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not at all to be wondered at, that naval histories should, at all times, be found to contain deeply interesting portions of the annals of mankind. It is nowise surprising that the love of the marvellous, so deeply implanted in the bosom of man, should find a gratification in contemplating the character of the gallant tar, and should view it, with all its hardihood, indifference to danger, and generosity, as scarcely inferior to any which is produced in the best constructed tales of poetry or romance. Under these circumstances, we must repeat the expression of our surprise, that no writer has yet arisen among us, to give, in an attractive and enduring form, a complete naval history of the United States-a history, not consisting of mere statistical details, or a formal list, in due chronological order, of the acts of Congress-not of rude and exaggerated sketches of the lives of those who have, from time to time, distinguished themselves in naval warfare; nor yet of a mere abstract of the official accounts of our battles-but an historical view of the navy from its origin to the present moment-marking the great eras in its progress, interspersing the narrative with judicious views on the commercial policy and naval resources of the country, (as illustrated by important events in our history) and adorning the whole with the exploits of our most distinguished commanders. This is a task, we admit, not of very easy performance. Most of the events during the Revolution, are, perhaps, already involved in impenetrable obscurity; and the destruction of many of the public records, and the death of most of the actors in the busy scenes which it would become the duty of the historian to describe, would, unquestionably, present serious embarrassments in his way. Still we think that competent talents, ardently, faithfully and perseveringly devoted to the task, would surmount most of these difficulties, and we are persuaded, that a truly classical history of the American navy, would meet with such universal favour as to reward most amply, the exertion of the best talents the country can afford. We think we know more than one individual fully competent to the task, and we feel great satisfaction in stating, that one of these-perhaps of all others the best qualified for its successful execution-if not now actually engaged in the work, has given a pledge, that it shall, at some future period, and we hope at no distant day, command his undivided attention. Mr. Cooper, the celebrated author of the "Spy" and the "Pilot," certainly one of the ablest and most popular of the writers who has yet appeared in our country, made, we are informed, a public declaration to his literary friends, on the eve of his departure for France, of his intention to write the Naval History of his

country. Mr. Cooper has been by profession a seaman, and has acquired in the course of many years experience, a thorough acquaintance with nautical affairs, and a perfect knowledge of the character and habits of nautical men. No writer in the English language-no writer, perhaps, in any age or country, has ever displayed greater power-a happier or more exquisite tact in delineating the characters, and describing the events which are peculiar to the ocean. The habits of his whole life have, moreover, brought him into close and intimate communion with the naval officers best acquainted with the public and secret history-indeed, with the whole career of the navy-and when to all these advantages, we add, the possession of an easy and graceful style, and descriptive powers of a very high order, we cannot but believe that Mr. Cooper is capable of producing a work on this subject, which will become one of the standard histories of the age.

With respect to the works which stand at the head of this article, we have, perhaps, already said enough, to convey to the reader our impression of their merits. Clark's History consists of little more than a list of the vessels which have, from time to time, been built for the Navy, or captured by them; of the acts and resolutions of Congress in relation to the naval establishment; and of extremely loose accounts of naval actions, interspered with brief and imperfect notices of the lives of our most distinguished naval men, and of many nowise distinguished, with occasional reflections, not very profound, on the naval policy of the United States. Both Clark's and Goldsborough's works, however, exhibit very commendable industry on the part of their authors, and contain many valuable records and documents for the use of the future historian. The work of Mr. Goldsborough, (who is, we understand, Secretary of the Board of Navy Commissioners at Washington) is peculiarly valuable on this account. It is to be regretted, that the second volume of his work has never been published, as it would, probably, have been much more interesting and valuable than the first. We must not be understood, however, as meaning to depreciate the value of either of these books. We regard them as store-houses, in which a mass of interesting materials (that might otherwise have perished) have been gathered together and treasured up, until some one, more highly gifted than the authors of the "Naval History," or the "Chronicle,' will be able to apply them to the most valuable purposes. We doubt much whether either of these authors ever aimed higher, than to render this useful and acceptable service to their

country.

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The best written, and we think by far the most interesting, view of our navy which has yet appeared (for we consider the "Naval Temples" and other works of that description as altogether unworthy of notice) is to be found in the "Analectic Magazine" for the years 1815 and 1816; during which period it assumed the additional cognomen of a "Naval Chronicle." These articles are evidently from the pen of an able and experienced writer. His examination of a “Synopsis of naval actions by a Besh officer on the American station," is an exquisite specimen of intermingled reasoning and sarcasm. In the style of these articles, we think we can discover a writer not unknown to fame, and even if general rumour had not designated the individual-we think we should have recognized in the style and peculiar spirit which animates the whole of the "Chronicle," the well-known author of "John Bull and Brother Jonathan."

With these preliminary remarks, we proceed directly to the task we have imposed upon ourselves in this article (freely availing ourselves of the work of Mr. Goldsborough) of giving a sketch, a very summary one it must necessarily be, of the Naval History of the United States, to which we propose to add a brief view of the present condition and future prospects of this important establishment. Remote as we are from the seat of the Federal Government, and kept in comparative ignorance of the condition of our great national establishments, we presume that most of our readers would derive information, and perhaps amusement from a mere detail of historical and statistical facts on this interesting subject. But we hope to impart an additional interest to our pages, by a few speculations, in which, in conclusion, we propose to indulge.

