only inflicts a penalty upon the offender.' Obedience to the laws is enforced by declaring illegal contracts void; by refusing to aid either party in the enforcement of them. When a statute is for revenue purposes, or is a regulation of a traffic or business, and not to prohibit it altogether, whether a contract which violates the statute shall be treated as wholly void will depend on the intention expressed in the particular statute. Unless the contrary intention is manifest the contract will be valid. All cases to which a statute cannot constitutionally apply will be excepted by necessary implication, however absolute and express the provision may be. A necessary implication means not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of an intention that one contrary to that 1O'Brien v. Dillon, supra; Griffith v. Wells, 3 Denio, 226; Bach v. Smith, 2 Wash. Ty. 145; Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456; Boutwell v. Foster, 24 Vt. 485; Hook v. Gray, 6 Barb. 398; Gray v. Hook, 4 N. Y. 449; Tylee v. Yates, 3 Barb. 222; Barton v. Port J. etc. Plk. R. Co. 17 Barb. 397; Pennington v. Townsend, 7 Wend. 276; Nellis v. Clark, 4 Hill, 424; De Begnis v. Armistead, 10 Bing. 107; Cope v. Rowlands, 2 M. & W. 149; Springfield Bank v. Merrick, 14 Mass. 322; Hallett v. Novion, 14 John. 273; Seidenbender v. Charles, 4 S. & R. 159. 2 Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387; Steers v. Lashley, 6 T. R. 61; Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179; Aubert v. Maze, 2 B. & P. 371; Ætna Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 11 Wis. 394; Williams v. Cheney, 3 Gray, 215; Jones v. Smith, id. 500; Towle v. Larrabee, 26 Me. 464; Pattee v. Greely, 13 Met. 284; Lovejoy v. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379; O'Donnell v. Sweeney, 5 Ala. 467; Fennell v. Ridler, 5 B. & C. 406. But see Columbus Ins. Co. v. Walsh, 18 Mo. 229; Clark v. Middleton, 19 id. 53. 3 Harris v. Runnells, 12 How. 79; Tyson v. Thomas, McClel. & Y. 119; which is imputed to the party using the language cannot be supposed.1 2 § 337. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by the common law and by implication. A grant of lands from the sovereign authority of a state to individuals to be possessed and enjoyed by them in a corporate capacity confers a right to hold in that character. A legislative grant made to an alien by necessary implication confers the right to receive and enjoy without prejudice on account of alienage.' Trustees, under an act of parliament for dividing and inclosing a common, being intended to continue and hold permanently, were thereby constituted a corporation by implication." A right to recover expenses incurred for the public good, under certain conditions, was granted by statute to the "local authority" authorized to act in the execution of the statute; it was held the action for that purpose might be prosecuted by that collective statutory designation, though not made a corporation." § 338. A statute of Michigan "relative to the rights of married women," in brief and comprehensive words, gave to the wife the full and absolute control of her real and personal estate, with power to contract, sell, transfer, mortgage, convey, devise and bequeath the same, in the same manner, and with the like effect, as if she were unmarried. This statute had the effect to abolish or abrogate the prospective estate by the curtesy. A statute declaring that property which accrues to a married woman shall be "owned and enjoyed" as her separate property will authorize her, if the property be merchandise, to trade. It is the nature of merchandise to be sold and exchanged. When, therefore, the statute authorizes married women to own, use and enjoy such property, it legalizes trade by them makes them merchants. So she is liable for repairs 1 Wilkinson v. Adam, 1 Ves. & B. 466; State v. Union Bank, 9 Yerg. 164. 26 Bac. Abr. 369; Booth v. Kitchen, 7 Hun, 260, 264; Livingston v. Harris, 11 Wend. 329, 340. 3 North Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109; Goodell v. Jackson, 20 John. 706. 4 Goodell v. Jackson, supra; Jackson v. Lervey, 5 Cow. 397. 5 Newport M. Trustees, Ex parte, 16 Sim. 346. 6 Mills v. Scott, L. R. 8 Q. B. 496. 7 Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60. 8 Wieman v. Anderson, 42 Pa. St. 311, 317. to her separate estate, made at her request and necessary for its preservation and enjoyment. The statute provides that any married woman might convey real estate "in the same manner, and with the like effect, as if she were unmarried." This implied a repeal as to married women and their separate estates of the general statute requiring a private examination apart from their husbands upon their acknowledgment of the execution of conveyances. A power given to a married woman to carry on a trade or business on her separate account includes the power to borrow money, and to purchase on credit property, real or personal, necessary or convenient, for the purpose of commencing, as well as the power to create debts in the prosecution of the trade or business after it has been established. Where a married woman who has a separate estate and carries on business in relation thereto, keeping a bank account in her own name, draws a check upon such account payable at a future day, on which she borrows money, the law presumes, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that such money was borrowed for the benefit of her separate estate, and holds her liable therefor. § 339. A statute of New York gave an appeal to "every person who shall think himself aggrieved by any judgment or order of any justice or justices," etc. Where a defendant, served with a summons which was to show cause, failed to appear and judgment went against him by default, it was treated as equivalent to a judgment by confession, and therefore he was not entitled to consider himself aggrieved and to appeal. An association was granted the privilege of constructing the Albany basin, and it was made a condition that they should erect the necessary bridges for the public accommodation. The grant was construed to imply an obligation to keep the bridges in repair. A statute providing for par 1 Lippincott v. Hopkins, 57 Pa. St. 328; Lippencott v. Leeds, 77 id. 420. 