genuineness of the grant to Leese which was described in the petition, or of any intermediate conveyances to the claimant. The confirmation inured to the benefit of the confirmee, and those claiming under him, however obtained, and, until set aside, the decree was conclusive as to his title in this action of ejectment. The confirmation, as we said in Estrada v. Murphy, "establishes the legal title in the confirmee, and this must control in the action of ejectment. If the confirmee, in presenting his claim, acted as agent, or trustee, or guardian, or in any other fiduciary capacity, a Court of Equity, upon a proper proceeding, will compel a transfer of the legal title to the principal, cestui que trust, ward, or other party equitably entitled to the same, or subject it to the proper trusts in the confirmee's hands. It matters not whether the presentation were made by the confirmee in his own name in good faith, or with intent to defraud the actual owner of the claim; a Court of Equity will control the legal title in his hands so as to protect the just rights of others. But in ejectment the legal title must control." (19 Cal. 272.)

Upon this view of the title the only matters, which could be properly left to the consideration of the jury, related to the boundaries of the premises and the possession of the defendants. The decrees of the Commission and of the District Court both give specifically *the boundaries [223] of the tract granted to Leese, and both describe the portion which was excepted and reserved from the confirmation as having been previously confirmed by a decree of the Commission to another claimant. The boundaries given of the tract are as follows: On the east, the waters of the bay of San Francisco; on the west, the Camino Real and the Portezuela; on the north, the land known as the rancho of Cornelio Bernal; and on the south, the land known as the rancho of José Sanchez. The location of the western boundary was clearly fixed by the evidence. To establish the position of the northern boundary a patent of the United States for the Bernal Rancho was introduced in evidence. This patent gave with great particularity the boundaries of the tract it embraces-stating the different courses they run, and the links and chains of each course. It fixed with absolute precision the southern line of the tract, and was therefore prima facie

evidence of the location of the northern boundary of the land granted to Leese. We say it was prima facie evidence; it may have been more than this-it may have been conclusive evidence. Its effect as evidence depended principally upon the character of the grant to Bernal; whether that were one of a certain quantity only, lying within outer boundaries embracing a larger tract, or one of specific land with defined boundaries. If the grant were of the first kind, the boundaries of the quantity designated, after its segregation by survey and measurement from the whole tract, may have been very different from the outer boundaries of the grant. If, on the other hand, the grant were of the second kind—that is, of specific land with defined boundaries, the official survey and measurement must have resulted in the simple identification of those boundaries; and the patent of the United States, giving their location with precision, would have been conclusive evidence of the position of the northern boundary line of the adjoining grant to Leese. In the present case there was nothing to show the character of the grant to Bernal; but the presumption is that the boundaries which it gave corresponded with those adopted by the United States in the patent following the confirmation. The patent was therefore prima facie evidence of the location of the designated northern boundary, to establish which it was introduced; [224] and as there was nothing *shown to rebut this prima facie evidence, it was for the purposes of the action

conclusive.

To establish the location of the southern boundary line, the plaintiff introduced in evidence an official survey of the rancho of Sanchez-known as the Buri Buri Rancho-made under the directions of the Surveyor-General of the United States for California by one of his deputies, and also a record of juridical poseession of the land delivered to the grantee in 1835. It is unnecessary to consider the objections taken to the evidence furnished on this head, as it did not bear upon any rights asserted by the defendants who have appealed from the judgment. There are over twenty defendants to the action, of whom only four are appellants; and of these, two are tenants of the other two. The land which the latter two occupied is situated several miles from the disputed southern

line of the premises in controversy; and there was no loca tion suggested even of that line which did not include their possessions. The numerous exceptions taken by other defendants to the evidence offered cannot, therefore, aid the appellants.

