of both cannot stand together. A special and local law provided that certain property should be subject to taxation; a subsequent general one that all such property should be exempt, and repealed all local or special acts inconsistent with its provisions. It was held that the special act was repealed.' Where all acts must be general by the constitution, and such an act is passed and it repeals all inconsistent legislation, it will have the effect to repeal all special acts which are in conflict with it. A law applying to some townships and excepting others is not a general law. The intention to except from such a law those which have special laws will not be imputed to the legislature when such exception would render the law unconstitutional, and it is framed broad enough to embrace the entire class to which it relates.2 Special or local laws will be repealed by general laws when the intention to do so is manifest, as where the latter are intended to establish uniform rules for the whole state. A general act prescribing a mode of punishment for a specific offense throughout the state will repeal an act limited to a single county prescribing a different punishment. A general statute for the suppression of prostitution is inconsistent with a local statute authorizing a regulation of it." A local or special law which adopts, by reference, provisions relating to procedure from an existing general statute, is not necessarily abrogated or affected by the subsequent repeal of the act containing the adopted provisions."

§ 160. The later law, which is potent to repeal. If a conflict exists between two statutes or provisions, the earlier in enactment or position is repealed by the later. Leges posterioris priores contrarias abrogant. Where there is an irreconcilable conflict between different sections or parts of the same statute the last words stand, and those which are in con

1 New Brunswick v. Williamson, 44 N. J. L. 165; Pausch v. Guerrard, 67 Ga. 319; Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Bridges, 30 N. J. L. 112; State v. Miller, id. 368; Great Central Gas Cons. Co. v. Clarke, 13 Com. B. (N. S.) 838; Bramston v. Colchester, 6 E. & B. 246; Evansville v. Bayard, 39 Ind. 450; Willing v. Bozman, 52 Md. 44.

? Hoetzel v. East Orange, 50 N. J. L. 354; Bowyer v. Camden, id. 87.

3 State v. Pearcy, 44 Mo. 159; People v. Miner, 47 Ill. 33.

4 Nusser v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. St. 126; Keller v. Commonwealth, 71 id. 413.

5 State v. Lewis, 5 Mo. App. 465. 6 Schwenke v. The Union Depot & R. R. Co. 7 Colo. 512.

flict with them, so far as there is a conflict, are repealed;1 that is, the part of a statute later in position in the same act or section is deemed later in time, and prevails over repugnant parts occurring before, though enacted and to take effect at the same time. This rule is applicable where no reasonable construction will harmonize the parts. It is presumed that each part of a statute is intended to co-act with every other part; that no part is intended to antagonize the general purpose of the enactment. To ascertain the legislative intent every part of an act, and other acts in pari materia, are to be considered. One part of an act may restrict another part—an early section a later, and vice versa; but if one part is so out of line with other parts and the general purpose of the act that it can only operate by wholly neutralizing some other part, then the latter provision is supreme as expressing the latest will of the law-maker. Hence, it is a rule that where the proviso of an act is directly repugnant to the purview the latter is repealed by it.3 Statutes speak from the time they take effect, and from that time they have posteriority. If passed to take effect at a future day, they are to be construed as if passed on that day and ordered to take immediate effect. Where two acts come into operation on the same day, and are repugnant, the one last approved repeals the other, unless a different intention is expressed,' or it may be ascertained upon testimony.

1 Albertson v. State, 9 Neb. 429. 2 Bac. Abr. tit. Statutes, D.; State v. Davis, 70 Md. 237; Harrington v. Rochester, 10 Wend. 550; Branagan v. Dulaney, 8 Colo. 408; Powers v. Barney, 5 Blatchf. 202; Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. St. 446, 449; Elliott v. Lochnane, 1 Kan. 135; Gibbons v. Brittenum, 56 Miss. 232. See Thomas v. Collins, 58 Mich. 64.

3 Att'y-General v. Chelsea Water Works Co., Fitzgib. 195; Farmers' Bank v. Hale, 59 N. Y. 53.

4 Ante, § 107.

5 Rice v. Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 125; Harrington v. Harrington's Est. 53 Vt. 649; Metropolitan Bd. of Health v. Schmades, 10 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 205.

