H.R. 547 A. Given the practical effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Timbers, there really exist no capital crimes today. I am in whole-hearted support of the amendment of the code to provide for the substitution of "first degree murder" and "forcible rape" for "offense punishable by death." Since, however, all rape except carnal knowledge is probably "forcible" I would urge consideration of “Rape while armed." B. I support the concept of a judicial officer being able to raise "sua sponte" the issue of detention. I wonder in the last analysis if such an amendment would be merely a "Pyrrhic" victory. Since the prosecutor presents the evidence necessary to establish the need for detention (s)he may thwart the intent of the amendment by refusing to present evidence. It is precisely because the Prosecutor has failed to request detention hearings where they were indicated to be appropriate that we are now considering further amendments to the law. C. A ten day "preliminary" detention period as described would seem perfectly logical for those on "probation, parole, or mandatory release pending completion of a sentence." For those who have not yet been convicted of an offense I think the standard should be different. For those accused of a crime the period should be immediate or certainly no longer than 72 hours. The prosecutor may need some time to "gather evidence sufficient to persuade a judicial officer to detain someone without bail "but in the case of those who have been accused and not yet convicted the burden on all of us should be greater than for those already convicted of crimes. D. I believe that increasing the time within which a trial must take place or the release of a person detained under this section should occur from 60 to 90 days is unwarranted. I say this for 3 reasons: 1. No one has proved that cases of this nature require 90 days to bring to trial. 2. If the persons detained are so dangerous that they are detained without bail at all-in violation of traditional if not Constitutional standards-then a very high burden is imposed to see that they are tried, convicted, and imprisoned as soon as possible. 3. Most states and the federal system strive to bring cases to trial within 60 days. The District of Columbia was exempted from the 60 day requirement of the Speedy Trial Act of 1975 because it was unnecessary. Chief Judge Harold Greene of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia testified that it was unnecessary to impose a 60 day limit because felony trials took place well within the prescribed period. There then appears no need to increase the time period without further statistics proving need or without a real test period. H.R. 484 A. I am in in general agreement that the Bail Reform Act of 1966 should be modified along the general line of the D.C. Bail Act amendments of 1970 by permitting the consideration of "danger" in fixing conditions of release and by detaining without bail certain defendants. I believe that such amendments should be coupled with the complete elimination of surety bond and the substitution of deposit bond in lieu thereof. B. I believe the category of defendants who might be treated in accordance with proposed detention provisions is far too broad. Many of the "protections" against wholesale detention of inappropriate persons which are contained in the present D.C. Code are lacking from this Bill. At a minimum they should be included. H.R. 2306 Same comments as those on H.R. 484. H.R. 4311 Same comments as those on H.R. 484. The substitution of any law which erodes traditional practices is a difficult process. In 1969 and 1970 I was adamantly opposed to the introduction of the issue of "danger" into the pretrial release process and even more opposed to the concept of outright pretrial detention. As time has gone by, however, the continued detention of pretrial accused under the sub rosa context of money bond high enough to insure appearance at trial has convinced me that the issue of dan ger and community safety must be addressed openly and honestly. I commend this committee's efforts to accomplish the elimination of hypocrisy in the bail decision. Mr. MAZZOLI. Thank you, sir. The committee stands adjourned until tomorrow. [Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., Tuesday, May 17, 1977, the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene Wednesday, May 18, 1977, at 10 a.m., Longworth House Office Building]. PRETRIAL RELEASE OR DETENTION WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 1977 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Romano L. Mazzoli (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Mazzoli and Risenhoover, and Delegate Fauntroy. Also present: Daniel Hall, subcommittee counsel; James T. Clark, legislative counsel; Daniel Freeman, counsel; Barbara W. Hayes, minority chief counsel; Harry Singleton, deputy minority counsel; and J. Dent Farr, legislative assistant. Mr. MAZZOLI. The subcommittee will come to order. We have as our first witness today, the corporation counsel for the District of Columbia, Mr. John Risher. Mr. Risher, we welcome you. I guess I am constrained to mention that the House has gone in session today at 10 o'clock; and, of course, we had not anticipated this when our hearings were set. In an effort to develop our testimony without too much difficulty and disconcertion to the people, your statement, of course, is a part of the record; and perhaps you might want to give, in a sense, a summary of it that might facilitate our developing the testimony without having too many interruptions. As I expect, we probably will be having a rollcall or a quorum in the not distant future. Thank you. You may proceed. Mr. RISHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I had not been prepared for the request that I give an abbreviate or summary version of my statement, and I fear if I try to do thatMr. MAZZOLI. Why don't you proceed and read your statement, if that is the way you prefer. Mr. RISHER. Thank you very much, sir. STATEMENT OF JOHN R. RISHER, JR., ESQ., CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Mr. RISHER. I am quite pleased to have been afforded the opportunity, again, to appear before this subcommitte to testify with respect to the subject of the pretrial detention of persons charged with the commission of crimes in the District of Columbia. On June 22 of last year, within a few months after becoming corporation counsel, I submitted a statement to this subcommittee regarding the same subject. [The text of my statement appears at pp. 296-98 of this committee's hearings "Pretrial Release or Detention." 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976, trial No. 94-21).] As I then noted, the existing law-the Bail Reform Act-provides a mechanism by which the U.S. attorney may seek the pretrial detention of persons arrested for particularly serious offenses. However, as I also observed, the U.S. attorney, as of that date, had sought to utilize that mechanism only on an average of once a month during the 5 years that the legislation then had been in effect. USE OF BAIL REFORM ACT PROCEDURES In that connection, I stressed the importance of the U.S. attorney's available himself, to a far greater extent, of the existing provisions of the Bail Reform Act, and noted a then increased resort by the U.S. attorney's office to the use of the act. Since that date, as recent statistics confirm, instead of invoking these provisions on an average of only once a month, the U.S. attorney's office has invoked them on an average of three times a month, and has been extraordinarily successful on almost each occasion. Surely this fact of recent history is extremely persuasive evidence that the Bail Reform Act is not nearly as ineffective a measure as was contended last year, by those who were urging that it was in need of substantial expansion. CUSTODIAN PROGRAMS A second factor which I stressed was the need to strengthen the thirdparty custodian programs envisioned by the act. It was and remains by view that third-party custodians need to do more than merely record the name and address of defendants released unto them. In other words, the role of the third-party custodian is not only to assure the presence of the defendant at each scheduled judicial proceeding: the third-party custodian also has a duty to assure the proper conduct of the defendant-that is the protection of the community-by offering necessary counseling services, pending the completion of the judicial process. Last year I had reason to believe that certain third-party custodians were not as vigilant in this regard as might have been expected. Thus, as I then noted, with the assistance of the chief judge of the superior court, I had convened a hearing panel for the purpose of reviewing all of the existing third-party custodian programs in the District of Columbia. As a result of that hearing, tighter standards for third-party custodians were drafted, standards which since have been adopted by both the Board of Judges of the Superior Court and the Criminal Justice Coordinating Board, of which I am chairman. Consequently. there now is what I believe a far more effective third-party custodian program-one which I must assume provides continuous communication with defendants awaiting trial, providing necessary counseling and job opportunities-and thereby assures a greater deterrence to |