Of the several instructions to the jury requested by the defendants, and refused by the Court, counsel alleges error only in the refusal of one. Of the mesne conveyances, through which the confirmee, Payson, deraigned his title from the grantee, Leese, one was executed by the Sheriff upon a sale under a judgment and execution of the District Court; and the instruction asked, if we understand its purport, was to the effect that if the property, according to the description in the Sheriff's return on the execution, differed from the property described in the Sheriff's deed and the decree of the United States District Court, the deed did not pass the property in controversy. The instruction is awkwardly expressed, but the proposition which it advances, is that the Sheriff's deed is inoperative to pass any property except that which is described in his return. The proposition as thus stated is not sound in itself, and if it were sound is inapplicable to the case at bar. The title of the purchaser does not depend upon the return of the Sheriff. It rests upon the judgment, execution, sale, and deed. There may in fact be no return, or it may be defectively made. "The purchaser," as we said in Cloud v. El Dorado County, "has no control over the conduct of the officer in [225] this respect, nor is it just or reasonable that he should be responsible for the remissness or negligence of the Sheriff in the discharge of such an office." (12 Cal. 133.) But even if the law were otherwise it could not be invoked to defeat a recovery in the present case. The final decree of confirmation settled the question as to the effect of that conveyance, and determined that the legal title to the premises was in the confirmee. In the action of ejectment this operation of the decree cannot be questioned. This latter consideration also disposes of the exception taken to the instruction, given at the request of the plaintiff, upon the nature of that partial or particular possession, from which a constructive possession of an entire tract is inferred.

Judgment affirmed.

HICKMAN v. ALPAUGH.

LAW OF PLACE PRESUMED.-Where the validity of a sale made in a foreign State is daawn in question in the Courts of this State the law of the place of contract will be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have been the same as that of our own State in reference to the same subject matter. This presumption extends to statutory as well as to the common law. IDEM-VALIDITY OF SALE HOW DETERMINED.

Thus, where in an action in a Dis

trict Court of this State, an issue was raised as to whether a sale of personal property made in Oregon was fraudulent, and no proof was made of the laws of Oregon: Held, that the validity of the sale must be determined by the common law and statutes in force in this State on the subject.

APPEAL from the Fifteenth Judicial District.

The defendant, who was Sheriff of Tehama County, having process in his hands against the property of one Farrens, seized under this process certain cattle which were in the possession of the plaintiff, and for the recovery of this property, with damages, the action is brought. The defense set up in the answer is, that the cattle were the property of Farrens, and were obtained by plaintiff under a fraudulent

sale made to him by Farrens for the purpose of [226] *defeating the creditors. It appeared from the evidence that the sale alleged to be fraudulent was made in the State of Oregon. No proof of the laws of Oregon was made on the trial. Under the instructions of the Court set forth in the opinion the jury found for the plaintiff. Defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied, and from this order and the judgment he appeals.

W. H. Rhodes, for Appellant.

By the laws of California, as well as by common law, a sale or assignment made for the purpose of defrauding creditors, if such object be known and concurred in by the vendee, is absolutely void. (Wood's Dig. 107.) By the comity of Courts of Justice, it is a rule of common law that the statutory laws of the State or country in which a cause of action arose, or in which the act was done, that is the subject of litigation, are presumed to be the same as the statutory laws of the forum, until the contrary affirmatively appears.

Presumption as to State laws, cited as authority in Hill v. Grigsby, 82 Cal. 60; Marsters v. Lash, 61 Cal. 624. See 15 Kan. 285.

(Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 252, and authorities there cited; Robinson v. Dauchy, 3 Barb. S. C. 29, and authorities cited; Hoffman v. Carew, 22 Wend. 322-324.)

W. S. Long, for Respondent.

NORTON, J. delivered the opinion of the Court-FIELD, C. J. concurring

On the trial of this action the Court gave the following charge to the jury: "The sale relied upon by the plaintiff, Hickman, of a portion of the property in controversy from N. J. Farrens to him took place in Oregon, and without the jurisdiction of the State of California, and, therefore, the said sale cannot be attacked by the defendant in this cause for an actual or legal fraud provided for by the statute of California relating to fraudulent conveyances." This charge was erroneous. There was no proof made as to the laws of Oregon, and in the absence of such proof the Court should have presumed them to be the same as the laws of our own State. This rule applies to the statute law of the State as well as to the common law. (Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 253, 254, and cases there cited; Leavenworth v. Brockway,

2 Hill, 201; Rob-*inson v. Dauchy, 3 Barb. 20; Hoff- [227] man v. Carew, 22 Wend. 322-324.)

For this error the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.

WILLIAMS v. YOUNG.

VENDOR'S LIEN.-A vendor's lien, after absolute conveyance, is not a specific absolute charge upon the property, but only an equitable right of the vendor to resort to it in case the purchase money is not paid.

IDEM-CANNOT BE ASSIGNED.-It is a right which can only be asserted by one who has parted with his property. It is the personal privilege of the vendor, given solely for his security, and is in its nature unassignable. Baum v. Grigsby, ante 172, affirmed.

178.

Cited as authority in Ross v. Heintzen, 36 Cal. 321. See Lewis v. Covillaud, ante