74. Book Keeping.-A book wherein the owner of a pool hall entered the amounts of money taken in, amounts paid out, and the amounts placed in the safe each day, was a compliance with his policy of burglary insurance requiring him to keep books showing the money on hand.-Gueringer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, Mo., 184 S. W. 936.

75. Stipulations.-Where fidelity bond stipulates against liability unless default occurs before expiration of bond and is discovered within one year after expiration, and that no suit shall be maintained unless within one year from claim thereunder, surety is not liable for default not discovered until nine years after expiration of bond, though action is then brought at once.-Third Nat. Bank of Columbus V. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, Ga., 88 S. E. 584.

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76. Intoxicating Liquors-Alcohol.-Alcohol is an "intoxicating liquor" within Rev. St. 1909, § 7222, though not specifically mentioned such.-State v. Nicolay, Mo., 184 S. W. 1183. 77-Local Option.-The state, on a trial of a violation of the local option law, need not show that notice of the result of a local option election was given, but the fact that notice was not given is a matter of defense.-State v. Fulton. Mo., 184 S. W. 938.

78. Landlord and Tenant-Eviction.-Nothing but a surrender, a release, a waiver, or an eviction can wholly or partly absolve a tenant from the obligation of his covenant to pay rent. In re Mullings Clothing Co., U. S. D. C., 230 Fed. 681.

73. Libel and Slander-Evidence. In action for slanderous words by attorney in judicial proceeding, evidence of slanderous remarks by plaintiff concerning defendant in same proceeding are admissible on question of malice and provocation in mitigation of damages.-La Porta V. Leonard, N. J., 97 Atl. 251.

be

Mandamus-Discretion.-Mandamus ing an extraordinary writ, with prerogative features, and not a writ of right, a strong case must be presented to coerce action by a judge, the presumption being that he has done his duty.-J. B. B. Coal Co. v. Halbert, Ky., 184 S. W. 1116.

$1-Discretion.-Since mandamus is a discretionary writ, the court will not order its issue in a case wherein it appears that the order of the state board of equalization is invalid as taking property without due process of law, or for any other reason.-People v. Pitcher, Colo., 156 Pac. 812.

$2. Master and Servant-Assumption of Risk. While a servant who works underneath a traveling crane, newly installed and not yet completed, assumes the risks ordinarily incident to the completion thereof, he does not assume risks created by the negligence of master in the prosecution of such Hayes v. Berry, Mo., 184 S. W. 913.

his work.

83.-Workmen's Compensation Act.-Where the employing city compensated the servant's widow for his wrongful death in full for all claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act,

her cause of action against the tort-feasor who caused his death passed to the city and became its property, with which it might deal as it chose. Saudek v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., Wis., 157 N. W. 579.

84. Evidence.-That a boy was wearing the uniform of a telegraph company is sufficient to establish his employment by the company at the time he ran into plaintiff's wife.-Phillips v. Western Union Tel. Co., Mo., 184 S. W. 958.

85. Proximate Cause.-Where a brakeman on alighting slipped on icy ground and, being overbalanced by an appliance held in one hand, in order to regain his balance, stepped toward the track on which a switch engine was being negligently operated, and was struck, held, that the negligence of the engineer was the proximate cause of his injury.-Rockhold v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., Kan., 156 Pac. 775.

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86. Respondeat Superior.-Railroad ploye who worked drying sand for use on locomotives could not recover for physical injuries occasioned by his having become overheated at work.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sawyers, Ky., 184 S. W. 1123.

87.Violation of Statute.-The violation of a statute prohibiting employment of boys under 14 years of age in coal mines is the proximate cause of an injury when it is a natural, probable and anticipated consequence of the nonobservance of the statute.-Griffith v. American Coal Co of Allegheny County, W. Va., 88 S. E. 595.

