more than is animal or vegetable oil, and it can indeed only be so classified in the most general or scientific sense. Dunham v. Kirkpatrick. Opinion by Gordou, J.

[Decided Oct. 2, 1882.]

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS AB

STRACT. JUNE, 20 1883.*

IGNORANCE

OF

PENALTY -TURNPIKE CHARTER LAW-ILLEGAL TOLL.-(1) Ignorance of the law will not excuse the offender, and consequently evidence of such ignorance is inadmissible. (2) If the stockholders of a turnpike company accept a charter, coupled with the condition and privilege to increase the tolls, provided they complied with certain pre-requisites, and at a certain time the company has no right to increase the tolls without first complying with such pre-requisites, and at the time designated. Grumbine v. State of Maryland. Opinion by Stone, J.

PARENT AND CHILD-MOTHERS RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT INJURY TO SON-DAMAGES-HIGHWAY -CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. (1) A mother sued the county commissioners of Hartford county to recover for injury done to her minor son, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants in not keeping a publie road in repair, over which the son was riding at the time he was injured. The father had died before the injury occurred. Held, that the mother, the father being dead, was entitled to recover for the services of her minor son, provided he was at the time of the injury actually living with and supported by her. That if the son were thus living with and supported by his mother, she was clearly entitled to recover for the care and labor of nursing him, and the expense and cost of medicines and medical attendance to which she was subjected on account of his injury, and which she procured for him. That the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the pain and suffering of her son, nor for her own anxiety and suffering on his account. (2) The care and caution required of one travelling on a public road is simply such as persons of common prudence ordinarily exercise. Commissioners of Hartford County V. Hamilton. Opinion by Miller, J.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS-AGREEMENT NOT TO BE PERFORMED WITHIN YEAR.-The defendant on the 8th of March, 1880, while negotiating for the purchase of a mill, found the plaintiff in charge of the same, and said to him: "If I buy this mill from M. P., I will employ you to take charge of it for a year, and will pay you $1000 a year." The plaintiff accepted the offer, and was afterward notified by the defendant that he had made the purchase. The plaintiff, on the day he was so notified, entered the service of the defendant, and was soon afterward discharged. In an action by him for a breach of the contract, it was held, that conceding there was a perfect contract entered into by the parties on the 8th day of March, 1880, the remedy upon it was not barred by the Statute of Frauds as being for services not to be completed within a year. When there is a possibility that the services may be performed within a year. the remedy for a breach of the contract is not barred by the statute. In Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burrows, 1281, it is said: "The Statute of Frauds plainly means an agreement not to be performed within the space of a year, and expressly and specifically so agreed. A contingency is not within it; nor any case that depends upon contingency." This construction of the statute has received *To appear in 60 Maryland Reports.

an unqualified recognition in this State. In the case of Ellicott v. Peterson's Ex'rs, 4 Md. 488, it is said: "These principles have been recognized by innumerable decisions both in England and in this country. And in pursuance of the principles which they sustain, especially that of the case of Peter v. Compton, Skinner, 353, it has been held both in England and in these States, the statute will not apply where the contract can by any possibility be fulfilled or completed in the space of a year, although the parties may have intended its operations should extend through a much longer period." Cole v. Singerly. Opinion by Yellot, J.

