than the receivership.-Ohio Motor Car Co. v. Eiseman Magneto Co., U. S. C. C. A., 230 Fed. 370.

16. Laborer.-Where employe of mining company was engaged to perform necessary services as watchman in payment for which general manager delivered copper plates to him, he is entitled to proceeds thereof as against purchaser from trustee in bankruptcy, plates not having been in trustee's possession.-Johnson v. American Smelting & Refining Co., Neb., 157 N. W. 337.

17. Mortgagee.-Under Bankr. Act, §§ 57a, 37e, 57h, secured creditor, who took legal title to land mortgaged to secure pledged bonds, held still a pledgee or mortgagee, and only entitled to prove excess above security.-In re J. G. Reichard & Bro., U. S. D. C., 230 Fed. 525.

18. Mingling Funds.-Trustee in bankruptcy, knowingly appropriating property of trustee for creditors carrying on business prior to bankruptcy, and mingling proceeds with proceeds of other property, held bound to pay therefor.-Bramble v. Brett, U. S. C. C. A., 230 Fed. 385.

19. Provable Claim.-Bankr. Act, § 63b, held to merely permit liquidation of unliquidated claims provable under section 63a, and not to enlarge class of provable debts.-Moore Douglas, U. S. C. C. A., 230 Fed. 399.

V.

20. State Law.-Bankr. Act, § 70e, held to authorize avoidance by trustee of only such transfers as creditors might have avoided under the laws of the state where the transaction occurred.-Manders v. Wilson, U. S. D. C., 230 Fed.

536.

Printed statement

21. Banks and Banking-Deposit Slip.on deposit slip that bank took checks for collection only as agent held some evidence of intention that bank should take check as agent, and not as owner.-American Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Dennis, Wash., 156 Pac. 559. 22.-Notice.-Knowledge of president of bank as member of brokerage firm that notes indorsed by depositor were for the benefit of firm is not imputable to bank.-First Nat. Bank of Birmingham v. Fidelity Title & Trust Co., Pa., 97 Atl. 75.

Notice.-Knowledge

by the president

23. of an insurance company and bank of defenses against a certificate of deposit assigned to the bank is not imputed to the bank, where the president acted solely for the insurance company.-Union State Bank of Shawnee, Okl., v. First Nat. Bank of Huntsville, Ark., Ark., 184 S. W. 411.

24. Collateral.-An indorser for accommodation of the payee or use as collateral security without consideration is not liable to the original payee.-Cox v. Heagy, Mo., 184 S. W. 495.

26. Installments.-Where the failure to pay an installment of a debt ipso facto matures the whole debt, it is not the rule that by accepting payment of overdue installments or extending time upon an installment the creditor waives the default.-Cofer v. Beverly, Tex., 184 S. W. 608.

27. Bills and Notes-Accommodation Indorser. -Where judgment was obtained against an accommodation indorser, he was entitled to sue the accommodated bank which received the consideration independent of the authority of the bank president to make the alleged promise that the bank would save plaintiff harmless from liability.-Means v. Merchants' State Bank, Kan., 156 Pac. 701.

on

28. Burden of Proof.-The burden is the bank issuing a negotiable certificate of deposit to show that a purchaser before maturity for full value had knowledge of the defenses.Union State Bank of Shawnee, Okla. v. First Nat. Bank of Huntsville, Ark., Ark., 184 S. W. 411. 29. Boundaries-Evidence. Recently made maps and plat of lands are of no value in determining a boundary existing 60 years before, such boundary being the bank of a river shown to have shifted since the grant.-Crosby v. Stevens, Tex., 184 S. W. 705.

30. Breach of Marriage Promise-Action.Where one tells his affianced he will never marry her, her right of action for breach of promise accrues immediately, although before the wedding day set.-Johnson v. Blomdahl, Wash., 156 Pac. 561.

31. Brokers-Burden of Proof.-It is incumbent on broker seeking to recover commissions to prove either that a sale was made or that purchaser was able and willing to buy, and failure to make sale was through no fault of broker or customer, but, if introduction of parties result in sale, he has earned his commission. Read v. Ely, Pa., 97 Atl. 111.

