descent is not a citizen of the United States, where he claims the right to admission on that ground, and the question of citizenship may be passed on by a court on writ of habeas corpus.1 Statutes as to deportation provide that a Chinaman found not entitled to remain in the United States shall be returned to the country whence he came, which will be that in which his residence was prior to coming into the United States - not necessarily China. In a prosecution for aiding or abetting the landing in the United States from any vessel of any Chinese person not lawfully entitled to enter, it must appear that the Chinese person was one prohibited from landing, and that he was brought on the same vessel from which he landed, on a voyage terminating at the time of the landing.' § 1345. To whom applicable. The statutes are applicable to Chinese laborers and not to merchants, and it is provided that the character of one claiming to be a merchant must be established by a certificate of the representative of the United States in China, and without such certificate one is not entitled to admission as merchant no matter what other evidence he may have as to his character. But such provisions as to a certificate are not applicable to one who claims the right to return to this country or remain in the country on account of having previously been established here as a merchant, and the fact of such character may be shown by other evidence." The statutes require that to have been a merchant the person seeking to return on that ground must have conducted business in his own name and his interest in the business must have been real, and if the business was a partnership business his name must have appeared in the partnership articles, although 1 In re Tom Yum, 64 Fed. R. 485. But the finding of a commissioner on a question of fact affecting the right of a Chinaman to remain in the country will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly against the weight of evidence: U. S. v. Chung Fung Sun, 63 Fed. R. 361. 2 Wan Shing v. U. S., 140 U. S. 424; U. S. v. Don On, 49 Fed. R. 569; In re Leo Hem Bow, 47 Fed. R. 302; In re Mah Wong Gee, 47 Fed. R. 433; U. S. v. Chong Sam, 47 Fed. R. 878. But where the Chinaman has been a sojourner in the country through which he has come on returning from China he should be sent back to China: U. S. v. Ah Toy, 47 Fed. R. 305. 3 U. S. v. Trumbull, 46 Fed. R. 755. 4 In re Wo Tai Li, 48 Fed. R. 668. Lau Ow Bew v. U. S., 144 U. S. 47; U. S. v. Lee Hoy, 48 Fed. R. 825; but see In re Yee Lung, 61 Fed. R. 641. it is not necessary that it shall have appeared in the firm designation. The term "laborer" in the exclusion act has the same meaning as in the treaty with China, in which the language used was broad enough to include gamblers and high-binders.2 A restaurant proprietor who keeps a place for serving meals and prepares the material for such meals is a laborer and not a merchant. So one who has been serving a term of imprisonment at hard labor is a laborer, although he may previously have been a merchant. A temporary absence from the United States with intent to return will not forfeit a residence already acquired. 6 § 1346. Naturalization.― Some offenses are provided for in connection with naturalization laws, such as taking a false oath or presenting a false and fraudulent certificate. The United States may sue in the federal courts for the cancellation of a certificate or decree of naturalization which has been obtained by fraud even in a state court. It is criminal to sell a certificate of naturalization to a person to whom it is not issued, and it is immaterial that the certificate thus offered to be sold is fraudulent, provided it is apparently valid.' 1 Lee Kan v. U. S., 62 Fed. R. 914; In re Quan Gin, 61 Fed. R. 395. Absence for even six years while retaining an interest in firm business and receiving a share of the profits continues a commercial domicile in the United States and prevents being sent back under the exclusion act: U. S. v. Chin Quong Look, 52 Fed. R. 203. 2 U. S. v. Ah Fawn, 57 Fed. R. 591. 525 R. 1005. A woman married accord- CHAPTER 71. VIOLATION OF NAVIGATION LAWS. § 1347. What criminal.-The navigation laws of the United States provide for the punishment of an officer for beating or ill-treating one of the crew, and any one is an officer under this statute who by authority exercises the function of control over the actions of the crew or any part of it. It is also criminal to harbor and secrete deserting seamen; but such statute does not apply to the harboring or secreting of a person employed or engaged to serve on a vessel not belonging to a citizen of the United States. It is criminal to destroy a vessel with the intent to defraud underwriters. For the purpose of preventing introduction of disease from foreign countries, there are regulations requiring a vessel bound for the United States to procure in the port of departure for the United States, from the United States consul there, a bill of health, the port of departure, in this sense, being not necessarily the last port at which the ship stops while bound for the United States, but the port from which she clears." The United States, in the exercise of its admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, provides for the punishment of various crimes on the high seas and navigable waters of the United States, such as that of murder, manslaughter, and the like. Crimes thus provided for are not essentially different from like crimes committed elsewhere, and need not be here specially discussed. For the purpose of having the coasting trade carried on by vessels of this country, it is made criminal to transport merchandise between ports of the United States on foreign vessels; but such statute is not violated by shipping goods from a port of this country to a 1 U. S. v. Trice, 30 Fed. R. 490. It is also criminal in an officer to force a mariner on shore: U. S. v. Ruggles, 5 Mason, 192. 2 U. S. v. Grant, 55 Fed. R. 414. Deserting seamen may be arrested and -- returned to the master: Robertson v. foreign port in a foreign vessel and afterwards forwarding them by another foreign vessel to another port of the United States, although this was the intention from the outset.1 State statutes as to pilotage,' boarding vessels before being made fast to the wharf, and the like, are so far peculiar in their nature that a general discussion of them is not practicable. 1U. S. v. Two Hundred and Fifty Kegs of Nails, 61 Fed. R. 410. 527 2 C. v. Ricketson, 5 Met. 412. CHAPTER 72. VIOLATION OF PENSION LAWS. § 1348. What criminal.-There are provisions against making a false certificate in support of an application for a pension,1 or a false affidavit. So one who makes a false deposition to enable another to obtain a penson is punishable. It is also an offense for a member of the board of examining surgeons to receive a bribe. For the protection of the pensioner it is made criminal to wrongfully withhold from such a person a pension due him; further it is made criminal to charge a pensioner for services in securing a pension more than a sum fixed by law. It is also made criminal to receive any compensation for procuring a pension claim before it is allowed." 1U. S. v. Kessel, 62 Fed. R. 57. 2 U. S. v. Van Leuven, 62 Fed. R. 69; U. S. v. Adler, 49 Fed. R. 733. And the latter crime may be committed though the affidavit is made before the proper officer, as the provision applies also to the offense of using a genuine instrument knowing it to be false, with intent to defraud the United States: U. S. v. Gowdy, 37 Fed. R. 332. 3 U. S. v. Rhodes, 30 Fed. R. 431. 4 U. S. v. Kessel, 62 Fed. R. 57; U. S. v. Van Leuven, 62 Fed. R. 62. v. Van Vliet, 23 Fed. R. 35; U. S. v. Hague, 22 Fed. R. 706; U. S. v. Mathews, 23 Fed. R. 74. One who as attorney fills out the vouchers necessary to obtain the first payment of pension money is within the terms of the statute making it a misdemeanor for a person instrumental in prosecuting the claim to retain a greater compensation than allowed by law: U. S. v. Reynolds, 48 Fed. R. 721. It is not necessary to specify in what way the accused was instrumental in obtaining a pension: U. S. v. Rey 5 Ballew v. U. S., 160 U. S. 187; U. nolds, 48 Fed. R. 215. S. v. Scott, 25 Fed. R. 470. 6 Frisbie v. U. S., 157 U. S. 160; U. S. 7U. S. v. Van Leuven, 62 Fed. R. 52. 528 |