§ 786. Possession with intent.-The possession of counterfeit money is criminal only as coupled with some unlawful intent, and such intent must be established to make a prima facie case.' There are two classes of criminal possession as defined by statute, the one consisting in the having possession with intent to pass for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud, the other in having possession with intent to put into circulation, although no fraud upon the person to whom the counterfeit is passed is intended. The latter covers the case of those who deal in counterfeit money. In the first class it is necessary to show that the intention was to pass the counterfeit as genuine or true. But if the offense is made to consist simply in having in possession with intent to pass, the fraudulent purpose as to the one to whom the counterfeit is to be passed is immaterial. It is not necessary that the intention be to pass within the state; at least this is true as to bills of a bank situated within the state, as the passing of counterfeits of its bills anywhere would tend to defraud it. Continued possession of counterfeit money may be shown as tending to prove guilty knowledge; and, in general, the intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the possession. So evidence of a fraudulent sale is competent to support a charge of fraudulent possession. Whether it is necessary to allege the criminal intention in such cases will depend on statute.9 8 6 § 787. Representation of genuineness.-The offense of uttering involves a representation of the genuineness of the in 1 Brown v. P., 9 Ill. 439; Fergus v. S., 6 Yerg. 345; Owen v. S., 5 Sneed, 493. v. Jarvis, Dears. 552; Rex v. Fuller, Russ. & Ry. 308. 8 U. S. v. Biebusch, 1 McCrary, 42. 2 Bevington v. S., 2 Ohio St. 161; It is not necessary to prove the purP. v. Stewart, 4 Mich. 655. pose of the possession if it appears P. v. Stewart, 4 Mich. 655; Gabe that defendant knowingly had the v. S., 6 Ark. 519. 4 Hopkins v. C., 3 Met. 460, 464; C. v. Davis, 11 Gray, 4; Wilkinson v. S., 10 Ind. 372. 5 C. v. Cone, 2 Mass. 132; Spence v. S., 8 Blackf. 281; Clark v. C., 16 B. Mon. 206. 6 Harrison's Case, 2 Lewin, 118. counterfeit in possession and secretly kept it: Sasser v. S., 13 Ohio, 453. 9 Sizemore v. S., 3 Head, 26. The indictment may follow the language of the statute and need not describe the elements of the crime of counterfeiting: Long v. S., 10 Tex. Ap. 186. strument, and without that the offense is not committed, but the representation may be implied from the circumstances.1 § 788. The intent.-There must be an intent to defraud by the deceit and falsity exercised in making the instrument appear genuine. It is not necessary, however, that the intent be to defraud any particular person or corporation, and therefore the name of the person intended to be defrauded need not be alleged. To exhibit an engraving of a forged note as a pattern or specimen of skill is not criminal. So the accused may show that he received the counterfeit accidentally and in the usual course of business." But as in other cases where criminal intent is necessary the intent may be inferred from the act. There may be a joint uttering by which wrongful act and intent are combined so as to constitute the offense." 18. v. Calkins, 73 Ia. 128; S. v. Sherwood, 90 Ia. 550; Folden v. S., 13 Neb. 328; Smith v. S., 20 Neb. 284. Where a party executing a deed pretended to get his wife's signature thereto, but in fact procured his wife's name to be signed by his daughter, having the same name as his wife, and delivered the instrument to the mortgagee, he was held guilty of uttering a forged instrument: S. v. Farrell, 82 Ia. 553. 2U. S. v. King, 5 McLean, 208; Reg. v. Bradford, 2 F. & F. 859. Thus, where the forged instrument was presented to one who was acting in collusion with reference to the forgery in order that it might be protested, the act was held not to be criminal; and it was further held that if the protest and notice were only intended to induce the indorser whose name was forged to cover up the maker's guilt, no offense was committed: S. v. Redstrake, 39 N. J. 365. So where a forged diploma was exhibited to the public, it was held that there was no crime in such exhibition: Reg. v. Hodgson, Dears. & B. 3. S. v. Callendine, 8 Ia. 288; S. v. Barrett, 8 Ia. 536; Gentry v. S., 6 Ga. 503; Harrison v. S., 36 Ala. 248. But if