clause above stated, except to set it out, but recovery was denied to a mortgagee because of a breach of the policy by the owner, and the policy was treated exactly as if it contained no more than a loss-payable clause).

The court in Brecht v. Law Union & Crown Ins. Co. (1908) 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 207, 87 C. C. A. 351, 160 Fed. 399, said: "The special contract by which such right to receive payment was acquired is controlling; that is to say, the true meaning of this provision is that, when the conditions named in the policy are modified by the contract under which a mortgagee or other person acquires an interest under. the policy, then the conditions named in the policy shall only apply in the manner and to the extent provided in the special contract; or, if they are waived, that then they shall not apply at all. But when, as in this case, there is no special agreement modifying or waiving the conditions of the policy, and the insurance company has simply consented to the appointment of a third person to receive payment for any loss which may be sustained by the person to whom the policy was issued, then all its conditions apply. When the policies sued on were issued, it was not unusual for insurance companies to insure the interest of mortgagees by attaching to their policies slips containing what is known as the 'union mortgage clause,' whereby the insurance company agreed to pay to the mortgagee the amount to become due under the policy, as his interest might appear, regardless of subsequent breaches of certain conditions of the policy by the mortgagor. The following cases arose under policies containing such a clause: Magoun v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1902) 86 Minn. 486, 91 Am. St. Rep. 370, 91 N. W. 5; National Bank v. Union Ins. Co. (1891) 88 Cal. 497, 22 Am. St. Rep. 324, 26 Pac. 509; Hastings v. Westchester F. Ins. Co. (1878) 73 N. Y. 144; Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Bohn (1894) 27 L.R.A. 614, 12 C. C. A. 531, 27 U. S. App. 564, 65 Fed. 165. Now, if it had been the intention of the defendant to insure the plaintiff in error absolutely, and

without reference to any breach of the conditions of the policies by the St. Johns Luinber Company, such insurance could have been effected by the use of the ‘union mortgage clause' in defining the rights of the plaintiff in error under the policies; but, instead of doing this, the parties adopted a form merely designating him as the person to whom the loss, if any, should be payable,-a form which, under well-settled rules, subjects the appointee to the risk of all acts and omissions of the person to whom the policy was issued. Our conclusion, then, is that the provision of the policy upon which the plaintiff in error relies does not add to, or in any manner change, the legal effect of the slip making the loss, if any, under the policy, payable to him; that such provision was only intended to apply in cases where the insurance company, by some special agreement with the mortgagee or third person, acquiring an interest under the policy, has consented to a modification or waiver of the conditions in the policy; and that, as there was no such special agreement in the case before us, the circuit court did not err in rendering its judgment for the defendant insurance company upon the findings."

And in McDowell v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. (1913) 207 N. Y. 482, 101 N. E. 457, the court stated that it was reasonable that the conditions which referred to the risk while subsisting should apply alike to the mortgagor and mortgagee under a policy containing the clause under consideration, unless the parties had expressly stipulated otherwise by attaching a mortgagee clause; but it was held unreasonable that, after a loss had occurred, the interest of the mortgagee could be defeated by the refusal of the mortgagor to make proofs of loss.

The court in Franklin Ins. Co. v. Wolff (1899) 23 Ind. App. 549, 54 N. E. 772, stated that the decisions in Queen Ins. Co. v. Dearborn Sav. Loan & Bldg. Asso. (1898) 175 Ill. 115, 51 N. E. 717, and Oakland Home Ins. Co. v. Bank of Commerce (1896) 47 Neb. 717, 36 L.R.A. 673, 58 Am. St. Rep. 663, 66 N. W. 646, supra, were

based on the premise that a contract of insurance existed between the mortgagee and the insurer, distinct from that existing between the latter and the mortgagor; but said that they could not agree with this view, that there was no consideration moving from the mortgagee to the insurer, and that its obligation was to the mortgagor.

Even when it is held or assumed that, under the clause before discussed, some express provision is necessary in order to make the provisions as to forfeiture applicable to the mortgagee, the provision employed need not mention each condition or provision, but may be general in character.

Thus, in the reported case (SMITH v. GERMANIA F. INS. Co. ante, 1444), where the policy contained the clause set out at the beginning, a losspayable clause, making the loss payable to the mortgagee, "subject to all the terms and conditions" of the policy, was held to make the provisions as to forfeiture applicable to the mortgagee, so that he could not recover where the property was wilfully burned by the mortgagor.

