a general plan, are not entitled to enforce covenants against other grantees, and the grantors having disposed of all land in the neighborhood, no one can enforce the resrtictions.-Dime Savings Bank of Brooklyn v. Butler, N. Y., 160 N. Y. Sup. 954.

44. Deeds Restrictions. -A restriction in lots sold as part of a general scheme to create a residential section, that "but one dwelling house shall be erected thereon," held to define the use of the dwelling, and not to permit of more than one dwelling under a single roof.Powers v. Rodding, Mass., 113 N. E. 782.

45. Divorce-Cohabitation.-Evidence of the breaking of matrimonial cohabitation and living separately is not sufficient evidence of intention to desert without cause to warrant divorce for willful desertion and abandonment.Crouch v. Crouch, W. Va., 90 S. E. 235.

46. Community Property.-Under Civ. Code, $146, subd. 1, it is not improper where a husband obtains divorce for his wife's extreme cruelty to award him more than one-half of the community property, though the wife was hard worker.-Thomsen v. Thomsen, Cal., 159 Pac. 1054.

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47. Estoppel.-Where plaintiff was denied a divorce but her husband was granted a divorce, and plaintiff voluntarily accepted payment of the alimony awarded, she is estopped to appeal from the judgment.-Yates v. Yates, Okla., 159 Pac. 1107.

48. Instructions.-In a wife's divorce suit, instruction that the husband's dishonesty towards employer could be considered on her charge of cruelty, though it furnished no ground for divorce in itself, was improper.-Anglin v. Anglin, Ga., 90 S. E. 73.

parties

49. Matrimonial Domicile.-Where married in one state there establish a matrimonial domicile, which is retained by one spouse, innocent of any marital wrong, and abandoned by the guilty party, the courts of the state of matrimonial domicile have jurisdiction of the marriage relation, and can adjudicate respecting it on grounds recognized by the laws of that state, although the other spouse has left that jurisdiction and cannot be reached by formal process. Perkins v. Perkins, Mass., 113 N. E. 841.

50. Domicile Residence.-The term "residence" means a settled or fixed abode of a character indicating permanency, at least for an indefinite time, the home to which when one is absent, he has the intention of returning.— Jones v. Resor, Okla., 160 Pac. 58.

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51. Drains-Drainage District. Though notice of meeting for preliminary inspection for drainage district was given, that is immaterial, where the assessment was duly ratified and confirmed at a subsequent meeting regularly called and held in accordance with statute.-Middle Canal Co. v. Whitley, N. C., 90 S. E. 1.

52. Easements-Burden of Proof.-One disputing a prescriptive easement is entitled to the instruction that as to continuity of use the claimant must prove such repeated acts of such character and at such intervals as afford a sufficient indication to the owner that the right of way was claimed.—Dartnell v. Bidwell, Me., 98 Atl. 743.

53. Electricity-Negligence. In erection and maintenance of its trolley wires carrying heavy currents of electricity, across a space over which telephone wires were strung, electric railway company is bound to make effective provision against communication of current to the telephone wires.-Edmonds v. Monongahela Valley Traction Co., W. Va., 90 S. E. 230.

one

54. Executors and Administrators-Survey of Land. Where a tract is devised part to person and part to another, the executors cannot have a survey made and deeds recorded at the expense of the estate, but this is for such devisees to do, if desired, at their own expense. In re Winston, N. C., 90 S. E. 201.

55. Factors-Estoppel.-Where the consignors of cotton to a firm of factors did not participate in an arrangement whereby the firm stored the cotton in a warehouse, taking blanket warehouse receipts which it pledged for loans in accordance with a custom of the vicinity, the consignors were not bound by estoppel

57.

-Husband and Wife.-A husband's creditors having constructive notice of his deed to his wife, in consideration of prior indebtedness, or because it equitably belonged to her, it is, as against their claims for subsequent loans to the husband, at least, not fraudulent.-State Bank of Deep River v. Wolford, Iowa, 159 N. W. 572.

