ÆäÀÌÁö À̹ÌÁö
PDF
ePub

46.- -Temporary Separation.-Under Comp. Laws 1907, § 1206, while liability of husband for family expenses incurred by his wife may exist during a temporary separation, no liability can exist where the separation is permanent in its nature; no "family" then existing.-Berow v. Shields, Utah, 159 Pac. 538.

47.

Insurance-Assignment.-Where the charter of the insurer required the written indorsement of consent of its president and secretary to all assignments there could be no recovery on the theory that plaintiff was the assignee, where no written consent to an assignment was indorsed on the policy-Leonard V. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Monroe and Wayne Counties, Mich., 158 N. W. 1041.

48. -Benefit Society. A beneficial society acquired no title to excess dues paid by members pursuant to order of Court of Chancery providing that they are to be returned if determined by court to have been unlawfully exacted, and the court having SO determined.-Horner Heinecke, N. J., 98 Atl. 393.

V.

[blocks in formation]

em

50. Employers' Liability Policy.-In ployers' liability policy, provision requiring suit on policy within 90 days after judgment is "paid and satisfied" means when judgment is fully paid; cancellation of record not being necessary. -Philadelphia Pickling Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., N. J., 98 Atl. 433.

51. Funeral Benefits.-Where policy provides for weekly benefits for sickness or accidents and payment upon death of insured in consideration of weekly premium, provision that funeral benefit is weekly term insurance newable at option of insurer does not affect right of insured to continuance of the sickness and accident insurance.-National Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, Ga., 89 S. E. 633.

re

52. Liability.-Where plaintiff insured in mutual fire insurance company was in default when fire occurred, subsequent payment of dues to bank, having no knowledge of loss, which payment was not accepted by the company, did not render it liable.-Wolff v. German-American Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., Okla., 159 Pac. 480.

53. Proof of Death.-Where proofs of death are retained without condition or objection except to make additional demands which association had no authority to make, it waives any objections to the proofs.-Haskew v. Knights of Modern Maccabees, Okla., 159 Pac. 493.

54. Waiver.-Under policy of insurance, where defendant's agent with knowledge waived a condition against generation of gas in building, a subsequent change in the method without the insured's knowledge was not a breach which would avoid the policy.-Marx v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., Mich., 158 N. W. 1052.

Intoxicating Liquors-Instructions.-Re55. fusal of charge that "the mere having of a liquor license in one's possession or custody, where no liquors are found, is not a prima facie case" was proper, as not stating a correct proposition of law under Acts 1909, p. 84, § 221⁄2, making the payment of federal liquor license prima facie evidence.-Gibson v. State, Ala., 72 So. 569. 56.- -Possession of Liquor.-In prosecution for illegal retail liquor selling by statute there is a presumption of guilt arising from possession of a United States internal revenue license for retail sale of intoxicating liquor.-Montgomery v. State, Tenn., 188 S. W. 213.

57. Landlord and Tenant-Set-Off.-Action by cropper against landlord for proceeds of crop after payment of all advances made by defendant held an action ex contractu, permitting defendant to plead set-off of claims arising ex contractu.-Carswell v. Smith, Ga., 89 S. E. 698.

58. Unforeseen Accident.-The rule that a lessee cannot knowingly permit an inury from need of repairs that he might make with rent due lessor, and thus impose on lessor a loss greater than the repairs would have cost, does

not apply to unforeseen accident.-Boutte v. New Orleans Terminal Co., La., 72 So. 513.

59. Mandamus-Action.-Mandamus will lie to compel a county treasurer to pay a special claim out of a special fund, though an action would also lie against him for failure to make such payment.-Farson, Son & Co. v. Bird, Ala., 72 So. 550.

60. Board of Administration.-Duties of board vested with powers of auditor in respect to claims against the state may be controlled by the courts and compelled by writs of mandate.-U'Ren v. State Board of Control, Cal., 159 Pac. 615.

61. Evidence.-Mere ownership of proposed armory site gave relators no standing to invoke aid of writ of mandamus to compel board of freeholders of county to issue bonds to raise money to pay for the site, pursuant to P. L. 1913, p. 502.-Doremus v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Passaic County, N. J., 98 Atl. 390.