32. License.-Where town ordinance, requiring brokers to procure license, was primarily to raise revenue, its exclusion, in action by broker for compensation, was not error.Campbell v. Thomas, Okla., 156 Pac. 647.

or

33. Carriers of Goods-Carmack Amendment. The Carmack Amendment does not abrogate or impair the separate liability of terminal delivering carriers for losses occurring on their own lines, as fixed by state statutes or decisions.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Lynne, Ala., 71 So. 338.

34. Live Stock.-Where live stock are injured in transit by trampling, biting, or kicking each other, the carrier is not liable.Schloss-Bear-Davis Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., N. C., 88 S. E. 476.

35. Carriers of Passengers-Protection.-A railroad whose white passenger assaulted plaintiff's negress wife was not liable therefor, aside from the separate coach law, unless the road should have reasonably foreseen, in time to have prevented the assault, that the white person would commit it.-Texas & P. Ry. Co. y. Baker, Tex., 184 S. W. 664.

36. Common Carriers Franchise. (Ohio) Village ordinance, granting franchise to interurban railroad providing that if village should be annexed to city rate of fare between village and city should not exceed 5 cents, on acceptance by railroad, is a binding contract enforceable against it.-Interurban Ry. & Terminal Co. v. City of Cincinnati, Ohio, 112 N. E. 186.

37. Chattel Mortgages-Description.-All descriptions of property in a chattel mortgage must be construed under the rule that the law presumes that the mortgagor intended to confer a benefit on the mortgagee, so that the omission of location is not necessarily fatal,

if the property is otherwise sufficiently described. Bonneviere v. Cole, Wash., 156 Pac. 527.

38. Commerce Employe.-Where plaintiff was engaged as a railroad foreman in a crew making up interstate trains, and was injured during temporary lull in the work, he was engaged in interstate commerce when injured, and his case is properly brought within the federal Liability Act.-Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Skotzy, Ala., 71 So. 335.

39. Contracts-Construction.-A contract, requiring the contractor to excavate all "soil, earth, and stones," does not oblige him to excavate a ledge of rock not known to him at time of contracting.-Howard v. Howard Congregational Soc., Mass., 112 N. E. 233.

40. Third Person.-When a person for a consideration agrees to pay a sum of money to a third person, the latter has an absolute right to the benefit of the promise.-Concrete Steel Co. v. Illinois Surety Co., Wis., 157 N. W. 543. 41. Constitutional Law-Ministerial Officer.Though county auditor is but ministerial officer assessments for not personally interested in taxation, he may interpose defense that statute under which tax commission attempts assessment is unconstitutional.-State v. Leech, N. D., 157 N. W. 492.

42. Corporations-Foreign Corporation.— A contract for the sale of superheaters by a foreign corporation not complying with the corporation laws, requiring that the corporation not only manufacture and ship, but also erect, the superheaters in the buyer's plant in the state, involves the doing of business in the state, unless the installation was essential to the sale. Power Specialty Co. v. Michigan Power Co., Mich., 157 N. W. 408.

43.- -Set-Off.-A party, who loaned an insolvent corporation $2,000, in an action brought against him by the company's assignee to recover for the benefit of all creditors for an amount due upon an unpaid subscription for stock, could not set off the corporation's debt to him.-Everett v. Foster, Mass., 112 N. E. 239.

44. -Stock Subscription.-Where a subscriber to stock, induced thereto by misrepresentations, after discovering the facts renewed the note given for the price, he waived the fraud and acquiesced therein, and could not have cancellation of the note.-Cattlemen's Trust Co. of Ft. Worth v. Pruett, Tex., 184 S. W. 716.

45. Waiver.-Part of stockholders of corporation attending special meeting pursuant to notice not advising them that the election of directors would be taken up by atending the meeting, in which they did not participate, did not waive, want of proper notice to them.Dolbear v. Wilkinson, Cal., 156 Pac. 488.

46. Covenants-Breach.-Where owner of undivided seven-twelfths conveyed an undivided five-twelfths by deed with full covenants of warranty, there was no breach of the warranty, as there were other lands of the grantor on which the dower interest could take effect.Anen-West Commission Co. v. Harshaw, Ark., 184 S. W. 436.

Where

47. Customs and Usages-Evidence. manufacture of gasoline from waste was in its infancy at time of conveyance of waste gas, testimony as to custom by which conveyance of waste gas should be construed was inadmissible. -Bubb v. Parker & Edwards Oil Co., Pa., 97 Atl. 114.

