are intended for the enactment of laws. These differences may be observed in other constitutions, and therefore a considerable extract from the opinion has been quoted in note below. The words of the enacting style need not precede a preamble, but should precede the entire law.2 1 Zollards, J.: "Is a resolution a bill? Perhaps as accurate a definition of a bill as can be found is that given in Webster's Dictionary: 'A form or draft of a law, presented to a legislature, but not yet enacted; a proposed or projected law.' 'In some cases statutes are called bills, but usually they are qualified by some description; as, a bill of attainder.' Bills and acts are sometimes used as synonymous terms.. Cushing, sec. 2055. The definition of a bill as given by Webster is that usually accepted and acted upon; but as we shall see, our constitution extends it. The idea conveyed by the word bill is different from that conveyed by the word resolution. The distinction between a bill and resolution is clearly kept up in the constitution of this state as an examination of its provisions will show. We call attention to some of the sections of article 4. Bills may originate in either house, except revenue bills. Sec. 17. The vote on the passage of a bill or joint resolution shall be taken by yeas and nays. The bill must be read by sections on three different days, etc. Sec. 18. A joint resolution of different sections doubt less may be passed upon one reading. Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be embraced in the title. Sec. 19. There is no such provision in relation to joint resolutions. No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title. Sec. 21. This section 2 Barton v. McWhinney, 85 Ind. 481. has no reference to joint resolutions. No "act" shall take effect until the same shall have been published and circulated in the several counties of the state by authority, except in cases of emergency, etc. Sec. 28. This can have no reference to joint resolutions. They take effect as soon as passed. Bills and joint resolutions must be passed by a vote of a majority of the members of the legislature, and when so passed shall be signed by the presiding officers of the respective houses. These requisites they have in common, but the distinction is clearly kept up. Sec. 25. In section 14 of article 5, a bill is recognized as still a bill, after its passage and until it has reached the governor. Every bill which has passed, etc., shall be presented to the governor. The governor is required either to sign the bill, or return it to the house in which it may have originated, with his objections, etc. If he sign the bill, it becomes a law. If he veto it, and it is not repassed by the requisite vote, it does not become a law. Nothing of the kind is required in relation to a joint resolution under our constitution as we understand and interpret that instrument. Such a resolution, if passed by the requisite vote, and signed by the presiding officers, is in full force. Nothing would be added to its validity and force by the signature of the governor, nor has he any power to defeat it by a veto. It does not go to him for any purpose of approval or disap § 65. Same The required enacting style must be adopted. The same question arose in Nevada as in McPherson v. Leonard.' The provision of the constitution in Nevada proval. It appears from the constitutional debates that a proposition to include joint resolutions with bills in the above section, so that they should be sent to the governor, was voted down. 2 Deb. Const. Conv. p. 1331. This action of the convention is the more significant when we recollect that the convention was in a work of reform, adapting the new constitution to the increased wants and dangers of a rapidly increasing and progressive population, and that the constitution of 1816, which was being superseded, provided for joint resolutions as well as bills to be sent to the governor for his approval or disapproval, and to be treated by him and the legislature as bills if vetoed by him. It is very apparent from this examination of the constitution that the terms bill and joint resolution, as used therein, do not mean the same thing. They are widely different. Their functions are altogether different. Authority to act by joint resolution is given, affirmatively, by the constitution in but few instances. "By such resolution, the two houses may adjourn for more than three days. Art. 4, sec. 10. Certain officers may be removed by such resolution. Art. 6, sec. 7. Possibly under section 17 of article 5, the powers granted to grant pardons, etc., may be exercised by such resolution. Besides the authority thus granted, a joint resolution doubtless may be the means of expressing the legislative will in reference to the discharge of an administrative duty, if such expression falls short of the enactment of a law. The general and most common use of resolutions is in the adoption of rules and orders relative to the proceedings of the legislative body. Cushing, supra, sec. 779; Mays Par. Prac. pp. 440, 447, 450. Our conclusion upon this branch of the case is that a joint resolution under our constitution is not a bill, and that laws for the appropriation of money for public purposes or the payment of private claims . cannot be enacted by joint resolution. This view is sustained by the cases of Barry v. Viall, 12 R. I. 1, 18; Reynolds v. Blue, 47 Ala. 711; Brown v. Fleischner, 4 Oregon, 132; Boyen v. Crane, 1 W. Va. 176.” In deference to the opinion in Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268, the court in May v. Rice appear to consider the expression "every law," in the provision of the Indiana constitution relative to the enacting style, as more comprehensive and exclusive than the expression "the laws of this state" in the corresponding provision of the Mississippi constitution. The latter are the words of the Mississippi constitution, and the court, in Swann v. Buck, said, "there are no exclusive words in the constitution negativing the use of any other language; " meaning, doubtless, that the constitution did not forbid the use of any other words, or the passage of a law without those prescribed; for "the laws of this state include all, as much as the expression "every law." If a command broad enough affirmatively to include all the laws implies a negative, then one is implied from the language of the constitutions of both states. 