62. -Ministerial Duty. If board of park commissioners had performed its legal duty and authenticated demand of park engineer so that it would become liquidated, payment by city could be enforced only by mandamus.-Bloomshield v. Bay City, Mich., 158 N. W. 1043.

63. Ministerial Duty.-Where usual procedure involves allowance of claim by supervisors, mandamus lies to compel their observance of usual custom, although their action may not be necessary.Burr v. Board of Sup'rs of City and County of San Francisco, Cal., 159 Pac. 458.

64. Writ of Error.-A writ of mandamus may not be issued as a substitute for a writ of error or the right of appeal.-Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, Utah, 159 Pac. 541.

65.

Master and Servant-Course of Employment. Where defendant's chauffeur, after leaving defendant's wife and children at a circus, drove away in disobedience of specific instructions, and ran down plaintiff, held, that defendant was not liable, since the chauffeur was acting outside the scope of his employment.-Hill v. Staats, Tex., 187 S. W. 1039.

66. Course of Employment.-A deck hand who helped load and unload a barge at its termini held drowned in the course of his employment, where he fell off on a trip between such termini, although he had no duties to perform during the trip.-W. R. Rideout Co. v. Pillsbury, Cal., 159 Pac. 435.

67. Minor.-When Workmen's Compensation Act, § 2, is not intended by the employer to apply to a minor employe, the notice must be given to the parent or guardian of the minor. Notice posted in the works, or by means of the pay envelope, does not suffice.-Troth v. Millville Bottle Works, N. J., 98 Atl. 435.

68. Proximate Cause. A complaint under the common law, alleging that the injury sustained by plaintiff was the proximate result of the act of an incompetent fellow workman while in the discharge of a duty connected with his employment, which incompetency was known to defendant, was sufficient on demurrer.-Guiler v. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., Ala., 72 So. 498.

69. Respondeat Superior. A school, teaching automobile driving, is liable where its employe allows a student to operate a machine during an instruction trip, and his inexperience results in injury to plaintiff.-Easton v. United Trade School Contracting Co., Cal., 159 Pac. 597.

70. Respondeat Superior.-Where an appreciable interval intervenes between the acts of a railway employe in protection of company's property and an assault upon one sent away from the company's property, such assault will be deemed the personal act of the servant.Kinnomen v. Great Northern Ry. Co., N. D., 158 N. W. 1058.

[blocks in formation]

nership to build and sell houses, but each continued regular work aside from the joint adventure, the widow of a servant of the plumber, who employed regularly less than five men, could not base claim for compensation on partnership agency of the plumber and carpenter, so as to bring the number of employes within Workmen's Compensation Act, when such servant was killed in the plumber's individual service. Coady v. Igo, Conn., 98 Atl. 328.

73.- -Workmen's Compensation Act.-Testimony of plaintiff that loss of eye had impaired efficiency as workman because he could not gauge distances as well as before, is sufficient for finding of partial disability under Compensation Act.-Oliver v. Christopher, Kan., 159 Pac. 397.

74. Municipal Corporations-Evidence.--Evidence that other persons had previously stumbled, though they had not fallen, over the projection in a sidewalk on which plaintiff had tripped, causing her to fall, is competent both as notice to the city, and as characterizing the defect. Shugren v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 159 Pac. 530.

to

75.- -Extra Work.-Where a public improvement contract required extra work to be done only on written order, after agreement as cost, and provided that the contractor should get the dirt for an embankment from property owned or acquired by the defendant, the contractor could not, in the absence of written order, recover at law on the contract for extra haul from land afterwards acquired by defendant, if there was no fraud or mistake.-Mullins v. Kansas City, Mo., 188 S. W. 193.

76.-Liquidated Demand.-Where board of park commissioners authorized to employ an engineer at a per diem compensation declined to authenticate his demand, and common council, regarding such action as final, refused to allow it, the demand could be liquidated in no way except by suit.-Bloomshield v. Bay City, Mich., 158 N. W. 1043.

77. Public Improvement.-A taxpayer interested in an unsuccessful bidder for contract for public improvement, whose bid was lowest, suing to enjoin award to a higher bidder, could not claim that, because the specifications did not provide for comparison of devices to be offered, the council had no authority to investigate their merits in awarding the contract, where such unsuccessful bidder co-operated with the council | in making such comparisons.-West. v. City of Oakland, Cal., 159 Pac. 202.

