ingless. This construction would be violative of the primary rule that the legislature intended each word to have a meaning. Both the old charter and the new indicate that the word 'schoolhouse' was used in the latter as entirely distinctive from the words 'public buildings.'" An academy is not a public building within the meaning of a statute authorizing the trustees of a county to hold title to and reserve certain land for "public buildings." Kittaning Academy v. Brown (1861) 41 Pa. 270, wherein it was said: "If it be admitted that the Act of 1803 had impressed the condition upon the title that it should be held for the use of the 'public buildings' of the county, these must be construed to be a courthouse, the necessary public offices for the conduct of the business of county officers, and a jail. An academy is not a public building within the meaning of the act of assembly. The legislature had in mind those buildings which are ordinarily used in conducting county affairs. Nothing duct of the ordinary business of the county." Theater. Applying the rule of construction as governed by the use to which a building is put, it is held in the reported case (STATE v. SWANSON THEATER CIRCUIT, ante, 539) that a theater is a "public building" within the meaning of a statute authorizing the state board of health to prepare rules and regulations governing the proper sanitation of "public buildings." Waterworks. The words "public building" do not include a waterworks. municipal State ex rel. Robinson v. Columbia (1892) 111 Mo. 365, 20 S. W. 90, wherein it was held that a town could not raise revenue for the construction of a waterworks system, under a statute providing for taxation for the purposes of raising funds to construct public buildings. Workhouse. Under an act relating to the assessment of "public buildings" for taxation, it has been held that a "workhouse" erected by the directors of the poor of a town came within the meaning of the term "public building." Bedford Union v. Commissioners for Improvement (1852) 21 L. J. Mag. Cas. 224, 7 Exch. 777, 155 Eng. Reprint, 1163. M. B. PENINSULAR STATE SAVINGS BANK of Detroit, Michigan, V. CITIZENS' NATIONAL BANK of Knoxville, Iowa, Appt. Iowa Supreme Court-May 21, 1919. (Peninsular Bank v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 186 Iowa, 418, 172 N. W. 293.) Evidence presumption - damages from conversion of draft. 1. Upon proof of conversion by the collecting bank of a draft sent for collection, the owner is presumed to have been damaged to the extent of its face value. [See note on this question beginning on page 555.] Bills and notes failure to remit proceeds of draft after collection liability. 2. A bank which, after receiving for collection a draft with bill of lading attached, surrenders the bill of lading upon receiving a check of the consignee for the amount of the draft, and follows his instruction not to remit the proceeds of the check until further directions, is liable to the owner of the draft for its face value. APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the District Court for Marion County (Hays, J.) in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to recover damages for alleged conversion of a draft. Affirmed. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Vander Ploeg & Johnson for appellant: A bill of lading simply represents the property, and the indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading by the Denby Motor Truck Company to the plaintiff only operated to pass the title to the motor truck to the plaintiff bank. First Nat. Bank v. Mt. Pleasant Mill. Co. 103 Iowa, 518, 72 N. W. 689; Mechanics & T. Bank v. Farmers & M. Nat. Bank, 60 N. Y. 47; Forbes v. Boston & L. R. R. Co. 133 Mass. 154; Holmes v. German Secur. Bank, 87 Pa. 525; Dows v. National Exch. Bank, 91 U. S. 618, 23 L. ed. 214. The fact that the draft attached to the bill of lading was for more than the value of the motor truck does not affect the measure of damages for converting the bill of lading by delivering the same to the S. L. Collins Oil Company without the payment of the sight draft. As the bill of lading simply represents the goods, the measure of damages is the value of the goods at the time of the conversion of the bill of lading. Belden v. Boston & M. R. Co. 88 Vt. 300, 92 Atl. 212; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hartwell, 99 Ky. 436, 36 S. W. 183, 38 S. W. 1041; 10 C. J. 277. The sight draft, in any event, was no more than prima facie evidence of the value of the automobile truck, and the defendant should have been permitted to introduce testimony to show that the value of the automobile truck was less than the amount named in the sight draft. Citizens Nat. Bank v. Third Nat. Bank, 19 Ind. App. 69, 49 N. E. 171; Ft. Dearborn Nat. Bank v. Security Bank, 87 Minn. 81, 91 N. W. 257. The measure of damages to which the plaintiff was entitled was not the face of the sight draft, but the value of the automobile truck at the time and place that the bill of lading was delivered by the defendant bank to the S. L. Collins Oil Company. People's Nat. Bank v. Brogden, 98 Tex. 360, 83 S. W. 1098, Tex. Civ. App. 84 S. W. 601; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hartwell, 99 Ky. 436, 36 S. W. 183, 38 S. W. 1041. In order to recover substantial damages for violation of the instructions relating to the surrender of the bill of lading, the burden was upon the plaintiff to prove that it had suffered such damages. Fox v. Davenport Nat. Bank, 73 Iowa, 649, 35 N. W. 688. Mr. W. H. Lyon for appellee. Weaver, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The Denby Motor Truck Company, doing business in Michigan, consigned one motor truck to its