existing for all purposes. Nevertheless, in that limited field it is just as impossible to conceive of a state of war terminating without a state of peace beginning, just as impossible to conceive of a period of time which has ceased to be a time of war and yet has not become a time of peace, as it is in the larger field of a state of war for all purposes; and, since it is impossible to conceive of such a state of things, it follows, I think, that when Congress, in the joint resolution of March 3, 1921, declared that, for certain purposes of internal law, the state of war existing between the United States and Germany and Austria should be considered as terminated, it also declared, by necessary implication, that for those same purposes a state of peace should be considered to have begun in so far as the internal affairs of the United States are concerned.

It is not a question as to whether a state of war or of peace actually or technically exists between the United States and Germany and Austria so far as these countries as among themselves is concerned. What Congress has done is to declare a state or rather condition of peace to exist as to the laws of and governing the United States. Read in this light, which it seems to me it is evident is the true intent of Congress, all Acts and regulations depending for their force upon a state of war or emergency are of no further force.

I therefore answer your second question likewise in the affirmative.

Referring specifically to the enactments of Congress referred to me, I am of the opinion that the following Acts are affected by the joint resolution of Congress of March 3, 1921, in accordance with the foregoing opinion and that the same come within its intended purpose of restoring the internal affairs of the United States to a peace-time basis, namely, the Act of July 1, 1918 (40 Stat. 711); the Act of August 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 587); the particular provisions of the Act of July 1, 1918 (40 Stat. 711), referring to the Naval Reserve Force and officers; the Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 393); the Act of May 22, 1917, section 16 (40 Stat. 87); the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 602); the Act of July 1, 1918 (40 Stat. 718); section 1462, Revised Statutes, and section 1592, Revised Statutes,

referring to pay of officers; the Act of August 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 587); the Act of July 9, 1918 (40 Stat. 885); the Act of February 24, 1919 (40 Stat. 1150); the Act of August 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 586); various provisions of section 1624, Revised Statutes, articles for the government of the Navy, dealing with offenses committed during time of war; the Act of May 22, 1917, section 21 (40 Stat. 90); the Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 383); the Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 389); the Act of May 22, 1917, section 10 (40 Stat. 87), respecting promotions of probationary second lieutenants; the Act of July 11, 1919 (41 Stat. 153); the Act of February 24, 1919 (40 Stat. 1066); the Act of October 6, 1917, section 204 (40 Stat. 403); the Act of May 22, 1917, section 18 (40 Stat. 89).

Respectfully,

HARRY M. DAUGHERTY.

To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY FROM ONE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT TO ANOTHER.

There is no legal objection to the mere transfer from one bureau or department of the Government to another department of real or personal property no longer needed for the purposes for which it was appropriated.

Such a transfer is not a sale and is not open to the objection that public property can not be disposed of without the authority of Congress.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 20, 1921.

SIR: The question you submit, whether one department of the Government can transfer property no longer needed for the purposes for which it was purchased to another department of the Government where it can be utilized in the public service, necessitates a consideration of sections 3618 and 3678 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. These are the only statutory provisions which seem to be involved.

By the provisions of section 3678, supra, it is enacted that

"All sums appropriated for the various branches of expenditure in the public service shall be applied solely to

the objects for which they are respectively made, and for no others."

Obviously, the effect of this provision is to make unlawful the diversion of funds appropriated for one object of expenditure to another object of expenditure.

It is provided by section 3618, supra, how moneys derived from the sales of public property, with certain exceptions, shall be disposed of and used.