48. Damages Fright. Where negligence causes fright with no precedent impact or injury to the person, and the frightened person in a justified attempt to escape from the apprehended danger receives physical injury, damages may be recovered.-O'Meara v. Russell, Wash., 156 Pac. 550.

49. Death-Despondency.-Where a son contributed money at times to the support of his father, the irregularity of such contributions will not prevent the father from recovering damages for the son's wrongful death.-San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Blair, Tex., 184 S. W. 566.

50. Divorce Community Property.-While in granting a divorce the court may make neces

sary orders concerning the custody of the children, it cannot thereafter set apart for the maintenance of the children portions of the community property apportioned between the spouses.-Gully v. Gully, Tex. Civ. App., 184 S. W. 555.

51. Cruel Treatment. "Extreme cruelty" is not confined to physical violence, and any such continued course of conduct as, without fault of the wife, results in making the marriage unbearable and in driving her from her husband's home, is extreme cruelty.-McCue v. McCue, Mich., 157 N. W. 369.

52. Insanity.-An action for divorce or alimony may be maintained against an insane defendant where the acts constituting the grounds were committed by defendant prior to his_becoming insane.-Lewis v. Lewis, Okla., 156 Pac. 626.

53. Domicile-Abandonment. Where tor, after having established domicile in New Jersey, took apartments in New York and made New York his headquarters, and bought a house in California, but frequently emphasized that he he never was still domiciled in New Jersey, abandoned such domicile.-Givernaud v. Variel, N. J. Ch. Ct., 97 Atl. 49.

54.

Easements-Prescription.-Use of a way across church or parish property for the time requisite to acquire prescriptive easement as against an individual owner, where the admission of the parties excluded any inference of permissive use, gave the user a legal right of way. Thompson v. Bowers, Me., 97 Atl. 1. 55. Ballot. Where one whose ballot was rejected owned a farm in county and intended to return there whenever he could find some one who would live with him and care for him, ownership of the farm did not constitute a residence, as he actually was in another county.-Aldridge v. Hamlin, Tex., 184 S. W. 602.

Elections-Rejected

56. Estoppel-Precedence.-Where the facts call for the application of the doctrine of estoppel it has the field to itself, and supersedes all other rules which have not fully acted upon the particular situation.-Union Bank of Milwaukee v. Commercial Securities, Wis., 157 N. W. 510.

57. Evidence Criminal Knowledge.-The kicking propensity of the mule is a matter of common knowledge.-Consolidation Coal Co. v. Pratt, Ky., 184 S. W. 369.

58. False Pretenses-Principal and Agent.False representations to an agent, inducing action by his principal, are not distinguishable from these made directly to the principal.State v. Worman, N. J. Sup. Ct., 97 Atl. 31.

59. Fraud-Elements of.-To constitute fraud it is not necessary that the person making the statement either know it is untrue, or be recklessly and consciously ignorant whether it be true or untrue; it is sufficient if he be a party to the contract and profits by the other's loss.Power Specialty Co. v. Michigan Power Co., Mich., 157 N. W. 408.

60.

Honest Belief.-That defendant's agent in effecting a sale of land honestly believed a well drilled would produce sufficient water to irrigate the land will not prevent plaintiff from recovering damages, the representation being untrue.-Zavalla Land & Water Co. v. Tolbert, Tex. Civ. App., 184 S. W. 523.

61.- -Misrepresentation.-One misrepresenting to a bank a proposed borrower's responsibility cannot defend for loss on ground that loan made was unreasonable, and not to be anticipated.-Farmers' Savings Bank of Morrison v. Jameson, Iowa, 157 N. W. 460. 62.

Frauds, Statute of-Original Promise.An obligation is "original" if the promise is made at the time or before the debt is created and the credit is given solely to the promisor, but "collateral" if the promise is merely superadded to the promise of another; he remaining primarily liable.-Fairbanks v. Barker, Me., 97 Atl. 3.

91.

Municipal Corporation-Defective Sidewalk. A city was not liable for injuries to a sidewalk pedestrian, upon whom a billboard was blown which was on private premises and not obviously dangerous to pedestrians; the city having no notice that the board was defective or dangerous, and it appearing to be reasonably safe.-Dahmer v. City of Meridian, Del., 70 So. 321.

