words are grouped together, and have ordinarily a similar meaning, but are not equally comprehensive, they will qualify each other when associated; they may import a conventional sense and have great scope when so used without restriction in the context, and they may be capable of widely different applications when specialized by accompanying provisions expressive of a particular intention or limited application.' The expression, for instance, of "places of public resort" assumes a very different meaning when coupled with “roads and streets" from that which it would have if the accompanying expression was "houses." In an enactment respecting houses "for public refreshment, resort and entertainment," the last word was understood to refer to, not a theatrical or musical or other similar performance, but something contributing to the enjoyment of the "refreshment." By an act for clearing, watching and regulating the streets of a township, the commissioners were authorized to ascertain the sum to be raised by rates or assessments on the several inhabitants, and to raise such sums by rate or assessment upon the tenants and occupiers of all messuages, houses, warehouses, shops, cellars, vaults, stables, coach-houses, brew-houses and other buildings, gardens and grounds, and other tenements in the township. It was held that under this act the trunks and pipes, works and other apparatus of a water company, for the supply of the town with water, did not constitute a tenement within the meaning of the act, and therefore the company were not liable to be rated in respect of such property. The word tenement was used in other provisions of the act to denote buildings. "These are some of the instances," says Bayley, J., "in which the word tenement is used in this act; and from these instances and the object of the act, it may be collected in what sense it uses that word. The omission to use the obvious and general word 'lands,' and yet introducing gardens and garden grounds,'

1 Bear Brothers v. Marx, 63 Tex. 298; Moeller v. Harvey, 16 Phila. 66. 2 Endlich on St. § 400, citing for examples, In re Jones, 7 Ex. 586; 21 L. J. M. C. 116; In re Brown, id. 113, Reg. v. Brown, 17 Q. B. 833; Ex parte Freestone, 25 L. J. M. C. 121; Davys v. Douglas, 4 H. & N. 180; 28 L. J.

M. C. 193; Sewell v. Taylor, 29 id. 50; 7 C. B. (N. S.) 160; Case v. Storey, L. R. 4 Ex. 319; Skinner v. Usher, L. R. 7 Q. B. 422; Reg. v. Charlesworth, 2 Lowndes, M. & P. 117; Wilson v. Halifax, L. R. 3 Ex. 114.

Endlich on St. § 400; Muir v. Keay, L. R. 10 Q. B. 594.

implies that 'lands' in general are not intended to be rated. The object of the act was to give security and accommodation to the residents and to their property. The inhabited houses, therefore, and everything connected with residence or trade, as they have the advantage, were to be liable to the charge. The houses, warehouses, shops and all other buildings were to be rated, because they all had protection. But why were gardens and garden-grounds to be included if lands in general were not? Possibly, because the produce thereof was of value, and was a possible object of depredation, and the general lighting and watching of the town would give so much additional protection to this species of property as might properly make it the subject of charge. Gardens, therefore, and gardengrounds may, on this account, be distinguished from other descriptions of land, and may be subjected to this charge, whilst land in general is exempt. Pasture ground, for instance, stone quarries, and other kinds of real property, though included in the 43d Elizabeth as affording income, and supplying, therefore, the means of contribution, are omitted in this act, because such property derives no equivalent or material protection from it." A statute provided "that every person who shall be brought before any of the said magistrates charged with having in his possession or conveying in any manner anything which may be reasonably suspected of being stolen or unlawfully obtained, and who shall not give an account to the satisfaction of such magistrate how he came by the same, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." This was held, on account of the associated words and context, to apply only to possession in the streets, and not to possession in a house. "Taken by themselves alone," said Blackburn, J., "the words 'having in his possession,' of course include the case of a person having in his possession at any time, in any manner or in any place. But here we have them in connection with the words, or conveying in any manner anything which may be reasonably suspected of being stolen or obtained. I think the words of the statute sufficiently show that the legislature intended to confer this summary power only in the case where the person was 'having and conveying' in the sense of

1 Reg. v. Manchester, etc. Water-works Co. 1 B. & C. 630.

'having' ejusdem generis with 'conveying,' being in the streets or roads with them, or carrying them about."1

$263. The controlling effect in construction of associated words is well illustrated in Schenley's Appeal.

The question was the existence of a mechanic's lien on a dwelling-house under a statute providing for a lien on "improvements, engines, pumps, machinery, screens and fixtures erected, repaired or put in by mechanics, persons or material-men entering liens thereon." Agnew, J., said: "Though the word 'improvements' is large enough under ordinary circumstances to include a house or private dwelling, it is manifest, by its connection in this act with the words engines, pumps, etc., and by the two counties to which it was originally made applicable, that the word was not intended to authorize the creation of liens upon ordinary houses and dwellings of tenants independently of the works indicated by the other expressions used in connection with the word improvements."3 In a revenue act it was provided in one section that "every railroad company, steamboat company, canal company and slackwater navigation company, and all other navigation companies doing business in this state, and upon whose works freight may be transported, whether by such company or by individuals, and whether such company shall receive compensation for transportation, for transportation and toll, or shall receive tolls only, except turnpike, plankroad and bridge companies, shall pay a tax as upon tonnage." The next section provided that, in addition to the taxes provided for as aforesaid, every railroad, canal and transportation company liable to a tax on tonnage under the preceding section shall pay a certain tax on gross receipts. The