78. Negligence-Instructions.-In action under federal Employers' Liability Act, where negligence of defendant and plaintiff concurred in producing injury, instruction that, if plaintiff was injured as alleged, he would be entitled to recover, if defendant's negligence "contributed in whole or in part to the injury," is not error.Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Paschal, Gal., 89 S. E. 620.

79. Nuisance-Offense to Morals. The act of causing women to exhibit their naked persons to the public for a general admission fee, although not a crime, is so detrimental to public morals and offensive to the senses as to constitute a public nuisance, and may be restrained by injunction.-Weis v. Superior Court of San Diego County, Cal., 159 Pac. 464.

80. Perpetuities Rule. - Under the rule against perpetuities the contingency for future vesting must arise within the required limits, if at all, and is determined by the possibilities, and not the probabilities.-Taylor v. Crosson, Del., 98 Atl. .375.

81. Physicians and Surgeons-Negligence.-A physician, recommending during his temporary absence another physician with whom he is not financially connected, is not liable for the latter's negligence or want of skill.-Stokes Long, Mont., 159 Pac. 28.

v.

ac

82. Principal and Agent-Evidence.-In tion for money received against agent contracting to collect accounts "subject to its schedule of charges," a schedule furnished at time of contracting was admissible.-Credit Clearing House v. Wheeland Co., Ga., 89 S. E. 634.

83. Husband and Wife.-The agency of a wife for a husband in the purchase of goods not

[blocks in formation]

85. Principal and Surety-Discharge.-Stipulation in note that time of payment may be extended without notice is met by one extension, and if more than one extension is given for valid consideration without consent of surety, surety is discharged.-Kremke v. Radamaker, Okla., 159 Pac. 475.

86. Stipulation.-Failure to obligee of paid surety's building contract bond to perform contract stipulation not to pay more than 85 per cent of the value of the work until completion defeats recovery on the bond only to the extent the surety has been injured thereby.-National Surety Co. v. Haley, Okla., 159 Pac. 292.

87. Railroads-Receivers.-Receivers of railroad, operating train on track of another company by mere license without lease, are not liable for killing of stock, resulting not from negligence in operation of train, but from omission to inclose road with lawful fence.-Lusk v. Eddington, Okla., 159 Pac. 491.

88. Receivers.-Receivers of a railroad company, having been in possession of the road for more than a year, are liable for injuries resulting from a defective culvert on the right of way, which existed before they entered into possession of the property.-Sheat v. Lusk, Kan., 159 Pac. 407.

89. Statutory Duty.-Negligence cannot be based on failure to ring bell and sound whistle, where plaintiff shows that while in safe position he knew train was approaching.-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Barton, Okla., 159 Pac. 250.

90. Sales-Acceptance.-Where defendant buyer, after ascertaining that ice cream freezers sold him on approval did not work satisfactorily, continued to use the brine tank and pump portions with his old freezers for six months, held sufficient to sustain a finding that he had accepted the entire apparatus.-Emery_Thompson Machine & Supply Co. v. Graves, Conn., 98 Atl. 331.

91.

-Express Warranty.-A printed warranty in a contract of sale, that the manufacturer of an automobile will replace defective parts broken or worn out within one year, is enforceable against the manufacturer only when he is a party to the contract.-Rittenhouse-Winterson Auto Co. v. Kissner, Md., 98 Atl. 361.

92. Implied Promise.-Where carrier failed to deliver fruit in time and the buyer refused it, having paid the seller, and the carrier returned fruit to the seller and the difference between price and value of the fruit, on return, there was an implied promise of the seller to repay the buyer on demand.-Manning v. Chesky, Conn., 98 Atl. 357.

93.- -Implied Warranty.-Where the law implies a warranty as to the soundness of a commodity, it cannot be defeated by showing that the defect was latent and unknown to the seller, or that he was not negligent in not ascertaining it.-Greenwood Cotton Mill v. Tolbert, S. C., 89 S. E. 653.

94. -Option.-Plaintiff sold defendant gasoline to be delivered in stated time, contract giving defendant option of ordering additional gasoline during its continuance. Held, that agreement to furnish additional gasoline was an enforceable option based on consideration.Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Progressive Gin Co., Okla., 159 Pac. 349.

