that would otherwise be necessaries cannot be recovered for, unless she was expressly authorized to purchase them. For this, see Baccaria v. Landers, 146 N. Y. Supp. 158.

But a case has recently been decided by New York Court of Appeals which rules that one who has gone through a marriage ceremony with a woman then married to another and holds her out as his wife he is liable for necessaries, as though she were his lawful wife. Frank v. Carter, 113 N. E. 549. There are cited for this view three English cases and one by a nisi prius American court.

We think there may be a difference between a wife under English law and one under our system. In England the holding out may have a more conclusive principle of estoppel against the husband than under American law. And then to say that a presumed agency may arise out of a wholly illegal relation, so far as to bind the principal for the civil contracts of the agent, is to proceed quite far. There is nothing said in this case as to knowledge by the creditor of the unlawful relation existing be tween the purported husband and wife. But if he did know, might not he as creditor be deemed something of an accessory after the fact in supplying necessaries to the bigamous wife?

COMMERCE-AGGREGATE OF TIME BETWEEN CONNECTING CARRIERS UNDER 28-HOUR STOCK LAW.-In United States v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 234 Fed. 386, decided by District Court, Northern District of Iowa, it is held that where stock is kept in cars by one of several connecting carriers without food or water more than 28 hours and then turned over to another connecting carrier, who keeps them less than 28 hours, the latter carrier is responsible in no way for the period of 22 hours the stock was in its possession. It then delivered them to its connection and it extended the time to 35 hours.

The court said: "It appears that Rock Island Company (the first carrier) confined the stock beyond the 28-hour period and fully incurred the penalty for violation of 28-hour law; and to warrant recovery against defendant it must be charged, either with a part of the time the stock was in the custody of the Rock Island road or with a part of the time the Sioux City Terminal Company detained it after the defendant delivered the car to that company. I am unable to believe that when the Rock Island Company delivered the car to the defendant company it transferred to the defendant company *** its liability for the penalty it had incurred; nor that the time the car remained with the ter

minal company before it delivered it to the stockyards company can be charged to the defendant, and inasmuch as the defendant company did not have the car in its custody in excess of the 28-hour period, it is not liable for a violation of the act in carrying this shipment."

This holding appears to us so very radical, that it amounts practically to a nullification of the 28-hour law in every case where there are connecting carriers. Taking it that the time the stock was kept by the terminal company and add that to the time it was in the custody of defendant and then add this to the time it was in the custody of the Rock Island Company and the stock was kept at least 63 hours without food and water. It incidentally happened that the time with the Rock Island Company was long enough to make it liable. It is easily to be seen, however, that between three connecting railroads three times 27 hours could be taken up with no railroad liable for stock being without food and water.

If there were a sort of unity in transportation and it were so that connections were to be responsible, as they are made by the Carmack Amendment in a suit against the initial carrier, the law would have enforcement as it intends, viz.: that stock shall not be kept without food and water for more than 28 consecutive hours. Defendant should not have been allowed to receive the stock from the Rock Island, at least without giving it immediate relief and it should have passed its obligation to the terminal company as its agent to see that food and water were given within the next succeeding 28 hours.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A PASSENGER'S BAGGAGE.

Generally-It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule defining specifically what will constitute baggage in all circumstances. The question depends upon the purpose of the passenger's journey, his social standing, etc., and therefore only general rules can be stated that will be applicable in all cases. It is said that baggage includes such articles of personal convenience or necessity as are usually carried by passengers for their personal use, and

Articles Intended for Gifts-It seems that articles intended as gifts to members of the passenger's family, the articles being reasonable in number and value, properly constitute baggage." But this rule does not extend to articles intended as presents for friends.10

Twelve yards of dress goods, 11 wearing apparel and other articles, including material for two dresses,12 intended for use by members of the passenger's family, constituted baggage.

Articles of jewelry, intended to be presented to friends, do not constitute baggage.13

14

Money-A passenger is entitled to carry an amount of money that is reasonable in view of the probable expenses of the journey.1 Whether the amount claimed in case of loss is reasonable or excessive depends upon the character of the journey, the financial standing of the passenger, and all other special circumstances.15

"With respect to money, the rule appears to be well settled that money can only be considered as baggage if bona fide taken for traveling expenses and personal use on the trip, and it therefore appears that it is always necessary to aver and prove that such was the purpose for which the money was carried, and the amount must be limited to such as a reasonably prudent man would consider necessary for the purpose.'

