tainly destined to develop rather than fade; to absorb rather than be absorbed. The law was much against the principle in the beginning. Before 1852 all co-operative associations had to come under the Friendly Societies Act, which prohibited their dealing with any but their own members. An Act obtained in 1852 allowed them to sell to persons not members of their body. For many years they were not permitted to hold more than an acre of land. More lately this absurd restriction was abolished, and they were allowed to trade in land, to hold land to any extent, and to act as building societies. The friendly societies, which were in their origin merely working-men's clubs, have been the subject of legislation since the later years of the last century. It may be doubted whether, even up to this day, that legislation has not done them more harm than good. The law neither takes them fairly under its protection and control, nor leaves them to do the best they can for themselves uncontrolled and on their own responsibility. At one time the sort of left-handed recognition which the law gave them had a direct tendency to do harm. An officer was appointed by the Government, who might inspect the manner in which the accounts of the societies were kept, and certify that they were in conformity with the law; but he had no authority to look actually into the affairs of a society. His business was, in fact, nothing more than to certify that the legal conditions had been fully complied with, thus implying that on the face of things the accounts seemed all right. The mere fact, however, that there was any manner of Government certificate proved sadly misleading to thousands of persons. Some actually regarded the certificate as a guarantee given by the Government that their money was safe—a guarantee which bound the State to make good any loss to the depositors. Others, who were not quite so credulous, were convinced, at least, that the certificate testified on Government authority that the funds of the society were safe, and that its accounts and its business were managed on principles of strict economical soundness. The Government official certified nothing of the kind. A man at the head of a large establishment brings to some accountant the books of his household expenses. The accountant examines them and says, "All these figures add up quite correctly; the ac

counts seem to be kept on the proper principle. If all these goods were got which I see put down here, and if all these payments were made, then your accounts are in safe condition." But the accountant does not know whether the cook and the butler and the grooms got all the articles put down in the books, or whether the articles were all required, or whether they were paid for as stated. For all the accountant knows or professes to know, the owner of the house may be swindled by every servant and every tradesman. His affairs may be managed for him on some such principle as that of the house in which Gil Blas was once a servant, and where, from the steward down, the whole body of domestics and of tradespeople were in a conspiracy to cheat the unhappy proprietor. The certificate given to the friendly societies was of no greater value than this. Many of the societies were sadly mismanaged; in certain of them there was the grossest malversation of funds; in some towns much distress was caused among the depositors in consequence. The societies had to pass, in fact, through a stage of confusion, ignorance, and experiment, and it is perhaps only to be wondered at that there was not greater mismanagement, greater blundering, and more lamentable failure. It is not by any means certain that, during these earlier stages of the growth of such institutions, the interference and even the protection of Government would have done them much good. But the indirect control which the Government for a long time undertook had apparently no other effect than to interpose restriction just where restriction was injurious, and to give a semblance of protection which was only calculated to create a false security in the minds of ignorant people, and to lead to delusion and disappointment.

The Government cannot be charged of late years with any want of active interest in the business of life among the poor. Its protecting, directing hand is almost everywhere. Sometimes the help thus given is judicious and valuable. For example, the Post-office Savings-banks have become most popular institutions, and no one can doubt that they have tended to develop habits of prudence and economy among the poorer classes all over the country. One of the most curious phenomena of these later times is the reaction that has ap

parently taken place toward that system of paternal government which Macaulay detested, and which not long ago the Manchester School seemed in good hopes of being able to supersede by the virtue of individual action, private enterprise, voluntary benevolence. We shall still have to describe some much more remarkable illustrations of this reaction than any that have yet been given. Keeping for the present to trades' organizations, we would direct attention to the fact that whereas in old days the Government said, “You shall do nothing to help yourselves without our control; and we will do nothing for you but to prosecute you as often as possible," the tendency now is to say, " You may do everything you like for yourselves; but you must allow us to enter into a benevolent rivalry with you, and insist upon doing all we can for you in our way at the same time." Whatever the defects or the possible dangers of such a principle, if pushed too far, it is at least not likely to engender artisan conspiracy, to give excuse for secret association, to help men like Broadhead into the position of leaders and despots, to furnish weak minds with an excuse for following the instigations of the fire-raiser and the assassin. All that law has done lately to remove restriction from the "organization of labor," if we may once more employ that pompous but expressive phrase, has been well done. We must not hasten to anticipate ill from the almost equally rapid movement of the tendency to help labor in doing labor's own proper work.

