cruize, undertaken at this period, the Algerine fleet, which consisted of only four small frigates and a few xebecks, captured ten American vessels, and carried upwards of one hundred of our citizens into slavery. Our affairs had now reached a crisis which seemed to leave the American government no alternative but to fit out a naval force, as speedily as possible, unless indeed, it had been prepared to abandon the navigation of the Mediterranean altogether. Colonel Humphreys, in his letter to the Secretary of State, dated 25th of December, 1793, earnestly pressed this view of the subject on the consideration of the government. "If we mean (says he) to have a commerce we must have a naval force to defend it. It appears absurd to trust to the fleets of Portugal, or any other nation, to protect and convoy our trade." The American Consul, O'Brien, in his letter to Colonel Humphreys, is even still more explicit. He declares, "that he sees no alternative, but for the United States, with all possible speed, to fit out a naval force," and adds, "that if this plan is not adopted, the corsairs of Algiers and Tunis will remain masters of the western ocean,-they will cruise in the channels of the western islands, and be tempted to go even on the coasts of the United States." The whole subject was at length submitted to Congress by the President, and on the 27th of March, 1794, an act was passed to provide a naval armament. The preamble of the act is in these words, viz:-" Whereas the depredations committed by the Algerine corsairs on our commerce, render it necessary that a naval force should be provided for its protection. Be it therefore enacted, &c." The act authorized the President to provide, equip, and employ four ships of 44 guns, and two of 36, or in lieu thereof, a naval force, not exceeding in the whole that directed by the act-no ship to carry less than 32 guns, and then follows a special provision, "that if a peace shall take place between the United States and the regency of Algiers, no further proceeding shall be had under this act." Without this provision (says Goldsborough) it is well understood that this act wouldnot have passed, and even so restricted, the bill passed by a majority of only eleven

votes.

If our limits permitted, it would be curious and somewhat amusing, to examine the arguments urged in Congress on that occasion, against a navy, and in favour of buying the friendship of the Barbary powers, and even, if necessary, of subsidizing some of the European naval powers to protect our trade. But this we must forego. Contrary to all expectation, a peace was concluded with Algiers on the 5th of September, 1795, and before a single vessel, authorized by the law, had been finished,

though so much progress had been made in building them, that it was expected all the frigates might have been launched and completely equipped in the course of the year 1796, and at an expense less than half of what had been already expended. Congress was now compelled to decide whether the work should be abandoned, and all that had been done should be lost, or a navy of some description be suffered to exist. As usual in such cases, a middle course was adopted; and it was finally decided to complete three of the frigates which were in a state of the greatest forwardness-applying for that purpose the appropriation theretofore made for the whole. In a table exhibited in the work before us, the expense of this treaty with Algiers is set forth, and it appears, from the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, to have cost the United States nine hundred and ninety-two thousand, four hundred and sixty-three dollars-(over and above the annuity stipulated to be paid, and which it was estimated could not be paid at a cost to the United States of less than seventy thousand dollars per annum)—an amount falling but little short of the whole estimated cost of the six frigates, which had they been provided in due season, would, probably, have afforded (as a much smaller force has since done) complete protection to our commerce, and repaid at once, the whole expense of their construction.

The next great era in the naval history of the country, was that created by our difficulties with France. In the wars which grew out of the French Revolution, it was scarcely to have been expected that American commerce could escape depredations. We accordingly find that as early as 1793, both England and France began to capture our ships, impress our seamen, and, in short, to pursue that system, from the effects of which we were only able finally to relieve ourselves, by adopting measures of retaliation against one of those powers, and waging open war against the other. By the report of the Secretary of State, accompanying the President's Message of March, 1794, it appears, that the vexations and spoliations on our commerce had then reached such an alarming height as to threaten the ruin of our trade. These difficulties continued to increase until the latter end of the year 1795, when our differences with Great Britain were terminated by the ratification of Jay's treaty. Our differences with France, however, seemed rather to have been increased by that treaty, and on the 7th of December, 1796, President Washingtou, in his speech to Congress, called its attention to the subject of these depredations, and invoked it to remember "what was due to the character of the government and of the country." The message contains the first distinct VOL. II.-NO. 4.

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recommendation by the executive, of a naval policy. "To an active external commerce, (says the President) the protection of a naval force is indispensable. This is manifest of wars to which a state itself is a party. But besides this, it is in our own experience that the most sincere neutrality, is not a sufficient guard against the depredations of nations at war. То secure respect to a neutral flag, requires a naval force organised and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression. This may even prevent the necessity of going to war, by discouraging belligerents from committing such violations of the rights of the neutral party, as may first or last leave no other option. From the best information I have been able to obtain, it would seem as if our trade to the Mediterranean, without a protecting force, will always be insecure, and our citizens exposed to the calamities from which numbers of them have but just been relieved. These considerations invite the United States to look to the means, and to set about the gradual creation of a navy. Will it not then be advisable to begin without delay to provide and lay up the materials for building and equipping of ships of war, and to proceed in the work by degrees, in proportion as our resources shall render it practicable without inconvenience, so that a future war of Europe may not find our commerce in the same unprotected state in which it was found by the present ?"