129 Md. 386; ante, § 2. is that "the enacting clause of every law shall be as follows: 'The people of the state of Nevada, represented in senate and assembly, do enact."" In the case in which the question was discussed,' it appeared that an act was passed in the enacting clause of which there was omitted the words "senate and." The act was held unconstitutional and void. In the opinion, the court responds to the declaration in the Maryland case that the enacting style is not of the essence and substance of the enactment. Hawley, C. J., said that statement is clearly erroneous and the opinion fallacious. "How can it be said that these words are not of the essence and substance of a law when the constitution declares that the enacting clause of every law shall contain them." He quoted, with apparent approval from the dissenting opinion of Stewart, J., in the Maryland case, that it is incumbent on the law-making department to pursue the constitutional mode. "If a positive requirement of this character can be disregarded, so may others of a different character; and where will the limit be affixed or practical discrimination made as to what parts of the organic law of the state are to be held advisory, directory or mandatory? Disregard of the requirements of the constitution, although, perchance, in matters of mere form and style, in any part, in law, may establish dangerous examples, and should in all proper ways be discountenanced. The safer policy, I think, is to follow its plain mandates in matters that may appear not to be material, in order that the more substantial parts may be duly respected. If those who are delegated with the trust of making the laws, from the purest motives improvidently omit the observances of the constitution. under any circumstances, such oversight may be referred to in the future by others, with far different views, as precedents, and for the purpose of abuse. A higher responsibility is imposed upon those selected by the people for the discharge of legislative duty, and a greater obligation is demanded of them to exemplify, by their practice, a careful compliance with the constitution. By a vigilant observance of its commands, the more reasonable is the probability that the best order will be secured. It is unnecessary to illustrate, by any 1 State v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250. argument, the soundness of this general consideration, which I am sure all will admit to be unquestionable, that a strict conformity is an axiom in the science of government. I certainly entertain such profound conviction of its truth that I do not feel authorized to give my approval to this act as a valid law; but, on the contrary, am constrained to say that the omission of the style required by the constitution is fatal to its validity.”1 § 66. The modern constitutions go more and more into detail in regulating the exercise of the several powers which they grant. The object is manifestly to correct existing or apprehended mischief; not to legislate merely for order and convenient system. These regulations are in the fundamental law; they express the sovereign will of the people, and ought to be treated as limitations on the exercise of those powers. The modes prescribed for the exercise of the granted powers cannot be severed from the substantive things authorized to be done; the manner directed is the means-the appointed action through which alone the power is effective for the substantive objects intended to be accomplished. The legis lature must be constituted, sit at the time and place, and proceed in the methods dictated by its creator; otherwise it is not clothed with nor exercising the sovereign legislative power. The great weight of authority supports this view.' 1 Cushing's L. & Pr. Leg. Ass. J. 819, § 2102; Seat of Government Case, 1 Wash. T. 115. 2 See ante, $$ 30, 41; post, § 79; Cooley, Con. L. 94. This learned author says the courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a constitution. "Constitutions do not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding, except when such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing to be done; and they then must be regarded in the light of limitations upon the power to be exercised. It is the province of an instrument of this solemn and permanent character to establish those fundamental maxims, and fix those unvarying rules, by which all departments of the government must at all times shape their conduct; and if it descends to prescribing mere rules of order in unessential matters, it is lowering the proper dignity of such an instrument and usurping the proper province of ordinary legislation. We are not, therefore, to expect to find in a constitution provisions which the people, in adopting it, have not regarded as of high importance, and worthy to be embraced in an instrument which, for a time at least, is to control alike the government and the governed, and to form a standard by which is to be measured the power § 67. The legislative power cannot be delegated. The power to make laws for a state vested in the legislature is a sovereign power, requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion. It is a delegated power,-delegated in a constitution by the people in whom inherently are all the powers. On common-law principles, as well as by settled constitutional law, it is a power which cannot be delegated.1 This is a general rule or maxim; but like all other rules of the common law it is flexible, extending as far as the reason and principles on which it is founded go, and ceasing when the reason ceases. It admits of exceptions connected with the principle which supports the rule, or which may be presumed which can be exercised as well by the delegate as by the sovereign people themselves. If directions are given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a power should be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption that the people designed it should be exercised in that time and mode only." State v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 281; Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 44; per Bronson in People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 36; Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 566; Opinion of Judges, 6 Sheply, 458. See People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177. "The essential nature and object of constitutional law being restrictive upon the powers of the several departments of the government, it is difficult to comprehend how its provisions can be regarded as merely directory." Nicholson, C. J., in Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 504, 517. Mr. Cooley adds that "We impute to the people a want of due appreciation of the purpose and proper province of such an instrument, when we infer that such directions are given to any other end. Especially when, as has been already said, it is but fair to presume that the people in their constitution have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the pow ers delegated, and with, a view to leave as little as possible to implication." People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y. 328. 1 Carlisle v. Carlisle's Adm. 2 Harr. 318; Berger v. Duff, 4 John. Ch. 368; Hunt v. Burrel, 5 John. 137; Farnsworth v. Lisbon, 62 Me. 451; Brewer v. Brewer, id. 62; State v. Hudson County, 37 N. J. L. 12; State v. Copeland, 3 R. I. 33; Willis v. Owen, 43 Tex. 41; People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479; State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 362; Lockes' Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491; Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 id. 507; State v. Swisher, 17 Tex. 441; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483; People v. Stout, 23 Barb. 349; Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb. 112; Bradley v. Baxter, id. 122; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279; Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa, 491; State v. Beneke, 9 id. 203; State v. Weir, 33 id. 134; S. C. 11 Am. R. 115; Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 11 Pa. St. 61; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; Meshmeier v. State, 11 id. 482; Cincinnati, etc. R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77; Cooley's Con. Lim. 142; Slinger v. Henneman, 38 Wis. 504; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652. |