the name of the person intended to be defrauded is alleged it must be proven: S. v. Newland, 7 Ia. 242. And in such case if a corporation is named as the person intended to be defrauded, proof of the existence of such corporation is necessary; but that fact may be shown by reputation: S. v. Newland, 7 Ia. 242; S. v. Barrett, 8 Ia. 536. In an old case it was said that in an indictment for putting off counterfeit money the names of the persons to whom it was put off should be set out: Anon., 1 East, P. C. 180. And it seems that under some statutory provisions it is still necessary to allege the name of the persons intended to be defrauded: Goodson v. S., 29 Fla. 511; Buckley v. S., 2 Greene (Ia.), 162. (But the later Iowa cases are contra. See above in this note.) 4 Rex v. Harris, 7 C. & P. 428. 5 U. S. v. Kenneally, 5 Biss. 122. 6 Rex v. Shepherd, 2 East, P. C. 967; Reg. v. Hill, 8 C. & P. 274. 7 Rex v. Harris, 7 C. & P. 416; Reg. v. Vanderstein, 10 Cox, 146; Rex v. Else, Russ. & Ry. 142; Reg. v. Gerrish, 2 M. & Rob. 219; Rex v. Skerritt, 2 C. & P. 427; Reg. v. Hurse, 2 § 789. Guilty knowledge. As an element in the wrongful intent knowledge of the falsity of the instrument is necessary, and must be alleged and proven;1 and the question whether such knowledge existed is necessarily one for the jury. As proving guilty knowledge, the possession or uttering of other counterfeit coin may be shown.3 V. PROCEDURE. § 790. Jurisdiction of state and United States.-The of fenses relating to the coin were, before the organization of the federal government, punishable by the states, and the authority of the states in the matter continues unless taken away by the constitution of the United States and the statutes passed in pursuance thereof. The constitution confers upon congress the power "to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States;" and under this authority statutes have been passed from time to time by congress. While congress may undoubtedly, in the legislation upon any subject confided to it, make its statutes exclusive of state regulations on the same subject, yet in its statutes relating to crimes it does not attempt to do so, but has specially enacted that such provisions shall not be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several states under the laws thereof. M. & Rob. 360. But to render two or more liable for the same act of uttering, it must appear that they were so near each other as that each could assist in the act: Reg. v. Jones, 9 C. & P. 761; Rex v. Manners, 7 C. & P. 801; Rex v. Seares, Russ. & Ry. 25; Reg. v. West, 2 Cox, 237. 1 U. S. v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611; P. v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. 590; P. v. Smith, 103 Cal. 563; S. v. Williams, 66 Ia. 573; S. v. Morton, 8 Wis. 352; Wash v. C., 16 Grat. 530; Gates v. S., 71 Miss. 874; Elsey v. S., 47 Ark. 572; Powers v. S., 87 Ind. 97; S. v. Nicholson, 14 La. An. 785; Reg. v. Jones, 9 C. & P. 761; Reg. v. Page, 9 C. & P. 756. To charge with "knowingly uttering" is not enough; it must appear that And although in another sec defendant uttered with knowledge: S. v. Williams, 139 Ind. 43. 2 Parker v. P., 97 Ill. 32; Carver v. P., 39 Mich. 786; Reg. v. Byrne, 6 Cox, 475. 3 U. S. v. Burns, 5 McLean, 23; U. S. v. King, 5 McLean, 208; Reg. v. Forster, Dears. 456. But where the offense charged was uttering a counterfeit coin after a previous conviction, it was held that the previous conviction could not be put in evidence for the purpose of proving guilty knowledge: Reg. v. Goodwin, 10 Cox, 534. 4 C. v. Fuller, 8 Met. 313. tion it is provided that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States shall be exclusive with reference to all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States,' this provision must be taken in conjunction with the other, and as not negativing the exception there made. It has accordingly been held in the federal courts and in the courts of many of the states that the counterfeiting even of United States coin or notes, and the uttering of such counterfeits, are punishable under state statutes as offenses in the nature of a fraud, although they are also punishable under the federal statutes. This doctrine has not gone entirely unquestioned, but the cases to the contrary are few. The general reservation to the states of the jurisdiction above referred to does not