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In People v. Sheppard, 5 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 136, the complainant, who had formerly worn a long dress, with her hair arranged so as to rest upon the top of her head, was put upon the witness stand in short clothes with her hair braided in a child-like way, for inspection by the jury. Held, error.

Sufficiency of charge to jury. See People v. Brandt, 14 State Rep. 419; 110 N. Y. 657.

Subdiv. 2. To sustain an indictment, actual chastity must be shown. General reputation for unchastity is not admissible. Lack of chastity can only be shown by proof of specific acts. Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203; Kauffman v. People, 11 Hun, 82; Lyons v. State, 52 Ind. 426; 1 Am. Crim. Rep. 28.

She must be shown to have been actually chaste up to the commencement of the acts of the party accused. Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. 603; Safford v. People, 1 Park. 478.

The evidence of the female enticed, that she was unmarried at the time, is sufficient prima facie proof to bring a case within the statute. People v. Kenyon, 5 Park. Cr. 254, 289.

In Schnicker v. People, 88 N. Y. 192, it appeared that the prosecutrix, a German girl, who had been in this country about three weeks, went to the house of the accused, kept as a house of prostitution, not knowing its character, seeking employment as a domestic, and that the accused detained her there, by telling her that if she left she would be arrested, and by keeping the outer door locked; it appeared that the accused told her to go up stairs with a man, which she refused to do, that afterward a man was brought to her room and left there, who defiled her by force. Held, that a finding that she was taken against her will was justified, and that the intent of the accused to compel her by force, menace or duress to submit to defilement was a reasonable inference from the evidence.

It is competent for the prosecutrix to state why she went to the house of the accused, where she was detained against her will, and competent for the people to show that she went there for an innocent purpose. Schnicker v. People, 88 N. Y. 192.

Where the prosecutrix was left in a room, and a man afterward came there and defiled her by force, evidence of what occurred in the room is competent as a part of the res gesta. Id.

283. No conviction on certain testimony.- No conviction can be had for abduction, compulsory marriage, rape, or defilement, upon the testimony of the female abducted, compelled or defiled, unsupported by other evidence.

A conviction cannot be sustained upon the unsupported evidence of the female alleged to have been abducted as to either element constituting the crime, i. e., the taking or the intent. People v. Plath, 100 N. Y. 590; 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 53; 53 Am. Rep. 236. See, also, People v. Crowley, 102 N. Y. 234. Though a corroboration is required, the female is in no sense an accomplice of defendant. People v. Powell, 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 586.

The other evidence required by this section may be given by an accomplice of defendant. People v. Powell, 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 586.

If corroborated as to the facts of the taking, receiving and employing, etc., for the purpose of prostitution, and as to the fact of her being within the age prescribed by the statute, the conviction will stand. People v. Brandt, 14 State Rep. 419; affirmed, 110 N. Y. 647.

In People v. Cullen, 23 State Rep. 559; 5 N. Y. Supp. 886, in addition to the testimony of the complainant, a child, a physician testified that an examination of the child's person showed that an assault might have been committed. Held, proper to submit defendant's guilt or innocence to the jury. See, also, People v. Stott, 5 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 61.

The case of rape is an exception to the rule that the evidence of a witness cannot be corroborated or confirmed by proof that such witness stated the facts testified on the trial on some previous occasion when not under oath. People v. O'Sullivan, 104 N. Y. 481.

Evidence of the statements of the husband of the prosecutrix made in her presence on the day of the offense is admissible in corroboration of her testimony. Conkey v. People, 1 Abb. Dec. 418. See Woodin v. People, 1 Park. 464.

Whether the prosecutrix has been corroborated or not is a question for the jury. Crandall v. People, 2 Lans. 309.

§ 284. Seduction under promise of marriage.—A person who, under promise of marriage, seduces and has sexual intercourse with an unmarried female of previous chaste character, is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both.

"Seduction as a Crime," 3 Crim. Law Mag. 331; 87 Am. Dec. 405-11; 8 Am. St. Rep. 870; 31 Cent. L. J. 44.

Webster defines seduction as "the act or crime of persuading a female, by flattery or deception, to surrender her chastity." Seduction has been defined as "the use of some influence, promise, art or other means on the part of a man by which he induces a woman to surrender her chastity and virtue to his em braces." Anderson Law Dict. 932; Croghan v. State, 22 Wis. 444; Patterson v. Hayden, 17 Ore. 238; 11 Am. St. Rep. 822; in this case the court say: " "Courts have been more inclined to follow Webster's definition than those given by the legal lexicographers."