88. Mortgages Community Property.-A deed of community property made by a husband on the parol trust that the guarantee should pay debts of the husband, held not to be regarded as a mortgage given as security for the payment of the debt due the grantee or the other debts.-Bier v. Leisle, Cal., 156 Pac. 870.

89.- -Removal of Crop.-Where a crop had been removed from the land before its sale under a deed of trust which did not cover the growing crops, the purchaser at the sale did not acquire the crop.-Stuttgart Rice Mill Co. v. Reinsch, Ark., 184 S. W. 836.

90. Municipal Corporations-Injunction.--An injunction to restrain the ultra vires or illegal acts of municipal corporations or official officers will not be granted unless it appears that the taxpayer would be injured by the acts complained of.-Williams v. City of Baltimore, Md., 97 Atl. 140.

91.- Notice.-Though a city charter provided for notice to adjacent property owners before commencing construction of a sewer, such notice having been omitted when a sewer was constructed, an amendment to the charter, realty for sewers after their construction, held thereafter made, providing for levy on adjacent within the legislative power, curing such want of notice.-Phipps v. City of Medford, Ore., 156 Pac. 787.

92.

Negligence-Child.-Where a young child, accompanied by its parents, was killed in a passenger elevator, its was not negligence that both parents did not guard it.-Howard v. Scarritt Estate Co., Mo., 184 S. W. 1144.

93. Nuisance-Equity.-A reasonable apprehension of damage, or a danger which is apparent and real, as distinguished from an imaginary fear of injury, from an alleged nuisance, may warrant equitable relief.-Phipps v. Rogue River Valley Canal Co., Ore., 156 Pac. 794. 94. Parent and Child-Emancipation.-A parent permitting his son when to leave home about 18 years of age upon an agreement that the son was to have all his earnings, make his own contracts, and receive his own wages, thereby emancipated the son.-Holland v. Hartley, N. C., 88 S. E. 507.

95. Partition-Evidence.-Though

a parcel

of land exceeded the alleged 80 acres, yet, where the court directed the commissioners to set off of respective interests a the parties, report showing that a number of acres were set off to appellant and a larger number to appellee, who owned a greater interest, shows that all the land was partitioned according to the parties' interests. Burger v. Schnaus, Ind., 112 N. E. 246.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., JULY 21, 1916.

TERM OF EMPLOYMENT UNDER A "SATISFACTION CONTRACT."

If the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals construes New York decision correctly, and it cites a great abundance of New York cases in support of its view, a supposed definite term of employment, subject to performance of his duties by employe, seems little, if any, better than employment for an indefinite period, so far as employe is concerned. See American Music Stores v. Kussel, 232 Fed. 306.

But making the contract operative against an employe so as to make him liable to employer for quitting his service before his term of employment has ended, might not be deemed unilateral as to this feature, because consideration for his agreement would be found in his being employed at all. A contract must be regarded or not as unilateral in a general way and not merely because a right to one party has no correlative or offset right in the other in regard to particular features in a contract. The contract being one thing, cannot be split up into fragments to find corresponding rights and obligations as to each and everything in it.

Nevertheless, we cannot imagine any class of contracts more subject to the rule of taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances for the proper construction of the contract than is this.

For example, suppose the employer is an individual and not a corporation. The employe might be supposed perfectly willing to agree that the employer may express and make effective his expression of dissatisfaction. But if the employer is a corporation and its agents may be changed at any moment, it might not be thought reasonable for the employe to agree to abide by any unknown agent's expression of dissatisfaction.

The personal feature often cuts a figure in interpretation of contracts and, even if a corporation might be supposed to contract in every way just like an individual, yet the personality of one and that of the other might be looked to as aids in construction.

Pursuing this thought, we get around to Lord Coke's statement that a corporation has no soul, and it may be thought that he would not have said this, unless he meant to distinguish it from an individual in business, a corporation being wholly non-existent except in a business way. If it has no soul, it has no discretion except as controlled by policy. An individual employe may be looked to whose policy is controlled by his conscience and this the employe is willing to trust.

