nion he entertains on the ground that some of the writers alluded to, have given up the divine Inspiration of the Scriptures. As far as our knowledge of the learned and 'judicious' defences of Revelation is concerned, we are acquainted with comparatively few, to which this censure is applicable. Even Lardner, whose views on the subject of inspiration might be expected, from his general system of epinions, to be widely different from Dr. Cracknell's, has rendered such essential service to the historic evidences of the credibility of the Gospel, that it becomes all classes of inquirers to think and speak respectfully of his productions. Few, however, are qualified to read what is recondite and expensive;' and therefore, popular and easily accessible works on this subject are of great advantage. The name of Jennings is well known; and though his two discourses' needed not the imprimatur of any one to give them circulation, we are very happy in this opportunity of subjoining to Dr. C.'s, our humble recommendation.

Art. XI. Letters to a Friend, on the Evidences, Doctrines, and Duties of the Christian Religion. By Olinthus Gregory, LL. D. Of the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. Third Edition, with Corrections and Additions, 2 vols. royal 12mo. pp. xiv. 642, price 14s. Baldwin and Co. 1815.

WE

E notice with pleasure a third edition of this excellent work, on account of the considerable enlargements which it has received. By means of a larger page and about thirty additional pages, the Author has been enabled, without augmenting the price of the publication, to introduce about oneeighth of additional matter into these volumes, which will be found of no inferior importance or interest.

After the ample attention which these "Letters" ́received on their first appearance, in the former Series of our Review, it will be unnecessary for us to dilate on their characteristic merit, as a compendious argumentative exhibition of the Christian system. We know no work more admirably calculated to satisfy an inquiring mind, on the subject of the evidences and peculiarities of Christianity; and we have reason to believe that its usefulness has justified the praise it has received.

The principal improvements are contained in Letters 4, 5, 9, 13, 14, 15, and 21. In chapter the fourteenth, the Author, in adverting to the sufferings of Christ, puts this question to the disbelievers in the atonement: Whence arose the agony and the interruption of God's presence, which our Lord endured on the Cross, but from the necessity that he should suffer?

The answer to which Socinianism is driven,-that Jesus suffered for our benefit, as an example of patience and resig'nation,' is shewn to be worse than futile; and the subject is thus pursued in the present edition.

The answer here adverted to, is, moreover, as contrary to matter of fact as it is to reason: for, if the doctrine of satisfaction be denied, Jesus Christ did not present a splendid example of tience and resignation, Compare his behaviour under suffering with that of other martyrs, many, for example, in the third century. He suffered for the space of a few hours only: they were made to sustain sufferings for days, weeks, months, nay, in some cases, years. He suffered the punishment of the cross; they have agonized under boiling oil, melted lead, plates of hot iron; or have been broiled for days over a slow fire, or shut up in fiercely glowing brazen bulls; or have had their members cut and torn off, one after another, in tedious and barbarous succession. Yet he lamented, and they triumphed. Is not this infinitely astonishing, upon any other theory of religion than ours? Is it not incomprehensible that the Master of our faith, the "Captain of our sal"“vation," should be abashed and astounded at the sight or even the contemplation of death, and that his servants and followers should triumph in the midst of unequalled torments? The one is seized with sorrow even unto death; the others are transported with joy. The one sweats as it were drops of blood, at the approach of death; the others behold a Divine hand wiping off their blood, but not their tears, for none do they shed. The one complains that God forsakes him; the others cry aloud with rapture that they behold Him stretching forth his hands to encourage and invite them to him!

All this cannot be because his bodily torment is greater than theirs: nor can it be, because they have more internal strength and holiness than he has. But it is, because God administers more comfort to them than to him. Yet why so, if Jesus Christ be his "Son in whom he is well pleased?" Why, indeed, but,' because he regards him as our pledge, having constituted him "a sin-offering for us?"

• Contrast again, the dismal agony of our Lord, with the holy serenity of Stephen, or the joyful anticipation of Ignatius, or the heroic fortitude of Blandina, whose patience outstood the successive labours of a series of tormentors; and then ask-If the approbation of God ordinarily comforts those who suffer for righteousness' sake, could it not much better have consoled Jesus Christ? If the certainty of possessing an eternal life of bliss makes the martyrs leap with joy and exultation when they are about to lose a temporal life: shall not a like certainty, superadded to that of "finishing the work for which his Father sent him into "the world" fill Jesus with joy too? Shall men, who are accustomed to love the earth, rejoice to leave it; and shall Jesus Christ, who lowes heaven alone, be smitten with a thousand mortal terrors because he is going thither! How truly inexplicable must all this for ever remain, if the orthodox hypothesis be rejected.' pp. 60-62.

Art. XII. The Campaign of Paris, in 1814. To which is prefixed a Sketch of the Campaign of 1813. Translated from the French of P. F. F. J. Giraud. 6s. bds. Leigh, London. 1815.

WE have too long deferred our notice of this work. A second Campaign of Paris has already succeeded to that of 1814, and has eclipsed the interest of the first. The public mind, engrossed with the agitations of the present moment, is not to be supposed to have leisure for the calm, philosophic review of the details of past transactions. Uncertain into what form the dissolved and fluctuating elements of political society will subside, we wait with suspense, and with the sickness of hope deferred, the final issue of the tremendous conflict.