95. Waiver. Where seller notified buyer it would not carry out contract, and buyer requested performance, stating he would buy in open market and hold seller for difference between market and contract price, breach is not waived. Tri-Bullion Smelting & Development Co. v. Jacobsen, U. S. C. C. A., 233 Fed. 646.

96.Waiver.-Where a buyer aware of fraud perpetrated upon him suggests, if he does not demand, a rescission, and on its refusal enters

into a new and modified agreement covering the subject-matter of the first contract, the new agreement waives the fraud.-Brown v. Domestic Utilities Mfg. Co., Cal., 159 Pac. 163.

97. Specific Performance Equity. Equity will not decree specific performance if the contract by accident or mistake fails to express the true agreement.-McChesney v. Smith, S. C., 89 S. E. 639.

Interest.-Covenant

by

98. Incorporeal grantee to open and construct public street and sidewalks in manner beneficial to covenantee, confers incorporeal interest in land and will be specifically enforced.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Nelson, Ga., 89 S. E. 693.

99. Indefiniteness.-In suit for specific performance of contract to lease land, complaint showing that defendant had contracted to sell to another, who was in possession adverse to plaintiff, is not demurrable as indefinite, though it does not set out the contract of sale.-Colm v. Francis, Cal., 159 Pac. 237.

100. Option.-An oil and gas lease providing for annual commutation payment in lieu of beginning operations, otherwise the lease to be void, was a mere option not entitling lessee to specific performance, at least until he had performed or placed himself in a position where he could be compelled to perform.-Warner v. Page, Okla., 159 Pac. 264.

101. Oral Agreement.-Equity will not decree specific performance of an oral agreement to execute a written contract, where such agreement was not within the statute of frauds and therefore enforceable at law.-Clark v. City of Bradford Gas & Power Corp., Del., 98 Atl. 368.

102. Subrogation-Surety.-A surety has the right, when paying a creditor, to take an assignment of the evidence of indebtedness, to enforce it against his principal, and, though no assignment is taken, the surety will, under the doctrine of subrogation, be deemed to have received such assignment.-Cooper v. Jewett, U. S. C. C. A., 233 Fed. 618.

103. Surety.-Where county retained state warranty for state aid road construction surety on contractors' bonds, having paid claims of creditors, had equity in them as against bank, which loaned money to the contractors, taking assignment of all sums due them, but failed to trace the money to payments on the work. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Washington Nat. Bank, Wash., 159 Pac. 689.

104. Taxation Collateral Inheritance Tax.A will providing for the payment of the net income to testator's widow "during her life, if she shall so long remain my widow," gave the widow a life estate which was properly assessed as such under the Collateral Inheritance Tax Act. -Stengel v. Edwards, N. J., 98 Atl. 424.

105. Tax Levy.-Tax levy made at proper time and place by majority of county board is not void for want for jurisdiction, though record recites that it was made by board of equalization.-Peterson V. Anderson, Neb., 158 N. W.

1055.

106. Telegraphs and Telephones-Rules and Regulations. Where defendant installed private and pay phones in plaintiff's place of business under an agreement to share with him the pay phone receipts, a rule, restricting the private phone's use to plaintiff, is reasonable, at least against its promiscuous use by others.-Johnson v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., Utah, 159 Pac. 526.

as

107. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names-Exclusive Rights.-Where cartoonist entered the employ of a newspaper publisher and operator of a syndicate, the publisher did not acquire, against the cartoonist, from the mere fact of employment, the exclusive right to the use of the title of the cartoons; reputation therefor having been acquired before the cartoonist entered his employ.-Star Co. v. Wheeler Syndicate, N. Y., 160 N. Y. Supp. 689.

108. Trusts-Parol Agreement.-Parol agreement to maintain the grantor during her life as sole consideration for the conveyance is in

sufficient to create an express trust.-Brindley v. Brindley, Ala., 72 So. 497.

109. Vendor and Purchaser-Contract. The vendor's agreement to render the purchaser an accounting "upon the final consummation of the purchase," according to the contract, does not make such accounting a necessary part of the vendor's offer of performance.-Schwerin Estate Realty Co. v. Slye, Cal., 159 Pac. 420.

110. Waters and Water Courses-Corporation. -Where an irrigation company has commercially valued capital stock and its articles declare its purpose to supply water to the public, it is a corporation for profit and not a mutual company so as to give its stockholders the right to casement in the water right which could not be divested by sale by the corporation.-Canyon Creek Irr. Dist. v. Martin, Mont., 159 Pac. 418.