HIGHWAY-LIABILITY OF TOWN FOR DEFECT CAUSING INJURY-DEFECT NEED NOT BE IN WAY.-In order to render a town liable for injury to a traveler on the highway from a defect, it is not necessary that the defect be in the way, if it is in such close proximity as to render travelling along the way dangerous. In Hayden v. Attlebore, 7 Gray, 338, the injury arose from being precipitated into a cellar that was either within the limits of the way or in such close proximity thereto as to render travelling along the way dangerous. The defect complained of was the want of a railing. The court said that the want of a railing necessary to the safety of travellers was a defect in the way itself, for which the town was liable. In Coggswell v. Lexington, 4 Cush. 307, the injury was occasioned by a post outside the way as located. The court not deciding whether the town had the right as against the owner of the land on which the post stood to enter and remove it, said "it clearly had the right, and it was its duty, if it could not lawfully remove the post, to place such a fence or other barrier between it and the road as would have rendered the road safe." The law of Massachusetts on this subject is tersely stated by Gray, C. J., in the recent case of Puffer v. Orange, 122 Mass. 389. "A town is bound to erect barriers or railings, where a dangerous place is in such close proximity to the highway as to make travelling on the highway unsafe. But it is not bound to do so, to prevent travellers from straying from the highway, although there is a dangerous place at some distance from the highway which they may reach by so straying." In Warner v. Holyoke, 112 Mass. 362, the court says: "The law has nowhere undertaken to define at what distance in feet and inches a dangerous place must be from the highway in order to cease to be in close proximity to it. It must necessarily be a practicable question, to be decided by the good sense and experience of the jury." It seems to us that this is the only practical rule that can be adopted; and that as a general rule, it is for the jury to say, in the concrete case, whether the place is sufliciently near the highway to render travelling upon it unsafe unless guarded against, and that, as said in Adams v. Natick, 13 Allen, 432, this "must be determined by the character of the place or object between which and the travelled road it is claimed that the barrier should be interposed." As said by Hoar, J., in Alger v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 405: "The true test is not whether the dangerous place is outside of the way, or whether some small strip of ground not included in the way must be traversed in reaching the danger, but whether there is such a risk of a traveller, using ordinary care in passing along the the street, being thrown or falling into the dangerous place that a railing is requisite to make the way itself safe and convenient." Drew v. Town of Sutton. Opinion by Rowell, J.

*Appearing in 55 Vermont Reports.

LIBEL AMBIGUOUS CHARGE- EVIDENCE OTHER STATEMENTS TO SHOW ANIMUS.-(1) In an action for a libel, where the language used is ambiguous or ironical, the plaintiff's acquaintances may state their understanding as to whom the libellous charge refers, and what it imputes. As Abbott, C. J., in Bourke v. Warren, 2 C. & P. 307, says: "It is not necessary that all the world should understand the libel; it is sufficient if those who know the plaintiff can make out that he is the person meant." The doctrine that in such cases the witness may state his understanding of the language used is recognized in 2 Greenl. Ev., § 417; Leonard v. Allen, 11 Cush. 241; Stacy v. Port. Pub. Co., 68 Me. 279; Smith v. Miles, 15 Vt. 245; Odgers Libel and Slander, 539. (2) The defendant, after suit was brought, published another article referring to the plaintiff by name. It was admissible to show the animus, the intention, in publishing the first article. Also what one of the defendants said, a few days after the first publication, manifesting a hostile feeling toward the plaintiff, was admissible. "Any words written or spoken of the plaintiff before or after those sued on, or even after the commencement of the action, are admissible to show the animus of the defendant." Odgers, 271. "The second paragraph was admissible to show what the intention of the defendant was in publishing the first." Bosanquet, J., in Barwell v. Adkins, 1 Man. & Gra. 807. Knapp v. Fuller. Opinion by Powers, J.

SALE-CONDITIONAL SALE OF CHATTEL-FORFEITURE-DEMAND-WAIVER. By the conditional sale if the vendee failed to pay the note according to its tenor, he forfeited what he had paid, and the vendor could take the wagon. There was a failure to fully pay; but the vendor allowed the wagon to remain with the vendee; and he accepted payments after the last installment was due. Without making a demand he brought suit to recover the balance of the note, attaching the wagon and holding it by virtue of the attachment until the trial commenced, when he entered a non-suit, and claimed to hold it under the written contract. Held if a demand were necessary the bringing of the suit was sufficient. By making the attachment the defendant did not waive his right to the wagon under the conditional sale; nor was he estopped from asserting his right. Nor did he waive the causes of forfeiture arising from default of payment by accepting payments after the note was due. Hutchings Munger, 41 N. Y. 155; Manufacturing Co. v. Teetzlaff, 13 Rep. 511; Taylor v. Finley, 48 Vt. 78. Matthews v. Lucia. Opinion by Rowell, J.

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

CARRIER-CONTRACT LIMITING LIABILITY DOES NOT EXCUSE NEGLIGENCE.- A contract contained in a shipping bill given by a railroad company, and agreed to by the shipper relieving the company from liability for loss in transporting horses. Held not to relieve the company from liability for loss through its own negligence. A railroad company which undertakes to transport live-stock for hire for such persons as choose to employ it, assumes the relation of a common carrier, and becomes chargeable with the duties and obli. gations which are incident to that relation. Kimball v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 26 Vt. 247; Rixford v. Smith, 52 N. H. 355; Clarke v. Rochester & S. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 570; Evans v. Fitchburg R. Co., 111 Mass. 142; St. Louis & S. E. R. Co. v. Dorman, 72 Ill. 504; Powell v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 32 Penn. St. 414; Great Western R. Co. v. Hawkins, 18 Mich. 427, 433. The law has been determined in this State, and in most of the United States, as well as in the Federal Supreme

