713. Sentence of minor. When a person under the age of sixteen is convicted of a crime, he may, in the discretion of the court, instead of being sentenced to fine or imprisonment, be placed in charge of any suitable person or institution willing to receive him, and be thereafter, until majority or for a shorter term, subjected to such discipline and control of the person or institution receiving him as a parent or guardian may lawfully exercise over a minor. A child under sixteen years of age committed for misdemeanor, under any provision of this code, must be committed to some reformatory, charitable or other institution authorized by law to receive and take charge of minors. And when any such child is committed to an institution it shall, when practicable, be committed to an institution governed by persons of the same religious faith as the parents of such child.

People v. Dickinson, 57 Hun, 312; 32 State Rep'r, 496.

§ 714. Convict as witness. A person heretofore or hereafter convicted of any crime is, notwithstanding, a competent witness in any cause or proceeding, civil or criminal, but the conviction may be proved for the purpose of affecting the weight of his testimony, either by the record, or by his cross-examination, upon which he must answer any proper question relevant to that inquiry; and the party cross-examining is not concluded by the answer to such question.

See Code Civ. Proc., § 832; People v. McGloin, 91 N. Y. 241; 12 Abb. N. C. 172; 1 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 154; affirming 28 Hun, 155; 1 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 105; People v. Rose, 52 Hun, 37; Moremus v. Crawford, 51 id. 96; People v. Parr, 42 id. 316; 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 546; 5 id. 36; People v. Chapleau, 121 N. Y. 266; Spiegel v. Hays, 118 id. 660.

As to defendant as witness, see Code Crim. Proc., § 393, note.

An unconvicted perjurer is a competent witness. People v. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 266; 48 Hun, 45; 5 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 331.

Evidence that a witness has been convicted of being drunk and disorderly is admissible as affecting his credibility. People v. Burns, 33 Hun, 296; 2 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 415.

Where on a trial for rape, the prisoner testifies in his own behalf, a record of his conviction of petit larceny is admissible as affecting his credit. People v. Satterlee, 5 Hun, 167.

On a trial for burglary it is incompetent to ask the prisoner on cross-examination if he had not been arrested for bigamy, as such evidence does not legitimately tend to impair his credibility. People v. Crapo, 76 N. Y. 288; 32 Am. Rep. 302.

On a trial of an indictment, the prisoner, who had testified for himself, was asked on cross-examination how many times he had been arrested. This was objected to as incompetent to affect his credibility, and as tending to degrade

him, and it was claimed by counsel that he was privileged from answering. The objection was overruled. Held, error. People v. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571; 28 Am. Rep. 183.

In People v. Johnson, 57 Cal. 571, the court said: "Since the amendments of 1880 to the Penal Code, a defendant indicted for a felony, if he be a witness, may be asked the question whether he has previously been convicted of a felony, but such question only goes to the credibility of the witness. There is nothing in People v. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571, in conflict with the views here expressed. The question propounded to the defendant and considered by the court in that case was: 'How many times have you been arrested?' Whether the question had any bearing on the credibility of the witness was not determined, but the objection to it was sustained on another ground, which was distinctly taken, namely, that of privilege."

Upon the trial of an indictment for an assault where the defendant, as a witness in his own behalf, had given material testimony in conflict with that given on the part of the prosecution, held, that it was proper, within the discretion of the trial court, as bearing upon his credibility, to ask him, upon cross-examination, if he had not committed an assault upon another person. People v. Irving, 95 N. Y. 541. See, also, People v. Casey, 72 id. 393.

The fact of a conviction of a felony in another state does not render a witness incompetent, but goes only to his credibility. People v. Noyes, cited in 12 Hun, 234; National Trust Co. v. Gleason, 77 N. Y. 400; 33 Am. Rep. 632, note. Contra, State v. Foley, 15 Nev. 64; 37 Am. Rep. 458.

The legislature may not restore the competency of a witness rendered incompetent by reason of conviction of felony. State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113; 49 Am. Rep. 218.

§ 715. Husband and wife as witnesses. - The husband or wife of a person indicted or accused of a crime is in all cases a competent witness, on the examination or trial of such person; but neither husband nor wife can be compelled to disclose a confidential communication, made by one to the other during their marriage.

See People v. Wentworth, 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 210; People v. Houghton, 24 Hun, 501; People v. Briggs, 60 How. Pr. 31-36; Wilke v. People, 53 N. Y. 525: People v. Wood, 36 State Rep'r, 952.

A defendant's wife is a competent witness against him on his trial for murder. People v. Petmecky, 2 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 458; affirmed, 99 N. Y. 415, but on other grounds.

Letters from defendant to his wife are competent. People v. Petmecky, 2 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 458.

On the trial of a husband for murder, his wife, who was an eye-witness to the transaction in question, was excluded as a witness for the people upon objection by defendant's counsel. Held, that the jury had a right to infer that the evidence of the wife would have been unfavorable to defendant, and a submission to the jury of that question was not error. People v. Hovey, 29 Hun, 382.

§ 716. Creditor of convict.-A person injured by the commission of a felony, for which the offender is sentenced to impris onment in state prison, is deemed the creditor of the offender, and of his estate after his death, within the provisions of the statutes relating thereto.

717. Damages, how ascertained. In a case specified in the last section, the damages sustained by the person injured by the felonious act, may be ascertained in an action brought for that purpose by him against the trustees of the estate of the offender, appointed under the provisions of the statutes, or the executor or administrator of the offender's estate.