But the case we are here considering must admit a distinction in the cases which call for service by a servant upon a contract of employment for a stated time, with a satisfaction clause therein, and a contract for a piece of work with a similar clause.

Thus, after the court citing numerous master and servant cases decided by New York courts, in which honest dissatisfaction. by employer was held sufficient reason for discharge, also says that the principle decided in mere contract for particular work, decided also in New York cases, is not in conflict with rulings in the master and servant cases, notwithstanding that such dissatisfaction did not control. In the former, the work was completed and awaited acceptance, in the other there was arrest of further performance.

But it is not stated by the court that the terms of the contracts in either class were of an ambiguous nature so as to permit inquiry into an expression of dissatisfaction being a pretext or not. The circumstances, however, of a contract for complete performance of a piece of work were to be inquired into as to its reasonableness, notwithstanding its positive terms.

We have alluded above to unilateral features in a contract, notwithstanding the contract in which they find place is not unilateral. We think this view is right, but at

the same time, these features give occasion to inquire into reasonableness. Both master and servant are supposed, if one does, to contract for a definite period of employment. If anything interferes with this general purpose it should have more than the whim, fancy or pleasure of the one not in express terms bound to rest upon. The courts seem to admit the dissatisfaction must be real and it does not seem to violate any rule of right to compel one to show reasonable ground for his dissatisfaction. The burden of proof ought to be on him.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

CONTEMPT-TRIAL FOR WHEN NOT COMMITTED IN THE FACE OF THE COURT. -In Appeal of Verdon, 97 Atl. 783, decided by New Jersey Supreme Court, there is an interesting review of contempt of court not committed in its presence and whether it was contempt of a court of law or a court of equity, all of this is so far as the common law is concerned, as to which statutory modification is to be construed as a law in derogation thereof.

There is quotation from Blackstone that "This process of attachment (for contempt) is merely intended to bring the party into .court; and when there he must either stand committed or put to bail in order to answer upon oath to such interrogatories as shall be administered to him for the better information of the court with respect to the circumstances of the contempt. *** If the party can clear himself upon oath he is discharged, but if perjured may be prosecuted. After the party in contempt has answered the interrogations, his answer may be contradicted and disproved by affidavits of the adverse party, whereas in courts of law the admission of the party to purge himself by oath is more favorable to his liberty, though perhaps not less dangerous to his conscience; for if he clears himself by his answers, the complaint is totally dismissed. This method of examining the delinquent himself upon oath with regard to the contempt alleged has by immemorial usage now become the law of the land." 4 Bl. Com., p. 287. See also to the same effect, Ch. J. Kent in Jackson v. Smith, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 117.

This ruling was made in a case where a trial court called witnesses and heard evidence other than upon answer to interrogatories of respondent who stood mute in the trial, except that he offered to purge himself or to attempt to purge himself upon answer to interrogatories to be exhibited. None was exhibited but conviction was pronounced upon such other evidence. This conviction was reversed without remand.

It is said that no New Jersey statute has changed this common law practice, but the court speaks of the mildness, not to say ineffectiveness of law courts of England dealing with contempt compared with the severity of its criminal law in many respects. But they did not regard this procedure as punishing a criminal offense. Under Magna Charta this must be proceeded against by indictment. It was said the procedure in this form, for contempt "was justified upon the somewhat sophistical ground that the taking of such an oath by the defendant was not the giving of testimony, because, if there was no trial, there could be no testimony, and henee the defendant was not a witness." But suppose he refused to answer interrogatories? Then perhaps he could be punished for being refractory or ob structing justice.

But, if there is no statute modifying the common law, how would procedure be in courts abolishing all distinction between courts of law and courts of equity? We imagine procedure would be accordingly as a contemnor had offended in a case where a common law right or equitable relief was sought.