Court, to be that a common carrier of goods cannot by contract relieve himself from liability for his own negligence. Christenson v. American Express Co., 15 Minn. 270; Shriver v. Sioux City & St. P. R. Co., 24 id. 506; Railroad Co. v Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Ex. Co., 93 U. S. 174. Nor is there any reason why a different rule should prevail in respect to the transportation of live-stock, or of property under the care of the owner. The rule itself rests upon considerations of public policy, and upon the fact that to allow the carrier to absolve himself from the duty of exercising care and fidelity is inconsistent with the very nature of his undertaking. Moulton v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba R. Co. Opinion by Dickinson, J. [Decided Aug. 2, 1883.]

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

HE following decisions were handed down Friday, February 8, 1884.

Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event. The appeal from the order denying the motion to vacate the order of arrest dismissed, with costs against the appellant, Edwin L. Hayes-Agnes Y. Humphrey, respondent, v. Mary E. Hayes and another, appellants. Judgment affirmed, with costs against the appellant-In re Estate of John C. Zabrt.—Judgment affirmed with costs-Henry C. Simms, respondent, v. George Vogt and another, appellants; Michael Hynes, respondent, v. Thomas E. Patterson and another, appellants; Louis De V. Wilder, appellant, v. Lafayette Ranney and another, respondents; George W. Mead, respondent, v. Mary C. Jenkins and others, appellants: George Godfrey, administrator, etc., respondent, v. Ogden P. Pell, appellant.-Judgment of General Term reversed; that of Special Term affirmed with costs-Susan M. Murray and another, executors, respondents, v. Phebe Marshall, appellant.—Judg ment of General Term reversed; that of Special Term modified according to opinion, costs of both parties to be paid out of the estate of testator-Jeanie De F. K. Barbour, an infant, appellant, v. Robert W. De Forest and another, executors, respondents. Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event-John J. Townsend, respondent, v. New York Life Insurance and Trust Co., appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costs to the respondent, and appellants to be paid out of the estate-Walter P. Tillman, in his own right and as executor, v. Eliza Augusta Davis, and the executors of William N. Davis, appellants, and Isaac E. Bird, impleaded, etc., respondent.-Judg ment affirmed with costs to the respondent, payable out of the fund--Ann Reese, respondent, v. William Smythe, superintendent, etc., appellant.- -Order affirmed with costs-In re Application of the New York, West Shore & Buffalo R. Co., to acquire lands, respondent, of Johanna Pur and others, appellants.-Appeal dismissed with costs-Bolton Hall and others, appellants, v. United States Reflector Co., respondent. The cases argued were: Appeal from judgment of affirmance by General Term of a conviction of misdemeanor and sentence to pay a fine of $25. Argued by William F. Kintzing for appellant; Johu Vincent, assistant district-attorney for respondent-People, respondent, v. John M. Myres, appellant.Appeal from judgment of General Term, first department, affirming judgment rendered upon the verdict of a jury. Argued by A. J. Vanderpoel for appellants; S. P. Nash for respondents-John L. Sutherland and another, executors, respondents, v. Lauren C. Woodruff, appellant.Appeal from judgment of General Term, reversing the order and decree of the Surrogate's Court of Chautauqua county. Submitted - Nancy Watts and others, respondents, v. James Ronald, execu tor, etc., appellant.- -Appeal from judgment of affirmance by General Term of the decree of the Surrogate's Court of Queens county in admitting a codicil of the last will and testament of Margaret Woolley to probate-Benjamin Woolley, executor, appellant, v. Sarah E. Woolley and Minor Onderdonk, respondents. The court took a recess to Feb. 25.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, FEBRUARY 23, 1884.

CURRENT TOPICS.

OME recent citations in this journal from 31st Hun were by misprint attributed to 30th Hun.

It is amusing to see how earnest our western contemporaries, the Chicago Legal News, the Central Law Journal, and the Denver Law Journal are in opposition to the judges' gowns. We stirred up a hornet's nest by saying "it would not hurt our western communities if their courts were held in higher respect.

