length united in the determination to abandon the restrictive system, and to seek the redress of our wrongs by war,-while the opposition of that day, distrusting as they alleged the power and resources of the nation, to wage war successfully against Great Britain, and distrusting still more, perhaps, the men then in the administration of our public affairs,-seem to have acted on the principle, that the redress of all our grievances, was only to be found in a change of rulers. It is not our present purpose to notice the proceedings of the twelfth Congress, further than they have a direct and intimate bearing on the subject now under our consideration. Mr. Cheves was appointed Chairman of the Committee of Naval Affairs, and at once entered upon the subject of a naval establishment, with the energy and judgment for which he is so eminently distinguished. Looking to the war which was then at hand, as well as to the permanent interests of the United States, this enlightened practical statesman, resolved to submit to the representatives of the people and to the nation, the great question, whether it was our true policy to establish and maintain a navy,—a question which it was manifest, from the past history of the country, had never yet been decided. The Report, which stands at the head of this article, was the fruit of this determination. In the preliminary inquiries which led to that report, many of the most experienced and intelligent officers of our navy were examined,— the naval establishments of other countries were carefully looked into,―our necessities and our resources were accurately weighed, and the deliberate opinion was expressed by the committee, that in every view of the subject, it was the true policy of the United States to build up a naval establishment, as the cheapest, the safest, and the best protection to their sea-coast, and to their commerce, and, that such an establishment was inseparably connected with the future prosperity, safety, and glory of the country. From this able report, we must be permitted to make one

or two extracts:

The important engine of national strength and national security, which is formed by a naval force, has hitherto, in the opinion of the committee, been treated with a neglect highly impolitic, or supported with a spirit so languid, as while it has preserved the existence of the establishment, has had the effect of loading it with the imputations of wasteful expense and comparative inefficiency.

"No system has hitherto been adopted, which, though limited by the dispensing security of the times, and the just economy of our republican institutions, was yet calculated to enlarge, gradually, with the progress of the nation's growth in population, in wealth, and in commerce, or expand with an energy proportioned to a crisis of particular danger.

"That a naval protection is particularly secured to the interest of commerce by our great political compact, is proved by that part of the Constitution which expressly gave to Congress the power "to provide and maintain a navy ;" and is confirmed by the history of the times, and the particular circumstances which led to its institution; but it is alike secured by the fundamental nature of all government, which extends to every interest under its authority a protection (if within the nation's means) which is adequate to its preservation; nor is this protection called for only by the interest of a particular description of men, or a particular tract of country. A navy is as necessary to protect the mouths of the Mississippi, the channel through which the produce of the agriculture of the Western States must pass, to become valuable, as the bays of the Chesapeake and Delaware, and more necessary than on the shores of the Eastern or Southern States."

After stating that two objections had been strongly urged, viz: 1st. The great expense of a naval establishment, and 2ly. The inability of the country to maintain a navy "against the power of Great Britain." The committee say

"The first objection appears to your committee to be founded on a mistaken assumption of the fact, for, in their opinion, a naval force, within due limits, and under proper regulations, will constitute the cheapest defence of the nation.

"The other objection your committee suppose to have been founded on an imperfect examination of the subject; for those who are best able to form an opinion on this matter, from congenial professional pursuits as well as a particular knowledge of the marine of Great Britain, declare, that she cannot, at any time, spare more than a very limited force for the American station; one that can be effectually resisted by an establishment which may be supported by this government without a great direct expense; which, in its effects, will greatly more than reimburse to the national wealth the sums which may be drawn from it for this object; protect our harbours from insult, our coasting trade from spoliations, and give us the dominion of a sea on our borders which we ought to call our own, and defend with our cannon.

"With this view your committee have not considered the subject with regard only to the practicable and advisable preparation for the pre

* In the opinion of the committee, (in which they were supported by officers of the navy,) it would be necessary to enable a British fleet to maintain the command of the American coast, that a number of vessels should be employed on that service at least twice, and, perhaps three times as great as our own. The distance from Europe, the difficulty of procuring supplies,-the necessity of frequent reliefs, and the numerous stations on which British fleets must be kept, demonstrated in their opinion, that Great Britain could never employ against the United States a sufficient force to keep the command of our coasts in the face of an American squadron of twelve ships of the line, and twenty frigates. This, according to their calculations, would require a larger fleet than had ever been brought to act together, even when "the empire of the seas" was supposed to be at stake. It may be well doubted, however, whether these calculations are at all applicable to the existing state of things, when, by the creation of a powerful naval station at Bermuda, the British naval establishment has been brought to our very doors. This is a subject worthy of the early and serious consideration of our government.

sent momentous crisis, which, whatever it may be, must be greatly inadequate for the reasons already stated; but the object of the committee is to recommend a system which shall look to futurity, and though limited by the present situation and means of the country, having a capacity to be enlarged in proportion to the growing wealth, commerce, and population of the nation." [The committee then add-]"To restrain the great energies of such a number as this country possesses of the best seamen the world ever beheld, and such a mass of tonnage as Great Britain herself has not boasted more than twenty years, will as much transcend the feeble efforts of the politician as it would be beyond his power to create them. They are formed by the high behest of beneficent nature, nurtured by our wise, free and happy public institutions, and can only perish with the latter.

