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examining the documents submitted to Congress, at the commencement of the war, that the question of what description of vessels our navy ought to consist, in order to give to it the greatest possible efficiency, at the least possible expense, was fully considered, and decided by the executive and the legislature. From the clearest statements and calculations, it was was proved that ships of the line, for all purposes of defence, for all purposes indeed, requiring the concentration of strength, are incomparably the cheapest and most efficient force, while fast sailing frigates and sloops of war are to be preferred, for the purpose of crippling the commerce and resources of an enemy. To make our readers acquainted with the reason and nature of this distinction, we will refer to the report of the Secretary of the Navy, and the statements of the officers who were examined by the committee. From these valuable documents, our limits will not suffer us to make extracts. We can

not avoid, however, copying a few paragraphs from the statement of Commodore Stewart, an officer, who, in the capture of two British sloops of war at the same time, beautifully illustrated the correctness of his principles, by reducing his theories to practice.

"The relative force of a seventy-four gun ship and a large frigate, is nearly as one to three.*

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"By the above comparison, it appears, that a seventy-four gun ship discharges at one round, 3,224 lbs. of shot, and a frigate of the first class, 1,350 lbs. It therefore clearly proves the relative force, in point of metal, to be one to three, or thereabouts. When this circumstance is considered jointly with the following, it must appear to others, as it does to me, that as you increase the class of the ship, you increase the proportion of one to three, and diminish proportionally the expense of building, equipping and supporting them in commission, which may easily be established by estimates from the department, and the experience of all other maritime nations. Ships of the line are much stronger in scantling, thicker in the sides and bottom, less penetrable to shot, and, consequently, less liable to be torn, or battered to pieces or sunk.

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"I am aware that some are of opinion, that a more divided force is better calculated for action, from the advantageous position that would be given to a part. Suppose three frigates of 50 guns, were to undertake to battle a seventy-four gun ship, and that two of them were to occupy the quarter and stern of the seventy-four, (this is placing them in the most favourable position) the other frigate engaged abreast-every thing would depend on the time the frigate abreast could maintain that position, to enable the other two to act with effect on the stern and quarBut it must appear evident to all acquainted with the two classes of ships, that the frigate abreast could not withstand the fire of so heavy and compact a battery many minutes, and, in all probability, would be dismasted or sunk the second broadside. This would decide the fate of the other two.

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"The relative efficiency of large frigates and sloops of war is at least one to two, &c.

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"Ships of the line then are best calculated for the defence of our coast, and for the protection of our inward and outward commerce, when engaged in war with a foreign maritime power. It cannot be supposed that such a power would send to our coasts, frigates and smaller cruisers. Their first object will be, to restrain by ships of the line, our frigates, &c. from departing and preying upon their commerce; their next object will be, to send their smaller cruisers in pursuit of our commerce, and, by having their ships of the line parading on our coast, and threatening our most exposed sea-port towns, and preventing the departure of our small cruisers, they will be capturing whatever commerce may have escaped theirs, and re-capturing whatever prizes may have fallen into our hands. Thirdly, they can, at any time, withdraw their ships of the line, should a more important object require it, without hazarding much on their part, and return in suffici nt time to shut out our cruisers that may have departed during their absence. Fourthly, they can, at all times, consult their convenience in point of time and numbers, and will incur no expense and risk of transports for provisions and water, but go and procure their supplies at pleasure, and return to their stations ere their absence is known to us. For the prosecution of the present war, a mixed naval force of the following description is, in my opinion, the best calculated.

"Ships of the line to rate 74, and mount 88 guns.

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Frigates to rate 40, and mount 50 guns.

"Corvettes or sloops of war to rate 16, and mount 20 guns."

We had almost omitted to notice the Algerine war of 1815, which the author of "The Travelling Bachelor," calls "an episode" in our naval history. It cannot have escaped the recollection of any of our readers, that immediately after the ratification of the treaty of peace with Great Britain in 1815, war was declared against Algiers, and a squadron, consisting of three frigates and a few smaller vessels, was despatched to the Mediterranean under the command of Commodore Decatur. In less than thirty days from the time the American squadron sailed from New-York, a Turkish frigate and a brig had been captured, and their admiral killed; and in a few weeks Decatur returned to the United States, having concluded a satisfactory treaty with Algiers, and obtained redress for depredations committed by Tripoli and Tunis. What a contrast does the result of this expedition present, to the spectacle exhibited by the American Government on a former occasion, vainly negotiating for years to obtain the release of our captives, and the restoration of our ships!

From this period, the navy regularly progressed, until the year 1827, when the whole appropriation of eight millions of dollars was exhausted. The number of ships then built or building, was as follows, viz:

12 Ships of the Line,

16 Frigates,

16 Sloops of War,

Besides Schooners and Steam Batteries.

It had now been ascertained, that during a period of profound peace, the protection of our commerce did not require the keeping in commission a greater number of vessels than one ship of the line, six frigates, ten sloops of war, and a few schooners.