A woman cannot be said to be "seduced" who at the time of the alleged seduction was leading a lewd and lascivious life. Patterson v. Hayden, 17 Ore. 238; 11 Am. St. Rep. 822.

An illicit intercourse of long continuance not seduction. Safford v. People, 1 Park. 474.

If the prosecutrix have knowledge that the defendant was a married man at the time of the alleged seduction, it is a good defense. People v. Alger, 1 Park. 333; Callahan v. State, 63 Ind. 198; 30 Am. Rep. 211.

If the defendant, having arrived at the age of puberty, although under age, effect his purpose by promising to marry the girl, it is a sufficient and valid promise under the statute, and a promise on her part is implied if she yields, and she may testify that defendant's promise induced her to consent. Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203; 84 Am. Dec. 177; People v. Kane, 14 Abb. Pr. 15.

See, also, People v. Hustis, 32 Hun, 58; 2 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 448; People v. De Fore, 64 Mich. 693; 8 Am. St. Rep. 868.

A statute made it a felony for any person under promise of marriage to have illicit intercourse with a female infant of good repute for chastity. Held, that the promise need not be a valid one in fact if the infant understood it to be valid; and the indictment need not allege that the defendant was unmarried at the time. Callahan v. State, 63 Ind. 198; 30 Am. Rep. 211.

By "previous chaste character" in the statute is meant actual personal virtue and not reputation, and the fact that the female is in fact unchaste, can only be shown by proof of specific acts of lewdness on her part. People, 26 N. Y. 203; 84 Am. Dec. 177.

Kenyon v.

A statute provided for the punishing of the seduction of any unmarried woman "of previously chaste character." Held, that "character" referred to moral qualities and not to reputation, and evidence of reputation was not admissible upon the issue of character, but only to impeach or corroborate testimony regarding particular acts of unchastity. State v. Prizer, 49 Iowa, 531; 31 Am. Rep. 155.

On a prosecution for seduction of a woman of "good repute for chastity," the state must affirmatively prove such reputation. Zabriskie v. State, 43 N. J. L. 640; 39 Am. Rep. 610; Oliver v. Com., 101 Penn. St. 215; 47 Am. Rep. 704; Kaufman v. People, 11 Hun, 86; People v. Roderigas, 49 Cal. 9.

The prosecution must prove the actual personal chastity of the complainant, although the statute is silent as to character or repute; Polk v. State, 40 Ark. 482; 48 Am. Rep. 17.

And it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Squires, 49 Mich. 487.

In the following cases it was held, that previous chaste character was to be presumed until the contrary appears. People v. Kane, 14 Abb. 16; Crozier v. People, 1 Park. 453; Wood v. State, 48 Ga. 192; State v. Higdom, 32 Iowa, 262; Conkey v. People, 5 Park. 431.

An offer to prove by general reputation that the character of the prosecutrix was bad, is properly excluded. Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203; 84 Am. Dec. 177; State v. Prizer, 49 Iowa, 531; 31 Am. Rep. 155; Crozier v. People, 1 Park. 453; People v. McArdle, 5 id. 180; Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 644; Car penter v. People, 8 Barb. 603; Kaufman v. People, 11 Hun, 82.

If the indictment is defective in not giving the correct surname of the female, the court on trial has power to cure the defect by directing an amendment. People v. Johnson, 104 N. Y. 213; 5 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 218; affirming 4 id. 591. For form of indictment, see People v. Kenyon, 5 Park. 254; affirmed, 26 N.

Y. 203.

For the purpose of affecting his credibility, defendant may be asked on crossexamination if he has had sexual intercourse with a person other than the prosecutrix, and in no way connected with the action. People v.

Y. Cr. Rep. 470.

Eckert, 2 N.

In People v. Eckert, supra, defendant at the time of the alleged seduction was sixteen years of age, and the prosecutrix about six years older. She had known defendant from boyhood, and the illicit intercourse was deliberately permitted until just before the child was born. The conduct of the prosecutrix with

other men showed great laxity of moral obligation. Held, that as the evidence was strongly against the probability of the alleged promise to marry, and against the purity of character of the prosecutrix, a new trial should be granted. Upon a trial for seduction, the court should not instruct the jury upon the law of rape. Reynolds v. People, 41 How. Pr. 179.

