very elaborately discussed. We came unanimously to the conclusion in that case, that a provision for a vote of the electors of the city of Milwaukee in favor of an act of the legislature, before it should take effect, was a lawful contingency, and that the act was valid. That was a law affecting the people of Milwaukee particularly, while this was one affecting the people of the whole state. There the law was submitted to the voters of that city, and here it was submitted to those of the state at large. What is the difference between the two cases? It is manifest, on principle, that there cannot be any." § 74. The operation and terms of an act may be made to depend on foreign legislation. A statute of Illinois provides a general rate of taxation and scale of fees to be paid by foreign insurance companies doing business in that state. It also provides, by way of exception, that where the laws.of the state to which such foreign company belonged had imposed, or should thereafter impose, upon Illinois insurance companies doing business therein a higher rate of taxation than is required by the laws of Illinois, then the insurance companies of that state doing business in Illinois should there pay the higher rate charged in the state to which they belonged upon Illinois companies doing business in such state. The validity of this statute came in question in a late case in that state.' It was objected to on the ground that thereby the legislature had abdicated its legislative functions and surrendered them to a foreign state. The court denied the force of this objection, and by Mulkey, J., thus answered it: "It is competent for the legislature to pass a law the ultimate operation of which may by its own terms be made to depend upon some contingency, as upon the affirmative vote by the electors of a given district, or upon any other indifferent contingency the legislature in its wisdom may prescribe. Where the contingency upon which the ultimate operation of a law is made to depend consists of a vote of the people, or the action of some foreign deliberative or legislative body, as is the case here, it is erroneous to suppose the legislature in such case abandons its own legislative functions, or delegates its powers to the people in the one case or to such foreign deliberative or legislative body in the other. In either case the law is complete when it comes from the 1 Home Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 104 Ill. 653; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Welch, 29 Kan. 672; People v. Fire Association, 92 N. Y. 311. hands of the legislature, otherwise it would be inoperative and void; for we fully recognize the principle that a law, properly so called, cannot have a mere fragmentary or inchoate existence; and even if it could, neither the people by a vote, nor any other independent body, could complete the unfinished work of the legislature, and thus make it a law. But while this is so, nothing is better settled than that the operation and even remedial character of a perfect and complete law may, by virtue of limitations contained in the law itself, based upon contingent extraneous matters, be enlarged, diminished or wholly defeated. Such laws, though adopted, and absolutely perfect in all their parts, yet by their own limitations they are applicable to a hypothetical condition of things only, and which may or may not ever happen." § 75. Local laws dependent on popular vote generally held valid. It is now settled that laws, at least of local application, may be imperative or permissive; they may authorize the people of cities, villages, townships, counties, groups of counties, or other limited districts, not otherwise defined than for the purposes of such acts, to determine for themselves local questions of police, taxation, or any other matter affecting their local welfare; and the law may be conditioned to carry into effect their determination or option. They have thus been authorized to decide by popular vote and execute their decision to contribute for the building of railroads or other like public improvements;2 to divide a county or organize a new one; to establish or remove a county seat; whether there shall be license or prohibition of the liquor traffic;5 1 Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343 : Peo- Hamer, 38 Miss. 652; Slack v. Maysple v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37. ville, etc. R. R. Co. 13 B. Mon. 1. 2 Starin v. Town of Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439; Clarke v. Rochester, 28 N. Y. 605; Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb. 242; Corning v. Greene, 23 id. 33; Cincinnati, etc. R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77; Hobart v. Supervisors, 17 Cal. 23; Moers v. Reading, 21 Pa. St. 189; Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; Cotton v. Leon County, 6 Fla. 610; Powers v. Inferior Ct. 23 Ga. 65; State v. O'Neill, Mayor, etc. 24 Wis. 149; Alcorn v. 3 People v. Reynolds, 5 Gilm. 1; People v. Burns, 5 Mich. 114. + Barnes v. Supervisors, 51 Miss. 305; Ex parte Hill, 40 Ala. 121; Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Pa. St. 214. 