserted.5 § 133. Amended so as to read as follows.-The constitutional provision requiring amendments to be made by setting out the whole section as amended was not intended to make any different rule as to the effect of such amendments. So far as the section is changed it must receive a new operation, but so far as it is not changed it would be dangerous to hold that the mere nominal re-enactment should have the effect of disturbing the whole body of statutes in pari materia which had been passed since the first enactment. There must be something in the nature of the new legislation to show such an intent with reasonable clearness before an implied repeal can be 1 Town of Martinsville v. Frieze, 33 Ind. 507. 2 Draper v. Falley, 33 Ind. 465. 3 People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182; School Directors v. School Directors, 73 Ill. 249. 4 Morrison v. St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. 96 Mo. 602. 5 Underwood v. McDuffee, 15 Mich. 361, 367; Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291. 門 recognized. The amendment operates to repeal all of the section amended not embraced in the amended form. The portions of the amended sections which are merely copied without change are not to be considered as repealed and again enacted, but to have been the law all along; and the new parts, or the changed portions, are not to be taken to have been the law at any time prior to the passage of the amended act. The change takes effect prospectively according to the general rule. But all the provisions of the prior law amended which continue in force after the passage of the amendatory act derive their force thereafter not from the original but the amendatory act. A repeal of that act would not revive the provisions as originally enacted. On the contrary, a repeal of the amendatory act would be a repeal of the provisions therein continued in force from the original act.5 Gordon v. People, 44 Mich. 485; Ely v. Holton, 15 N. Y. 595; Moore v. Mausert, 49 id. 332; People v. Supervisors, 67 N. Y. 109; Burwell v. Tullis, 12 Minn. 572; Alexander v. State, 9 Ind. 337; Longlois v. Longlois, 48 id. 60-64; Benton v. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 226; The Borrowdale, 39 Fed. Rep. 376. See Powers v. Shepard. 48 N. Y. 540. 2 Basnett v. Jacksonville, 19 Fla. 3 Ely v. Holton, 15 N. Y. 595; N. Y. 226; Matter of Peugnet, 67 The word "hereafter" used in the statute as amended must be construed distributively. As to cases within the statute as originally enacted, it means subsequent to the passage of the original act; as to cases brought within the statute by the amendment, it means subsequent to the time of the amendment. It is a general rule, however, that an amended statute is construed, as regards any action had after the amendment was made, as if the statute had been originally enacted in the amended form.2 4 § 134. Repeal and re-enactment.- Where there is an express repeal of an existing statute, and a re-enactment of it at the same time, or a repeal and a re-enactment of a portion of it, the re-enactment neutralizes the repeal so far as the old law is continued in force. It operates without interruption where the re-enactment takes effect at the same time.3 The intention manifested is the same as in an amendment enacted in the form noticed in the preceding section. Offices are not lost; corporate existence is not ended; 5 inchoate statutory rights are not defeated; a statutory power is not taken away nor criminal charges affected by such repeal and re-enactment of the law on which they respectively depend. This rule was applied in Walker v. State, though after a conviction for murder and a sentence of death pronounced, and pending an appeal therefrom, the revised penal code took effect and changed the previous penalty for the offense from "death" to "death or confinement in the penitentiary for life." 6 1 Matter of Peugnet, 67 N. Y. 444. 2 Holbrook v. Nichol, 36 Ill. 161; Turney v. Wilton, id. 385; Conrad v. Nall, 24 Mich. 275; Kamerick v. Castleman, 21 Mo. App. 587; Queen v. St. Giles, 3 E. & E. 224; Ashley v. Harrington, 1 D. Chip. 348; Harrell v. Harrell, 8 Fla. 46. 3 Fullerton v. Spring, 3 Wis. 667; Laude v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. 33 id. 640; Scheftels v. Tabert, 46 id. 439; Middleton v. N. J. & C. R'y Co. 26 N. J. Eq. 269; Glentz v. State, 38 Wis. 549; Moore v. Kenockee, 75 Mich. 332; Junction City v. Webb, 23 Pac. Rep. 1073 (Kan.). 4 State v. Baldwin, 45 Conn. 134. 5 United Hebrew B. Asso. v. Benshimol, 130 Mass. 325; Wright v. Oakley, 5 Met. 400, 406; Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450. 6 Caperon v. Strout, 11 Nev. 304; Skyrme v. Occidental, etc. Co. 8 id. 219; Moore v. Kenockee, 75 Mich. 332. 7 Middleton v. New Jersey, etc. Co. 26 N. J. Eq. 269. 8 State v. Gumber, 37 Wis. 293; State v. Wish, 15 Neb. 448. 97 Tex. App. 245. If a greater penalty is imposed for an offense defined in the re-enacted law, the previous law is deemed repealed; and after such repeal takes effect there can be no punishment inflicted for any offense committed contrary to its provisions while they were in force. A repeal is not rendered inoperative by a re-enactment where they are not simultaneous, where there is an interval of time after the repeal takes effect before the re-enactment goes into operation; or where, instead of the old law ceasing to operate by repeal, it has served its purposeis exhausted and spent before the re-enactment.3 § 135. Amendments by implication not within the constitutional requirement. It has been held in Nebraska that if a statute is intended to be amendatory, and is clearly so, it is within this provision of the constitution, though framed as an independent act and complete in itself; that being amendatory, it should be expressly so; that the law as amended should be given in full with such reference to the old law as will clearly show for what the new law is substituted. When, however, an act properly constructed amends certain sections, and the change so made impliedly modifies certain other provisions to bring them into harmony, this effect does not require the sections thus modified to be included as changed in the amendatory act.' It is generally held that though a supplementary act, or an independent act, if complete in itself, though it consequentially modifies, like an amendatory act, certain existing statutes, it is not necessary to include them as thus modified. This constitutional provision is held not to apply to such cases; they are held not to be within the mischief intended to be remedied. 1 State v. Van Stralen, 45 Wis. 437; State v. Campbell, 44 id. 529. A statute which merely fur Colo. 403; Evernham v. Hulit, 45 2 Kane v. New York, etc. R'y Co. 49 501; Timm v. Harrison, 109 Ill. 593; Conn. 139. 3 Emporia v. Norton, 16 Kan. 236. 4 Smails v. White, 4 Neb. 357; Sovereign v. State, 7 id. 409, 413. Swartwout v. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. 24 Mich. 389; Lawrence v. Grambling, 13 S. C. 125. Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 579. People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 484; Denver Circle R. R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 People v. Wright, 70 id. 388; Home Insurance Co. v. Taxing Dist. 4 Lea, 644; Scales v. State, 47 Ark. 476; Bird v. County of Wasco, 3 Or. 282; Harrington v. Wands, 23 Mich. 385; State v. Cross, 38 Kan. 696; Pollard, Ex parte, 40 Ala. 77; Ware v. St. Louis, etc. Co. 47 id. 667; Tuskaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 id. 9; Fleischner v. Chadwick, 5 Oregon, |