6 Rex v. Middlesex, 2 B. & Ad. 818.

8

The Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. St. 446. In this case it appeared that the legislature repealed a part of a bill pending before the governor, and he approved the repealing statute. Held, that he had no power to reinstate the repealed provision by subsequently signing the act in which it was contained. The relative time of approval of acts bearing the same date may be inferred from the numerical order of the acts as published. Straus v. Heiss, 48 Md. 292; Metropolitan Board of Health v. Schmades, 10 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 205. See Thomas v. Collins, 58 Mich. 64.

1Straus v. Heiss, supra; Gardner v. Collector, 6 Wall. 499. In Mead v.

§ 161. Where two statutes in pari materia, originally enacted at different periods of time, are subsequently incorporated in a revision and re-enacted in substantially the same language, with the design to accomplish the purpose they were originally intended to produce, the times when they first took effect will be ascertained by the courts, and effect will be given to that which was the latest declaration of the will of the legislature, if they are not harmonious. An existing statute is not to be considered as original because it is embodied in a revision, and therefore is not to be construed on the theory that none of its provisions had been in effect prior thereto. The appearance of such a statute in the form and body of a revision has no other effect than to continue it in force."

§ 162. Effect of repeal. The general rule is that when an act of the legislature is repealed without a saving clause, it is considered, except as to transactions past and closed, as though it had never existed. This is not true in an absolute sense, nor without exception, unless it is provided that the repealed statute cannot be revived by the repeal of the repealing statute. A repealed law is indefinitely suspended while the repealing statute is in force. When that statute is repealed its repealing force is spent, and the one which is repealed thereupon comes again into operation.

Bagnall, 15 Wis. 156, it was held that when the legislative intent is to be inferred from the priority of one act to another, regard must be had to the dates of approval of the acts and not to their dates of publication. The court say; "It is true that general laws must be published before they can take effect, but that does not make the printer a part of the lawmaking power, nor enable him, by delaying the publication of one law longer than that of another which was passed at the same time, to change the relations of the two upon the point of priority."

1 Winn v. Jones, 6 Leigh, 74; Blackford v. Hurst, 26 Gratt. 206; Hurley v. Town of Texas, 20 Wis. 638; United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508; Vietor

This revival would not ensue if

v. Arthur, 104 U. S. 498; Mobile Savings Bank v. Patty, 16 Fed. Rep. 751. 2 City of St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 509; City of Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 52 id. 428; State ex rel. Att'yGen'l v. Heidorn, 74 id. 410. See ante, § 134.

3 Curran v. Owens, 15 W. Va. 208; Surtees v. Ellison, 9 B. & C. 750; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Alabama Med. College v. Muldon, 46 Ala. 603; Musgrove v. Vicksburg, etc. R. R. Co. 50 Miss. 677; McQuilkien v. Doe ex. dem. Stoddard, 8 Blackf. 581; Hunt v. Jennings, 5 id. 195; Potter's Dwarris, 160.

4 Post, § 168; Bac. Abr. tit. Statute, D.; Phillips v. Hopwood, 10 B. & C. 39; Brinkley v. Swicegood, 65 N. C. 626; Smith v. Hoyt, 14 Wis. 252.

the repeal had the effect of absolute extinguishment.' In the interpretation of statutes, clauses which have been repealed may still be considered in construing the provisions that remain in force. Where a doubt exists as to the meaning of a statute, the pre-existing law, and the reason and purpose of the new enactment, are considerations of great weight. It is more accurate to say that after it is repealed it is, as regards its operative effect, considered as if it had never existed, except as to matters and transactions past and closed. The repeal of an exception extends the purview."