own order to Knoxville, Iowa, and delivered it to the Grand Trunk Railway Company, a common carrier, for transportation to Knoxville. For this shipment the truck company took from the carrier a receipt and bill of lading, stating its own name as consignee and marked, "Notify S. L. Collins Oil Company, Knoxville, Iowa." It also provided in terms that the surrender of the original bill of lading, properly indorsed, should be a condition precedent to the delivery of the shipment by the carrier, and that inspection of the property should not be permitted unless provided by wire, or unless written permission so to do was indorsed on said bill. Having received the bill of lading, the truck company drew its draft upon S. L. Collins Oil Company for $848.50, which draft, accompanied by the bill of lading, they negotiated and delivered to the plaintiff, and received credit for the full face thereof. On the same day the plaintiff bank forwarded both draft and bill of lading to the defendant, Citizens' (Peninsular Bank v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 186 Iowa, 418, 172 N. W. 293.) National Bank of Knoxville, for collection, with instructions to "deliver bill of lading on payment of draft only." Lafe Collins, who was president of the defendant bank, was also president of the S. L. Collins Oil Company. On receipt of the draft and bill of lading by the bank at Knoxville, Collins took possession of the bill, presented it to the carrier, and obtained possession of the truck for the oil company, by which it has since been retained. At some time, whether before or after taking possession of the bill of lading does not appear, Collins made and delivered his check to the defendant for the full amount of the draft, $848.50, but instructed the bank not to pay or remit it to plaintiff until he should so direct. Neither draft nor bill of lading has ever been returned or accounted for by the defendant. Payment having been demanded by the plaintiff and refused by the defendant, this action was brought to recover the amount of the draft as damages for its conversion. The defendant's answer admits receiving the draft and bill of lading, but denies all other allegations of the petition. The facts above set forth are wholly undisputed. At the close of the plaintiff's testimony, and again when both parties had rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict in its favor. The grounds assigned for the motion are: (1) Insufficient evidence to sustain a recovery. (2) That under the law applicable to the case the oil company was the consignee in fact, and was entitled to demand and receive delivery of the truck without presentation of the bill of lading. (3) That plaintiff had failed to prove the value of the truck described in the bill of lading. The motion having been denied, defendant offered to prove by competent testimony that the value of the truck represented by the bill of lading at the time the bill was surrendered to Collins did not exceed $600, and, the offer being overruled, defendant rested without tender or offer of other evidence. Plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict in its favor was thereupon sustained, and from the judgment thereupon defendant appealed. In argument to this court the appellant relies on the single proposition that the measure of plaintiff's damages, if any, is the actual value of the truck described in the bill of lading, and that if there be no evidence of such value there can be no recovery; or, if there be any right of recovery upon the showing made, it is for nominal damages only, and it was, therefore, error for the trial court to overrule the defendant's offer to prove such value to be less than the amount of the draft. Counsel's argument proceeds upon the theory that this action, in legal effect, is one for the recovery of damages for the loss of the truck described in the bill of lading, and, such being the case, the measure of damages is necessarily the value of the truck, the accompanying draft being, at most, mere prima facie evidence of such value. Now it may be admitted, as counsel contend, that the indorsement and transfer of the bill of lading serve to vest the title to the truck in plaintiff, but it by no means follows that this is an action to recover its value. Plaintiff did not buy the truck; it bought the truck company's draft on the oil company for $848.50, and took the legal title to the truck as security for its acceptance and payment. It sent both bill and draft to the defendant, to collect, not the reasonable or market value of the truck, but the amount of the draft. If the draft had been dishonored upon presentation, and the security had been surrendered or lost by the defendant, plaintiff could have sued and recovered the value of it, but this was not the plaintiff's only recourse. As between itself and the truck company the draft was a bill of exchange, and upon its dishonor by nonacceptance plaintiff had immediate right of recourse thereon against said company. The petition not only charges the unauthorized surrender of the truck and defendant's failure to collect the draft before such surrender, but also alleges defendant's refusal to return the draft upon demand. This is a sufficient allegation of a conversion of the instrument. Proof of the conversion is undisputed, and plaintiff is presumed to Evidencepresumptiondamages from conversion of draft. have been damaged to the extent of its face value. Hubbard v. State L. Ins. Co. 129 Iowa, 13, 105 N. W. 332; Dean v. Nichols & S. Co. 95 Iowa, 89, 63 N. W. 582. Evidence showing the value of the truck to be less than the amount of the draft had no tendency to rebut the presumption that the draft was worth the sum