"Your committee, however, admit, that it will neither be politic nor practicable to swell the naval establishment of this country to the size of our desires or of our necessities; but a gradual increase of it, is, in their opinion, within the most limited means, and within the obvious policy of the government: and, in attempting this, some present addition will be made (too little-much too little, they lament) to the best strength of the nation, as a measure of preparation for this crisis of danger.

"With these observations, and with a full, detailed, and useful report of the Secretary of the Navy, in reply to questions propounded by your committee, they beg leave to recommend, that all the vessels of war of the United States, not now in service, which are worthy of repair, be immediately repaired, fitted out, and put into actual service."

In the bill which accompanied this report, no authority was given to build ships of the line. It will be found, on examining Mr. Cheves' speech, however, in support of the system recommended by the committee, that the force which it was contemplated to create, and of which the frigates authorized by this bill, were only a part, consisted of twelve ships of the line, and twenty frigates, besides floating batteries, and other vessels of an inferior class.

In examining the situation of the navy at this period, our attention is arrested by the very low condition into which it had been suffered to fall. From the official statements which accompany the report, it appears that we had but three frigates of the first class in the navy,-that but five vessels, of any description were in commission, viz:

and, that we owned, in the whole, but ten, seven of which were

of the second class, and of inferior force,-all wanting extensive

repairs, and two of them, (the New-York and the Boston) were found, on examination, unworthy of repair, and condemned accordingly. Such was the state to which the navy had been reduced, and from which it has, in the course of fourteen years (during three of which, the nation was engaged in a war with the greatest maritime nation in the world) been raised up to its present flourishing condition, by perseverance in the wise and liberal policy then adopted.

At the next session, the subject of the navy was again brought before Congress, and an act was passed (approved 2d January, 1813) "to increase the navy of the United States," by which the President was authorized to cause to be built four ships, of not less than 74 guns, and six ships, of not less than 44 guns, and the sum of two millions and a half of dollars was appropriated for this purpose. On the 3d of March, of the same year, a supplementary act was passed authorizing the construction of six sloops of war, and also any number of armed vessels which the public service might require on the lakes: and the President was, at the same time, authorized to sell so many of the gunboats, as in his judgment might be no longer necessary to be retained,- --a power which was the death-warrant to these ves

sels.

On looking back to the conduct of the navy during the war with Great Britain, the mind is dazzled at the surpassing brilliancy of its career. Whatever doubts had existed of the capacity of the United States to maintain a navy in the presence of other maritime nations of the world, and especially of GreatBritain, were dispelled forever.

In our former wars, we had to contend with the ships of nations not distinguished for their naval achievements, but now we were brought to cope with that power, which having triumphed over the fleets of France, of Spain, and of Holland, claimed to be "the mistress of the seas." All that skill or experience could achieve in the construction or management of vessels of war, Great Britain had attained—while the lofty spirit of her officers, excited by an unbroken chain of victories, had by a rich harvest of honors and rewards been carried to the highest pitch. These gave advantages so decided, that with the exception perhaps of our own naval officers, the expectation was almost universal, both at home and abroad, that on equal terms we would probably be defeated. The action between the Constitution and the Guerriere, opened the eyes of the world to the truth, that America could cope with Great Britain, even "in her own element," and from that hour the charm of British invincibility on the ocean was finally dissolved. Fortunately, the decision of the

great question was not left to depend on a single action, over the result of which, doubts might have been thrown, by attributing it to some of those accidental causes which the British naval writers have showed themselves so ingenious in urging as excuses for their defeats. The actions between the United States and the Macedonian, the Constitution and the Java, the Wasp and Frolic, and especially the victories of Perry and McDonough, on Erie and Champlain, which following in rapid succession, has, we are persuaded, fully settled the question, not only in America, but on the continent of Europe. We believe that among all candid men, even in Great Britain, it is now conceded that the American navy, in the materials, form and construction of her ships, the skill and gallantry of her officers, the sterling qualities of her seamen, and above all, in the perfection of her gunnery, is in no respect inferior, and in some superior to their own. The fact that the British Government has been engaged ever since the peace, in re-organizing her naval establishment, nearly on the model of our own, seems to us to be an official recognition of all that we have ever claimed on this subject.

The peace of 1815, found in the heart and the mind of the country, but one intense and absorbing feeling in favour of the navy. It had fought itself into the affections of the people. All doubt was at an end-all distrust forever banished-and, thenceforward, the struggle of all parties seems to have been, who could do most for this establishment, now the cherished favourite of the Government, and the people of the United States. The first fruit of this feeling, was the act of 29th April, 1816, which appropriated "one million of dollars per annum, for eight years, for the gradual increase of the navy;" and which directed the President to cause to be built, in addition to the vessels heretofore ordered, "eight ships of the line, and nine frigates of 44 guns ;" which, with those of the same description already authorized, would give to the navy, twelve ships of the line, and twenty frigates, exclusive of sloops of war, and other inferior vessels.

It is worthy of remark, that public opinion had now undergone so thorough a revolution in relation to the navy, that it was found impossible to keep the zeal of the representatives of the people in its behalf, within reasonable bounds. The appropriation of a million of dollars per annum, for eight years, was found from experience to be greater than could be advantageously applied; and after expending five millions, the remaining three millions were divided into annual appropriations of five hundred thousand dollars for six years. It will be seen, on