CRIMINAL

LAW-SUGGESTION OF INFERENCE AS EXPRESSION OF OPINION.— The poverty of the printed record as compared with the presence of witnesses before a court is suggested in the report of the case of State v. Matthews, 97 Atl. 824, decided by Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

This was a prosecution for the sale of intoxicating liquor, old cider being seemingly a beverage of intoxicating nature. Defendant claimed to have sold vinegar and not old cider. Evidence showed defendant was asked by the purchaser if he had any old cider and he replied, "No, but he had some vinegar." The court asked a witness: "Was it old cider which the respondent may have called vinegar with a twinkle in his eye?" Of this interrogatory appellant particularly complained.

The Supreme Court said: "But we think that expression was nothing more than a suggestion

to the jury, for their consideration, of the possibility that, even if respondent in answer to Marshall's inquiry for old cider, called what he sold him vinegar, nevertheless he did not mean it and so indicated to Marshall." The court then goes on to argue that it was plain from the evidence that this was what was meant, because otherwise Marshall, who was after old cider, would not have bought three gallons of what he was told was vinegar and use it as a Leverage.

The court then says: "It is the authoritative expression of an opinion as to an issue of fact arising in the case which the statute prohibits and not the suggestion of an obvious inference from admitted facts and circumstances, made to assist the jury in coming to a clear understanding of the law and the evidence." But is it not indulging in refinement to say a court may suggest an inference from facts, when it is for the jury without any suggestion to say what the facts themselves mean? What chance, indeed, had the defendant's claim to a sale of vinegar in the face of such a suggestion by the ourt. Why not rather suppose they seized this suggestion as a joke and carried their apprehension into their verdict?

APPEAL AND LRROR--REDUCTION OF DAMAGES BY EXCLUSION OF INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE.- In Slack v. Joyce, 158 N. W. 310, decided by Wisconsin Supreme Court, there appears a salutary ruling for the ending of litigation that well may be commend1, though made in a suit for the recovery of Unliquidated damages arising out of the commission of a tort.

In this case there was no claim that any !judice or bias infuenced the verdict in favor patit or that the mind of the court was shocked, or that any accurate measurement ad be Lade as to the damage shown by the tent and the incompetent evidence. The facts show that plaintiff was injured by Ving ran into by an automobile and afterwards Galracted typhoid fever. The proof to show ut the fever resulted from the injury was held bolly insuffieint. The verdict was for $725,

The court said: "In view of the fact that the eid me was not sufficient to warrant the jury la dig that the disease contract. d by plain

es coed by the injury, the damages are ective. We have therefore concluded to give Qu'in the option to take judgment for $400 Carges, and in case of his failure to so elect trial is ordered.”

As the court left the question of such a result to the jury there is no certainty it did not take it into account at all, and nothing to show that it did. The verdict, then, was not rendered upon a certain showing of proof at all and when the Supreme Court undertakes to render what should have been a proper finding, it indulges in something of the same kind of surmise or conjecture which it says the jury should not use. Nevertheless, it is well to bring litigation to a conclusion, even though on strict principle this may seem impossible to do.

STATUS OF ARMED MERCHANTMEN.

So long as nations appeal to war to settle their differences, so long are there bound to be perplexing questions between helligerents and neutrals. And as the relations between nations become ever more and more involved, so do these questions become ever more intricate. The belligerent will ever seek to crush his foe by every means at his disposal and history has shown that the shutting off of commercial relations has been the most effective means. A nation compelled to live entirely upon its own resources is a nation doomed to defeat in th end. Not generally because it cannot obtain munitions of war, but because it is unable to recruit its armies by withdrawing men from the pursuits of agriculture and in lustry. The neutral's interests thus ecome directly opposed to those of the telligerent. He seeks to maintain his existing trade and increase it. He looks with dis favor upon any interruption of what he re gards his rights. This is not because of any favoritism but it is a purely business proposition, and there is no friendship in business. The words of Grotius will always remain true, "One party defenling the rig orous rights of war; the other the fre doma of commerce."

The latest point of difference between a belligerent and a neutral in the pres n'