apply, however, to the punishment of offenses in connection with the national banks other than the counterfeiting of their bills, such, for instance, as embezzlement and the like; and in these cases it is held that the punishment provided by the federal statutes is exclusive of any power to punish by the states. But where an offense under the national banking act is committed by forgery, the forgery is punishable under the state law. Under the power to regulate commerce and to coin money, as well as that of punishing the offenses against the law of nations, congress may punish the counterfeiting of foreign coin. But this authority does not exclude that of the states in the same mat IR. S., § 711. the laws of the state, the jurisdiction of the state courts to punish it is not precluded: Hoke v. P., 122 Ill. 511; C. v. Luberg, 94 Pa. St. 85. 2 Fox v. S., 5 How. 410, 432; C. v. Fuller, 8 Met. 313; Dashing v. S., 78 Ind. 357; P. v. McDonnell, 80 Cal. 285; S. v. McPherson, 9 Ia. 53; Jett v. C., 18 Grat. 933; S. v. Pitman, 1 Brev. 32; S. v. Antonio, 3 Brev. 562; S. v. Tutt, 2 Bailey, 44; Chess v. S., 1 Blackf. 198; Sizemore v. S., 3 Head, 26; In re Truman, 44 Mo. 181; Martin v. S., 18 Tex. Ap. 224; Ex parte Geisler, 50 Fed. R. 411. The same principle is applicable to having in possession instruments used in counterfeiting coin: P. v. White, 34 Cal. 183; S. v. Brown, 2 Oreg. 221. So, if the act, while it may constitute a crime under the laws of the United 6 U. S. v. Marigold, 9 How. 560; States, is also a distinct offense under U. S. v. White, 27 Fed. R. 200. 3 Mattison v. S., 3 Mo. 421; S. v. Brown, 2 Oreg. 221; Ex parte Houghton, 7 Fed. R. 657. 4 C. v. Felton, 101 Mass. 204; C. v. 5 S. v. Cross, 101 N. C. 770. The forgery of a promissory note made payable at a national bank is not a crime against the United States: Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 131. ter. It seems that one state has no authority to punish the offense of counterfeiting committed in another state. But, on the other hand, it has been held that the offense of forging in another state titles to lands to be used for the purpose of committing a fraud within the state of the jurisdiction is punishable in the latter. As the essence of the crime of forgery is the fraudulent intent, the crime may be considered as committed where the false making or alteration is effected; it is immaterial that the property to be affected is in another state. § 791. Venue. The crime of forgery may be punished in the county in which the forged instrument is uttered and published. So there may be an uttering and publishing through the hands of an innocent agent, so as to constitute the offense where the agent acts, although the principal is in another county. Under some statutes it has been held that putting a letter containing a forged instrument into the mail is an uttering where the letter is mailed, and the postmark is evidence thereof; but it is not an uttering in the county of the person to whom it is addressed. Under other statutes it is properly held that the uttering with intent to defraud is committed where the letter is received through the mail, and not, even partially, in the county where the letter is mailed.10 Possession or uttering is evidence of the commission of the crime of forgery in the same county." § 792. Indictment.- The indictment should describe the instrument, the act of defendant which is complained of with reference thereto, and the fraudulent intent with which it was done.12 1 Sutton v. S., 9 Ohio, 133; S. v. Antonio, 3 Brev. 562. 2 S. v. Knight, 1 Taylor, 65. Hanks v. S., 13 Tex. Ap. 289. 4P. v. Flanders, 18 Johns. 164. McGuire v. S., 37 Ala. 161; Mason v. S., 32 Tex. Ap. 95. 10 S. v. Hudson, 13 Mont. 112. 11 S. v. Gullette, 121 Mo. 447; Bland v. P., 4 Ill. 364; S. v. Thompson, 19 Ia. 299; S. v. Blanchard, 74 Ia. 628; S. v. Poindexter, 23 W. Va. 805; S. v. Morgan, 2 Dev. & B. 348; Johnson v. S., 35 Ala. 370; U. S. v. Britton, 2 6 Bishop v. S., 30 Ala. 34; C. v. Hill, Mason, 464; Rex v. Pim, Russ. & Ry. 11 Mass. 136. 7 Perkins' Case, 2 Lewin, 150. 8 U. S. v. Plympton, 4 Cranch, C. C. 309; U. S. v. Wright, 2 Cranch, C. C. 296. P. v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. 509. 425. Contra, C. v. Parmenter, 5 Pick. 279. 12 P. v. Wright, 9 Wend. 193; S. v. Stuart, 61 Ia. 203; Hughes v. C., 89 Ky. 227; Smith v. S., 29 Fla. 408; U. S. v. Moore, 60 Fed. R. 738. |