92. Ordinance.-It is no defense to an action for injuries caused by an obstructed sidewalk that plaintiff was not observing the ordinance to keep to the right.-Lancaster v. City of Columbia, S. C., 88 S. E. 463.

93. Trespass.-A boy rolling a hoop on a street is not a trespasser, and an automobile driver must exercise reasonable care to avoid him. Patrick v. Deziel, Mass., 112 N. E. 223., 94. Names-Adoption.-One may, without abandoning real name and without fraudulent intent, adopt any name by which he may transact business, execute contracts, and sue and be sued. Badger Lumber Co. v. Collinson, Kan., 156 Pac. 724.

97.

Patents-Accounting.-In suit for accounting for royalties, where invalidity of patent and notice of termination of license contract is pleaded, fact that licensee continues to use patent marks and dates of patentee presents strong evidence of operation under license, and patentee has remedy in equity.-K-W Ignition Co. v. Unit Coil Co., Ohio, 112 N. E. 199.

98. Evidence.-Numerous and concurring decisions of courts of the same rank in respect to a patent should be followed, unless the evidence to the contrary is of that degree of certainty which amounts to a demonstration.Cincinnati Butchers' Supply Co. v. Walker Bin Co., U. S. C. C. A., 230 Fed. 453.

99.- -Rights Under.-Patent law held not source of patentee's right to fix price of article or make, use and vend it but source of right to exclude others.-Swindell v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., U. S. C. C. A., 230 Fed. 438.

100. Payment-Recovery.-Brokers, learning that report of sale of stock for which they had paid owner was erroneous, were entitled to return stock and recover amount paid.-Donner v. Saskett, Pa., 97 Atl. 89.

101. Principal and Agent-Evidence.-The rule against proving agency by the declarations and statements of the agent does not deny to the agent the right to testify as to the fact of his agency, as to which he is as competent to testify as any other witness. Spears V. Black, Mich., 157 N. W. 382.

102. Railroads-Ordinary Care.-While open safety gates do not relieve person crossing railroad from exercising due care, fact that they are open when train is approaching is for jury to consider in determining whether injured person used proper care. Siever V. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., Pa., 97 Atl.

116.

103.- -Last Clear Chance.-Where, after seeing boy trespassing on a flat car, the engineer does not check speed of locomotive and boy jumps off and is injured by cars on main track running without brakes, the railroad is liable for injuries received by him.-O'Neal v. Big Pine Lumber Co., La., 71 So. 355.

104. -Nuisance.-A railroad in a street permitted to be there by competent authority is not a "nuisance," though damages to abutting landowners were not ascertained and paid before putting it there.-Plantenga v. Grand Rapids Terminal Ry. Co., Mich., 157 N. W. 425.

105. Tresspassers.-Where a railroad company, having knowledge that its tracks

were

habitually used by many persons as a passway, failed to object or to take any steps to prevent such use, such persons are not "trespassers."-Trojanowski v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., Wis., 157 N. W. 536.

106. Receivers-Distribution.-Where a railof road in receivership is sold in foreclosure receiver's certificates under a decree that from the proceeds the certificates be paid first, the proceeds are applicable first to pay the receiver's fees and expenses, and then to pay pro rata the certificates on a par with claims against him for car service and damages to shippers.-Jeffers v. New Jersey & P. R. Co., N. J., 97 Atl. 32.

107. Sales-Damages.-Where there is no rescission of contract, measure of damages for breach of warranty of personalty is difference between value of property as it is and what it would have been worth if as represented.-Oxygenator Co. v. Johnson, Neb., 157 N. W. 339.

of

108. Description Property.-Contract for sale of "store and office furniture and fixtures" and of "merchandise" in the grocery line held not to include two horses, a delivery wagon and a set of double harness.-James v. Doss, Tex. Civ. App., 184 S. W. 623.

109. Street Railroads-Proximate Cause.Where the horse behind which plaintiff rode was frightened by an automobile and driven upon the track of a street railroad, and its motorman was negligent in failing to stop his car, the negligence of the motorman was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury received when the horse was killed.-Walter v. Detroit, J. & C. Ry. Co., Mich., 157 N. W. 414.

110. Taxation-Holding Company.-Township authorities could not take property owned by one corporation of several operated as a single system under a trade-name by a holding company to pay taxes assesed upon realty of another one of the corporations.-Rapid Ry. Co. v. Schroeder, Mich., 157 N. W. 422.

