not a tax, but that a requirement that the tax must be paid in advance is merely a taxing provision and does not render the statute unconstitutional as being a license law.1 § 1213. Constitutional prohibition.- In some states the principle of prohibition as a method of regulating the sale of liquors is embodied in the constitution itself, with authority to the legislature to provide means for enforcing the regulation. Under such a provision the legislature may carry out the constitutional prohibition by statutes providing different means for accomplishing the object. But a constitutional prohibition will not be self-executing, and until the legislature provides means for its execution, a previous license law is not to be deemed repealed. Such a constitutional provision does not deprive the legislature of the power which it previously had to pass a prohibitory law. Where the constitution authorizes the legislature to regulate or prohibit the sale, it limits the power which the legislature otherwise would have had to exercise authority with respect to the subject other than by regulation or prohibition of the sale, and under such constitutional provision a statute punishing the keeping for sale is not valid." § 1214. Sale by public agent.- In a few states the plan has been tried of prohibiting all sales by private parties, and vesting the right to sell for proper purposes in some public officer or agent who shall have no direct personal interest in the business." In South Carolina a recent statute vests in the state the entire and exclusive right to bring into the state and keep or sell intoxicating liquors. As to its interference with interstate commerce, this act has already been mentioned; as to its constitutionality in other respects, the views of the supreme court of the state have not been uniform. At first it was held that the act was unconstitutional upon various grounds, the principal of which were that it abridges the individual rights of the citizens to engage in the business, and is not a police regulation. But in the later cases the constitutionality of the act has been upheld as a police regulation. In each of the principal cases the supreme court has been divided. § 1215. Constitutionality of provisions as to evidence.The difficulty of securing a conviction under the liquor laws by reason of subterfuges resorted to in carrying on the business has led to the adoption in various states of special rules affecting the evidence in such prosecutions. The constitutionality of these special provisions has been frequently called in question, but in a general way these statutes have been upheld, although they place burdens upon the defendant which he is not compelled to bear in other prosecutions, if they leave him a fair opportunity for defense. Thus, it is held that the legislature may make admissible certain classes of hearsay evidence, or provide that upon proof of certain suspicious circumstances a presumption shall arise that defendant is guilty, thereby throwing upon him the burden of overcoming such a presumption. Thus, the fact of delivery, or possession, or drinking upon the premises, may be made prima facie evidence of guilt." It is constitutional to make the general reputation of the place admissible evidence to prove the illegal character of the business done there sufficient to warrant a conviction, and so long as the discretion of the jury in weighing such evidence is not interfered with, this is constitutional. But if the statute leaves to the jury no discretion, but attempts to make the bad reputation of the place exclusive evidence of defendant's guilt, it will be unconstitutional as interfering with due process of law. It is competent for the legislature to throw upon defendant the burden of showing that he is duly licensed to make sales." So it is constitutional to throw upon the physician who prescribes 4S. v. Beswick, 13 R. I. 211; S. v. Kartz, 13 R. I. 528. But in Connecticut a similar statute was given a somewhat different interpretation and was upheld: S. v. Morgan, 40 Conn. 44; S. v. Thomas, 47 Conn. 546. C. v. Tuttle, 12 Cush. 502; S. v. Higgins, 13 R. I. 330; S. v. Mellor, 13 R. I. 666; S. v. Buckley, 40 Conn. 246; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623. And see infra, § 1281. intoxicating liquors as a medicine, the burden of showing that the patient needed the liquor for that purpose.' 1216. Construction of statutes.-The only question of any special interest arising in the construction of liquor laws is as to the effect of the adoption in successive statutes of conflicting methods of dealing with the subject. Thus, a localoption statute may succeed a licensing statute, and, of course, if it permits the sale in localities, the restrictions of the licensing statute may thereby be removed; while, on the other hand, if under the local-option statute sales in particular districts are prohibited which before might have been made under the licensing statute, the penalties of the license statute may still be enforced as an additional method of punishment. It is impossible to discuss the questions which have arisen in particular cases, as they involve the provisions of special statutes, but the cases cited in the note are in point on the general question." So it was held that a provision prohibiting sales to minors was repealed by a local-option law abolishing entirely the license system and substituting stringent prohibition. In general it may be stated that regulations not inconsistent with each other may be enforced, although they are not parts of the same system, but seek to obtain the object of regulation by different means; but if the different systems are wholly distinct and apparently intended to be exclusive, there cannot be prosecution under both systems." Where there is a state regulation and also a power of regulation given to cities, the question may arise as to whether the regulations by ordinances 1 C. v. Minor, 88 Ky. 422. 2 Robertson v. S., 5 Tex. Ap. 155; Boone v. S., 12 Tex. Ap. 184; S. v. Turner, 18 S. C. 103; Kohlbrunner v. S., 67 Miss. 368; Boswell v. S., 70 Miss. 395; Butler v. S., 25 Fla. 347; S. v. Smiley, 101 N. C. 709; S. v. Martin, 3 Heisk. 