111. Wills-Bequest.-A bequest of testator's "money in bank" includes time and savings deposits, as well as checking accounts.-Lyons v. Lyons, U. S. C. C. A., 233 Fed. 744.

112. Contract.-Under contract to make will in consideration of support, where devisee supported testators for 15 years till devisee's death, there was such substantial performance that equity will grant relief equivalent to specific performance, and fasten trust on property for heirs of beneficiary.-Torgerson v. Hauge, N. D., 159 N. W. 6.

113. Devise.-Under the will of one leaving two daughters as only heirs, devising one-third of realty to one daughter, and in case of her death without issue living over to the other daughter, and the residue to the latter, the contingent remainder of the latter on her death during the former's life, passed under her will, rather than to her heirs at law. (Per Watts and Gage, JJ.)—Du Bose v. Kell, S. C., 89 S. E. 555.

114. -Evidence.-In a suit contesting a will for mental incapacity, exclusion of testimony regarding a real estate transaction by testator is proper where it was not shown, nor offered to be shown, that the testator's conduct was abnormal. In re Ross' Estate, Cal., 159 Pac. 603.

115. Evidence.-The scrivener may be asked what were the relations between the testator and beneficiary at the time of executing the will, if tending to prove a condition, a fact always admissible when relevant and material and when the intent of the testator is doubtful. -Appeal of Scully, Conn., 98 Atl. 350.

116. Lapsed Legacy.-Where testator provided that the residue of his estate should be divided among the legatees in proportion to their moneyed legacies, and two of the legatees predeceased him, held, that their shares lapsed into the residue and did not become intestate property.-Allen v. Moore, N. J., 98 Atl. 420.

117. Limitation in Devise.-Where a devise of a fee simple is followed by condition that if the devisee should die without heirs the land should go to his sister, it is not impaired by such limitation where the devisee survives the testator, since to invoke the limitation, the devisee must die before the testator's death.Scruggs v. Mayberry, Tenn., 188 S. W. 207.

118. Power of Disposition.-A will leaving entire estate to widow during widowhood, with power of disposition for support of herself and children, gives power to mortgage only her interest and not the children's interest.-Sheffield v. Grieg, S. C., 89 S. E. 664.

119.- -Power of Disposition.-Where testator's will gave his wife a life estate with power of disposition which she must exercise in her lifetime, if at all, the wife's estate in the land was not enlarged into a fee.-State v. Gaughan, Ark., 187 S. W. 918.

120.- -Statute of Distributions.-A will, directing that residue be divided "among my heirs as may be directed by laws of the state," not otherwise defining heirs, divides it according to the statute of distributions, the widow taking a third as such an "heir," where she and some of testator's children survive him.— Gardner v. Horton, S. C., 89 S. E. 637.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., NOVEMBER 17, 1916.

DISCRIMINATION BY PUBLIC UTILITY IN
FAVOR OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

of their burdens. In the absence of legislation upon the subject, such discriminations cannot be held illegal as matter of law without overturning the foundation upon which the rule itself is built."

There is then quoted from a case by New York Court of Appeals holding to be binding and not against public policy a contract by a telephone company to maintain without charge telephones in the public offices of a city. N. Y. Telephone Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 202 N. Y. 511, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 560.

By contract made in 1886, a city in Maine was to pay to a water company twenty annual payments for a specified number of hydrants and no more, and for water for defined city purposes. Taxes, that might be assessed against the water company, should be taken as the equivalent for the latter. The water company was granted the right to dig up streets for laying of pipes and to fix and collect water rates. City of Belfast v. Belfast Water Co., 98 Atl. 738, decided by Maine Supreme Judicial Court. This contract was carried out faithfully on both sides until January, 1916, when the water company advised the city that the contract was il-poration, whatever advantage the par

legal and that from and after April, 1916, it would recognize it no longer, unless arrangements were made for fair comI ensation for hydrants and for supplying the city with water. Thereupon the above case came up under a bill to enjoin the water company, under the circumstances, from taking the threatened course.