9916

(9) Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Skinner, 88 Ark. 189, 113 S. W. 1019, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 850; Jones v. Priester, 1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. 326; note in 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 850.

(10) Nevins v. Bay State S. B. Co., 4 Bosw. 225.

(11) Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Skinner, 88 Ark. 189, 113 S. W. 1019, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 850.

(12) Dexter v. Syracuse, B. & N. Y. R. Co., 42 N. Y. 326. 1 Am. Rep. 527.

(13) Nevins v. Bay State S. B. Co., 4 Bosw. 225.

(14) Jordan v. Fall River R. Co., 5 Cush. 69, 51 Am. Dec. 44; Hasbrouck v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 202 N. Y. 363, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 537. 7 N. C. C. A. 975. 95 N. E. 808, aff'g. 137 App. Div. 532, 64 Misc. 478; Fairfax v. New York, etc., R. Co., 73 N. Y. 167.

Where a blacksmith was traveling between two points in the state of Texas, to visit his children, and carried on his person about $80, it was held that $157 carried in his trunk was baggage, his visit extending over a period of 10 or 15 days.17

Where the plaintiff and his wife were traveling together it was held that he was entitled to carry $145 as baggage, he having testified that that amount was not more than was reasonable for the expenses of himself and wife on the trip.18

Money carried solely for the purpose of transportation, is not baggage.19 Nor is money carried for business purposes.20

"Baggage does not include funds carried for the purpose of transportation and remittance, or for investment in another locality. It should be limited to money taken for traveling expenses properly so called. When thus limited, the principle does not involve any departure from the rule that the liabilities of the carrier are imposed in respect to the compensation paid, but is in strict accordance with that principle."21

Jewelry-Where there was evidence that the plaintiff was a lady of prominence; that while a passenger on one of the defendant's trains, she carried among other things in a grip, three rings, valued at nearly $1,500, which were stolen by a train employe; that the rings were adapted to her social position; that she was in the habit of wearing them at parties and receptions; that she was on her way to visit her daughter, who was attending school; and that she expected to attend a reception that evening, it was held that she was entitled to recover for the loss of the rings on the theory that they constituted baggage.22

In an action to recover for the loss of a ring valued at $150, there was evidence that the plaintiff and his wife were traveling together; that his wife always wore the ring and never had it off her hand before this occasion, except once, to have it repaired; that on this occasion she gave it to the plaintiff, because the stone was loose and she feared she would lose it; that she gave it to him, asking him to keep it in his pocketbook until they could get it fixed, and that they intended to have it fixed while on the trip. Held, that the ring was baggage.23

A passenger's trunk, in addition to clothing, contained a gold match box with diamond setting, valued at $260; an onyx ring, valued at $14; a pearl in diamond setting, of the value of $150; a scarf pin, valued at $38; a silver cross, valued at $2; a silver watch charm, value $6; cuff buttons, of the value of $45; and a plain gold match box, valued at $20. In an action against the railroad company to recover for the loss of said trunk and contents the question whether the enumerated articles constituted baggage was submitted to the jury by an instruction advising them that a passenger over any railroad was entitled to carry with him his baggage, which meant those articles of personal comfort, convenience, and adornment usually taken by a traveler on a journey or visit. The jury found that the articles were baggage, and on appeal such finding was upheld.24

A widow, sixty-nine years of age, who gave her occupation as that of housewife, who had made four trips to Europe for pleasure during the preceding ten years, who had been to California five or six times, who had traveled over Mexico and the greater part of the United States, who owned a home, and lived on her income, and who was in what some would call good

(23) Godfrey v. Pullman Co., 87 S. C. 361, 7 N. C. C. A. 976n.

(24) Robert v. Chicago & A, R. Co., 148 Mo. App. 96, 7 N. C. C. A. 974, 127 S. W. 925.

(27) St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Miller, 103 Ark. 37. (28) St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Dickerson, 29 Okla. 386. 118 Pac. 140. 7 N. C. C. A. 976n. (29) McCormick v. Hudson R. R. Co., 4 E. D. Smith 181.

(30) Toledo W. & W. R. Co. v. Hammond, 33 Ind. 379.

(31) Bruty v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 32 Upp. Can. (Q. B.) 66.

(32) Metz v. California S. R. Co., 85 Cal. 329, 9 L. R. A. 431.

(33) Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Meek, Tex. Civ. App. - 75 S. W. 317 (1903).

(34) Wells v. Great Northern R. Co., 59 Ore. 165. 1 N. C. C. A. 659. 114 Pac. 92.

(35) Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Swift, 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 282, 20 L. ed. 423.