§ 163. Rights depending on a statute and still inchoate, not perfected by final judgment or reduced to possession, are lost by repeal or expiration of the statute. This rule applies to mechanics' liens given by statute where the requisite proceedings to fix the lien have not been completed at the date of the repeal. An assessment of taxes on corporate stock was made under a statute which was subsequently repealed. The collection of the taxes was regulated by another law. The repeal of the statute under which the assessment had been made was held not to affect it. The assessment was closed and ended, and therefore not subject to the rule applicable to

1Home Ins. Co. v. Taxing Dist. 4 Co. 50 Miss. 677; People v. Livingston, Lea, 644. 6 Wend. 526; Tivey v. People, 8 Mich. 128; Knox v. Baldwin, 80 N. Y. 610; Hampton v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. St. 329; State v. Baldwin, 45 Conn. 134; Bay City, etc. R. R. Co. v. Austin, 21 Mich. 390; Bennet v. Hargus, 1 Neb. 419; Williams v. Middlesex, 4 Met. 76; Oriental Bank v. Freese, 18 Me. 109;

? Bank for Savings v. The Collector, 3 Wall. 495; Crow Dog, Ex parte, 109 U.S. 556; Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204; Attorney-General v. Lamplough, L. R. 3 Ex. D. 223; Commonwealth v. Bailey, 13 Allen, 541; Flanders v. Merrimack, 48 Wis. 567.

4 Attorney-General v. Lamplough,

supra.

3 Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall. 374, 380; Bailey v. Mason, 4 Minn. 546; The Heydon's Case, 3 Rep. 76. Schooner Rachel v. United States, 6 Cr. 329; Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507; Gregory v. German Bank, 3 Colo. 332; S. C. 25 Am. Rep. 760; Gaul v. Brown, 53 Me. 496; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 152. See Restall v. London, etc. R'y Co. L. R. 3 Ex. 141, which is dissented from in Butcher v. Henderson, L. R. 3 Q. B. 335. See, also, Morgan v. Thorne, 7 M. & W. 400.

5 Smith v. Hoyt, 14 Wis. 252; Goodno v. Oshkosh, 31 id. 127; Bank for Savings v. The Collector, 3 Wall. 495.

6 Bechtol v. Cobaugh, 10 S. & R. 121; Van Inwagen v. Chicago, 61 Ill. 31; Town of Belvidere v. Warren R. R. Co. 34 N. J. L. 193; S. C. 35 id. 587; Musgrove v. Vicksburg, etc. R. R.

Bailey v. Mason, 4 Minn, 546.

pending proceedings when the law under which they were commenced has been repealed.' There was a sentence of condemnation of a vessel for trading contrary to a temporary act of congress; the vessel had been sold and the proceeds paid over to the government while the law was in force. Pending an appeal from the sentence the act expired. It was held that the sentence could not, under such circumstances, be affirmed after the expiration of the law, and restitution was ordered.2 An informer who commences a qui tam action under a penal statute does not thereby acquire a vested right to the forfeiture; his claim to the penalty is inchoate, and cannot be fixed except by judgment. The repeal of the statute before judgment prevents the imperfect right from being consummated. It matters not whether the whole penalty when received is given to the public or to the informer, or is divided between them."

§ 164. When a right has arisen on a contract, or a transaction in the nature of a contract authorized by a statute, and has been so far perfected that nothing remains to be done by the party asserting such right, the repeal of the statute will not affect it or an action for its enforcement. It has become a vested right which stands independently of the statute.' A contractor for grading streets was authorized by the existing law to sue delinquent abutters for unpaid assessments. This right of action was held a part of the contract and not taken away by repeal of the law creating it.' Causes of action barred by the statute of limitations are not revived by a repeal of the statute. The repeal of a statute giving a lien for advances of money for certain purposes will not affect the lien as to such advances as were made prior thereto.' Rights that pass and become vested under the existing law are supposed to be beyond the control of the state through its legis

1 Town of Belvidere v. Warren R. R. Co. 34 N. J. L. 193.

2 The Schooner Rachel v. United States, 6 Cr. 329; Yeaton v. United States, 5 id. 281.

4 Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450.

5 Creighton v. Pragg, 21 Cal. 115. 6 Cassity v. Storms, 1 Bush, 452 Right v. Martin, 11 Ind. 123; Cooley's

3 Bank of St. Marys v. State, 12 Ga. Const. L. *365.

475.

7 Commissioners v. Northern Bank, 1 Met. (Ky.) 174.