Among other reasons given by the court for sustaining the injunction prayed for, it was said: "Free service to the public is not at common law unreasonably, and, therefore, unlawfully discriminatory. The law against unreasonable discrimination rests on public policy. It is forbidden, because it is opposed to the interest of the public, which requires that all should be treated alike. under like circumstances. Discriminations, however, in favor of the public are not opposed to public policy, because they relieve the people generally of part

It was said in that case that: "Discriminating contracts between public utility corporations and their patrons, which are held to be void as inimical to the public good are so held because unreasonable advantage is thereby given to one customer or a class over others, whereas all have a moral and legal right to equality of treatment. In case of the contract being between a private corporation and the state or other public cor

ticular customer has over general customers obviously inures to the benefit of the former in the aggregate. In other words, in the ultimate there is no discrimination which is inimical to the public good and hence no violation of public policy."

It seems to be true that while at common law there is merely the requirement that a public utility shall give service to every applicant for fair compensation, but it is not true that all shall be charged the same rate. It has been left to statute to declare, that there shall be a uniform rate to all under like circumstances. Is it, therefore, true, that where a general statute declares that no discrimination shall be shown between customers, courts may reason out an exception in favor of the state or any of the divisions of a state?

States have a business as distinguished from a governmental capacity. When

they enter into contracts not in their sovereign capacity they are treated like individuals. With municipalities of a state the same rule applies.

It may be true that it is hard to discern where a less rate in favor of a city than to an individual or to a private corporation might work any detriment to other customers of a public utility. But there is something else to care for in compelling uniform rates between customers, than the advantage one customer might obtain over another. It is the duty of the state to conserve the ability of a public utility so it may not only presently serve customers, but that it shall continue to be able to serve the public.

en

This double aspect, then, may make the requirement as to a uniform rate to all a sort of promise to owners of a public utility, that it always shall be forced. In this way, it becomes not only a limitation on the power of a public service corporation in favor of people generally, but also a guaranty in favor of owners. If rates were fixed in view of free or less charge to the public this would be all right. But you cannot add free service. to the public where rates have already been prescribed.

Furthermore, a state is not the absolute owner of the privileges it gives to a public service company, but but it holds these privileges in trust for the people generally. It must, therefore, treat companies exercising these privileges according to a trust relation. They must be allowed to conduct their business with their customers according to their normal manner of dealing with them and not as possibly influenced by contracts which may cause them a loss. It surely would not look right to charge the state more than they would a private individual. Why should they be allowed to charge it less?

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

ADMIRALTY

MARITIME TORT ONLY WHEN CONSUMMATION WITHIN JURISDICTION. In Gordon v. Drake, 159 N. W. 340, decided by Supreme Court of Michigan, it was held, that where one on a boat was told by the captain to "jump" and was injured by jumping and falling on a wharf, there was no jurisdiction in admiralty, though the boat was in navigable waters.

This was upon the principle that in admiralty it is the locality and not the origin of injury or the main part thereof, which gives jurisdiction. Does this principle rightly embrace this kind of a case?

The court cites a case of a bale of cotton falling from ship's tackle upon party on wharf; and also a case where one descending a defective ship ladder was injured by being thrown on a wharf, and it must be admitted that holding these cases not to be within admiralty jurisdiction strongly points to the same ruling in the instant case. But for one to jump in an emergency is the same thing as to be struck and caused to fall. If the plaintiff had been given a blow, which knocked him from a ship to a wharf, and he were injured immediately by the blow, there would seem to be a real consummation on the ship and the added injury on the wharf was a natural consequence -not, so to speak, a consummation. In any other way you would have to split up jurisdiction.

This case is not precisely like the cases cited. In the latter the negligence is in insufficient working appliances and the more or less remote consequence is injury in another place. In the former, the injury is the direct result of a tortious act.

RAILROADS-INJURY TO EMPLOYE ON INTERSTATE TRAIN CHARTERED BY CIRCUS.-In Mancher v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 159 N. W. 422, decided by Nebraska Supreme Court, the question arose whether or not a contract with a circus company came under federal or state law so as to determine whether the former law controlled as to exemption of carrier from all liability to employes of the circus company.

The court said: "If the contracts fell within the federal statute they are void because they undertake to exempt the carrier from all liability, but this was not a contract for the transportation of a mere piece of inanimate freight. It was a contract for the transportation of a person in whose life and safety the state has an

« ÀÌÀü°è¼Ó »