CHAPTER LV.

THE EXAMPLE OF THE NEW DOMINION.

ON February 19th, 1867, Lord Carnarvon, Secretary for the Colonies, moved the second reading of the Bill for the Confederation of the North American Provinces of the British Empire. This was, in fact, a measure to carry out in practical form the great principles which Lord Durham had laid down in his celebrated report. Lord Durham had done more than merely affirm the principles on which the Constitution of the Canadas should be established. He had laid the foundations of the structure. Now the time had come to raise the

building to its practical completion. The bill prepared by Lord Carnarvon proposed that the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, in other words Upper and Lower Canada, along with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, should be joined in one federation, to be called the Dominion of Canada, having a central or federal Parliament, and local or state Legislatures. The central Parliament was to consist of a Senate and a House of Commons. The Senate was to be made up of seventy members nominated by the Governor-General for life, on a summons from under the Great Seal of Canada. The House of Commons was to be filled by members elected by the people of the provinces according to population, at the rate of one member for every 17,000 persons, and the duration of a Parliament was not to be more than five years. The executive was vested in the Crown, represented of course by the Governor-General. The principle on which the central Parliament was constructed appears to have been arrived at by adopting some of the ideas of England and some of those of the United States. The Senate, for example, was made to resemble as nearly as possible the system of the English House of Lords; but the representative plan applied to the House of Commons was precisely the same as that adopted in the United States. It seems almost superfluous to observe that the whole idea on which the Dominion system rests is that of the American federation. The central Parliament manages the common affairs; each province has its own local laws and legislature. There is the greatest possible variety and diversity in the local systems of the different provinces of the Dominion. The members are elected to the House of Commons on the most diverse principles of suffrage. In some of the provinces the vote is open; in others it is given by ballot, in secret.

The Act of Confederation recites that the Constitution of the Dominion shall be similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom. But in truth the only similarity consists in the fact that one of the two chambers is nominated by the Crown, and that the authority of the Crown is represented in the Dominion by the presence of a Governor-General. all other respects the example of the American Republic has been followed. The keystone of the whole system is that principle of federation which the United States have so long

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represented, and which consists of local self-government for each member of the Confederacy, and the authority of a common Parliament for strictly national affairs. This fact is not an objection to the scheme. It is, on the contrary, the best security for its success. It would have been impossible to establish in Canada anything really resembling the Constitution of England. Uniformity of legislation would have been unendurable. Nothing could make the Senate of Canada an institution like the English House of Lords. Nomination by the Crown could not do it. There was some wisdom in the objection raised by Mr. Bright to this part of the scheme. A good deal of sentimentalism was talked in Parliament by the Ministers in charge of the Confederation scheme about the filial affection of Canada for the mothercountry, and the intense anxiety of the Canadians to make their Constitution as like as possible to that of England. The Canadians appear to have very properly thought of their own interests first of all, and they adopted the system which they believed would best suit the conditions under which they lived. In doing so, they did much to strengthen and to commend that federative principle on which their Dominion is founded, and which appears likely enough to contain the ultimate solution of the whole problem of government as applied to a system made up of various populations with diverse nationalities, religions, and habitudes. So far as one may judge of the tendencies of modern times, it would seem that the inclination is to the formation of great State systems. The days of small independent States seem. to be over. If this be so, it may safely be asserted that great State systems cannot be held together by uniform principles of legislation. The choice would clearly seem to be between small independent States and the principle of federation adopted in the formation of the Dominion of Canada.

The Dominion scheme only provided at first for the Confederation of the two Canadian provinces with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Provision was made, however, for the admission of any other province of British North America. which should desire to follow suit. The newly constructed province of Manitoba, made up out of what had been the Hudson's Bay territories, was the first to come in. It was admitted into the union in 1870. British Columbia and