This volume is absurdly announced in the preface, as forming a very natural and important sequel to Labaume's "Narrative of the Campaign in Russia.'" Labaume's work gave a detailed account of the various events to which it referred, portrayed numerous and interesting features of national and individual character, and was altogether an original and impressive composition. But the present is nothing more than a tolerably respectable abstract of the gazettes and bulletins, with some few additions afforded by the information easily obtained by a resident on the immediate scene of conflict. Of the desperate and sanguinary contests of Lutzen, Bautzen, Wurchen, Dresden, Wachau, Leipzig, and Hanau, we learn little more than that such battles were fought, and that their ultimate effect was the retreat of Napoleon to the heart of France; in fact, Giraud himself expresses his intention merely to take a rapid view of the events of the campaign of 1813, and only so far as may be necessary to illustrate the influence which they had on that of 1814'

The daring obstinacy of the French leader, hazarding every thing rather than make the slightest concession, was never more strangely exemplified, than in his inflexible determination to maintain himself in Saxony. He had under his immediate command, and in the garrisons of Poland and Germany, certainly not less than five hundred thousand excellent French soldiers, nearly one half of whom had been accustomed to the use of arms and the presence of the enemy. His first, and, perhaps, his greatest error, was the separation of nearly seventy thousand of his best troops, and the loss of their active services, by shutting them up in garrison towns, where they answered no other purpose whatever than that of forming a sort of preparatory school of German militia, of which description of soldiery, the blockading corps were principally composed. His second, and certainly the most destructive mis

take, was the maintainance of a position much too far in advance, and tenable only in the improbable event of the neutrality of Austria. The battles of Leipzig awoke him from his dream, and the bold and brilliant manoeuvres of the Bavarian General Wrede, completed his discomfiture.

So much has been written and extensively read on the subject of the Campaign of Paris, that we shall not detain our readers by a long and critical detail of its less interesting parts, but satisfy ourselves with a rapid glance at its more strongly indicated features. It was begun on the part of Buonaparte, by a repetition of the blunder which had essentially contributed to the loss of the preceding; he locked up a powerful and veteran army of scarcely less than one hundred thousand men, within the walls and gates of the German fortresses, and this first false step, equivalent to half a dozen defeats, he never recovered. At length, the Allied armies poured into France in every direction, Schwartzenberg crossed the Swiss frontier, Blucher advanced from Mayence, Bernadotte and Graham remained in observation. After various minor actions, the French Emperor in person attacked Marshal Blucher's main body at Brienne, and succeeded in forcing his position in its most important point. At Rothiere, he was less fortunate; after a sanguinary conflict his centre was penetrated, and he fell back in disorder upon Troyes, with great loss both of men and artillery.

It was now evident, that his object had completely failed. He had expected to have surprised the army of Silesia which consisted only of fifty thousand men. He hastened thither with superior forces; and after his first successes, the manœuvres of Blücher compelled him to engage with a considerable part of the united allied armies, who repulsed him without bringing all their divisions into action.' pp. 58, 59.

Napoleon's situation was now extremely critical: defeated and disheartened, his army committed the greatest excesses even in their own country; the Allies were evidently pressing on Paris, and his fortunes appeared altogether desperate. In this crisis, he exerted himself with the most brilliant skill and activity. Profiting by the error of the Allies, whose divisions were separated from each other in the most negligent and unmilitary manner, he began a series of movements which had nearly reinstated his affairs; he first attacked and captured the corps of Alsufieff; he then routed and drove before him the division of General Sacken, and two days afterwards (Feb. 14th) assaulted Blucher at Vauchamp.

Blucher, who was inferior in cavalry, determined to retreat, and formed his infantry into squares. Our bulletins say that four of these squares were broken in different charges, but the reports of the enemy assure us that we could make no impression upon them. The exaggeration was, here, on their side. Napoleon had detached some cavalry on the rear of the Prussian Marshal, and he was consequently obliged to retire in confusion on the great road to Champ

Aubert.

At Etoges he found another body of French infantry, which he was obliged to attack, although it was night, in order to continue his retreat. Generals Kleist and Kaufsiewitz forced their passage. Marshal Blücher halted at his first position, rallied at Châlons the corps of Yorck and Sacken, and reinforced himself with the corps of Langeron and Saint Priest, waiting for an opportunity to act again on the offensive.' p. 66.

The statement here, that Blucher retired in disorder, is obviously inaccurate. If he had been thrown into the least confusion, his ruin was inevitable; every thing depended on the firmness of his order, and the steadiness of his march: Buonaparte risked every thing to destroy his opponent; he poured his cavalry on the Prussian, masses; he intercepted their march on the Chaussée by an able and rapid movement; and finally, he sent forward his light troops to take possession of Etoges, but all was in vain; the Prussians manoeuvred as at a Potsdam_review, their squares were impenetrable, their artillery and their bayonets destroyed the French cavalry, and they finally forced a passage through the last barrier which the skill and energy of their antagonist had interposed in the line of their retreat. Let justice, however, be done to the French commander. If Blucher displayed the utmost firmness when entangled in a most dangerous position, he yet owed his safety principally to the unyielding valour of his soldiers; but Napoleon perfectly exhausted the resources of military genius, and if he failed, it was not from any deficiency in his plans, but from the inferior quality of his troops.

On the same day, however, an advantage was obtained by the Allies, in a different quarter, which proved in the event, more than an equivalent for this partial failure. After a successful engagement, the Russian General Winzingerode, entered Soissons. On the 21st, Napoleon appeared on different ground, beat Wittgenstein in the battle of Nangis, and forced the position of Villeneuve, defended by the Bavarian commander Wrede; he afterwards dislodged the Allies from Montereau, and, elated by his successes, tore the treaty of Chatillon, and exclaimed-'I shall be at Vienna much sooner than they will be at Paris! In the mean time, the indefatigable Blucher again

t