58. -Mingling Goods.-That live stock of debtor was mingled with that of his sons and sold by them does not give creditors right of action against sons to set aside transfer as fraudulent.-Scholle v. Finnell, Cal., 159 Pac.

1179.

59. Reservation in Deed.-A reservation in a trust agreement to the grantor or his family of an advantage inconsistent with the purposes of the conveyances is ordinarily evidence of fraud, but not where it is consistent with the nature of the transfer.-Petrie v. Wyman, N. D., 159 N. W. 616.

60. Guaranty Continuing. A continuing guaranty is one which is not limited to a single transaction, but which contemplates a future course of dealing covering a series of transactions, as to which the guarantor has not bound himself for a definite period, and the consideration for which is divisible.-Ricketson v. Lizotte, Vt., 98 Atl. 801.

61. Guardian and Ward Jurisdiction.-A

sale of minor's land under order of the county court by a guardian cannot be attacked in ejectment by evidence that the guardian at the time of appointment was a minor; the county court as to such matter being one of general jurisdiction and the attack being collateral.Johnson v. Johnson, Okla., 159 Pac. 1121.

62. Insurance Application.-Statement in application for health insurance, "I am in sound condition," held, under Revisal 1905, § 4808, not to vitiate policy, though insured had hernia, unless serious enough to affect his soundness.— Hines v. New England Casualty Co., N. C., 90 S. E. 131.

63. Breach of Warranty.-Fact that party assured against loss by theft had had similar policy from another company withdrawn before issuance of his policy, which, in a schedule, warranted that he had no burglary insurance and had made no application therefor, held not breach of warranty.-Goldberg V. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., N. Y., 160 N. Y. Sup. 1089.

64. Change of Beneficiary.-Under Code Iowa, § 1789, authorizing change of beneficiary at the pleasure of insured, by-law requiring consent of association to change of beneficiary is invalid.-Garrett v. Garrett, Cal., 159 Pac. 1050.

65. Limiting Liability.-Clause in accident policy, limiting liability, "if the member shall carry other accident insurance," covers life of policy, and if, without notice to the insurer, the insured takes out another policy, the beneficiary can recover only the proportional value of the policy.-Dustin v. Interstate Business Men's Acc. Ass'n, S. D., 159 N. W. 395.

66. -Vested Right.-Where surviving wife died intestate before she actually had possession of her share of insurance fund arising from her deceased husband's policies, her administrator had the right to sue for and collect it.-German-American Trust Co. v. Ten Winkel. Colo., 160 Pac. 188.

67. Waiver. Where fire policy requires preliminary proofs of loss, a denial of liability by insurer waives performance of act prescribed. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. c. Fields, Ind., 113 N. E. 756.

loss, that insured furnish a sworn statement thereof, he need not do so if the insurer absclutely denies liability.-Kutschenreuter v. Prov idence Washington Ins. Co., Wis., 159 N. W. 552.

69.

Landlord and Tenant-Nuisance.-Where doors over an opening in a sidewalk from which stairs lead to the basement were properly constructed and in proper condition, the owner was not liable as for maintaining a nuisance to one injured by falling therein when the lessee had the doors open.-Dammeyer v. Vorhis, Ind., 113 N. E. 764. defendant

70. Larceny-Loan.-That quired possession through a loan of a mule in furtherance of a fraud, intending to steal it, would constitute larceny, and, instead of having a temporary possessory right as a gratuitous bailee, his holding would be tortious, and he would be a tresspasser ab initio.-Savage v. State, Ala., 72 So. 694.

71. Libel and Slander-Libel per se. As a general rule, when language is published concerning a person or his affairs, which, from its nature, necessarily must, or presumably will, as its natural and proximate consequence, occasion him pecuniary loss, its publication is libelous per se.-Hughes v. Samuels Bros., Iowa, 159 N. W. 589.

72.- -Oral Utterance. To render oral utterance nonactionable on ground hearers did not understand colloquium to charge offense conveyed by the words spoken, it must be shown that the words were not intended to impute the offense they ordinarily convey, and understanding of witnesses cannot control.-M.

v. J, Wis., 159 N. W. 551.

