intended unity of the enacting part. The whole act can be valid only when the subject so stated includes all the provisions in the body of the act. None of the provisions of a stat!ute will be held unconstitutional when they all relate, directly or indirectly, to the same subject, have a natural connection, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title.2 $86. The requirement to state the subject in the title.The direction is, generally, that the subject be "expressed in the title." It is varied in some instances. In Nevada it is to be briefly expressed; in several it is to be clearly expressed. These qualifying words do not add any new element; they merely assist in the interpretation. A brief statement of the subject will suffice under the provision as it is generally worded; and the decisions in Nevada afford no ground for inferring that a prolix title, otherwise unobjectionable, would vitiate an act. The requirement that it be clearly expressed imports no more than that it be expressed; though it may add some emphasis." [If the title does not clearly express the subject, but is ambiguous and suggestive of doubt, still it is believed the doubt, if possible, would be resolved in favor of the validity of the act. The title of an act was formerly no part of it, and was not much resorted to in the exposition of the act; but under this constitutional clause it is an indispensable part of every act.7 3 887. The subject in an act can be no broader than the statement of it in the title.- It is required not only that an act shall contain but one subject, but that that subject be ex 1 Montgomery M. B. & L. Asso. v. Robinson, 69 Ala. 413; Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 99; Grover v. Trustees, etc. 45 N. J. L. 399; Shivers v. Newton, 45 N. J. L. 469; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269. 2 Howland Coal & Iron W. v. Brown, 13 Bush, 685; Phillips v. Bridge Co., 2 Met. (Ky.) 222; Louisville, etc. Co. v. Ballard, 2 Met. (Ky.) 168; Chiles v. Drake, 2 Met. (Ky.) 150; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 id. 566. 3 Shivers v. Newton, 45 N. J. L. 469. Commonwealth v. Martin, 107 Pa. St 185; W. Phila. R. R. Co. v. UnioL R. K. Co. 9 Phila. 495; Carr v. Thomas, 18 Fla. 736; Evans v. Memphis, etc. R. R Co. 56 Ala. 246; Board of Com'rs v. Baker, 80 Ind. 374; Township of Union v. Rader, 39 N. J. L. 509. 6 Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. × 147; State v. Board, etc. 26 Ind. 522; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553. 7 McGrath v. State, 46 Md. 633; State v. Town of Union, 33 N. J. L. 350; Indiana Central R'y Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; Yeager v. Weaver, 64 Pa. St. 427; Stein v. Leeper, 78 Ala. 517. pressed in the title. The title, thus made a part of each act, must agree with it by expressing its subject; the title will fix bounds to the purview, for it cannot exceed the title-subject, nor be contrary to it. An act will not be so construed as to extend its operation beyond the purpose expressed in the title.2 It is not enough that the act embraces but a single subject or object, and that all its parts are germane; the title must express that subject, and comprehensively enough to include all the provisions in the body of the act. The unity and compass of the subject must, therefore, always be considerea with reference to both title and purview. The unity must be sought, too, in the ultimate end which the act proposes to accomplish, rather than in the details leading to that end. The particular effect of the purview exceeding the title, or of the latter misrepresenting the purview, will be discussed in another section. The title cannot be enlarged by construction when too narrow to cover all the provisions in the enacting part, nor can the purview be contracted by construction to fit the title;" but the title, if not delusively general, may be sufficient though more extensive than the purview." 88. Requisites of title-It need not index the details of the act. The title must state the subject of the act for the purpose of information to members of the legislature and pub 1 Board of Com'rs v. Baker, 80 Ind. 374; Matter of Tappen, 36 How. Pr. 390; State v. Garrett, 29 La. Ann. 637; Coutieri v. Mayor, etc. 44 N. J. L. 58; Mississippi, etc. Boom Co. v. Prince, 10 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 391; S. C. 34 Minn. 71; Ex parte Moore, 62 Ala. 471; Matter of Blodgett, 89 N. Y. 392. 2 Bates v. Nelson, 49 Mich. 459. 3 Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 201; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192; Ross v. Davis, 97 Ind. 79; Knoxville v. Lewis, 12 Lea, 180; Stiefel v. Md. Inst. for Blind, 61 Md. 144; Town of Fishkill v. Fishkill, etc. P. R. Co. 22 Barb. 634; Grover v. Trustees, etc. 45 N. J. L. 399; Shivers v. Newton, 45 N. J. L. 469; Cooley's Const. L. 179; Greaton v. Griffin, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 310. 