** * Better have judges in gowns than lynchers in masks." Upon this the Denver Law Journal remarks: "We agree with our contemporary in these sentiments expressed by him. But would judges in gowns prevent lynchers in masks? Would the presence of a judge in his gown repel a party of lynchers about to inflict the penalty of death upon a red handed murderer, of whose guilt there is no doubt? We believe that the true remedy is to have a more honest administration of the law, to make the prosecuting officer an appointive instead of an elective officer, depending for his position on the votes of the very class of people who are most frequently amenable to the law. We would give the State the benefit of the ablest counsel experienced in law, instead ef selecting for prosecutor some beardless youth just out of a law school, or as is more frequently the case, some frequenter of the corner grocery or pot-house politician, ignorant often of the very elements of criminal law. It is the want of ability in the prosecutor, while the defendant has the ablest and most astute counsel, and the tendency of the courts to give every advantage to the defendant, which so often results in a miscarriage of justice, and creates a want of confidence in our courts. Out of this arises lynch law. Can a gown restore confidence in the integrity of a court, in which a man of whose guilt there can be no question, is set at liberty through a mere technicality? Confidence in the honesty of the judge begets respect for the court, and such respect is far more desirable, and tends more to elevate the popular ideas of law and of the courts than all the gowns with which the judges could be robed. Prompt, swift and impartial justice administered by the courts is the true mode of elevating the popular idea of law and of the court. We suggest that our contemporary join with us in laboring to elevate the popular idea of the law and the courts by insisting on the prompt, speedy and impartial administration of justice by the courts, and dispense with gowns for the judges." This of course goes mainly to the matter of the inefficiency of the prosecuting attorneys, and yet we do not see how having the judge wear a gown could render the prosecuting attorney any less efficient than VOL. 29 No. 8.

our western contemporary confesses that he is. But we still suspect that lynching prevails in the west because of a public disbelief in the ability and independence of judges as well of as prosecuting attorneys. We do not have any lynching in this State, whatever may be the reason for it in the west.

etc.

The Central Law Journal gets more excited over the matter than is necessary, and talks of our "grotesque humor," "abuse," "taking offense, We hope that our brother does not carry any weapon more deadly than a "pocket pistol," else this temper of his may prove dangerous to his near neighbors. But he continues: "If the judges of New York must be dressed in silk before the people will treat them with respect, then we think our Albany contemporary would be more in place in confining its attention to home necessities, rather than in casting slurs at our western courts. The western courts of last resort are held in as high respect by the people as that of New York, and the ability of the western bench will compare with that of the court whose members our contemporary would robe. If there is a marked lack of respect in western communities for the administration of justice, it is for the verdicts of juries, and not for the opinions of the courts of last resort. Occasionally the latter make mistakes, and we have freely criticised them, but we have never conceived the idea of concealing their lack of ability, if there be any such lack, by covering them with robes, wherewith to inspire the people with awe. We have no hesitation in saying that we would give more for the opinion of the Supreme Court of Michigan than for that of New York's pet court, even if its judges were in gowns. Yet this is one of the courts

which deals with the interests of our western communities." So it seems that the objectors do not agree among themselves. According to the Central lynching springs from lack of confidence in the verdicts of juries, and not from the inefficiency of the public prosecutors, as the Denver writer puts it. In many of the western States the public have so little confidence in their judges that they forbid them to comment on the facts to the jury. The books are full of new trials for disregard of this injunction. We are not so much afraid of our judges as that. But a public that cannot trust its own juries may well muzzle its judges, and ought to, to be consistent. There certainly is no better court than the Supreme Court of Michigan, as we have more than once before remarked, but would the Central Law Journal think any less of it if its judges should put on gowns? After all, our west ern brethren may be right about the dress of their judges. We do not assume to dictate. Has it ever occurred to them that our judges and our bar may be the better fitted to pronounce upon the question in our own State? When our judges put on the gowns, as we suppose they will, the reports of the Court of Appeals of this State, we predict, will not fall off in circulation in the west.

A correspondent of the Delhi Republican also opposes the gowns, and says we are cool if not modest." We hope we are both. The gowns are both. The correspondent quotes De Tocqueville's approbatory comment on the absence of ceremonial costumes," and dwells on the custom of our judges to sit without gowns, and distinguishes the case of military uniforms because they are prescribed by law, but he has not a word to say about the gowns of the Supreme Court judges. He also speaks of the superior simplicity of the early times of the republic, forgetful of Washington's four- (or six-) horse State carriage, and of the insuperable etiquette of the old White House. The correspondent of course quotes the somewhat familiar expression about crooking the pregnant hinges of the knee, but he winds up with an entirely unique and telling metaphor of "our democratic pyramid of liberty, fraternity and equality." We have not proposed to go back to the pyramids, but only to the fathers who put gowns on their judges, and whose degenerate offspring left them off through carelessness.