And in Burns v. Alliance Co-op. Ins. Co. (1918) 103 Kan. 803, 176 Pac. 985, where the standard mortgage clause and loss-payable clause were the same as those in the reported case (SMITH V. GERMANIA F. INS. Co.), the mortgagee was held bound by the provisions as to forfeiture, and precluded from recovering by a breach thereof by the mortgagor. The court said: "The question to be here determined is whether the incorporating in the loss-payable clause of the words, 'subject, however, to all the terms and conditions of this policy,' amounts to an indorsement or attachment of such terms and conditions, thereby making them applicable to the mortgagee as well as to the mortgagor. The very purpose of the language seems to be to make it clear that the mortgagee was not to be released from the restrictions laid

upon the insured. We interpret it as adopting by reference all the provisions of the policy, and giving them the same force as though they had

A

been again set out at length, thereby making them applicable to the mortgagee, and preventing any exception or immunity in his favor. In Welch v. British American Assur. Co. (1905) 148 Cal. 223, 113 Am. St. Rep. 223, 82 Pac. 964, 7 Ann. Cas. 396, which is cited in behalf of the plaintiff as in conflict with the conclusion we have reached (but which we regard as not in point, because the loss-payable clause contained only the words: 'Loss, if any, payable to George D. Welch as his interest may appear' [p. 230]), it was said of the method of making the conditions of the policy applicable to the mortgagee: 'It would not be necessary to write them out in full upon the policy, which would be practically impossible. few words making the provisions, or certain of them, as was desired, applicable to the other interest, could readily be inserted in the slip containing what is called the "loss-payable" clause attached to the policy.' (P. 227.) Our attention has not been called to any decision holding the mortgagee to be relieved from the conditions imposed upon the owner, where the loss-payable clause contained anything which we consider equivalent to the words, 'subject, however, to all the terms and conditions of this policy,' for we do not regard such a phrase as, "This slip is attached to and forms a part of policy No. -,' as meeting that descripton, or as having any effect other than to identify the particular policy to which the slip is intended to apply. Nor do we find any case involving the precise question here presented,― that is, where the body of the policy provided that its conditions should not apply to a mortgagee unless they were indorsed thereon or attached thereto, and the 'loss-payable' clause in favor of the mortgagee was expressly made subject to all the terms of the policy."

And in Vancouver Nat. Bank v. Law Union & Crown Ins. Co. (1907) 153 Fed. 440, where the policy contained the mortgage clause involved in the preceding cases, the court gave as one reason for holding the condi

tions as to forfeiture operative as to the mortgagee that it was stipulated at the foot of the policy that the policy was made and accepted subject to the following stipulations and conditions, printed on the back hereof, together with such other provisions, agreements, or conditions as may be indorsed hereon or added hereto, stating that the plain intendment from the whole contract was that all the conditions, including those contained upon the mortgagee slip, should be construed together and harmonized, if possible, and that the court had endeavored to do this.

But in Welch v. British American Assur. Co. (Cal.) supra, it was held that a declaration that the policy was made "subject to the foregoing stipulations, together with such other provisions, agreements, or conditions as may be indorsed hereon or added hereto," did not change the effect of the mortgage clause, as that clause was one of the stipulations and conditions to which the last paragraph referred, and which was affirmed by it.

In Royal Ins. Co. v. O. L. Walker Lumber Co. (1916) 24 Wyo. 59, 155 Pac. 1101, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1174, there was held to be no writing upon the policy within the provision that in case of any person having an interest in the subject-matter of the insurance, the conditions hereinbefore contained should apply as written upon or attached, where the words, "and subject in all other respects to the terms and conditions of this policy," were used in the "lightning clause." The court, with reference thereto, said: "Nor is there any indorsement or writing upon or attached to the policy doing so, unless the words found in the 'lightning clause,' 'and subject in all other respects to the terms and conditions of this policy,' are to be understood as constituting a part of, or explaining, or qualifying, the loss-payable clause. But those words cannot, in our opinion, be so construed. They clearly, we think, have reference only to the provision of the paragraph containing

them, declaring that the policy shall cover direct loss caused by lightning within the stated limitation as to amount, and their sole effect is to make the terms and conditions of the policy applicable to the same extent if the loss be caused by lightning as in case of a loss by fire. They are not connected with the loss-payable clause, and we see no reasonable ground for holding that it was intended thereby to express or explain the manner in which the conditions of the policy shall apply respecting the interest protected by the loss-payable clause. The policy would therefore lack a provision declaring the condition as to alienation by the insured owner applicable to plaintiff's interest."

And the mortgagee's right under a policy taken by the mortgagor is, except as to the insured's failure to file proofs of loss, open to the same defenses of forfeiture as are available against the latter, under a policy making the loss payable to the mortgagee, as its interest might appear, but providing that, except as varied by written indorsement or rider attached, the forfeiture clauses should apply to the insured and the mortgagee. Clover Crest Stock Farm v. Wyoming Valley F. Ins. Co. (1919) 108 Misc. 465, 177 N. Y. Supp. 771.

And in Longfellow v. National Fire Ins. Co. (1918) 102 Kan. 473, 170 Pac. 813, a mortgagee was held precluded from recovering by the mortgagor's breach of the condition against a change of title, where the policy issued to the mortgagor provided that the insurer consented that the loss, if any, should be payable to the mortgagee, "for and on account of said assured; subject, however, to all the terms and conditions contained or referred to in" the policy, since such stipulation merely constituted the mortgagee an appointee to receive the proceeds of the policy for the assured, subject to compliance by the latter with the conditions essential to recovery by him. J. T. W.

Libel against class.

failure to name individual.

2. In order to render one amenable to prosecution for publishing or circulating libelous matter, it is not necessary that such matter name the individuals, or any one of them, comHeadnotes by ARMSTRONG, J.

posing the class against whom the matter complained of is libelous. [See 17 R. C. L. 460.] Indictment-sufficiency..