487; Garner v. S., 8 Blackf. 568; Baird v. S., 52 Ark. 326; Blackwell v. S., 45 Ark. 90; Mazzia v. S., 51 Ark. 177; S. v. Orton, 41 Ark. 305; S. v. Cathey, 41 Ark. 308; C. v. Weller, 14 Bush, 218; C. v. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70; S. v. Benjamin, 2 Oreg. 125. S. v. Yewell, 63 Md. 120; T. v. are required, the same act of illegal Cain, 8 W. Va. 720; Teague v. S., 39 are exclusive of the state legislation or concurrent with it; this will depend upon the language of the statute, for if the delegation of power to the city is to make additional regulations, the state law will be enforced in the city; but if the power of regulation is placed exclusively in the city, the state statutes will be inoperative as to such city so far as sales are authorized under city ordinances; although, if a sale is not authorized under a city ordinance, there may be punishment under the state law as well. If the provisions of the ordinance are inconsistent with the state law and beyond the authority of the city they will, of course, be void. The adoption of local option in a particular locality may suspend in that locality the general state law. If, as between two statutes, the later one repeals the former by implication, it will prevent prosecutions for offenses already committed under the former statute unless there is some form of saving clause. Where, by local option, the provisions of the general liquor law are suspended and not repealed, a person may be convicted after such suspension for violation of the law committed before the adoption of local option. Indeed, any superseding statute which leaves the prior statute in force for some purposes will leave in existence all the laws relating to the enforcement of the prior act. 1 Ambrose v. S., 6 Ind. 351; Sloan v. S., 8 Blackf. 361; Gardner v. P., 20 Ill. 430; Corbett v. T., 1 Wash. T. 431; Sanders v. S., 34 Neb. 872; S. v. Harris, 50 Minn. 128; Hill v. Dalton, 72 Ga. 314; Angerhoffer v. S., 15 Tex. Ap. 613. 2 C. v. Luck, 2 B. Mon. 296; S. v. Wheeler, 27 Minn. 76; Phillips v. Tecumseh, 5 Neb. 312; Hetzer v. P., 4 Colo. 45; Craddock v. S., 18 Tex. Ap. 567. As to the question of construction, see Woodward v. Turnbull, 4 Ill. 1. 3 S. v. Pfeifer, 26 Minn. 175; S. v. Fleckenstein, 26 Minn. 177; S. v. Langdon, 29 Minn. 393; S. v. Langdon, 31 Minn. 316. Mueller, 81 Pa. St. 127. And see 6 Halfin v. S., 5 Tex. Ap. 212; Boone v. S., 12 Tex. Ap. 184; Freese v. S., 14 Tex. Ap. 31; Prather v. S., 14 Tex. Ap. 453; Dawson v. S., 25 Tex. Ap. 670. By special provision the repeal of prohibition in a county may not have the effect of releasing offenders who have violated the prohibitory law while in force: Ezzell v. S., 29 Tex. Ap. 521. On the other hand, a conviction for illegal sales is good although after the offense and before the trial a law was passed authorizing such sales: Acree v. C., 13 Bush, 353. 7P. v. Wade, 101 Mich. 89; Winter 4 Adams v. Albany, 29 Ga. 56; S. v. ton v. S., 65 Miss. 238. Winkelmeier, 35 Mo. 103. 8 Sanders v. C., 117 Pa. St. 293; S. v. 'P. v. Murphy, 93 Mich. 41; C. v. Funk, 27 Minn. 318. § 1217. Concurrent effect of federal, state and city provisions. By the federal statute providing for the raising of internal revenue, retail liquor dealers are required to pay a license, but the possession of such license does not exempt the holder from the operation of state laws regulating or even prohibiting the sale of liquors, the federal statute being the means only of raising revenue and not a police regulation,1 which would be beyond the power of congress. There are also federal statutes passed in the exercise of the power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, prohibiting the introduction of spirituous liquor into the Indian country; and the payment of a revenue tax for a license to sell liquors in a particular district does not authorize the seller to introduce such liquors into the Indian country, although it is within such district. Furthermore, in the exercise of the power of the federal government to legislate for the territory of Alaska, the importation of liquor into that territory, or the sale of liquor therein, is prohibited. As pointed out in the preceding section, there may be difficulty in determining whether a state statute regulating the sale of liquors continues in force in a city which, under authority given to it, passes ordinances respecting the same matter. In general, the power given to a city will not be deemed exclusive, but must be exercised in subordination to the general laws of the state. 1 McGuire v. C., 3 Wall. 387; Pervear v. C., 5 Wall. 475; C. v. Thorniley, 6 Allen, 445; C. v. O'Donnell, 8 Allen, 548; C. v. Sanborn, 116 Mass. 61; S. v. Delano, 54 Me. 501; S. v. Lillard, 78 Mo. 136; Pierson v. S., 39 Ark. 219; S. v. McCleary, 17 Ia. 44; S. v. Carney, 20 Ia. 82; S. v. Stutz, 20 Ia. 488; S. v. Baughman, 20 Ia. 497; S. v. Downs, 116 N. C. 1064; S. v. Hazell, 100 N. C. 471; S. v. Joyner, 81 N. C. 534; In re Jordan, 49 Fed. R. 238. The holder of a government license has no right to sell liquors on a steamboat plying on a navigable river without complying with the state laws: Boyd v. S., 12 Lea, 687; C. v. Sheckels, 78 Va. 36. The federal courts have no jurisdiction of a violation of a state law by the holder of Yet the city may impose addi a federal license: C. v. Casey, 12 Allen, 214. As to the effect of a federal license as evidence of illegal selling or keeping for sale, see infra, § 1280. 2 In re Boyd, 49 Fed. R. 48; U. S. v. Carr, 2 Mont. T. 234. This does not, however, prevent transportation of liquors through the Indian country: U. S. v. Twenty-nine Gallons of Whiskey, 45 Fed. R. 847. As to regulation of sales to Indians, see infra, § 1263. 3 U. S. v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 108 U. S. 491. 4 Nelson v. U. S., 30 Fed. R. 112; U. S. v. Warwick, 51 Fed. R. 280; In re Moore, 66 Fed. R. 947. 5 S. v. Harper, 58 Mo. 530; Sweet v. Wabash, 41 Ind. 7; Loeb v. Attica, 82 Ind. 175; S. v. Peterson, 38 |