The plan was therefore adopted, of finishing and keeping under cover (where experience has proved that ship timber can be preserved for any length of time) all the vessels thereafter to be built, ready to be launched and put into service at the shortest notice. It is much to be regretted that this plan had not been sooner adopted, as it would have kept in a state of perfect soundness, several of our vessels of the first class, which are now lying in ordinary, undergoing a process which will make it necessary in a few years to rebuild them entirely. In this state of things, the question came up before Congress during the session of 1827, what further measures ought to be adopted in relation to the naval establishment? It is worthy of remark, that while the Government was, with indiscriminate zeal, appropriating millions to the building of ships, no proVOL. II.-NO. 4. 48

vision was made for dry-docks, rail-ways, or any of the auxiliaries of a naval establishment, which the experience of all maritime nations had proved to be indispensably necessary. These subjects, however, were now fully considered, and a bill was reported by the naval committee of the Senate, which proposed to appropriate five hundred thousand dollars per annum, for six years, to "the gradual improvement of the navy." The objects designated in the bill were-1st. The laying up ship timber for future use. 2ly. The construction of dry-docks. 3ly. A marine rail-way. 4ly. The improvement of navy yards. 5ly. The establishment of a naval academy;—all of which received the sanction of Congress and of the Executive, except the naval academy, which was lost in the House of Representatives. The views of the committee on the several matters embraced in this bill, are fully explained in the speech of their chairman, Mr. Hayne.

We subjoin several extracts from this speech, as the most recent exposition of the naval policy of the United States :

"In the regular progress of time and of events, the point to which the fathers of the naval policy, in the first instance looked, has been attained-that is to say, the creation of a navy, supposed by them to be adequate to the command of our coasts in time of war. The question now presents itself, shall we stop here?

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"No one can look at the map of the United States, without perceiving that the true defence of this country is pointed out by the finger of God. A navy will keep your enemies at the door, save the country from invasion, and your soil from being polluted by the foot of an enemy. As, in the progress of human affairs, wars must come, we ought to be so prepared for that event, as to shield our citizens from its horrors. Fortifications, standing armies and navies, are the usual means resorted to for this purpose. But the extent of our country forbids our resorting to the former, except at a few exposed points; large standing armies are not only immensely expensive, but are dangerous to liberty, and alien to the feelings and habits of our people. Our great reliance, therefore, in all emergencies, must be on the militia; but, to give them time to rally and buckle on their armour, to save a needless waste of blood and treasure, it is of the last importance to have the means of arresting your enemy at the very threshold, and of keeping your bays, inlets and cities, and all the great avenues leading into the country, effectually guarded against his approach. This is the appropriate duty of a navy. The public ships now owned by the United States, would employ, in time of war, upwards of twenty thousand men-men disciplined by their habits and pursuits in peace, for the service to which they would be applied in The number of seamen in the merchant service of the United States, is not less than seventy or eighty thousand; and if you had ships in which to employ them, under experienced and skilful officers, I cannot doubt that they would add to the strength of the country at

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least as much as an army of one hundred thousand regular troops. The ease with which a fleet can be removed from place to place-(they move, sir, "on the wings of the wind")—the rapidity of concentration on any given point-the aid which can be rendered by floating batteries in the defence of cities, and of troops on shore-all demonstrate that a navy is the appropriate defence of this country. That it is the cheapest, is manifest from the obvious consideration, that nearly the whole of the seamen that will man your fleets in time of war, are disciplined and maintained in peace without costing you a single cent; and, that their services can be commanded the very moment they are wanted. You possess, indeed, in these men, a regular force of the very best description, maintained almost without cost, and what is of equal importance, in no degree dangerous to liberty. Though standing armies have often overthrown the liberties of their country, navies have always been their defence. Our distance from Europe, gives, also, to our navy, a most decided advantage in carrying on a defensive warfare; and when to all this is added, the utility of a navy in the protection of our commerce in peace, as well as the facility it will afford us (when it shall be sufficiently matured) of carrying on offensive operations against an enemy on the ocean itself, I trust that nothing need be added on this topic.

"I proceed now to consider, in their order, the various objects to which this fund is to be applied.

"I have said sir, that it is not at present deemed necessary to increase the number of our vessels of war. These are not only adequate to the protection of our commerce in peace, but are as numerous as can be well preserved, in the situation in which they are placed. But, looking to the future, it is obvious that the time is at hand, when an additional number of ships will become necessary. In a country like ours, which doubles its population in twenty-five years, it is most manifest that, if we mean to keep up our establishments, and adapt them to the growth and condition of the country, we must be constantly progressing. To stop short in our course, is to retrograde. If we do not want new ships now, it will become necessary to build them in a very few years. But ships, to be valuable and permanent, and to be built with a due regard to economy, can only be constructed of seasoned timber. You must look far ahead, therefore, in order to lay the foundation of a navy, commensurate with the increasing population and resources of the United States. The live oak of the Southern States (beyond all comparison the best ship-timber in the world) derives all its durability from its being duly seasoned. It is a waste, without excuse, of this most precious material, to work it up in a green state; and, wherever this has been done, our ships have become liable to sudden decay, and there has been a certain loss, both of time and of money. Oak timber of any kind, but especially the live oak, may, with proper care, be preserved for an indefinite length of time.

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I come now to the dry docks, which form the next object of this bill. And here I must begin by saying, that it is not a little surprising that a country, possessing a navy of twelve ships of the line, and twenty frigates, should be without one of these necessary appendages of all na

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