3. For an information held sufficient to charge libel against the members of the Knights of Columbus living in Canadian county, see opinion.

of the court.

The information sufficiently charges the crime of libel.

State v. Brady, 44 Kan. 435, 9 L.R.A. 606, 21 Am. St. Rep. 296, 24 Pac. 948; Jones v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 364, 70 Am. St. Rep. 751, 43 S. W. 78; State v. Hosmer, 72 Or. 57, 142 Pac. 581; People v. Eastman, 188 N. Y. 478, 81 N. E. 459, 11 Ann. Cas. 302; State v. Clyne, 53 Kan. 8, 35 Pac. 789; People v. Turner, 28 Cal. App. 766, 154 Pac. 34; State v. Dowd, 39 Kan. 412, 18 Pac. 483; State v. Williams, 74 Kan. 180, 85 Pac. 938; State v. Elder, 19 N. M. 393, 143 Pac. 482.

Armstrong, J., delivered the opin

ion of the court:

The plaintiff in error, Roy Crane, was convicted at the January, 1916, term of the county court of Canadian county, on a charge of libel. The information in the case, omitting the formal parts, is as follows:

"Now comes S. T. Roberson, county attorney of Canadian county, state of Oklahoma, who prosecutes on behalf of the state, and gives the court to know and be in

formed that one Roy Crane, late of the county of Canadian and state of Oklahoma, on or about the 4th day of July in the year of our Lord 1915, at and within said county and state, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully, and maliciously circulate a certain printed book entitled 'Barbarous Catholicism and Moral Theology of St. Liguori, by Professor Roy Crane,' which printed book aforesaid contained certain false printed statements and matter of and concerning members of fourth degree Knights of Columbus, in that said printed statements and matters set out and stated, a purported part fourth degree Knights of Columof the purported oath of said bus, which said purported part of said purported oath was false and untrue; said Knights of Columbus being a Catholie fraternal lodge or of which association, members

fourth degree Knights of Columbus, to wit, J. M. Harkin, W. E. Ross, T. H. Rasp, Dr. J. T. Riley, Reverend R. Sevens, A. J. Gerrer, and G. W. Flanigan, were on said date and are at this time residents of Cana

dian county, Oklahoma, and which said false printed part of purported oath and statements and matter so circulated by the said Roy Crane, by the delivery and distribution of copies of said book to each of the following persons, to wit: G. F. Gossett, Joe Hainey, Ed. Washecheck,

Albert Edmenton,

Fred Kimble, Reverend De Pew, Ernest Louchen, Guy Yowell, and Dave Taylor, and others whose names are to the county attorney unknown-exposed the aforesaid fourth degree Knights of Columbus to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, and obloquy, and which said false printed purported part of purported oath and statements and matter tended to deprive

said

fourth degree Knights of Columbus of public confidence, and which false printed purported part of purported oath, and statements and matter in said book so circulated by said Roy Crane, as aforesaid, is printed upon pages numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, in said book circulated as aforesaid, and is as follows, to wit:

"Introduction.

"Why I have written this book. During the last twenty-five years many of the devout and cultured Protestants throughout the world have doubted that the intentions of the Roman Catholic religion was for the best interest of society, and in all times, when they would read books put forth discussing the murderous, treasonable, dago philosophy called Catholicism, they would say, Can this be true?

"But as the books they would read were either written by one who did not know or who was afraid to bind himself to write the truth under affidavit, and many, many are the times that well-intending Protestants would have liked to give good reasons for being opposed to Roman Catholicism, but as they had nothing that they knew to be absolutely true against the Roman Catholic religion they would not discuss the question.

"It is in behalf of these classes of American citizens that I give unto them and the world the greatest treatise of the subject of Roman Catholicism since the days of Martin Luther.

"And every word in this book is given under a sworn affidavit and of itself establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the book's contents is true and correct, for if it were not the author would be sent to the penitentiary.

"Not only will you find a complete and correct record of the Massacre of Odessa, Russia, but you will also find a translation of the moral theology of Saint Liguori, which is the prescribed moral standard of the Catholic Church and unto it every priest is bound to be subject, and the same questions that the priest asks women and children. in the confessional box are herein contained and given to you subject to your own honest and sincere consideration.

""This book also makes plain that the blessings and curses of the Pope of Rome accomplish nothing according to the statements given; not only does this book give unto you the spirit of the Catholic Church of the whole world and a record of the Pope's blessings and curses, but it also gives to you the effect of this immoral culture culture wherever Rome has become supreme, and those who have doubted as to what Roman Catholicism is and when its doctrines were originated, will find in this book the standard doctrines of the Church of Rome and correct statements as to when and from where they obtained their ideas, and a record of the immoral lives of the different Catholic Popes of Rome is made plain to you as to what they did and as to the time they did it.

“With all doubt as to the truthfulness of this book removed, because of the affidavit affixed, you can refer to it as being true and correct, and by and with its help and aid you are enabled, if opportunity presents, to refute every