Speaking of robes, we betook ourself to Washington the last week to behold a sight which we had never seen - the Supreme Court in session, and to see if there is really any thing so objectionable about their robes. To our disappointment we found the court taking a vacation for the month, which it seems is their uniform custom. "Vacation" means a time for consultation and writing opinions. We were enabled, however, to see the court in detail, and to hear from them individually, which was much pleasanter than to hear some tedious lawyer lecturing them on elementary principles, and to undergo the possible shock of the robes. We also visited the chambers of our National legislators, and although perhaps it is a little outside our jurisdiction we will venture to suggest that it would be better manners if the Senate would not compel the chaplain to pray for empty seats at noon, and if the leading members of the House would not smoke in public session. Also that the atmosphere of both chambers is perfectly abominable- literally as bad as that of an Irish tenement house. Our own capitol has cost a good deal of money, and one of the rooms is deficient in acoustic properties, but all are well ventilated.

A correspondent, whose communication appears in another column, thinks that we were not respectful enough to Mr. Carter's pamphlet on Codification. We thought we paid it the greatest respect by reading it. We hope we said nothing disrespectful. The worst we said of it was that it was too long, and that very few would read it. We stick to this, and we think Mr. Carter will realize the truth of our criticism when he reads (as we presume he will) Mr. Field's short answer an answer so short that everybody will be sure to read it without troubling themselves about the pamphlet to which it is an answer, and an answer so conclusive, as it seems to

-

us, that it leaves no room for a reply. Some admirer of Mr. Carter has come out in The Nation with a pronunciamento against codification, in which there is an amusing attempt to conceal favoritism under the guise of impartiality. We have the greatest respect for The Nation's literary ability and authority; none at all for its politics or its law. We never knew it to be right on a legal matter yet. Even The Nation concedes the usefulness of "temporary statutes," but it prefers that the judges shail make them. All these theorists will find themselves defeated one of these days - perhaps not this year nor next by the success of what they deny. The man will get up and walk in spite of their denial of the power of motion. Meantime we turn and point from Mr. Carter and The Nation to Story, Metcalf and Greenleaf, and we ask our readers to peruse their opinion of codification given in our last issue, and the opinions of the current working of the system in California. There is just one point in which The Nation is right. The Code of Civil Procedure, as it now stands, is an argument against codification. Mr. Throop spoiled Mr. Field's Code. Let us be careful to avoid another voluminous and obscuring glossary of this kind.

The Tribune is circulating postal cards, with a request for answers to these questions. "1. Are you in favor of Codification of the Common Law in this State? 2. Are you in favor of the proposed · Field Civil Code?' 3. Why?" The Tribune ought to have added: "4. Have you read the proposed 'Field Civil Code?'" We have a strong suspicion that the answers to questions one and two from the class to whom the Tribune will send will be unanimonsly in the negative, and that the answers to question four would be nine-tenths in the negative.

Sir John Mellor does not believe in oaths, and declares that he is "profoundly convinced by a long judicial experience of the general worthlessness of oaths, especially in cases in which their falsity cannot be tested by cross-examination, or be criminally punished," and that therefore he "has become an advocate for the abolition of oaths as a test of truth." Bentham and Pothier were of the like opinion. The latter said: "A man of integrity does not require the obligation of an oath to prevent his demanding what is not due to him, and a dishonest man is not afraid of incurring the guilt of perjury. In the exercise of my profession for more than forty years I have not more than twice known a party restrained by the sanctity of the oath from persisting in what he had before asserted." All this is chimerical. Unless it is conceded that oaths induce perjury, they must be useful at least as a profession that the witness is telling the truth, and recognizes the solemnity of his situation. But oaths tend to make truthful men careful, moderate, and candid, however ineffectual they may be with dishonest men.

NOTES OF CASES.