73. Slander per se.-Spoken of a lawyer, the words, "He does not practice the law, because he has been disbarred," constitute a slander per se.-Tim v. Hawes, N. Y., 160 N. Y. Sup. 1096.

74. Licenses Vehicles.-The legislature may impose a wheelage tax on vehicles and provide that the proceeds shall be used to maintain and repair highways.-Park v. City of Duluth, Minn., 159 N. W. 627.

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coun

75. Mandamus—Appeal and Error.-On peal from award of a peremptory writ of mandamus on overruling demurrer and motion to quash, requiring a city comptroller to tersign a warrant for refund of an excessive personal property tax, the case will not be reversed merely to enable the city to plead as a defense that plaintiff unlawfully concealed assessable property, since the city has its remedy by reassessing such omitted property.State v. Kotecki, Wis., 159 N. W. 583.

76. Evidence. Where moderator and clerk of a caucus testify that they cannot conscientiously say that petitioner for mandamus to compel them to make certificate of nomination under oath received majority of votes cast and is entitled to a certificate, where a teller took away the ballots cast for the opposing candidate, petition for mandamus will be denied.Davis v. Pendleton, R. I., 98 Atl. 803.

77. Marriage Infant.-A female, married under the age of 18, has the right, on attaining that age, to confirm or disaffirm the marriage and sue for annulment, but, having once elected, cannot change her decision.-Terrky v. Terrky, N. Y., 160 N. Y. Sup. 1016.

78. Master and Servant-Assumption of Risk. -Under Federal Employers' Liability Act, § 4, in action against railroad by its employe for injuries in interstate commerce, doctrine of assumed risk applies, and has same effect as at · common law; i. e., employe does not assume negligence of the master unless he knew of it or must have known of it.-Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Fitts, Tex., 188 S. W. 528.

79. Assumption of Risk. In action under Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908 and amendments, for injury to experienced car repairer from striking plunger of defective drawbar without instructions to strike plunger, held that he assumed the risk and could not recover. Gaines v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada, Mich., 159 N. W. 542.

83.

-Workmen's Compensation Act.-A restaurant dishwasher, upon whom, while at work, the ceiling fell, due to overload of stored goods on the upper floor, over which the master had no control, received an injury "arising out of the employment."-Kimbol v. Industrial Accident Commission, Cal., 160 Pac. 150.

84.-Workmen's Compensation Act.-Under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 12(a), engineer of tugboat who was drowned in making his way to a boat after having, through mistake in its location, gone on another boat to reach his vessel, held not killed in course of his employment, so no compensation could be allowed. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, Cal., 159 Pac. 1041.

85. Monopolies-Patents.-Under the Clayton Bill, a contract whereby one having a patent monopoly for the manufacture of motion picture projecting machines required purchasers to refrain from using films manufactured by competitors of the patentee of the machines is invalid.-Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., U. S. C. C. A., 235 Fed. 398.

86. Mortgages Substituted Deed.-The owner of land executed a security deed, and later sold the land, and holder of security deed surrendered it and received a new one from the purchaser; held that the first security deed was canceled and all rights were eliminated therefrom.-Jordan v. Bullard, Ga., 90 S. E. 41. 87. Municipal Corporations Extraordinary Care. Drivers at crossings must be highly vigilant and maintain control so that they can stop vehicles so as to prevent danger to pedestrians, but between crossings they are not held to the same high standard of care, though they must be constantly on the lookout.-Virgilio v. Walker, Pa., 98 Atl. 815.

88. Infant.-The court could not say as matter of law that girl six years of age was, or was not, old enough to be capable of exercising some care in crossing street used by automobiles; that being for the jury.-Meserve v. Libby, Me., 98 Atl. 754.

89. Injunction.-The construction by a railroad of a high embankment over part of a borough street which has been recognized by the borough as a public street or used as such by the public, though never formally laid out, will be permanently enjoined.-Mill Village Borough v. Nypano R. Co., Pa., 98 Atl. 779.