718. Construction of terms. In construing this Code or an indictment or other pleading in a case provided for by this Code, the following rules must be observed, except when a contrary intent is plainly declared in the provision to be construed, or plainly apparent from the context thereof:

1. Each of the terms, "neglect," "negligence," "negligent and "negligently," imports a want of such attention to the nature or probable consequences of the act or omission as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his own concerns.

2. Each of term "corrupt" and "corruptly" imports a wrongful desire to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage to or by the person guilty of the act or omission referred to, or to some other person.

3. Each of the terms "malice" and "maliciously " imports an evil intent or wish or design to vex, annoy or injure another person, or to maltreat or injure an animal.

4. The term "knowingly" imports a knowledge that the facts exist which constitute the act or omission a crime, and does not require a knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act or omission.

5. Where an intent to defraud constitutes a part of a crime, it is not necessary to aver or prove an intent to defraud any particular person.

6. The term "vessel" includes ships, steamers, canal boats and every boat or structure adapted to navigation or movement from place to place by water, either upon the ocean, lakes, rivers or artificial waterways.

7. The term "signature" includes any memorandum, mark or sign written with intent to authenticate any instrument or writing; or the subscription of any person thereto.

8. The term "writing" includes both printing and writing

9. The term "property" includes both real and personal property, things in action, money, bank bills, and all articles of value.

10. The singular number includes the plural and the plural the singular.

11. A word used in the masculine gender comprehends as well the feminine and neuter.

12. A word used in the present tense includes the future.

13. The term "person" includes a corporation or joint association as well as a natural person. When it is used to designate a party whose property may be the subject of any offense, it also includes the state or any other state government or country which may lawfully own property within the state.

14. The term "real property" includes every estate, interest and right in lands, tenements and hereditaments.

15. The term "personal property" includes every description of money, goods, chattels, effects, evidence of rights in action, and all written instruments by which any pecuniary obligation, right or title to property, real or personal, is created, acknowl edged, transferred increased, defeated, discharged or diminished, and every right and interest therein.

16. The terms" reputed house of prostitution or assignation," "house of prostitution," "house of ill-fame or assignation," "disorderly house," include all premises which by common fame or report are used for purposes of prostitution or assignation.

Subdiv. 1. See People v. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 487; 1 N. Y. State Rep. 450; Moebus v. Herrmann, 108 N. Y. 353; Rosenplaenter v. Roessle, 54 id. 268; New York Guaranty Co. v. Gleason, 53 How. Pr. 125; Sherman v. Transportation Co., 62 Barb. 150.

Subdiv. 5. See § 721, post; Huntington's Trial, 86; People v. D'Argencour, 32 Hun, 178. This sub-division is constitutional. People v. Martin, 2 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 51.

Subdiv. 6. See Crawford v. Collins, 45 Rarb. 269; 30 How. Pr. 398; Tinken v. Stillwagon, 1 City Ct. Rep. 390.

Includes a "dry dock."

77 N. Y. 448.

Walsh v. N. Y. Dock Co., 8 Daly, 387; affirmed,

Subdiv. 9. See 2 Abb. N. Y. Dig. 634.

Subdiv. 10. State v. Main, 31 Conn. 574.

Subdiv. 13. "Foreign government." Republic of Honduras v. Soto, 112 N. Y. 310.

Foreign corporation." Matter of McMahon, 66 How. 192-193; People, ex rel., v. Mc Lean, 80 N. Y. 259.

"Corporation.". People v. Rector, etc., 22 N. Y. 44; British, etc., v. Comrs., 31 N. Y. 32; 28 How. Pr. 44; People v. May, 27 Barb. 238; United States Tel. Co. v. West. Union Co., 56 id. 47; State v. Waterloo Turn Verein, 71 Iowa, 226; 60 Am. Rep. 786.

'State." Martin v. State, 24 Tex. 61.

"United States." State v. Herold, 9 Kans. 194.

Subdiv. 15. A discharge of a mortgage complete in form, and bearing the signature of the mortgagee, and duly acknowledged, until delivered to some one by the maker for the uses and purposes therein expressed, is not "personal property" as defined by this statute, and cannot be the subject of larceny. People v. Stevens, 3 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 583; 38 Hun, 62.

The court say:

This definition of the term 'personal property' is only new in form; the various previous enactments on the subject having been simply collected and consolidated. See Phelps v. People, 72 N. Y. 350.

§ 719. Application of this Code on prior offenses.— Nothing contained in any provision of this Code applies to an offense committed or other act done, at any time before the day when this Code takes effect. Such an offense must be punished according to, and such act must be governed by, the provisions of law existing when it is done or committed, in the same manner as if this Code had not been passed; except that, whenever the punishment or penalty for an offense is mitigated by any provision of this Code, such provision may be applied to any sentence or judgment imposed for the offense after this Code takes effect. An offense specified in this Code, committed after the beginning of the day when this Code takes effect, must be punished according to the provisions of this Code, and not otherwise.

See § 2, ante, and notes; People v. Keeler, 32 Hun, 589, note; People v. Raymond, 96 N. Y. 38; People v. Keeler, 99 id. 463; 3 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 354; People v. McTameney, 30 Hun, 505; 13 Abb. N. C. 55; 1 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 437; 66 How. 74; Matter of Hallenbeck, 65 How. 501; People v. Sadler, 97 N. Y. 146; People v. Jaehne, 103 id. 198; People v. Dowling, 1 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 530; Matter of Hoffman, id. 484; People v. Coffee, 62 How. Pr. 445; Matter of Walker, id. 352.

§ 720. Application of this Code to prior offenses.The provisions of this Code are not to be deemed to affect any civil rights or remedies existing at the time when this Code takes effect, by virtue of the common law or of any provision of statute.