N v. Lamar, Supreme Court of Georgia,

6

an injunction will be granted to restrain the maker of a compound from using his name, or the trademark of the medicine, when for a good consideration he has sold the right to make and vend it, and has stipulated that he will not use his own name, or permit another to use it for that purpose, and has transferred his trade-mark thereto to the purchaser. The court said: "A contract is declared void under our Code when it is in general restraint of trade.' Code, § 2750. This is but the announcement of a principle long recognized in the common law. In the case of Holmes v. Martin, 10 Ga. 503, this court announced, in construing a contract involving this question: 'A contract in general restraint of trade is void, but if in partial restraint of trade only, it may be supported, provided the restraint is reasonable, and the contract founded on a consideration.' This distinction between such stipulations as are in general restraint of trade, and such as are in restraint of it only as to particular places and persons or for a limited time,' has long been recognized both in England and America; the latter, if founded on a good and valuable consideration, are valid; the former are invariably prohibited. The reason assigned for this difference is, that all general restraints tend to promote monopolies and tend to discourage industries, enterprise, and fair competition, which reason does not apply to partial restraints. This distinction between general restraints and partial restraints has been recognized by this court also in 30 Ga. 414; 45 id. 319; 58 id. 567. This question was elaborately discussed and many cases reviewed and cited in the leading case of Morse Drill and Machine Co. v. Morse, 103 Mass. 73. In Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R., 9 Eq. 345, the plaintiffs purchased a right of a certain process of manufacture, with an agreement by the vendors that they would not directly or indirectly carry on, nor would they, to the best of their power, allow to be carried on by others in any part of Europe, any company or manufactory having such manufacture for its object, or in any way interfere with the exclusive enjoyment of the purchasing company of the benefits agreed to be purchased. It was held that the restraint was reasonable, and not greater, having regard to the subject-matter of the contract, than was necessary for the protection of the purchasers, and it was enforced against the vendors. But are the covenants of this contract in general restraint of trade? The stipulation which, it is alleged, is void for all that cause is in these words: 'I agree never to use, or permit my name to be used, or any preparation which could be recommended and sold for the same purpose.' Defendant below had already stipulated and did sell all his interest, with trade-mark, etc., in the Lung Restorer' to the defendants in error. Then in the stipulation above he agrees further 'never to use, or permit my name to be used, on

not himself use his name, or permit his name to be used, on any such preparation. The only restraint the covenant imposes on him is that his name shall not appear by his consent on any such preparations. Can this stipulation be said to be in general restraint of trade, or is it not rather a partial restraint, and is it at all unreasonable? The absence of his name may limit the sales of any new preparation he may compound; the preparation may be wanting in the magic word, but for its absence he contracted and received a consideration therefor. He may compound and sell a score of other nostrums to cure the diseases for which the 'Lung Restorer' is fitted; the only exhibition is, he must not put on them the cabalistic word 'Brewer,' and thus violate the contract into which he has entered. That he has done this the evidence abundantly shows, when he published and offered upon the market 'Brewer's Sarsaparilla Syrup,' professing to be a permanent cure for all diseases of the lungs and throat."

For a lawyer's wife to make her husband's clerk jealous of her husband is "extreme cruelty," justifying a divorce. In Carpenter v. Carpenter, Kansas Supreme Court, November 9, 1883, 1 Pac. Rep. 122, it appeared that the defendant prepared and sent anonymous letters to a clerk in the office of her husband, falsely charging that a criminal intimacy existed between her husband and the wife of such clerk; and also prepared and sent anonymous letters to the editors of newspapers at Leavenworth, making similar charges, with the expectation that such charges would be published in the newspapers and be made public. Her husband, at the time, was a member of a church, and professed to be an honest and faithful Christian, and had high aspirations for political preferment. These charges not only tended to wound his feelings and to destroy his peace and happiness, and to impair his bodily health, but they were also naturally calculated to put his life in jeopardy; they were naturally calculated, if the clerk believed that they were true, and that a criminal intimacy existed between the plaintiff and the clerk's wife, to cause the clerk to take vengeance on the plaintiff. Held, that this conduct on the part of the plaintiff's wife constituted "extreme cruelty," within the meaning of the statute. The court said: "The legal question that arises upon these facts is whether they constitute 'extreme cruelty' or not, within the meaning of the divorce statute. It was formerly thought that to constitute extreme cruelty, such as would authorize the granting of a divorce, physical violence was necessary; but the modern and better considered cases have repudiated this doctrine as taking too low and sensual a view of the marriage relation; and it is now very generally held that any unjustifiable conduct on the part of either the husband or wife which so