2 Blood v. Humphrey, 17 Barb. 660; Andrews v. Shaffer, 12 How. Pr. 441; Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 271; Wiles v. Peck, 26 id. 47; Richardson v. Pulver, 63 Barb. 67. 3 Frecking v. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422; Chapman v. Foster, 6 Allen, 136. See Zurn v. Noedel, 113 Pa. St. 336; 4 Nash v. Mitchell, 8 Hun, 471. 5 Adams v. Oaks, 20 John. 282; Adams v. Foster, id. 452. See Schuster v. Supervisors, 27 Minn. 253; Vanderstolph v. Boylan, 50 Mich. 330. 6 People v. Cooper, 6 Hill, 516. tition and requiring the plaintiff in his complaint to give a statement of all the rights and titles of the parties, directed service on all the parties concerned, and the guardians of such as were minors. As it was deemed that minors were not competent to make a statement of the rights and titles of the parties, it was held that the statute did not apply where all the owners were minors.1 § 340. It is a principle or truism that for every wrong there is afforded by the law an appropriate remedy. Upon every statute made for the redress of any injury, mischief or grievance, an action lies by the party aggrieved, either by the express words of the statute or by implication. In other words, if a statute which creates a right does not indicate expressly the remedy, one is implied, and resort may be had to the common law, or the general method of obtaining relief which has displaced or supplemented the common law. A statute provided a penalty for the commission of a fraud, which was "to be sued for in any court of competent jurisdiction for the benefit of the person or persons, etc., upon whom such fraud shall be committed." It was implied the suit should be brought in the name of the defrauded party.a § 341. Whenever a power is given by statute, everything necessary to make it effectual or requisite to attain the end is implied. It is a well established principle that statutes containing grants of power are to be construed so as to include the authority to do all things necessary to accomplish the object of the grant." The grant of an express power carries with it by necessary implication every other power necessary and proper to the execution of the power expressly 1 Gallatian v. Cunningham, 8 Cow. 361. 2 Van Hook v. Whitlock, 2 Edw. 304, 311; Bullard v. Bell, 1 Mason, 290. To give a reasonable effect to the word "from" in reference to the subjectmatter, it was held proper to consider the extrinsic situation, and if the object of the act could not otherwise be accomplished it should be construed as inclusive. Smith v. Helmer, 7 Barb. 416. 3 Winn v. Ficklen, 54 Ga. 529. See post, § 399. 4 Thompson v. Howe 46 Barb. 287. 51 Kent's Com. 464; Stief v. Hart, 1 N. Y. 20, per Jewett, C. J.; Mitchell v. Maxwell, 2 Fla. 594; Re Neagle, 39 Fed. Rep. 833; S. C. 135 U. S. 1; Commonwealth v. Conyngham, 66 Pa. St. 99; Witherspoon v. Dunlap, 1 McCord, 546. "People v. Eddy, 57 Barb. 593; Mayor, etc. v. Sands, 105 N. Y. 210, 218. granted. Where the law commands anything to be done it authorizes the performance of whatever may be necessary for executing its commands. When a justice of the peace is required to issue a warrant for the collection of costs made on a hearing before him, it is implied that he has power to decide on the amount. When an existing jurisdiction is enlarged so as to include new cases, it is not necessary to declare that the old provisions shall apply to the new cases. If, for example, the jurisdiction of justices of the peace should be extended to actions of slander, the existing provisions for a review by certiorari and appeal would apply to cases coming under the en 11 Kent's Com. 404. The constitution of New York declares "no private or local bill which may be passed shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." The validity of an act "to amend the several acts in relation to the city of Rochester" was questioned on the ground of embracing a multiplicity of subjects. The principal point relied upon was that the authority conferred upon the water commissioners, by one section of the act, to contract with the trustees of villages through which the water to the city might be conducted to supply such villages with water, and authorizing the trustees to levy the annual expense with their annual tax, was, one or both of them, an independent subject not embraced in the title. "It is not denied," said Church, C. J., "that provisions for furnishing the city with a supply of water relate to the legitimate functions of a city government, and are properly included in such a bill as this. That object, it seems, was secured by an independent bill to which these provisions are amendments. The purpose of both is to furnish the city with water for the extinguishing of fires and other public uses, and also to furnish the inhabitants of the city with pure water for domestic purposes. The latter may be regarded as a means or instrumentality of accomplishing the former. To secure this object it is assumed to be necessary for the city authorities to go beyond the limits of the city to procure the necessary supply, and, in doing so, they must come in contact and deal with private or other interests in no way connected with the city. They must take private property, pass over and use public highways, streets, and, perhaps, railroads. The authority to secure the right, although it may involve details in no other way connected with the city, and may affect other persons or corporations and their property, does not constitute it an independent subject. The power to supply villages with water by contract is incidental to the main purpose, and may serve as a means of attaining it. The authority conferred upon the trustees to levy the tax was indispensable to render the contract effectual. The power to sell involves the power to buy and pay for, and taxation was the only mode which could be adopted for that purpose." People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553. See Odell v. De Witt, 53 N. Y. 643. 2 Foliamb's Case, 5 Coke, 116. 3 Voorhees v. Martin, 12 Barb. 508. |