for which it was drawn. There is still another aspect to the case which necessitates an affirmance of the judgment below. It was shown by the cashier of the defendant bank, not only that it received the draft for collection, but also that it received from the president of the oil company, who was also its own president, a check for the full amount of the draft, which it still holds, and says, in excuse of its failure to remit, that said officer ordered its nonpayment until he should direct otherwise. In other words, defendant has collected the full amount of the draft, but withholds its remittance to the payee at the request of the debtor. This being admitted, it is bound in law to account to failure to remit plaintiff for the full face of the draft, or to affirmatively plead and prove Bills and notes proceeds of draft after collectionliability. some fact or facts which excuse or avoid performance of that duty. No such defense is pleaded, and none is proved. In other words, the defendant confesses the truth of the averments of the petition, but neither alleges nor proves any new matter which tends to deprive the admitted facts of their ordinary in want of value of shipment legal effect. If it be true, as perhaps we may infer, that there is some dispute between the truck company and the oil company concerning the truck defense to action described for proceeds of the draft. bill of lading, the merits of such controversy are wholly immaterial, in this action between the plaintiff, who purchased the draft, and the defendant, to whom it was sent for collection. To sustain the defendant's position upon this appeal would be tantamount to saying that in any and every case where property is sold for delivery by carrier upon payment of the agreed purchase price, if the purchaser is fortunate enough, or cunning enough, to secure a delivery without payment, he is no longer bound by the price agreed upon, and the seller can recover on the basis of the market value only. No authority for such holding can be found. The cases cited by appellant where common carriers have been sued for conversion of the property described in bills of lading, and have been held liable for no more than the value of the thing converted, are not at all in point. In Belden v. Boston & M. R. Co. 88 Vt. 300, 92 Atl. 212, the action was by a shipper against a carrier because the latter had delivered the goods to the consignee without presentation of the bill of lading. It was not an action against the consignee for the contract price, or against a bank or collection agency for conversion of a draft for the purchase price. The duty of the carrier was to safely transport the goods and make proper delivery to the consignee, and if, by failure in this duty, it became chargeable as for a conversion of the property, the measure of its liability was, as in other cases of conversion, the value of the thing converted. This liability on the part of the carrier did not relieve the consignee from his obligation to pay the contract price of the shipment, or the consignor from its liability as drawer (Peninsular Bank v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 186 Iowa, 418, 172 N. W. 293.) upon any draft drawn against the shipment and negotiated to a bank. The shipper in such case could maintain an action against the carrier for the value of the property lost, or against the consignee for the contract price of the property, and the purchaser of the draft, if one is drawn against the shipment and dishonored for want of acceptance, may sue the drawer, and recover thereon its full face value. So, too, as before noted, if the draft be drawn with the bill of lading attached, the title to the shipment vests in the holder of the draft as security for its payment, and if, by fault of the carrier, the security be lost or converted, then the right of the holder to recover from the carrier would be limited to the value of the thing lost, but there is no such issue in this case. The trial court did not err in directing a verdict for plaintiff, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Ladd, Ch. J., and Gaynor and Stevens, JJ., concur. NOTE. The measure of damages for breach of duty by bank in respect to collection of commercial paper is the subject of the annotation following NORTHWESTERN NAT. BANK v. PEOPLE'S STATE BANK, post, 555. Particularly, as to measure of damages for breach of duty by turning over bill of lading without requiring payment of draft, see subd. III. d, 1, of that annotation. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL BANK of Minneapolis, Minnesota, Damages Appt., V. PEOPLE'S STATE BANK of Courtland, Kansas. Kansas Supreme Court - July 9, 1921. (109 Kan. 506, 200 Pac. 278.) for delivery of bill of lading without collecting draft. The seller of certain cars of potatoes drew sight drafts on the purchaser in favor of the plaintiff bank, and attached them to the bills of lading with instructions to deliver on payment of drafts only. The plaintiff bank sent the bills with drafts attached to the defendant bank, which bank delivered the bills of lading without collecting the drafts. In a suit for damages against such bank for failure to follow instructions, held, that actual damages only can be recovered-in this case nothing, as the plaintiff received all the potatoes brought and were actually worth. [See note on this question beginning on page 555.] Headnote by WEST, J. APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the District Court for Republic County (Hogin, J.) in favor of defendant in an action brought to recover damages for its tailure to follow instructions as to collection of certain drafts. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. |