We should suppose, reasoning a priori, that the Americans, descended from the greatest commercial nation in the world— bringing with them all the propensities of a commercial people, and extensively engaged themselves, almost from the first moment of their settlement, in commercial pursuits-would, in imitation of the mother country, as well as from obvious considerations of policy, have seized the earliest opportunity of laying the foundation of a navy, to which they had been accustomed to look, as the only safeguard of commerce, and for the creation of which their country afforded such admirable materials. Why this was not the case, can only be accounted for from the pervading sense of the immense power of the British navy, against the permanent supremacy of which, it was considered altogether hopeless to struggle. Though the framers of the Constitution confided to the Federal Government the power "to provide and

maintain a navy," yet there is nothing in the history of the times to induce a belief, that it was in their contemplation, that measures should be immediately taken to create one-certain it is that no such measures were adopted, or even proposed; and, on careful examination, we think it will be found, that until the year 1811, the policy of laying the deep and broad foundation of such an establishment was never decisively adopted by the United States. In taking a retrospect of the history of the country during the Revolution, and for a considerable time afterwards, we are forcibly struck by the fact, that no attempt was made to call forth its naval resources, except for temporary purposes; and then only under the pressure of great emergencies. As the most pressing exigencies could alone rouse the country to the employment of naval means, so when these past away, our vessels of war were suffered to rot, and we relapsed into a state of total indifference on the subject. In fact if the people of the United States had actually set out with the belief that a navy was in all respects useless, we aver that just such a course must have been, as actually was pursued, in relation to "this right arm of the national defence."

It will be found on examination, that for a great many years, nothing was ever voluntarily done for the navy. That the navy has, in fact, done every thing for itself, and may almost be said "to have been its own architect." The first measure adopted during the war of the Revolution, for awakening the naval spirit of the country was the employment of two small vessels, one of 10 and the other of 14 guns, for the purpose of intercepting certain transports laden with munitions of war, and bound either to Canada or Boston. For the purpose of carrying this object into effect, a committee of three members of Congress, consisting of Messrs. Dean, Langdon, and Gadsden, were appointed in October, 1775. To this committee, subsequently enlarged to thirteen, was committed the general superintendence and direction of the navy. Soon after this, it was resolved by Congress to build thirteen vessels, principally for the purpose of destroying the merchant ships of the enemy engaged in bringing supplies to their fleets and armies. From this period to the end of the war, the administration of the navy department underwent frequent changes. In November, 1776, "three persons, well skilled in maritime affairs," were appointed to execute the business of the navy, under the direction of the marine committee. This system continued till October, 1779, when Congress established a "Board of Admiralty," consisting of three commissioners, not members of Congress, and two members of Congress. In 1781, "an agent of marine" was appointed, with full autheVOL. II.-NO. 4. 45

rity "to direct, fit out, equip, and employ the ships and vessels of war of the United States, under such instructions as he should from time to time receive from Congress." On the 6th of September of the same year, the duties prescribed to the agent of marine were devolved on Robert Morris, superintendent of finance, who, it is stated by Mr. Goldsborough, "appears to have had the chief agency in the civil administration of the navy during the greater part of the Revolution." The largest vessels of war put into commission during the Revolution, were frigates of the second class. One ship to be called the America, and rated at 74 guns (though subsequently ordered to be armed with 56) was indeed built; but she was not completed till 1781, when John Paul Jones was elected by Congress to command her; she was never, however, put into commission, being on the 3d of September, 1782, presented to his Most Christian Majesty "in testimony of the sense entertained by Congress of his generous exertions in behalf of the United States, and to replace the Magnifique of 74 guns, lost in the harbour of Boston."

The greatest number of vessels at any one time, in the service of Congress during the Revolution (exclusive of gallies and cutters) was twenty-five (employed in the year 1776) of which there were five frigates of 32 guns, twelve vessels of from 24 to 28 guns, and eight mounting from 10 to 16 guns. And though several additional vessels were subsequently built, yet at no period during the war was its strength increased, its losses exceeding the inconsiderable additions made to it from time to time. The following is a list of the Captains appointed to command these vessels according to the rank assigned to them under the resolution of Congress of April, 1776, viz:-John Hopkins, Samuel Tomkins, Charles Miller, Nicholas Biddle, John Barry, Thomas Read, Charles Alexander, and James Nicolson. The primary object to which the naval force was devoted was to intercept transports laden with supplies for the British army-which, besides depriving the enemy of their resources, was of vast importance to the colonies in furnishing them with arms, ammunition and clothing, of which they were nearly destitute. At a later period the naval force seems to have acted in conjunction with the numerous privateers which issued from every port against the commerce of the enemy, and with such decided effect, that it has been estimated that the number of captures in the course of the war amounted to 803, of which there were re-taken or lost 153, leaving a gain to the United States of 650, the value of which is estimated at eleven millions of dollars. We agree with our author that this estimate must

* Journals of Congress, vol. ii. p. 208.

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