5 Caldwell v. Barrett, 73 Ga. 604; Hammond v. Haines, 25 Md. 541; Commonwealth v. Weller, 14 Bush, 218; State v. Cooke, 24 Minn. 247; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491; S. C. 13 Am. R. 716; Boone v. State, 12 Tex. App. 184; Groesch v. whether paupers shall be a county or a township charge;1 whether they will have a system of free schools; whether domestic animals shall be permitted to run at large. The people locally interested may have the option to accept or reject a municipal charter or amendatory acts, or local police law.5 Acts giving such local options have not unfrequently been framed to secure it by making a new law go into effect or not according to the result of a popular vote. In State v. Noyes, the people in a town meeting adopted a general law to suppress bowling alleys, and thereby, pursuant to its provisions, put it locally in operation. In Mississippi an act for local taxation was, by its terms, suspended, and ceased to have effect by a protest of a majority of the legal voters. By the terms of a local act of Wisconsin it was to be void unless the legal voters of the city to which it was applicable should vote to accept it. It was an act to establish a board of public works. It was held valid; that it was a constitutional act to take effect or go into operation only upon a contingency provided in the law itself." In a Virginia act for local free schools it was provided that the act should not be carried into effect until a majority of the people of the district should approve it. It was sustained as constitutional.9 In Boyd v. Bryant," a general police law, to take effect upon local adoption, was held constitutional. State, 42 Ind. 547; Schulherr v. Bordeaux, 64 Miss. 59; Commonwealth v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 27; State v. Wilcox, 42 Conn. 364; State v. Court Com. Pleas, 36 N. J. L. 72; S. C. 13 Am. R. 422; Barnes v. Supervisors, 51 Miss. 307; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 id. 745. 1 Town of Fox v. Town of Kendall, 97 Ill. 72. 2 Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt. 78. 3 Holcomb v. Davis, 56 Ill. 413; Erlinger v. Boneau, 51 id. 94; Dalby v. Wolf, 14 Iowa, 228. 4 Mayor, etc. v. Finney, 54 Ga. 317; Wales v. Belcher, 3 Pick. 508; City of Paterson v. Society, 24 N. J. L. 385; People v. Butte, 4 Mont. T. 179; S. C. 47 Am. R. 346. 5 Boyd v. Bryant, 35 Ark. 69; S. C. 37 Am. R. 6. 6 30 N. H. 279. 7 Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209. 8 State v. O'Neill, Mayor, etc. 24 Wis. 149. 9 Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt. 78. Such cases as Rice v. Foster, Parker v. Commonwealth,2 Ex parte Wall, and Maize v. State, are now exceptional, and are simply out of harmony with the law as generally held throughout the country. On the whole it may perhaps be considered a sound conclusion, and I think it is supported by a preponderance of authority, that whether an act is general or local the legislature may in their wisdom take into consideration the wishes of the public, and determine not to impose a law on an unwilling or non-consenting people. Having the power to make their laws conditional to take effect only on the happening of contingent events, what the event shall be on which the taking effect of an act shall depend is not a judicial question, but wholly and absolutely within the discretion of the legislature, like the emergency which will induce them to make an act take immediate effect, and that the result of a popular vote is a contingent event within that discretion. 14 Harr. 479. 26 Pa. St. 507, now overruled in Locke's Appeal, 72 id. 491. 3 48 Cal. 279. 44 Ind. 342, substantially overruled by Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. 547. CHAPTER IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT NO ACT EMBRACE MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT AND THAT IT BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE § 76. Substantial agreement of con- 79. Regarded as mandatory. 85. Provisions must be germane. 87. Provisions can have no greater scope than subject in the bill. 88. Title need not index details of act. 89. "Etc." may increase scope of title. § 90. Title too general. 91. Title should accompany bill in 93. What general title includes. 101. Title and subject of amend- 102. Provisions not within subject in the title. 103. Effect of act containing more than one subject. $76. Substantial agreement of constitutional provisions Exceptions. In the constitutions of a large majority of the states are provisions relating to the title and singleness of the subject-matter of legislative acts. It is not uniformly expressed in the same words, but it is in substance the same that no law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title.1 1 Alabama-1865: Art. 4, sec. 2. Each law shall embrace but one subject, which shall be described in the title. 1868: Each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title. Art. 4, sec. 2. 1875, adds: Except general appropriation bills, general revenue bill, and bills adopting a code, digest or revision of statutes. California - 1849: Art. 4, sec. 25. Every law enacted by the legis- ject, and that shall be expressed in the title. Colorado-No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed. Florida 1868: Art. 4, sec. 14. Each law enacted in the legislature shall embrace but one sub |