1 Hadley v. Perks, L. R. 1 Q. B. 444. 270 Pa. St. 98.

3 Where it appeared that an insurance company constituted a person named its agent, and there was no definition of his powers, the word "agent," it was held, should be taken in its general signification, and as embracing all powers which the company might confer on one whom it selected to represent it. He was authorized to act as "agent or surveyor," and the court remarked: “If

.

it be said that the word 'surveyor' limits and defines' agent,' we answer, not any more than agent' limits and defines 'surveyor;' in other words, either includes the duties and powers of both; the agent is surveyor and the surveyor is agent; one officer is clothed with the powers necessary to fill both offices." Lycoming F. Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 83 Pa. St. 223. See Central Trust Co. v. Sheffield & B. Coal, etc. Co. 42 Fed. Rep. 106.

preceding section had not used the phrase "transportation company," but had simply designated some companies by name, and designated others as companies upon whose works freight might be transported as the means of bringing all under a liability for the tonnage carried over their work, whether carriers themselves or not. When the phrase "transportation companies" was used in the subsequent section it was a nomen collectivum to embrace all the companies which had been described in the other section, and was intended to include all steamboat, slackwater navigation and other companies "upon whose works freight may be transported." 1

§ 264. Where a statute was indefinite and obscure, the court, in view of all the indications afforded by the context, construed this proviso as applicable only to the tenant: "That no appeal shall lie in the case of rent, but the remedy by replevin shall remain as heretofore." The literal terms of a statute prohibited any lien as against purchasers and mortgagees by four species of judicial acts and proceedings, viz.: (1) Judgments; (2) recognizances; (3) executions levied on real estate, and (4) writs of scire facias to revive or have execution of judgments, unless the same were indexed as prescribed. All of these acts and proceedings were within the function of, and indeed peculiar to, the court of common pleas, and all, save one, were exclusively cognizable and possible in that court. The recognizance was known in the orphans' court, as it was in the criminal court, but the others were not. But the recognizance is also a form of obligation known to the practice of the common pleas, and, therefore, where it is coupled with other acts and proceedings of that court, the whole being subject to a regulation common to all, it is not necessary to infer that it is used in any other than its natural, associated sense. Therefore, it was held that recognizances taken in the orphans' court to operate as liens were not required to be indexed. The word "records" may be restrained by the context to mean only those in the office of registers of deeds. In a marine policy the underwriters insured against the wrongful acts of individuals under the description of "pirates, rogues, thieves," and it also insured against loss by

3

1 Commonwealth v. Monongahela

Nav. Co. 66 Pa. St. 81.

2 Hilke v. Eisenbeis, 104 Pa. St. 514.

3 Holman's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 502.

4 Carter v. Peak, 138 Mass. 439.

arrests, etc., by "all kings, princes and people." The word people was construed to mean the power of the country.'

$265. A statute of limitations as to a claim to any way or other easement, or to any water-course, or the use of any water, to be enjoyed or derived upon, over or from any "land or water," does not include the servitude of allowing "the streams and currents of air and wind to pass over land to a mill." It points to a right belonging to an individual in respect of his land, not a class such as freemen or citizens claiming a right in gross wholly irrespective of land. It was enacted that "any tenement or part of a tenement occupied as a house for the purpose of trade only, or as a warehouse for the sole purpose of lodging goods, wares or merchandise therein, or as a shop or counting-house, shall be exempt" from certain duties. It was held on the maxim noscitur a sociis, that the business of a telegraph company is a trade within the meaning of that statute. The word "delivery," being associated in a bankrupt act with "gift or transfer," was held to be confined to transactions of the same nature; that to be a delivery it must purport to part with some property or interest in the goods delivered, to amount to an act of bankruptcy. A carriers' act, providing for mitigation of the responsibility of carriers, contained an enumeration of articles within its provisions, among which were "paintings, engravings, pictures;" and a question arose whether colored imitations of rugs and carpets and working designs, each of them valuable and designed by skilled persons and hand-painted, but having no value as works of art, were included within that provision. It was decided that they were not. The word "paintings," being associated with "engrayings and pictures," was to be understood as meaning paintings valuable as works of art. This conclusion was deemed to be in accord with the general or popular meaning of the word."

1 Nesbitt v. Lushington, 4 T. R. 783.

2 Webb v. Bird, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 268; S. C. 13 id. 841; Bryant v. Lefever, 4 C. P. Div. 172.

4 Chartered Mercantile Bank, etc. v. Wilson, L. R. 3 Ex. D. 108.

5 Cotton v. James, Mood. & Mal. 278; Isitt v. Beeston, L. R. 4 Ex. 159. 6 Woodward v. London, etc. R'y

3 Mounsey v. Ismay, 3 H. & C. at Co. 3 Ex. D. 121.

p. 497.