90. License.-Laws 1909, c. 113, § 4, subd. 2, providing that every motor vehicle while in use shall be equipped with front lamps showing white lights and a red tail light, applies only to vehicles in use and not to a dead motor car being hauled through the street by another car.-Musgrave v. Studebaker Bros. Co. of Utah, Utah, 160 Pac. 117.

91. Negligence.-That person injured by automobile was not an ordinary pedestrian, but a workman on the street, should be considered in measuring his negligence.-Cecola v. 44 Cigar Co., Pa., 98 Atl. 775.

92.

-Special Assessment.-Under Code Supp. 1913, § 791i, rendering liable to special assessment for street improvements, the right of way of any railroad fronting or abutting upon a street, a railroad carrying passengers and freight, operating over 20-foot strip in middle of street, and having fee in such strip, held liable to assessment.-Des Moines City Ry. Co. v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 159 N. W. 450.

93.- -Statutory Violation.-It is negligence per se for one to drive an automobile in violation of the statute law.-Taylor v. Stewart, N. C., 90 S. E. 134.

Instruments.

96. Negligence- - Dangerous Handle of valve used to flush toilets is not so reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made as to require manufacturer to make it carefully under penalty of liability to persons other than immediate purchaser for injuries from failure to perform such duty through using defective material.Byers v. Flushovalve Co., N. Y., 160 N. Y. Sup. 1050.

97. Proximate Cause.-Recovery for death of minor child drowned in water-filled vault at rear of defendant's lot, held properly denied; it not appearing that children frequented such place. Selve v. Pilosi, Pa., 98 Atl. 723.

98. Officers-Negligence. It is no defense to an action on official bond of a public officer having the custody of public moneys that it was lost without fault or neglect on his part.Trustees of Village of Bath v. McBride, N. Y., 113 N. E. 789, 219 N. Y. 92.

99. Payment-Duress.-Duress by threat of imprisonment sufficient to warrant recovery of money paid thereunder must provoke fear sufficient to overcome the will of a man of ordinary firmness and constancy, and it is important in determining sufficiency of the acts to show duress, whether a precept has been issued.-Campbell v. Chabot, Me., 98 Atl. 746. 100. Physicians and Surgeons - License. Under Public Health Law, § 160, subd. 7, and sections 161, 173, and Const. art. 1, § 3, held that defendant, never registered or licensed as practitioner of medicine, if in good faith practicing the tenets of the Christian Science Church, would not be guilty of "practicing medicine without lawful authorization and registration."-People v. Cole, N. Y., 113 N. E. 790, 219 N. Y. Sup. 98.

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101.- -Practice of Medicine.-Statutes, regulating the practice of medicine and providing penalties for failure to comply therewith, include all who practice the art of healing, whatever the therapeutic agency employed, so that for every purpose one practicing osteopathy is practicing medicine.-State v. Collins, Iowa, 159 N. W. 604.

102. Principal and Surety Defalcation.— Where an agent who gave bond to secure moneys collected notified his employer of defalcations and was continued in his employment on promise to make restitution, agent's sureties who were not notified were freed from liability on all collections made after employer had knowledge of the offense.-Phoenix Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Newell, Okla., 159 Pac. 1127.

103. Presumption.-Surety on bond to secure employer against breach of servant's contract or default in collections must be presumed to know that, on notice to the obligee terminating liability, the nature of the risk required continuing liability for the time necessary to prevent further collections, and cannot limit liability to embezzlements prior to notice, if the obligee suffered further losses despite diligent efforts to protect himself.-Ricketson v. Lizotte, Vt., 98 Atl. 801.

104. Quo Warranto-Ouster.-In quo warranto proceedings to test respondent's right and title to a public office, if respondent is wrongfully holding the office, there should be a judgment of ouster, though relator is not entitled to the office. State v. Harmon, Me., 98 Atl. 804.