4 State v. Town of Union, 33 N. J. L. 350; State v. County Judge, 2 Iowa, 280; City of St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Whiting v. Mt. Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Clinton v. Draper, 14 Ind. 295; Supervisors v. People, 25 Ill. 181; Succession of Lanzetti, 9 La. Ann. 329. 5 See post, §§ 102, 103. 6 Howland Coal & Iron Works v. Brown, 13 Bush, 681; In re Paul, 94 N. Y. 497; Matter of Sackett, etc. Sts. 74 N. Y. 95; State v. Clinton, 27 La. Ann. 40. Yeager v. Weaver, 64 Pa. St. 427; In re De Vaucene, 31 How. Pr. 337; Luther v. Saylor, 8 Mo. App. 424; Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 431; Coutieri v. New Brunswick, 44 N. J. L. 58; Garvin v. State, 13 Lea, 162. lic while the bill is going through the forms of enactment.1 It is not required that the title should be exact and precise.2 It is sufficient if the language used in the title, on a fair construction, indicates the purpose of the legislature to legislate according to the constitutional provision; so that making every reasonable intendment in favor of the act, it may be said that the subject or object of the law is expressed in the title. As said by the supreme court of Illinois, the constitution does not require that "the subject of the bill shall be specifically and exactly expressed in the title; hence we conclude that any expression in the title which calls attention to the subject of the bill, although in general terms, is all that is required." It may be general, but must be specific enough to answer reasonably the purpose for which the subject is required to be expressed in the title." When the subject is stated in the title the constitution is so far complied with that no criticism of the mode of statement 1 Grover v. Trustees, etc. 45 N. J. L. 399; McGrath v. State, 46 Md. 633; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 185; Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192; Indiana Cent. Ry. Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 83; People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182; State v. County Judge, 2 Iowa, 282; Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mayor, etc. 8 N. Y. 252; Mississippi, etc. Boom Co. v. Prince, 10 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 392; S. C. 34 Minn. 71; Harris v. People, 59 N. Y. 602; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; National Bank v. Southern, etc. Co. 55 Ga. 36; Town of Fishkill v. Fishkill, etc. P. R. Co. 22 Barb. 634; Hargrave v. Weber, 66 Mich. 59. 2 Grover v. Trustees, etc. 45 N. J. L. 399; Daubman v. Smith, 47 N. J. L. 200; In re Mayer, 50 N. Y. 506; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 558; Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Richoux, 23 La. Ann. 745; Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 431. 3 Grover v. Trustees, etc. supra; State Line, etc. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 429; Atkinson v. Duffy, 16 4 Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 436. 5 Shivers v. Newton, 45 N. J. L. 469; State v. Garrett, 29 La. Ann. 637; Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147; Matter of Sackett, etc. Sts. 74 N. Y. 95; Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 83; Green v. Mayor, etc. R. M. Charlt. 368; Mayor, etc. v. State, 4 Ga. 26; City of Eureka v. Davis, 21 Kan. 580; Grover v. Trustees, etc. 45 N. J. L. 399; People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 183; Montgomery, etc. Asso. v. Robinson, 69 Ala. 413; American Printing House v. Dupuy, 37 La. Ann. 188; State v. Wilson, 12 Lea, 246; State v. McConnell, 3 Lea, 332; State v. Whitworth, 8 Lea, 594; Commonwealth v. Green, 58 Pa. St. 226; Luehrman v. Taxing Dist. 2 Lea, 425; Clinton Water Com'rs v. Dwight, 101 N. Y. 9; In re Knaust, 101 N. Y. 188; Greaton v. Griffin, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 310; Daubman v. Smith, 47 N. J. L. 200; State v. Elvins, 32 N. J. L. 362; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; Falconer v. Robinson, 46 Ala. 340. will affect the validity of the act. The statute is valid in such a case; the degree of particularity in expressing the subject in the title is left to the discretion of the legislature.1 No particular form has been prescribed in the constitution for expressing the subject or purpose of a statute in its title. It need not index the details of the act, nor give a synopsis of the means by which the object of the statute is to be effectuated by the provisions in the body of the act. X - 2 § 89. "Etc." may increase the scope of a title -" And for other purposes" will not. It has been decided in Tennessee that "etc." added to a title has force in extending the enumeration which precedes it. The question arose as to the validity of provisions in an act having this title: "An act to punish as felons all parties who may engage in keeping or conducting halls or houses for conduct of games of keno, faro, three-card monte and mustang, etc." Turney, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The 'etc.' used at the end and as part of the title may not be rejected; it has a meaning. Webster defines it, 'et cetera,' and others,' and so forth.' This definition applied here makes it import 'and the rest of In re Mayer, 50 N. Y. 504; Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mayor, etc. 8 N. Y. 241; State v. Town of Union, 33 N. J. L. 350; State v. Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236; Montgomery, etc. Asso. v. Robinson, 69 Ala. 413; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 494; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Whiting v. Mt. Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Indiana Cent. R. R. Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; State v. Bowers, 14 Ind. 195; State v. County Judge, 2 Iowa, 280; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116. 2 Grover v. Trustees, etc. 45 N. J. L. 399; People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182. 3 People v. McCallum, supra; Stuart v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 525; St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn. 50; State v. Daniel, 28 La. Ann. 38; McCaslin v. State, 44 Ind. 151; Collins v. Henderson, 11 Bush, 74; Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mayor, etc. 8 N. Y. 241; Conner v. Mayor, etc. 5 N. Y. 285; People v. Lawrence, 41 N. Y. 137; Daubman v. Smith, 47 N. J. L. 200; Luehrman v. Taxing Dist. 2 Lea, 425; Township of Union v. Rader, 39 N. J. L. 507; Brown v. State, 73 Ga. 38; Reed v. State, 12 Ind. 641; State v. Lasater, 9 Baxt. 584; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; Hammond v. Lesseps, 31 La. Ann. 337; Peachee v. State, 63 Ind. 399; Howell v. State, 71 Ga. 224; Luther v. Saylor, 8 Mo. App. 424; Martin v. Broach, 50 Am. Dec. 306; People v. Brislin, 80 Ill. 423; Bright v. McCulloch, 27 Ind. 223; State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 325; State v. County Comm'rs, 13 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 203; S. C. 17 Nev. 96; Goldsmith v. Rome R. R. Co. 62 Ga. 473; State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227; Gabbert v. Jefferson R. R. Co. 11 Ind. 365. 4 Garvin v. State, 13 Lea, 162. the games,' or 'other games.' It gives the members of the legislature notice that the subject of the title is drawn or elaborated in the body of the act; that the reformatory force of the act is not to be confined to houses, or to persons keeping houses for playing the four games recited, but is extended to other games. It has a significant and pointed conclusion which could not escape the attention of any member of the legislature who has regard to his obligations and duties. It said to him in terms, other games are leveled at besides the four mentioned in the title, and you are invited to look at them. It admonished him, the act is not made to cover a legislation incongruous in itself. By fair intendment, the bill had a necessary and proper connection with the act. It cannot be objected that the title upon the subject is broader than the act under it. The title notified the legislature of a thoroughly comprehensive thrust at all parties engaged in conducting gambling houses; the act confines the thrust to parties conducting houses in the playing of nine games. The record shows there are a great many other games which are played everywhere, besides these mentioned in the act, of which, however, we presume the draftsman of the act was uninformed, but which might have been embraced under the title to his act. It is now insisted the abbreviation etc.' has no meaning at all, or, at most, means and for other purposes.' .. The abbreviation may no longer be called such. It is thoroughly incorporated into our language, is defined by our lexicographers, and is a perfect English word in almost common use. "It cannot mean 'and for other purposes,' for the reason that such definitions would include any and all purposes, however foreign to the object of the legislation, one of the inconveniences and inconsistencies intended to be remedied by the present constitution." The phrase, "and for other purposes," expresses no specific purpose, and imports indefinitely something different from that which precedes it in the title. It is therefore universally rejected as having no force or effect, wherever this constitutional restriction operates.1 1 City of St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 637; Commonwealth v. Green, 58 Pa. 578; State v. Garrett, 29 La. Ann. St. 233. |