$285. Subsequent marriage. The subsequent intermarriage of the parties, or the lapse of two years after the commission of the offense before the finding of an indictment, is a bar to a prosecution for a violation of the last section.

§ 286. No conviction on certain testimony. - No convic tion can be had for the offense specified in section two hundred and eighty-four, upon the testimony of the female seduced, unsupported by other evidence.

In People v. Kearney, 110 N. Y. 188; reversing 47 Hun, 129, the testimony of the prosecutrix was to the effect that the crime was committed in July, and that defendant thereafter had frequent intercourse with her until December. The prosecution was permitted to show, under objection and exception, that the prosecutrix had a child in August of the next year; held, error, that the evidence did not tend to corroborate the testimony of the female as to the commission of the crime charged, as it did not tend to show illicit intercourse thirteen months before the birth of the child.

The testimony of the female seduced need only to be supported as to the promise of marriage, and the carnal connection. Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 38; Kenyon v. People, 26 id. 203; People v. Hine, 8 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 139; Rice v. Com., 100 Penn. St. 28; People v. Kearney, 110 N. Y. 188.

The corroboration may be by circumstantial evidence. Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 644; State v. Brinkhaus, 7 Crim. Law Mag. 343; State v. Hill, 4 S. W. Rep. 121.

Evidence that defendant had opportunities to employ arts, deceptions and false promises is sufficient, as corroborative evidence, to connect him with the offense charged. State v. Araah, 55 Iowa, 250.

Whether the prosecutrix has been sufficiently corroborated is a question for the jury. Crandall v. People, 2 Lans. 309.

Evidence of previous acts of lewdness and unchastity by the complainant with other men is admissible. State v. Patterson, 88 Mo. 88; 57 Am. Rep. 374; State v. Brassfield, 81 Mo. 151; 51 Am. Rep. 234.

But not of subsequent acts. Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 644; State v. Dietrick, 51 Iowa, 467. Contra, State v. Brassfield, 81 Mo. 151; 51 Am. Rep. 234.

Where it is necessary to take the testimony of the prosecutrix through an interpreter, it is not error to allow the state to ask her, on her direct examination, if she had the intercourse with defendant after the promise of marriage, and if without the promise to marry she would have allowed the intercourse. People v. Jensen, 33 N. W. Rep. (Mich.) 811.

In Cook v. People, 2 Th. & C. 404, the prosecutrix was asked, "And would you have consented to it (the connection), in the absence of a promise?" Held, inadmissible as calling for a merely speculative answer.

But the female may testify to the fact that she consented to the intercourse because of the promise. State v. Brinkhaus, 7 Crim. Law Mag. 343.

Evidence that defendant, subsequent to the seduction, had refused to marry the prosecutrix is inadmissible. Cook v. People, 2 Th. & C. 404.

The existence of pregnancy is not essential to a conviction under the statute. Id.

If the prosecutrix have knowledge that defendant is a married man at the time of the alleged seduction, it is a good defense. People v. Alger, 1 Park. 333.

CHAPTER III.

ABANDONMENT AND OTHER ACTS OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN.

SECTION 287. Abandonment of child under six years.

288. Unlawfully omitting to provide for child.
289. Endangering life or health of child.

290. Keepers of concert saloons, etc.

291. Children not to beg, etc.

292. Certain employment of a child.

293. Duty of officers of society.

§ 287. Abandonment of child under six years.- A parent, or other person having the care or custody, for nurture or education, of a child under the age of six years, who deserts the child in any place, with intent wholly to abandon it, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison, for not more than seven years, or in a county jail for not more than one year.

See 1 Bish. Crim. Law (7th ed.), § 557; 1 Whart. Crim. Law (8th ed.). § 331. This statute is designed to protect the public. People v. Naehr, 30 Hun, 461.

Abandonment is not a continuous act, but the offense is complete when the separation takes place. Bayne v. People, 14 Hun, 181.

§ 288. Unlawfully omitting to provide for child.-A person who willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to perform a duty by law imposed upon him to furnish food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance to a minor, or to make such payment toward its maintenance as may have been required by the order of a court or magistrate when such minor has been committed to an institution, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

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