106.- Statutory Violation.-Where a railroad was negligent at crossing in failing to sound a bell or whistle, plaintiff, driving an automobile, was not grossly negligent in failing to apply his emergency brake or adopting other possible means of escapé from the dangerous situation, created by defendant's negligence.-Kaufmann v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., Wis., 159 N. W. 552.

107. Trespasser.-Where a train blocks a crossing in violation of statute, a traveler attempting to go round it is not a trespasser, as regards right to warning of approach of another train.-Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Hunter, Ind., 113 N. E. 772.

108. Release Federal Employers' Liability Act.-Federal Employers' Liability Act, § 5, rendering any contract void, the purpose or intent of which is to exempt the carrier from liability created by the act, has no application to the case of a release of liability given a railroad by its injured employe after the accident, in consideration of being furnished further employment for one day.-Panhandle & S. F. R. Co. v. Fitts, Tex., 188 S. W. 528.

109. Street Railroads-Last Clear Chance.A street railway company is not liable to an injured pedestrian, who has negligently placed himself in danger, if the peril could have been discovered by ordinary care, but only if, after actually discovering it, the operatives failed to use all means at their command to prevent injury.-Galveston Electric Co. v. Swank, Tex., 188 S. W. 704. 110.

Negligence.-If, because of a mist and fading light, the motorman could not observe clearly the position of an automobile, nor discover whether it had cleared the track, it was his duty to have his car under such control as to admit of stopping after discerning objects on the track and before collision therewith.-Travelers' Indemnity Co. v. Detroit United Ry., Mich., 159 N. W. 528.

111. Taxation Assessment. In assessing property of an interstate corporation engaged in sale of electric power and water, it is improper to capitalize earnings of whole property and ascribe total value to distributing lines as a mode of assessing such lines for taxation.Nevada-California Power Co. v. Hamilton, U. S. D. C., 235 Fed. 317.

113.

trial

member

Trade Unions-Suspension.-A of a labor union cannot be suspended or expelled without charges and due where property rights are involved, nor can a distinction be drawn between individuals and local branches of associations in this respect; confiscatory by-laws being against public policy.Neal v. Hutcheson, N. Y., 160 N. Y. Sup. 1007. 114. Trespass Justification. The justification in trespass that "the way in dispute has been used for 43 years by defendant, who claims right by user to pass over the land," does not permit introduction of evidence as to repairs, since every fact of justification must be pleaded. -Dartnell v. Bidwell, Me., 98 Atl. 743.

The

115. Trover and Conversion-Damages. general rule as to measure of damages for conversion is subject to the exception that, where the property consisted of articles for personal use, which have little or no market value, the measure of damages is the reasonable value to the owner.-Erie R. Co. v. Steinberg, Ohio, 113 N. E. 814.

116. Waters and Water Courses-Irrigation. -Defendant who made oral contract giving plaintiff's predecessor title right to use overflow waters in consideration of his permitting overflow on his land, could not, after 40 years of such use and expenditure of money in development of orchards, etc., cut off water during irrigating season without becoming liable for consequent damages.-Bright v. Virginia & Gold Hill Water Co., U. S. C. C. A., 234 Fed. 839.

BAR ASSOCIATIONS,

bar association meetings for 1916-when and where to be held, 48, 231, 320.

presidents and secretaries of state bar associations, 446.

proposed changes in the judicial and other sections of the American Bar Association, 376.

organization of the Alaska Bar Association, 156.

program of meeting of the Alabama Bar Association, 30.

program of the California Bar Association, meeting, 48.

report of the meeting of the American Bar Association, 191.

report of the meeting of the Colorado Bar Association, 120.

report of the meeting of the Kentucky Bar Association, 84.

report of the meeting of the Michigan Bar Association, 65.

report of the meeting of the Missouri Bar Association, 263.

report of the meeting of the Nevada Bar Association, 412.

report of the meeting of the North Carolina Bar Association, 102.

report of the meeting of the Ohio Bar Association, 190.

report of the meeting of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, 65.