111. Telegraphs and Telephones-Negligence. A boy injured by a guy wire hanging from a telegraph pole while playing on a grass plot alongside the traveled part of a highway was in a place where he had a right to be.-Fry v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., Mass., 112 N. E. 214. the bene

it

112. Trusts-Spendthrift.-Where ficiary under a spendthrift trust is judicially declared insane by court of another state, is trustee's duty to ascertain his mental condition before making payments to him.-In re Thaw's Estate, Pa., 97 Atl. 108.

113.

Usury-Defenses.-A purchaser of property charged with a usurious lien may interpose the defense of usury in an action to foreclose the lien, where he has paid his grantor the full amount of such lien or assuming its payment.-Gold-Stabeck Loan & Credit Co. v. Kinney, N. D., 157 N. W. 482.

114. Vendor and Purchaser-Fraud.-One, who, subsequent to an exchange of property by plaintiff without knowledge of fraud inducing such exchange, acquired in property plaintiff parted with, does not become liable for the fraud, in absence of showing of relation of principal or partner to person making false representations.-Smith v. O'Dean, Minn., 157 N. W.

503.

115. Wills Construction.-Under a will devising a share of the residue of real and personal property in trust to pay over the income to one for life, royalties on mining leases earned previous to, but payable after the testatrix's death, were payable to the life tenant.-Poole v. Union Trust Co., Mich., 157 N. W. 430.

116. Implication.-A gift to a grandchild cannot be implied from a gift to a daughter defeasible if the daughter dies without children surviving. In re Allis' Will, Wis., 157 N. W. 548.

The case of Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 577, in which opinion by Chief Justice White was thought to sustain jurisdiction of the complete res in an action or divorce where there was bona fide residence by the plaintiff and voluntary appearance by defendant, a non-resident, is seriously contested by New Jersey Court of Chancery, in Lister v. Lister, 97 Atl. 170.

This position was taken only argumentatively by the Chief Justice and was based on Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, which was said by the Chief Justice to have ruled that: "Where a bona fide resi

dence has been acquired in a state by either of the parties to a marriage, and a suit is brought by the domiciled party in such state for divorce, the courts of that state, if they acquire personal jurisdiction also of the other party, have authority to enter a decree of divorce, entitled to be enforced in every state by the full faith and credit clause."

The New Jersey Court, however, says that the Cheever-Wilson case "was decided nearly fifty years ago, when the subject of the situs of matrimonial status as a res was involved in obscurity and affected by some judicial notions which since that time have been repudiated by the courts," and though the question "had been fully argued upon both sides," in that case, its decision was not necessarily called for by the facts.

The New Jersey Court assails the correctness of the principle, however, though it be that the status of the marriage so far as plaintiff is concerned, is present, yet

that status is not there so far as defendant is concerned. It is contended that if bona fide residence is necessary to change status as to plaintiff, the same must be true as to defendant.

Using language pointedly referring to the case before it, the New Jersey Court says: "If a woman, a resident of New Jersey, goes voluntarily into a Nevada court and litigates a divorce suit, brought in that court against her by her husband who is a bona fide resident of Nevada, I am unable to perceive how anything more than an original res, i. e., the status of the husband in respect of marriage in the state. of Nevada, can be involved. The other res which is the status of the woman, in respect of marriage in the state of New Jersey, cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction. of a Nevada court by any appearance or other action on the part of the woman. * * * New Jersey must give full faith and credit to Nevada decrees where the Nevada courts have jurisdiction, but the constitutional mandate does not expand the operation of the Nevada decree which New

Jersey must respect. The Nevada decree

which the full faith and credit it commands New Jersey at all times to respect is the decree of the Nevada court that in Nevada where such decree can be enforced, the status of marriage has been destroyed."

We do not see, if there is only this effect of the Nevada decree, why any other state than Nevada might not regard the decree as New Jersey does. If Nevada has not acquired any jurisdiction over the wife's status to the marriage, then the faith and credit clause would not protect the decree in New York any more than in New Jersey. If then the wife were to remove to another state or go into another state to get married or some property interest in the other state was affected by the marriage relation, undissolved as to her, this Nevada decree could not be set up as a defense or as a means of attack.

If this condition of things arises out of decrees in voluntary appearance in a state