Concretely, the question turns on whether such a transfer from one Government department to another is or is not a sale. In the consideration of this question, which has frequently arisen in the administration of the War and Navy Departments, the Judge Advocate General of the Army has uniformly held that the transfer of public property from one bureau or department to another is not a sale. The decisions relating thereto are collected in the Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the Army for the years 1912 and 1915, as follows:

"But where the property desired to be transferred is no longer needed for the purpose for which appropriated, it may be transferred to another department without the consent of Congress. Such a transfer would not be a sale, as the Government would not part with its title, and it would not, therefore, be open to the objection that public property can not be disposed of without the authority of Congress. Section 3678, Revised Statutes, provides that 'all sums appropriated for the various branches of expenditures in the public service shall be applied solely to the objects for which they are respectively made, and for no others.' While this statute prohibits the expenditure of an appropriation for purposes other than those for which appropriated, yet, if it be regarded as intended also to forbid the application of property purchased from an appropriation for a particular purpose to a different purpose, it should not be construed to forbid such a transfer where the property is no longer needed for the purpose for which appropriated. Therefore the property being no longer needed for the purpose for which appropriated, held that two vessels belonging to the Navy Department might be transferred for a definite or an indefinite time to the War Department for use as Army transports (C.

7840, Mar. 14, 1900); that certain cooking utensils, tableware, and soap, purchased from a river and harbor appropriation to be used in connection with the improvement of rivers and harbors in Florida, could be turned over to an officer for use in connection with a river improvement in Georgia (C. 10300, Apr. 25, 1901); that five mules purchased in connection with certain harbor improvements in Alabama could be transferred to the Quartermaster's Department of the Army (C. 3679, Nov. 26, 1897); that a sailboat in possession of the United States engineering officer at San Juan could be transferred to the Lighthouse Board (C. 10315, Apr. 29, 1901); that a Remington typewriter in possession of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission could be exchanged for a Smith Premier in the office of a certain quartermaster (C. 10741, June 25, 1901); that certain cable laid between Narragansett Pier and Block Island could be transferred to the Weather Bureau in the Department of Agriculture on the condition that the bureau keep the cable in repair, and in case of war or other military necessity restore it to the War Department (C. 12883, June 30, 1902); that certain property belonging to the Medical Department of the Army which had been condemned and ordered to be destroyed could be turned over to the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture (C. 21850, July 26, 1907)." Digest, 1912, p. 31.

In 1915, Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General's Office, p. 491 (July 1, 1912, to April 1, 1917), there was submitted whether a team of dogs belonging to the Bureau of Fisheries, Department of Commerce, for which the Bureau of Fisheries had no immediate use, could be transferred to the Signal Corps in Alaska. The Judge Advocate General held that such transfer could be made. These decisions recognize that such a transfer is in no sense a sale, for the reason that the Government does not part with the title to the property so transferred or loaned. Clearly, if the title changed, then such transaction would not be proper without the consent of Congress.

That such a transaction is not a sale is conversely recognized in a recent decision by the Comptroller of the Treas

ury rendered June 20, 1919, 25 Comptroller's Decisions, 961, in which it was held that where equipment is transferred from one department to another, payment to the transferring department is not authorized, since the transaction is not a sale. It was further adjudged that no adjustment of appropriations was necessary where the expenditure from the appropriation which bore the original expense had accomplished the purpose for which it was made, provided the transfer involved no additional charge against the appropriation under which the equipment was originally purchased. That is to say, a mere transfer without additional expense involves a mere question of accountability and not an adjustment of appropriations.

This question has been decided by Attorney General Brewster under date of December 20, 1882. It was there said inter alia:

"But where articles are manufactured or purchased by one branch of the public service under an appropriation made for that purpose, and are afterwards, on grounds of administrative expediency, transferred to another branch of the service, the latter thereupon reimbursing the appropriation of the former with the cost of the articles out of an appropriation applicable to the manufacture or purchase thereof, this transaction is not a sale either according to the ordinary or the legal signification of that term. It is nothing more than a transfer of the custody and use of the property and consequent accountability for the same, accompanied by a transfer of the cost thereof from one appropriation to another, within the scope of either of which the expenditure may properly come. The owner

ship (a transfer of which is an inseparable element in a sale of property) remains unchanged." (17 Op. 482.)

The question naturally and logically arises whether real estate can be transferred from one department to the other, assuming, of course, that it falls within the classification of property no longer needed for the purposes for which it was originally acquired. In other words, can real estate acquired for a definite and peculiar use be devoted to another and distinct purpose in the same or another department or bureau of the United States Government? This