In the first message of President Adams, (16th May, 1797,) he enforces the wisdom of this policy in very emphatic language. In consequence of the message of General Washington, Congress called for a report respecting the depredations committed on the commerce of the United States. It appeared from the report made in obedience to this call, that between three and four hundred American vessels had been captured by French cruisers the greater number of which had been condemned.

Congress at this session, among other measures, having in view the protection of the commerce and the vindication of the honour of the country, authorized the President to fit out and employ the frigates United States, Constitution and Constellation, and made an appropriation for completing the three frigates then on the stocks. This was the second important step taken by the Government for the purpose of creating a naval force, and like the former, it was forced upon them by hard necessity. Every thing was now rapidly tending to a rupture with France. Every effort to avert that calamity seemed only to hasten its approach. At length Congress determined, in accordance with the declared wishes of the President, to take measures to redress our wrongs by force of arms.

On the 9th of April, 1798, the Secretary of War (then also charged with the duty of superintending the concerns of the navy) submitted to the House of Representatives his plans for the protection of our commerce. Among the means recom mended as indispensably necessary, was "a provision for building or purchasing two vessels of 22 guns, eight of 20 guns, and ten of 16 guns; and, that the President should be vested with authority in case of open rupture, to provide, by such means as he may judge best, a number of ships of the line not exceeding six, or an equivalent force in frigates." With these recommendations Congress so far complied, as to authorize the President "to cause to be built, purchased or hired, a number of vessels not exceeding twelve, to carry not more than 22 guns each." A few days afterwards, the office of Secretary of the Navy was created, and Benjamin Stoddert (a gentleman who proved himself, says our author, pre-eminently qualified for the station) was appointed to that office.

In the course of the months of May, June and July, of the same year, acts were passed declaring the treaties with France no longer obligatory-authorizing the capture of French armed vessels and directing so many additional vessels of war to be built, as made the whole number at that time, (July 1798) authorized by law, amount to

12 Ships of not less than 32 guns,

12

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of not less than 20), nor exceeding 24,

And 6 66 of 18 guns, besides gaHies and revenue cutters. So great was the activity displayed in providing this force, that towards the close of the year 1798, there were actually at sea, no less than four squadrons, under the separate commands of Commodores Barry, Truxton, Tingey, and Stephen Decatur, Senior, consisting in all, of four frigates, four ships of 18 guns, and eight smaller vessels. Of the operations of the navy during this brief French war, our limits will not permit us to speak. The spirit of the country blazed forth-several brilliant naval actions were fought, and splendid victories achieved, and all doubt was removed of the ability of the United States to carry on maritime warfare successfully and gloriously.

Though many other officers eminently distinguished themselves, Truxton was the hero of the French war. In the actions with the Insurgent and the Vengeance, the former of which he captured, and the latter compelled to strike her colors, (though she finally escaped) he achieved victories over a greatly superior force, and displayed so much skill and gallantry as to command universal admiration, and to receive, with a gold medal, the thanks of Congress. In looking over the list of

names which became "known to fame" in the course of this war, we find those of Rodgers, Hull, Stewart, Porter, and many others which have since become identified with the honor of the navy, and the glory of the country.

On the 3d of March, 1801, our hostilities with France were terminated by a treaty of peace, and the active services of the navy being no longer required, the President was authorized by "the act providing for a Naval Peace Establishment," "to cause to be sold all the vessels belonging to the navy, except the following, viz:-The United States, Constitution, President, Chesapeake, Philadelphia, Constellation, Congress, New-York, Boston, Essex, Adams, John Adams, and General Greene." The act further directed, that six of the frigates should be kept in constant service, and the President was required to retain in service, nine captains, thirty-six lieutenants, and one hundred and fifty midshipmen.

Happily for the fortunes of the navy, the termination of hostilities with France, was immediately followed by new difficulties with the Barbary Powers-and the moment our vessels of war returned into port, it became necessary to despatch a fleet under Commodore Dale to the Mediterranean. For a period of nearly four years, (from 1801 to 1805) the operations of this squadron (successively commanded by Commodores Dale, Morris, Samuel Barron, Preble, and Rodgers) were carried on with various degrees of energy and success, but throughout the whole period, our young officers were undergoing a course of instruction, and were subjected to a system of training, the beneficial effects of which, the country has experienced from that period even to the present hour. The result of the French war, and especially the brilliant achievements of Truxton, had excited the spirit of the navy, and given an impulse to our brave and enterprising young men, which now burst forth with a splendour which adorned their names with imperishable glory.

For two years, however, after the American fleet made its appearance in the Mediterranean, no actions were performed (if we except the capture of the Tripoli, of 14 guns, by the Enterprise, of 12 guns, commanded by Lieutenant Sterrett) which at all satisfied the expectations of the country. The people of the United States had begun to look upon the navy with a partial eye-they had become proud of its high character, and were not to be satisfied with any thing short of complete and dazzling success. The boast of Commodore Morris, therefore, "that during the whole period of his command, there was not a citizen of the United States who either lost his property, or was made a captive," was not admitted as an apology for the